one can have through some need, but no longer unbegottenness; for the unbegotten must exist as unbegotten without any necessary cause. Another. If the element is the first body, and the body from elements is the second body, and the body from elements cannot be unbegotten (for nothing unbegotten can be later than something begotten), how, if the bodies from elements are imperishable, will they not be begotten imperishables? Another. If all the elements are begotten, how is it not foolish to say that the things from elements are unbegotten? For if matter in itself is neither element nor substance, but having received quality and quantity becomes element and substance, how can the things composed of such elements also be unbegotten, if it should happen that they are imperishable? Another. If body is one thing, and imperishable body another, and perishable body another, and according to the difference of imperishability and perishability the body is divided into imperishable and perishable body, how is it not necessary for the divided body to have the property of being either begotten or unbegotten? But if neither of these is a property of the divided body, how will the divided body be neither begotten nor unbegotten? And if this is impossible, for the divided body to be neither, then it is necessary to posit that this divided body is the imperishable body and the perishable, into which the divided body is divided. Question. If what comes to be from God perishes, by whose evil does it perish, that of the maker or of the thing made or of some external contrary force to the maker? Answer. Perishable things perish neither from the evil of the maker nor from that of a contrary force, but by the decree of the creator, who works perishability in particulars, but imperishability in universals. For if perishable things were perishing from the evil of one of the aforementioned, the whole genus would perish, both the particular and the universal; for if we grant that perishability is from some evil, the genus of perishable things would not be preserved as imperishable among the things that come to be, as evil would have mastery over the universal just as over the particular. But if it is impossible for the universal to be destroyed by some evil, then neither is the particular destroyed by some evil, but by the decree of God. For if there is no evil among existing things capable of preventing generation, then neither is there any evil among existing things that destroys the genus. Answers concerning the resurrection to the aforesaid questions about it. 1. For a man to be or to become eaten by a fish, and for the fish to be eaten by a man, neither resolves the man into a fish nor the fish into a man, but the resolution of each

μὲν διὰ χρειώδη τινὰ δύναταί τις ἔχειν, ἀγενεσίαν δὲ οὐκέτι· τὸ γὰρ ἀγένητον χωρὶς πάσης χρειώδους αἰτίας δεῖ ὑπάρχειν ἀγένητον. Ἄλλο. Eἰ πρῶτον μὲν σῶμα τὸ στοιχεῖον, δεύτερον δὲ σῶμα τὸ ἐκ στοιχείων, τὸ δὲ ἐκ στοιχείων σῶμα οὐκ ἐνδέχεται εἶναι ἀγένητον (οὐδὲν γὰρ ἀγένητον ὕστερον εἶναι δύναται γε νητοῦ), πῶς, εἰ ἔστι τὰ ἐκ στοιχείων σώματα ἄφθαρτα, οὐ γενητὰ ἔσονται ἄφθαρτα; Ἄλλο. Eἰ γενητὰ πάντα τὰ στοιχεῖα, πῶς οὐκ ἔστι ληρῶδες τὸ τὰ ἐκ στοιχείων λέγειν ἀγένητα; Eἰ γὰρ ἡ ὕλη καθ' ἑαυτὴν μὲν οὐκ ἔστιν οὔτε στοιχεῖον οὔτε οὐσία, προσλαβοῦσα δὲ ποιότητά τε καὶ ποσότητα στοιχεῖον γίνεται καὶ οὐσία, πῶς τὰ ἐκ τῶν τοιούτων στοιχείων ἀποτελούμενα δύναται εἶναι καὶ ἀγένητα, εἰ συμβαίη αὐτοῖς εἶναι ἄφθαρτα; Ἄλλο. Eἰ ἄλλο τὸ σῶμα καὶ ἄλλο τὸ ἄφθαρτον σῶμα καὶ ἄλλο τὸ φθαρτὸν σῶμα, κατὰ δὲ τὴν διαφορὰν ἀφθαρσίας τε καὶ φθορᾶς διαιρεῖται τὸ σῶμα εἰς ἄφθαρτόν τε καὶ φθαρ τὸν σῶμα, πῶς οὐκ ἔστιν ἀνάγκη ἴδιον εἶναι τοῦ διαιρουμένου σώματος τὸ γενητὸν ἢ τὸ ἀγένητον; Eἰ δὲ οὐδὲν τούτων ἴδιόν ἐστι τοῦ διαιρουμένου σώματος, πῶς οὐκ ἔσται τὸ διαιρού μενον σῶμα οὔτε γενητὸν οὔτε ἀγένητον; Eἰ δὲ τοῦτο ἀδύ νατον, τὸ μηδέτερον εἶναι τὸ διαιρούμενον σῶμα, ἀνάγκη ἄρα ἐστὶ τεθῆναι τὸ διαιρούμενον σῶμα τοῦτο εἶναι τὸ ἄφθαρ τον σῶμα καὶ τὸ φθαρτόν, εἰς ἃ διαιρεῖται τὸ διαιρούμενον σῶμα. Ἐρώτησις. Eἰ φθείρεται τὸ γινόμενον ὑπὸ τοῦ θεοῦ, τίνος κακίᾳ φθείρεται, τοῦ ποιήσαντος ἢ τοῦ γεγονότος ἤ τινος ἔξωθεν ὑπεναντίου γινομένου τῷ ποιήσαντι; Ἀπόκρισις. Oὔτε ἐκ τῆς τοῦ πεποιηκότος κακίας οὔτε ἐκ τῆς τοῦ ὑπεναντίου φθείρεται τὰ φθειρόμενα, ἀλλὰ τῷ ὅρῳ τοῦ δη μιουργοῦ, τοῦ ἐργαζομένου ἐν μὲν τοῖς καθέκαστον τὴν φθο ράν, ἐν δὲ τοῖς καθόλου τὴν ἀφθαρσίαν. Eἰ γὰρ ἐκ τῶν εἰ ρημένων τινὸς κακίας ἐφθείρετο τὰ φθειρόμενα, ὅλον ἂν τὸ γένος ἐφθείρετο, καὶ τὸ καθέκαστον καὶ τὸ καθόλου· εἰ γὰρ δῶμεν ἔκ τινος κακίας εἶναι τὴν φθοράν, οὐκ ἂν διεσώθη ἐν τοῖς γινομένοις τὸ γένος τῶν φθειρομένων ἄφθαρτον, τῆς κα κίας ὥσπερ τοῦ καθέκαστον οὕτως καὶ τοῦ καθόλου κυριευού σης. Eἰ δέ τινος κακίᾳ τὸ καθόλου φθαρῆναι ἀδύνατον, οὐδ' αὖ τὸ καθέκαστόν τινος φθείρεται κακίᾳ, ἀλλὰ τῷ ὅρῳ τοῦ θεοῦ. Eἰ γὰρ οὐκ ἔστιν ἐν τοῖς οὖσι κακία τις δυναμένη κω λῦσαι τὴν γένεσιν, οὐδ' ἄρα ἔστιν ἐν τοῖς οὖσι κακία τις ἡ φθείρουσα τὸ γένος. Ἀποκρίσεις περὶ ἀναστάσεως πρὸς τὰς προῤῥηθείσας ἐρωτήσεις περὶ αὐτῆς. α. Τὸ τὸν ἄνθρωπον εἶναι ἢ γενέσθαι ἰχθυόβρωτον καὶ τὸν ἰχθὺν ἀνθρωπόβρωτον οὔτε τὸν ἄνθρωπον εἰς ἰχθὺν ἀνα λύει οὔτε τὸν ἰχθὺν εἰς ἄνθρωπον, ἀλλ' ἑκατέρου ἡ ἀνάλυσις