is unmixed nor is it primary evil. For if evil were contrary to every good, it would be necessary, since the good exists in itself and primarily before the good in another, that evil also be twofold, the one being evil itself, the other in another. But if evil is contrary to those goods which have their being in another, then surely much more is evil also in another, and does not exist in itself; for neither is the good to which evil is contrary, but is in another and not separate. For what could be contrary to the primarily good, not only evil, but anything else among beings? For all beings are through it and for its sake. But it is impossible for the contrary to exist on account of its contrary nature, but rather for the contrary itself not to exist; for contraries are destroyed by one another, and in general all contraries are attached to a single head and genus; but of the primarily good, what genus could there be? For what is beyond the nature of the good? And what among beings could be of the same genus as it? For there would have to be something else prior to both, of which they would be parts; and the good would no longer be the principle of beings, but that which is common to both would be. Therefore, nothing is contrary to the primarily good, nor to all things that participate, but to those in which the participation is not in the same way. 38 --- <since even> when privation is present, it is not yet evil, but when it becomes complete, the nature of evil has also departed-I mean, for example, when disorder is present, but not all of it, it is a disease in a body; for the privation of all order destroys at the same time both the subject and the evil in it. And not yet having come to be is a privation, but is not evil; - --but none of these is yet evil. But in general, disorder and lack of measure, as has been said, must be understood in one way as the absence <of those things>, <I mean> of both measure and of order, and in another way as the nature contrary to them; for the one fights against measure and order, but the other is only a removal of those things and nothing other than a negation, or rather, when those things are present they are what they are, but when absent they leave behind their own privations. If, therefore, evil is contrary to the good and is in conflict with it, but privation neither fights against its own state nor is it its nature to do anything, whose very being is so obscure in every way and powerless, as their argument goes; how could we still trace the cause of evil back to this, from which all power of acting has been taken away? For this belongs to form and power; --- In which of the beings, then, evil both is and is not, is clear from these things. 39 But since it is in souls in one way, and in bodies in another---; is the evil in souls greater than that in bodies ...? --- <and to the greater good the greater evil is contrary; so that> the evil in souls is greater than that in bodies, not in all, but in as many as have a capacity by nature to suffer; but in as many as have only actuality, evil is transient and an absence of the whole perfection and only a remission; for the one is contrary to virtue, the other to the goods of the body, and the one to what is according to intellect, the other to what is according to nature. Inasmuch, then, as intellect is superior to nature and what is according to intellect is superior to what is according to nature, so much surely is what is contrary to intellect beyond what is contrary to nature <in respect to evil>. But if the one is destructive of substance, and the other of power only, what is surprising? For when of the same thing one destroys the substance and the other the power, then the destroyer of the substance is a greater evil; but when it is the substance of one thing and the power of another, it is not strange for the destroyer of the power ... to exceed in evil, <for instance> if the power of another is superior to the substance of this thing, as ... the powers of the soul <are said> to <both beget and> preserve the bodily substance. <This, then, Socrates in the Republic also> <calls> a most dreadful evil and <says that> it is not such, if it were deadly [Pl. resp. X 6iod 5-6]; for it would quickly bring the souls that have it to non-being. But it is better not to be than to be badly; <for the one is> of being, <and the other> a privation of the good; which also shows that bodily evil is not more grievous than wickedness in souls; for the one, when intensified, ends in non-being, but the other in being badly. --- 40 It would be next to consider--- <the causes of evils> whether there is one and the same cause for all of these, or not. For indeed - --some, having spoken of a source of evils, derive from it every evil whatsoever.

ἐστι τὸ ἀμιγὲς οὐδὲ τὸ πρώτως κακόν. εἰ μὲν γὰρ τῷ ἀγαθῷ παντὶ τὸ κακὸν ὑπεναντίον ἦν, ἔδει, τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ πρὸ τοῦ ἐν ἄλλῳ καθ' ἑαυτὸ καὶ πρώτως ὄντος, καὶ τὸ κακὸν εἶναι διττόν, τὸ μὲν αὐτό, τὸ δὲ ἐν ἄλλῳ. εἰ δὲ ἐκείνοις ἐστὶ τῶν ἀγαθῶν ἐναντίον τὸ κακόν, οἷς τὸ εἶναι ἐν ἄλλῳ, πολλῷ δήπου μᾶλλον καὶ τὸ κακὸν ἐν ἄλλῳ, καθ' ἑαυτὸ δὲ οὐκ ἔστιν· οὐδὲ γὰρ τὸ ἀγαθόν, ᾧ τὸ κακὸν ὑπεναντίον, ἀλλὰ ἐν ἄλλῳ καὶ οὐ χωρίς. καὶ τί γὰρ ἂν εἴη τῷ πρώτως ἀγαθῷ μὴ ὅτι κακόν, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἄλλ' ὁτιοῦν τῶν ὄντων ἐναντίον; πάντα γὰρ τὰ ὄντα δι' ἐκεῖνο καὶ ἐκείνου ἕνεκά ἐστι. τὸ δὲ ἐναντίον εἶναι διὰ τὴν ἐναντίαν φύσιν ἀδύνατον, ἀλλ' αὐτὸ τοὐν- αντίον μὴ εἶναι· φθείρεται γὰρ ὑπ' ἀλλήλων τὰ ἐναντία, καὶ ὅλως πάντα τὰ ἐναντία μιᾶς ἐξῆπται κορυφῆς καὶ γένους· τοῦ δὲ πρώτως ἀγαθοῦ γένος τί ἂν εἴη; τί γὰρ ἐπέκεινα τῆς τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ φύσεως; τί δ' ἂν ἐκείνῳ γένοιτο τῶν ὄντων ὁμογενές; δέοι γὰρ ἂν ἕτερον εἶναί τι πρὸ ἀμφοῖν, οὗ μέρος ἂν ὑπάρχοι ἐκεῖνα· καὶ οὐκ ἂν ἔτι τὸ ἀγαθὸν ἀρχὴ τῶν ὄντων, ἀλλ' ἐκεῖνο ἂν εἴη τὸ κοινὸν ἀμφοῖν. οὐδὲν ἄρα τὸ ἐναντίον τῷ πρώτως ἀγαθῷ, ἀλλ' οὐδὲ τοῖς μετεχομένοις πᾶσιν, ἀλλ' οἷς μὴ ὡσαύτως ἡ μέθεξις. 38 --- <ἐπεὶ καὶ> στερήσεως παρούσης οὔπω κακόν, παντελοῦς δὲ γενομένης καὶ ἡ τοῦ κακοῦ φύσις ἀπελήλυθε-λέγω δὲ οἷον ἀταξίας μὲν παρούσης, ἀλλ' οὐ πάσης, νόσος ἐν σώματι· ἡ πάσης γὰρ τῆς τάξεως στέρησις ἅμα τό τε ὑποκείμενον ἀνεῖλε καὶ τὸ ἐν αὐτῷ κακόν. καὶ μήπω μὲν γενόμενον στέρησις μέν ἐστι, κακὸν δὲ οὐκ ἔστιν· - --τούτων δὲ οὐδέν πω κακόν. ὅλως δὲ τὴν ἀταξίαν καὶ τὸ ἄμετρον, ὥσπερ εἴρηται, ληπτέον ἄλλως μὲν τὴν ἀπουσίαν <ἐκείνων>, τοῦ τε μέτρου <λέγω> καὶ τῆς τάξεως, ἄλλως δὲ τὴν ἐναντίαν πρὸς αὐτὰ φύσιν· ἡ μὲν γὰρ μάχεται τῷ μέτρῳ καὶ τῇ τάξει, ἡ δὲ μόνον ἀφαίρεσίς ἐστιν ἐκείνων καὶ οὐδὲν ἄλλ' ἢ ἀπόφασις, μᾶλλον δὲ ἐκεῖνα παρόντα μὲν ἐστὶν ἅ ἐστιν, ἀπόντα δὲ τὰς ἑαυτῶν καταλείπει στερήσεις. εἰ τοίνυν τὸ μὲν κακὸν ἐναντίον τῷ ἀγαθῷ καὶ στασιάζει πρὸς αὐτό, στέρησις δὲ οὔτε μάχεται τῇ ἑαυτῆς ἕξει οὔτε δρᾶν τι πέφυκεν, ἧς καὶ τὸ εἶναι τοιοῦτον ἀμυδρὸν πάντῃ καὶ ἀμενηνόν, ὡς ὁ ἐκείνων λόγος· πῶς ἂν ἔτι τὸ κακο- ποιὸν ἐπὶ ταύτην ἀνάγοιμεν, ἧς πᾶν ἀφῄρηται τὸ ποιεῖν; εἴδους γάρ ἐστι τοῦτο καὶ δυνάμεως· --- Ἐν τίσι μὲν οὖν τῶν ὄντων τὸ κακὸν ἔστι τὲ καὶ οὐκ ἔστι, ἀπὸ τούτων δῆλον. 39 Ἐπεὶ δὲ ἄλλως μέν ἐστιν ἐν ψυχαῖς, ἄλλως δὲ ἐν σώμασι---· πότερον τὸ ἐν ψυχαῖς κακὸν μεῖζον τοῦ ἐν σώμασι ...; --- <μείζονι δὲ ἀγαθῷ τὸ μεῖζον κακὸν ἐναντίον· ὥστε> μεῖζον τὸ ἐν ψυχαῖς ἢ ἐν σώμασι κακόν, οὐ πάσαις, ἀλλ' ὅσαις ἡ δύναμις πάσχειν πέφυκε· ὅσαις δὲ ἡ ἐνέργεια μόνον, ἐξίτηλον τὸ κακὸν καὶ ἀπουσία τῆς ὅλης τελειότητος καὶ ὕφεσις μόνον· τὸ μὲν γὰρ ἀρετῇ ἐναντίον, τὸ δὲ τοῖς σώματος ἀγαθοῖς, καὶ τὸ μὲν τῷ κατὰ νοῦν, τὸ δὲ τῷ κατὰ φύσιν. ὅσῳ δὴ οὖν φύσεως ὁ νοῦς καὶ τὸ κατὰ νοῦν τοῦ κατὰ φύσιν κρεῖττον, τοσούτῳ δήπου καὶ τὸ παρὰ νοῦν τοῦ παρὰ φύσιν ἐπέκεινα <πρὸς τὸ κακόν>. εἰ δὲ τὸ μὲν οὐσίας ἐστὶ φθαρτικόν, τὸ δὲ δυνάμεως μόνον, τί θαυμαστόν; ὅταν γὰρ τοῦ αὐτοῦ τὸ μὲν τὴν οὐσίαν, τὸ δὲ τὴν δύναμιν φθείρῃ, τότε μει- ζόνως κακὸν τὸ τῆς οὐσίας φθαρτικόν· ὅταν δὲ ἄλλου οὐσίαν καὶ ἄλλου δύναμιν, οὐκ ἄτοπον τὸ τῆς δυνάμεως φθαρτικὸν ... ὑπερβάλλειν τῷ κακῷ, <οἷον> εἰ τῆς τοῦδε οὐσίας ἡ ἄλλου δύναμις κρείττων, ὡς ... αἱ ψυχῆς δυνάμεις <λέγονται> τὴν σωματικὴν οὐσίαν <καὶ γεννᾶν καὶ> σώζειν. <τοῦτο ἄρα καὶ ὁ ἐν Πολιτείᾳ Σωκράτης> πάνδεινον κακὸν <ὀνομάζει> καὶ οὐ τοιοῦτον <εἶναί φησιν>, εἰ θανάσιμον ἦν [Pl. resp. X 6iod 5-6]· ταχέως γὰρ ἂν εἰς τὸ μὴ εἶναι περιῆγε τὰς ἐχούσας αὐτὸ ψυχάς. κρεῖττον δὲ τὸ μὴ εἶναι τοῦ κακῶς εἶναι· <τὸ μὲν γάρ ἐστι> τοῦ ὄντος, <τὸ δὲ> τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ στέρησις· ὃ καὶ τὸ σωματικὸν κακὸν οὐκ ἀργαλεώτερον ἀποφαίνει τῆς ἐν ψυχαῖς πονηρίας· τὸ μὲν γὰρ ἐπιτεινό- μενον εἰς τὸ μὴ εἶναι τελευτᾷ, τὸ δὲ εἰς τὸ κακῶς εἶναι. --- 40 Ἑπόμενον δ' ἂν εἴη θεωρῆσαι--- <τὰ τῶν κακῶν αἴτια> εἴτε καὶ τούτων ἕν τι καὶ ταὐτόν ἐστι πάντων αἴτιον, εἴτε μή. καὶ γὰρ - --οἱ μὲν πηγὴν τῶν κακῶν εἰπόντες, ἀπ' αὐτῆς παράγουσιν πᾶν τὸ ὁπωσοῦν κακόν.