That evil is not of matter nor in bodies is clear from these things; for matter and that which moves discordantly are not the same. And that matter is not to be posited as the primary evil, Socrates in the Philebus has, I think, sufficiently shown , generating the infinite from god [Pl. Phileb. 23c 9]. And if the infinite itself is to be called matter, matter is from god, if indeed the primary infinite must be said to beget from god all essential infinity dependent on a single cause, and especially that which is unable to make the mixture with the limit, since god is the cause of their subsistence and of the mixture. This, then, brings the nature of the body as body back to a single cause, god; for it is he who generated the mixed. Therefore neither the body nor matter is evil; for these are the offspring of god, the one as a mixture, the other as the infinite. --- and he himself saying in those passages : Did not, then, the things that come to be and all the things from which they come to be provide us with the three kinds [Pl. Phileb. 27a 11-12]? Therefore the body, this too being one of all things, since it is mixed, and the limit and principle in it on the one hand, and the infinite on the other, will be from there in two ways, both according to the whole and according to the parts. For what else in it is the infinite but matter? And what is the limit but the form? And what is that which comes from these but the composite? If, therefore, both all the things that come to be and the things from which they come to be, are mixed and limit and infinite; but that which crafts all these things is another and a fourth, as he himself says [Phileb. 27 aƒb]; we would not say that matter or form or the mixed is produced from any other source than from God, itself mixed. And what that has come from there could be evil? For it is not of heat to cool, nor of the good to produce evils; therefore, neither matter nor the body should be called evil. 36 --- that matter is neither good nor evil. For if it were good, it would be an end and not the last of all things, and that for the sake of which and an object of desire; for every good is of this kind, since the primary good is the end and that for the sake of which all things are and is desired by all beings. If, on the other hand, it were evil, there would be another god and principle of beings, one at variance with the cause of good things, and there would be two springs let loose to flow [Pl. leg. I 636d 7-8] from opposite directions, one of good things, the other of evil things, and not even for the gods themselves would life be without grief nor outside of mortal difficulty, for whom there is something hostile and alien and, as it were, vexing. But if it is neither, what would it be in itself? Or must this be said of it, which has often been said: the necessary? For the nature of the good is one thing, and the nature of evil is another, and these are opposed to each other; and a third is another, being neither simply good, nor evil, but necessary. For evil leads away from the good and flees its nature; but the necessary is everything that it is for the sake of the good and has its reference to it and for its sake has whatever generation it had; but if for the sake of the generation of something ... , but nothing else for its own sake, we would then call it both an end and a good; it must surely be called necessary for generation itself and not evil, and to have come from God as necessary and to be necessary for the forms that are unable to be established in themselves. For the cause of all good things had to produce not only things that are good and such of themselves, but also that nature, which is not simply and of itself good, but desires the good, and desiring this it also gives generation to others into being and in some way upon it. For its lack of good things contributes to the creation of sensible things, since being also substantiates not only beings, but also those that desire participation in being, for which being consists in the desire for that which is. At any rate, the primarily desirable is one thing, another is that which desires it and has the good in this; another is everything in between, which is desirable to some, but desires others, clearly those before it and those for whose sake it is. 37 Therefore, examining matter itself from this argument, we would find it to be neither good nor evil, but only necessary; and as having come to be for the sake of a good, it is good, but simply it is not good; and as the last of beings it is evil, if indeed that which is most distant from the good is evil, but simply it is not evil, but—as has been said—necessary. And in general, it is not true that evil exists itself by itself anywhere; for not

ὕλης τὸ κακὸν οὐδ' ἐν τοῖς σώμασιν, ἐκ τούτων δῆλον· οὐ γάρ ἐστιν ἥ τε ὕλη καὶ τὸ πλημμελῶς κινούμενον ταὐτόν. ὅτι δὲ καὶ τὴν ὕλην οὐ τὸ πρώτως κακὸν <θετέον, ἱκανῶς, οἶμαι, ἔδειξεν ὁ ἐν Φιλήβῳ Σωκράτης>, ἐκ τοῦ θεοῦ τὴν ἀπειρίαν <γεννῶν> [Pl. Phileb. 23c 9]. εἰ δὲ καὶ αὐτόθεν τὸ ἄπειρον τὴν ὕλην ῥητέον, ἐκ τοῦ θεοῦ ἡ ὕλη, εἴ γε τὸ πρώτως ἄπειρον τὴν οὐσιώδη πᾶσαν ἀπειρίαν μιᾶς αἰτίας ἠρτημένην θεόθεν <ἐκγεννᾶσθαι ῥητέον, καὶ μάλιστα> τὴν μετὰ τοῦ πέρατος ποιεῖν τὸ μίγμα μὴ δυναμένην, ὡς τοῦ θεοῦ ὄντος αἰτίου τῆς ὑποστάσεως αὐτῶν καὶ τῆς μίξεως. τοῦτο μὲν οὖν καὶ τὴν τοῦ σώματος ᾗ σῶμα φύσιν εἰς μίαν αἰτίαν ἄγει, τὸν θεόν· αὐτὸς γάρ ἐστιν ὁ τὸ μικτὸν γεννήσας. οὔτε ἄρα τὸ σῶμα κακὸν οὔτε ἡ ὕλη· ταῦτα γάρ ἐστι θεοῦ γεννήματα, τὸ μὲν ὡς μίγμα, τὸ δὲ ὡς ἄπειρον. --- <καὶ αὐτὸς λέγων ἐν ἐκείνοις>· οὐκοῦν τὰ μὲν γινόμενα καὶ ἐξ ὧν γίνεται πάντα τὰ τρία παρέσχετο ἡμῖν γένη [Pl. Phileb. 27a 11-12]; τὸ ἄρα σῶμα, ἓν καὶ τοῦτο τῶν πάντων ὄν, ἐπειδὴ μικτόν, καὶ τὸ μὲν ἐν αὐτῷ πέρας καὶ λόγος, τὸ δὲ ἄπειρον, διχῶς ἐκεῖθεν ἔσται, κατά τε τὸ ὅλον καὶ κατὰ τὰ μέρη. τί γὰρ ἄλλο ἐν αὐτῷ τὸ ἄπειρον ἢ ἡ ὕλη; τί δὲ τὸ πέρας ἢ τὸ εἶδος; τί δὲ τὸ ἐκ τούτων ἢ τὸ σύνολον; εἰ τοίνυν καὶ αὐτὰ τὰ γινόμενα πάντα καὶ ἐξ ὧν γίνεται, μικτόν ἐστι καὶ πέρας καὶ ἄπειρον· τὸ δὲ δὴ πάντα ταῦτα δημιουργοῦν ἄλλο καὶ τέταρτον, <ὥς φησιν αὐτός> [Phileb. 27 aƒb]· οὔτ' ἂν τὴν ὕλην οὔτ' ἂν τὸ εἶδος οὔτ' ἂν τὸ μικτὸν ἀλλαχόθεν ἢ ἐκ τοῦ θεοῦ <μικτὸν> παράγεσθαι φήσαιμεν. τί δ' ἂν ἐκεῖθεν γενόμενον εἴη κακόν; οὔτε γὰρ θερμότητος τὸ ψύχειν οὔτε ἀγαθοῦ τὸ κακὰ παράγειν· οὔτε ἄρα τὴν ὕλην οὔτε τὸ σῶμα κακὸν προσρητέον. 36 --- μήτε ἀγαθὸν εἶναι τὴν ὕλην μήτε κακόν. εἴτε γὰρ ἀγαθόν, τέλος ἔσται καὶ οὐκ ἔσχατον τῶν πάντων, καὶ οὗ ἕνεκα καὶ ἐφετόν· πᾶν γὰρ τὸ ἀγαθὸν τοιοῦτον, ἐπεὶ τὸ πρώτως ἀγαθὸν τέλος καὶ οὗ ἕνεκα πάντα καὶ ἐφετὸν πᾶσι τοῖς οὖσιν. εἴτε αὖ κακόν, θεὸς ἔσται καὶ ἀρχὴ τῶν ὄντων ἄλλη καὶ στασιάζουσα πρὸς τὴν τῶν ἀγαθῶν αἰτίαν, καὶ ἔσονται δύο πηγαὶ μεθειμέναι ῥεῖν [Pl. leg. I 636d 7-8] ἐξ ἐναντίας, ἀγαθῶν μὲν ἄλλη, κακῶν δὲ ἄλλη, καὶ οὐδὲ αὐτοῖς ἔσται τοῖς θεοῖς βίος ἀπήμων οὐδὲ ἔξω τῆς θνητῆς δυσχερείας, οἷς ἐστί τι δυσμενὲς καὶ ἀλλότριον καὶ οἷον ἐνο- χλοῦν. εἰ δὲ μὴ ἔστιν ἑκάτερον, τί ἂν εἴη καθ' ἑαυτήν; ἢ τοῦτο ὃ πολλάκις εἴρηται τὸ ἀναγκαῖον ἐπ' αὐτῆς ῥητέον; ἔστι γὰρ ἄλλη μὲν ἡ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ φύσις, ἄλλη δὲ ἡ τοῦ κακοῦ, καὶ ταῦτα μὲν ἀλλήλοις ἐναντία· τρίτη δὲ ἄλλη, μήτε ἀγαθὸν ἁπλῶς οὖσα, μήτε κακόν, <ἀλλ' ἀναγκαῖον. τὸ μὲν γὰρ κακὸν> ἀπάγει τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ καὶ φεύγει τὴν ἐκείνου φύσιν· τὸ δὲ ἀναγκαῖον <τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ ἕνεκα> πᾶν ἐστὶν ὅ ἐστι καὶ ἐπ' αὐτὸ τὴν ἀνα- φορὰν ἔχει καὶ δι' ἐκεῖνο τὴν οἱάνποτε γένεσιν ἔσχεν· εἰ δὲ γενέσεως ἕνεκά του <...>, ἄλλο δὲ αὐτῆς ἕνεκα μηδέν, ἵνα ἂν καὶ τέλος αὐτὴν καὶ ἀγαθὸν ἐλέγομεν· ἀναγκαῖον δήπου πρὸς τὴν γένεσιν αὐτὴν καὶ οὐ κακὸν προσρητέον, καὶ γεγονέναι θεόθεν ὡς ἀναγκαῖον καὶ εἶναι τοῖς ἐφ' ἑαυτῶν ἱδρῦσθαι μὴ δυναμένοις εἴδεσιν ἀναγκαῖον. οὐ γὰρ μόνον τὰ ἀγαθὰ καὶ παρ' ἑαυτῶν τοιαῦτα παράγειν ἔδει τὴν τῶν ἀγαθῶν ἁπάντων αἰτίαν, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὴν φύσιν ἐκείνην, ἣ μὴ ἔστι μὲν ἁπλῶς καὶ παρ' αὐτῆς ἀγαθόν, ὀρέγεται δὲ ἀγαθοῦ, οὗ καὶ ὀρεγομένη δίδωσιν ἄλλοις γένεσιν εἰς τὸ εἶναι καὶ ὁπωσοῦν ἐπ' αὐτῆς. τὸ γὰρ ἐνδεὲς αὐτῆς τῶν ἀγαθῶν συντελεῖ πρὸς τὴν τῶν αἰσθητῶν δημιουργίαν, ἐπεὶ καὶ τὸ ὂν οὐ τὰ ὄντα μόνον ὑφίστησιν, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὰ ἐφιέμενα τῆς τοῦ εἶναι μετουσίας, οἷς τὸ εἶναι κατὰ τὴν τοῦ ὄντος ἔφεσιν. ἄλλο γοῦν τὸ πρώτως ἐφετόν, ἄλλο τὸ ἐφιέμενον ἐκείνου καὶ ἐν τούτῳ τὸ ἀγαθὸν ἔχον· ἄλλο τὸ μεταξὺ πᾶν, ὃ τοῖς μὲν ἐφετόν ἐστι, τῶν δὲ ἐφίεται, δηλαδὴ τῶν πρὸ αὐτοῦ καὶ ὧν ἕνεκά ἐστι. 37 Τὴν μὲν οὖν ὕλην τὴν αὐτὴν ἔκ γε τοῦ λόγου τοῦδε σκοποῦντες ἂν εὕροιμεν, ὡς οὔτε ἀγαθὸν οὔτε κακόν, ἀλλὰ ἀναγκαῖον μόνον· καὶ ὡς μὲν γενομένη ἕνεκα ἀγαθοῦ, ἀγαθόν, ἁπλῶς δὲ οὐκ ἀγαθόν· καὶ ὡς μὲν ἔσχατον τῶν ὄντων κακόν, εἴπερ τὸ πλεῖστον ἀφεστὼς τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ κακόν, ἁπλῶς δὲ οὐ κακόν, ἀλλ'-ὥσπερ εἴρηται-ἀναγκαῖον. ὅλως δὲ τὸ κακὸν αὐτὸ καθ' αὑτό που εἶναι οὐκ ἀληθές· οὐ γάρ