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of the species, of which they are properties, but also the species are predicated of their own properties; for every man is capable of laughing, and everyone capable of laughing is a man. For if an ape is also said to laugh, it does not laugh with the heart but with its expressions; for it is an imitative animal. So that the predication of genera of species and that of differentiae of species and that of species of individuals is said to a greater extent, but that of properties equally. These things that are equally convertible are also said to be predicated convertibly. 8 Concerning synonymous and homonymous predication. Synonymous predication is when the subject accepts both the name and the definition of that name, for example, animal is predicated of man. And man accepts both the name and the definition of animal; for an animal is an ensouled, sentient substance. And man also admits this definition; for man is also a substance and ensouled and sentient. But homonymous predication is when it accepts the name, but by no means the definition, for example the image of a man accepts the name of man, but does not accept the definition of man; for the definition of man is a rational, mortal animal, receptive of intellect and knowledge. But the image is neither an animal; for it is not ensouled, nor rational, nor receptive of intellect and knowledge. It is necessary to know that whatever is predicated of something as of a subject, that is, synonymously, will also be predicated of the subject of that thing, for example, animal is predicated of man as of a subject, that is, synonymously, and man of Peter; for Peter is a subject to man. Therefore, animal is also predicated of Peter; for Peter is also an animal. The subject is spoken of in two ways, one with respect to existence, the other with respect to predication. And with respect to existence, just as substance is the subject for accidents; for in it they have their being and outside of it they do not subsist. But the subject with respect to predication is the particular; for the particular is subject to the more universal with respect to predication, since the more universal is predicated of the more particular, as animal is predicated of man. And the universal is said to be "of a subject," while the more particular is a subject with respect to predication. And the accident is said to be "in a subject," that is, in substance, while substance is a subject with respect to existence. 9 Concerning predication in the "what it is" and predication in the "of what kind it is." Predication in the "what it is" is one thing, and in the "of what kind it is" is another; and in the "what it is" is when, being asked "what is man?" we say "animal"; but in the "of what kind it is" is when, being asked "what kind of animal?" we say "rational, mortal." So that the genus and the species are predicated in the "what it is," but the differentia, both the essential and the non-essential, that is, the accident and the property, are predicated in the "of what kind it is." But the hypostasis indicates neither what it is nor of what kind it is, but who it is; for when asked "who is this?" we say "Peter." Then, being asked "what is Peter?" we say "a man." Again, being asked "what kind of man?" we say "tall perhaps, or maimed." It is necessary to know that things differing in nature are called "one thing" and "another thing." For we say: A man is one thing and a horse another thing, that is, another thing according to nature; for the species of man is different and that of the horse is another. But things differing in number, that is, the hypostases, are called "one person" and "another person." For we say that Peter is one person and Paul is another person. But we cannot say that Peter is one thing and Paul another thing, since we would be speaking falsely; for they are one in nature, not

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τῶν εἰδῶν, ὧν ἐστιν ἴδια, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὰ εἴδη κατηγοροῦνται τῶν ἰδίων αὐτῶν· πᾶς γὰρ ἄνθρωπος γελαστικός, καὶ πᾶς γελαστικὸς ἄνθρωπος. Εἰ γὰρ καὶ γελᾶν λέγεται πίθηκος, οὐ γελᾷ τῇ καρδίᾳ ἀλλὰ τοῖς σχήμασι· μιμητικὸν γὰρ ζῷόν ἐστιν. Ὥστε ἡ μὲν τῶν γενῶν κατὰ τῶν εἰδῶν κατηγορία καὶ ἡ τῶν διαφορῶν κατὰ τῶν εἰδῶν καὶ ἡ τῶν εἰδῶν κατὰ τῶν ἀτόμων ἐπὶ πλέον λέγεται, ἡ δὲ τῶν ἰδίων ἐπίσης. Ταῦτα δὲ τὰ ἐπίσης ἀντιστρέφοντα καὶ ἀντικατηγορούμενα λέγονται. 8 Περὶ συνωνύμου καὶ ὁμωνύμου κατηγορίας. Συνώνυμος μὲν κατηγορία ἐστίν, ὅτε καὶ τὸ ὄνομα καὶ τὸν ὅρον αὐτοῦ τοῦ ὀνόματος δέχεται τὸ ὑποκείμενον, οἷον τὸ ζῷον κατηγορεῖται τοῦ ἀνθρώπου. Καὶ δέχεται ὁ ἄνθρωπος καὶ τὸ ὄνομα καὶ τὸν ὅρον τοῦ ζῴου· ζῷον γάρ ἐστιν οὐσία ἔμψυχος αἰσθητική. Καὶ ὁ ἄνθρωπος δὲ ἐπιδέχεται τὸν ὅρον τοῦτον· καὶ οὐσία γάρ ἐστιν ὁ ἄνθρωπος καὶ ἔμψυχος καὶ αἰσθητικός. Ὁμώνυμος δέ ἐστι κατηγορία, ὅτε τὸ μὲν ὄνομα δέχεται, τὸν δὲ ὅρον οὐδαμῶς, οἷον ἡ εἰκὼν τοῦ ἀνθρώπου τὸ μὲν ὄνομα τοῦ ἀνθρώπου δέχεται, τὸν δὲ ὅρον τοῦ ἀνθρώπου οὐ δέχεται· ὁ γὰρ ὅρος τοῦ ἀνθρώπου ζῷον λογικόν, θνητόν, νοῦ καὶ ἐπιστήμης δεκτικόν. Ἡ δὲ εἰκὼν οὔτε ζῷόν ἐστιν· οὐ γάρ ἐστιν ἔμψυχος οὔτε λογικὸν οὔτε νοῦ καὶ ἐπιστήμης δεκτικόν. Χρὴ γινώσκειν, ὅτι, ὅσα κατηγορεῖται κατά τινος καθ' ὑποκειμένου ἤγουν συνωνύμως, καὶ τοῦ ὑποκειμένου αὐτῷ κατηγορηθήσεται, οἷον τὸ ζῷον ὡς καθ' ὑποκειμένου κατηγορεῖται τοῦ ἀνθρώπου ἤγουν συνωνύμως καὶ ὁ ἄνθρωπος τοῦ Πέτρου· ὑκόκειται γὰρ τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ ὁ Πέτρος. Κατηγορεῖται οὖν καὶ τοῦ Πέτρου τὸ ζῷον· καὶ ὁ Πέτρος γὰρ ζῷόν ἐστι. Τὸ ὑποκείμενον δισσῶς λέγεται, τὸ μὲν πρὸς ὕπαρξιν, τὸ δὲ πρὸς κατηγορίαν. Καὶ πρὸς ὕπαρξιν μέν, ὥσπερ ὑπόκειται ἡ οὐσία τοῖς συμβεβηκόσιν· ἐν αὐτῇ γὰρ ἔχουσι τὸ εἶναι καὶ ἐκτὸς αὐτῆς οὐχ ὑφίστανται. Τὸ δὲ πρὸς κατηγορίαν ὑποκείμενόν ἐστι τὸ μερικόν· ὑπόκειται γὰρ τὸ μερικὸν τῷ καθολικωτέρῳ πρὸς κατηγορίαν, ἐπειδὴ τὸ καθολικώτερον κατηγορεῖται τοῦ μερικωτέρου, ὡς τὸ ζῷον κατηγορεῖται τοῦ ἀνθρώπου. Λέγεται δὲ τὸ μὲν καθόλου καθ' ὑποκειμένου, τὸ δὲ μερικώτερον ὑποκείμενον πρὸς κατηγορίαν. Λέγεται δὲ τὸ συμβεβηκὸς ἐν ὑποκειμένῳ τῇ οὐσίᾳ, ἡ δὲ οὐσία ὑποκείμενον πρὸς ὕπαρξιν. 9 Περὶ τῆς ἐν τῷ τί ἐστι κατηγορίας καὶ τῆς ἐν τῷ ὁποῖόν τί ἐστι κατηγορίας. Ἄλλο ἐστὶν ἡ ἐν τῷ τί ἐστι κατηγορία καὶ ἄλλο ἡ ἐν τῷ ὁποῖόν τί ἐστι· καὶ ἡ ἐν τῷ τί ἐστι μέν, ὅτε ἐρωτώμενοι «τί ἐστιν ἄνθρωπος» λέγομεν «ζῷον»· ἐν δὲ τῷ ὁποῖόν τί ἐστιν, ὅτε ἐρωτώμενοι «ὁποῖον ζῷον» φαμὲν «λογικὸν θνητόν». Ὥστε τὸ μὲν γένος καὶ τὸ εἶδος ἐν τῷ τί ἐστι κατηγορεῖται, ἡ δὲ διαφορὰ ἥ τε οὐσιώδης καὶ ἡ ἐπουσιώδης ἤγουν τὸ συμβεβηκὸς καὶ τὸ ἴδιον ἐν τῷ ὁποῖόν τί ἐστι κατηγοροῦνται. Ἡ δὲ ὑπόστασις οὐδὲ τί ἐστι δηλοῖ οὐδὲ ὁποῖόν τί ἐστιν, ἀλλὰ τίς ἐστιν· ἐρωτώμενοι γὰρ «τίς ἐστιν οὗτος» λέγομεν «Πέτρος». Εἶτα ἐρωτώμενοι «τί ἐστι Πέτρος» λέγομεν «ἄνθρωπος». Πάλιν ἐρωτώμενοι «ὁποῖος ἄνθρωπος» λέγομεν «μακρὸς τυχὸν ἢ κολοβός». Χρὴ δὲ γινώσκειν, ὅτι τὰ φύσει διαφέροντα ἄλλο καὶ ἄλλο λέγονται. Λέγομεν γάρ· Ἄλλο ἐστὶν ἄνθρωπος καὶ ἄλλο ἵππος, ἄλλο δὲ κατὰ φύσιν· καὶ γὰρ ἕτερον εἶδος τοῦ ἀνθρώπου καὶ ἄλλο τοῦ ἵππου. Τὰ δὲ ἀριθμῷ διαφέροντα ἤγουν αἱ ὑποστάσεις ἄλλος καὶ ἄλλος λέγονται. Λέγομεν γάρ, ὅτι ἄλλος ἐστὶν ὁ Πέτρος καὶ ἄλλος ὁ Παῦλος. Οὐ δυνάμεθα δὲ εἰπεῖν, ὅτι ἄλλο ἐστὶ Πέτρος καὶ ἄλλο Παῦλος, ἐπεὶ ψευδόμεθα· ἓν γάρ εἰσι τῇ φύσει, οὔκ