Alexander of Lycopolis, Treatise on Manichaean Opinions

Tractatus de placitis manichaeorum

Upon matter, which will be mixed with it throughout for the death of matter will be the separation of this power from it at some later time. thus, th

A rebellion of matter against god. but i would not say that these things are insufficient to persuade those who approach the argument without examinat

Will subsist, the mover and the moved for which of them, then, does he vote, that we may posit that one first with god?

Will be separated. for there is one place for the heavy, and another for the intermediate, and for the light, for to the one belongs the above, to ano

To god, when they say he arranged the plot against matter, because it desired the beautiful. with what that he had did god wish to punish matter? for

13 and what things does he say are evils? for concerning the sun and the moon, he leaves out nothing but concerning the heaven and the stars, if he s

It requires nourishment. for those living things that were immortal have been set free from decay and growth, such as the sun and moon and stars, alth

18 for the wise thing said by them is this, that just as we see that when the soul is separated from the body the body itself is destroyed, so too whe

The divine power, if indeed it is subject to passion and divisible throughout its whole self, and one part of it becomes sun, and another, moon? for t

Is heavy, nor is it possible for it to reach the moon at all. what reason is there for that which first arrives at the moon not to be sent up immediat

For thus the world is worse than the creator and than the artisans, as many as are their works. if therefore man is the work of matter, he is certainl

To use a worse way of life, how is it reasonable? and if the divine power is greater in these things, what use are such things for nourishment, since

The word finds to be altogether, or the last of all things and able with difficulty to arrive at a spurious notion. but is the lightless fire indeed g

it requires nourishment. For those living things that were immortal have been set free from decay and growth, such as the sun and moon and stars, although they are perceptible, are outside of these things and of such an accusation; but man, being able both to perceive and to judge, and wise in potentiality—for he has the power to become such—having received his own, so to speak, tramples on it.

16 For it is altogether worthwhile to inquire of these men, whether it is possible for no man to become virtuous, or whether it is possible for some. For if no one is wise, why then does the Manichaean himself—for I omit the others—not only say that he is virtuous, but also claim that he is able to make others such? But if there is anyone at all, what prevents all from becoming virtuous? For what is possible concerning one is also possible concerning all, and through the same means by which one man becomes virtuous, all could become so; unless they say that the greatest part of the power is received by such men. Again, then, in the first place, what need is there for the labor of education? For we could become virtuous while sleeping. Or why especially do such men lead their listeners to the hope of what is noble? For even while rolling about with courtesans, they could have their own good. But if education and the better guidance and the earnestness concerning the attainment of virtue have made him such, let all become such, and the disordered motion of matter, which is so much talked of by them, is done away with. It would have been much better to say that wisdom was given by God as a weapon to men, so that what belongs to them from desire and pleasure because they are sentient, this, by gradually leading to the good, might remove from them the consequent absurdity; for thus they themselves, professing to teach virtue, would have been worthy of emulation for their purpose and their life, and there would have been much hope that evils would someday cease when all have become wise. This, it seems to me, Jesus understood, and so that farmers and carpenters and builders and the others from the crafts might not be excluded from the good, he established a common council of all together and through simple and easy discourses brought them to a conception of God and made them come to a desire for the good.

17 But how, then, is it said that "God sent down the divine power upon matter"? For if it always was, and neither God nor matter is conceived of as prior to it, there are thus again three principles according to the Manichaean, and perhaps very many will appear a little later. But if it is created, how is it itself without matter? And if it is a part of God, in the first place, they thus declare God to be composite and corporeal; and this is absurd and impossible. But if he made it and it is without matter, I wonder how neither this man nor those who follow him have considered that if what is said according to the true opinion that the successive things are hypostases while God remains, God made this power by his will, how did he not also become the cause of all other things that have come to be, needing no pre-existing matter at all? Such, then, are the absurdities that appear from this, and what follows are the next things. For did the power have a nature to flow upon matter? Or was this contrary to its nature? How then was it mixed? But if this was according to its nature, it was surely always with matter; and if this is so, how do they speak ill of matter, since it was a mixture with the divine power from the beginning? And how will it be destroyed when the divine power that was mixed with it has at some point departed? For it was reasonable that noble things should be preserved and become causes of some other good for those to whom they are present, rather than to bring upon them destruction or some other evil.

τροφῆς δεῖται. ἃ μὲν γὰρ ἦν ἀθάνατα ζῷα καὶ φθορᾶς καὶ αὔξης ἀπήλλακται οἷον ἥλιος καὶ σελήνη καὶ ἀστέρες , καίτοι ὄντα αἰσθητ<ικ>ά, ἐκτὸς δὲ τούτων ἐστὶν καὶ τῆς τοιαύτης αἰτιάσεως· ὁ δὲ ἄνθρωπος καὶ αἴσθε σθαι καὶ κρίνειν δυνάμενος καὶ δυνάμει σοφός ἔχει γὰρ δύναμιν τοιοῦτος γενέσθαι ἀπολαβὼν τὸ ἴδιον δή, καταπατεῖ.

16 ὅλως γὰρ ἄξιον πυθέσθαι τούτων τῶν ἀνδρῶν, πότερον οὐδένα ἄνθρωπον δυνα τὸν σπουδαῖον γενέσθαι ἤ τινά γε ἐνδέχεται. εἰ μὲν γὰρ οὐδεὶς σοφός, τί δήποτε αὐτὸς ὁ Μανιχαῖος ἐῶ γὰρ τοὺς ἄλλους οὐ μόνον σπουδαῖος εἶναι λέγει, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἄλλους φησὶν ἱκανὸς εἶναι τοιούτους ποιῆσαι; εἰ δ' ὅλως ἔστιν τις, τί κωλύει καὶ πάντας γενέσθαι σπουδαίους; ὃ γὰρ περὶ ἕνα, καὶ περὶ πάν τας ἐνδέχεται, καὶ δι' ὧν καὶ εἷς, διὰ τούτων καὶ πάντες ἐνάρετοι ἂν γένοιντο· εἰ μή τί φασιν τῆς δυνάμεως πλεῖστον τοῖς τοιούτοις ἐναπολαμβάνεσθαι. πάλιν τοίνυν πρῶτον μὲν τίς χρεία τοῦ περὶ τὴν παίδευσιν πόνου; γενοίμεθα γὰρ ἂν καθεύδοντες σπου δαῖοι. ἢ διὰ τί μάλιστα τοὺς ἀκροωμένους αὐτῶν οἱ τοιοῦτοι ἄνδρες εἰς ἐλπίδα ἄγουσι τοῦ καλοῦ; καὶ γὰρ καλινδούμενοι σὺν ταῖς ἑταίραις τὸ οἰκεῖον ἔχοιεν ἂν ἀγαθόν. εἰ δὲ ἡ παίδευσις καὶ ἡ περιαγωγὴ ἡ βελτίων καὶ τὸ σπουδαῖον περὶ τὴν τῆς ἀρετῆς ἀνάλη ψιν τοιοῦτον αὐτὸν ἀπειργάσαντο, πάντες γινέσθωσαν τοιοῦτοι, καὶ ἀνῄρηται ἡ θρυλουμένη ὑπ' αὐτῶν τῆς ὕλης ἄτακτος κίνησις. πολὺ δὲ κάλλιον ἦν τὴν σοφίαν ὅπλον φάναι τοῖς ἀνθρώποις ὑπὸ τοῦ θεοῦ δεδόσθαι, ἵν' ὅ ἐστιν αὐτοῖς διὰ τὸ αἰσθητικοῖς εἶναι ἐξ ἐπιθυ μίας καὶ ἡδονῆς, τοῦτο κατὰ μικρὸν εἰς τὸ ἀγαθὸν περιάγουσα τὸ ἑπόμενον ἄτοπον ἐξ αὐτῶν ἀνέλῃ· οὕτω γὰρ αὐτοί τε ἀρετὴν ἐπαγγελλόμενοι διδάσκειν ζηλωτοὶ ἂν ἦσαν τῆς προθέσεως καὶ τοῦ βίου, πολλή τε ἂν ἦν ἐλπὶς τοῦ ὅτι ποτὲ παύσεται τὰ κακὰ πάντων γενομένων σοφῶν. ὃ δοκεῖ μοι κατανενοηκέναι ὁ Ἰησοῦς καὶ ἵνα μὴ ἀπεληλαμένοι ὦσι τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ γεωργοί τε καὶ τέκτονες καὶ οἰκοδόμοι καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι ἀπὸ τῶν τεχνῶν, κοινὸν συνέδριον καθίσαι πάντων ὁμοῦ καὶ διὰ ἁπλῶν καὶ εὐκόλων διαλέξεων καὶ εἰς θεοῦ ἔννοιαν αὐτοὺς ἀπενηνοχέναι καὶ τοῦ καλοῦ εἰς ἐπιθυμίαν ἐλθεῖν ποιῆσαι.

17 Ἀλλὰ γὰρ πῶς ποτε λέγεται τὸ «κατέπεμψε τὴν δύναμιν τὴν θείαν ὁ θεὸς ἐπὶ τὴν ὕλην»; εἰ μὲν γὰρ ἦν ἀεὶ καὶ οὔτε ὁ θεὸς πρότερος αὐτῆς ἐπινοεῖται οὔτε ἡ ὕλη, τρεῖς πάλιν οὕτως εἰσὶν ἀρχαὶ κατὰ τὸν Μανιχαῖον, τάχα δὲ καὶ πάμπολλαι φανήσονται ὀλίγῳ ὕστερον. εἰ δ' ἐπιγενητή, πῶς ἐστιν [πῶς] ὕλης ἄμοι ρος αὐτή; εἰ δὲ μέρος ἐστὶν τοῦ θεοῦ, πρῶτον μὲν σύνθετον καὶ σωματικὸν ἀποφαίνουσιν οὕτως τὸν θεόν· τοῦτο δὲ ἄτοπον καὶ ἀδύνατον. εἰ δὲ ἐποίησεν αὐτὴν καὶ ὕλης ἄμοιρός ἐστιν, θαυμάζω πῶς οὐκ ἐσκόπησαν οὔτε οὗτος οὔτε οἱ ἀπ' ἐκείνου, ὅτι εἰ ὃ λέγεται κατὰ τὴν ἀληθῆ δόξαν ὅτι τὰ ἐφεξῆς μένοντος τοῦ θεοῦ ὑποστάσεις εἰσὶν τὴν δύναμιν ταύτην ἐποίησεν βουληθεὶς ὁ θεός, πῶς οὐχὶ καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἁπάντων τῶν γενομένων αἴτιος ἐγένετο οὐδὲν ὕλης προὑπαρ χούσης προσδεηθείς. τὰ μὲν δὴ φαινόμενα ἄτοπα ἐκ τούτου τοιαῦτα, ἑπόμενα δὲ τὰ ἑξῆς. ἆρά τε γὰρ φύσιν εἶχεν ἡ δύναμις ῥεῖν ἐπὶ τὴν ὕλην; ἢ παρὰ φύσιν ἦν αὐτῇ τοῦτο; πῶς οὖν ἐμίχθη; εἰ δὲ κατὰ φύσιν αὐτῇ τοῦτο, πάντως που καὶ ἀεὶ σὺν τῇ ὕλῃ ἦν· εἰ δὲ τοῦτο, πῶς κακῶς τὴν ὕλην ἀγορεύουσιν μῖγμα οὖσαν ἐξ ἀρχῆς πρὸς τὴν θείαν δύναμιν; πῶς δὲ καὶ φθαρήσεται μιχθείσης τῆς θείας δυνάμεως πρὸς αὐτὴν ἀποχωρησάσης ποτέ; ἔσῳζεν γὰρ δὴ τὰ καλὰ καὶ ἑτέρου τινὸς ἀγαθοῦ αἴτια γίγνεσθαι οἷς ἂν παρῇ εὔλογον ἢ διαφθορὰν ἢ ἄλλο τι κακὸν ἕτερον ἐπάγειν αὐτοῖς.