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Of sins, some require reason and teaching, but others are so manifest and clear, that they are prevented by fear and punishment alone; for instance, to murder, to commit adultery, to steal, does not need reasoning; for which reason also the lawgiver did not compose teaching about these things resounding to us, that the thing is evil; for he had preoccupied us with reason; but only forbade, You shall not commit adultery, you shall not murder. But when he discourses to us about contempt for widows and mistreatment of deposits, he also lays down reasonings, Have mercy on the widow, he says, and on the sojourner; for you also were a sojourner in the land of Egypt. Honor the sabbath with rest, he says; then he also lays down a reason. To abstain from fate, therefore, is not of those things that need reasoning, but of those that are clear. For just as it is clear that to murder is evil and to commit adultery is base, so it is clear that to pay attention to fate is evil and forbidden. For do not think from those who are persuaded by it that it is one of the things not forbidden; since murder is also dared, and it is forbidden by the laws, and adulteries and robberies are among the forbidden things, although they are done by many. Since indeed to be persuaded by one's nativity is one of the forbidden things, just like murder, by the very laws of the Greeks, let someone who has committed adultery with the wife of so-and-so come forward, and being accused in a court, let him say, that it was not I, but my nativity; for I wanted to be chaste, but it pushed me and cast me into it; will he not for this reason pay a harsher penalty, as making a ridiculous defense? will he obtain any pardon? In no way. And yet, according to them, he ought to have. For if all things happen by nativity and not by choice, there is no defense greater than this. For if choice is master of and more powerful than nativity, there would be no nativity; if, even if someone should contrive countless things, it is necessary to fulfill its commands, this man is punished in vain, and will not obtain pardon; but no one will hear of him either defending himself or obtaining pardon; so among all the matter is discredited, and seems to be a myth and nonsense. And many of the rulers, although if one suffers violence from a man, this very thing is sufficient for a defense for the one accused, rather it seems to no longer be a crime, at any rate many of the rulers, having been accused for unjust murders, paid the penalty, but the public executioners who ministered to the murder, and had become the perpetrators of the slaughter with their own hands, no one would drag to court, nor even investigate them at all, since necessity makes a defense for them, and the authority of the office, and the fear of subordination. Then they know to grant pardon to a man compelled by a man 50.759 of the same race and kind; but for one compelled by fate, ought they not much more to grant pardon? For indeed it was necessary to escape. But of that, as they say, so inescapable is the rule, that even if one should go to a desert, or to the sea, or wherever, he will not escape its decrees. How then is it not absurd for the one constrained by the violence of barbarians to enjoy the greatest pardon, so as not even to be accused at all, but for the one compelled by a more powerful force, as they say, to pay the penalty, and not even to be given a hearing for such a defense for himself? For no one ever by putting forward fate as a defense has escaped, not a criminal in the courts, not a servant in the house, not children in school, not apprentices in the crafts, in whatever they might do wrong. How then do some advocate for fate while dishonoring it, and granting no pardon to the necessity imposed by it? Thus in truth, and in their conscience they have strongly persuaded themselves that the thing is a myth. But when they fall into grievous sins, they add another to them again, as by this
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ἁμαρτημάτων τὰ μέν ἐστι λόγου δεόμενα καὶ διδασκαλίας, τὰ δὲ οὕτω φανερὰ καὶ δῆλα, ὡς φόβῳ καὶ τιμωρίᾳ μόνῃ κωλύεσθαι· οἷον τὸ φονεύειν, τὸ μοιχεύειν, τὸ κλέπτειν, οὐ δεῖται λόγων· δι' ὅπερ καὶ ὁ νομοθέτης οὐχὶ διδασκαλίαν ὑπὲρ τούτων συντέθεικε περιηχοῦσαν ἡμᾶς, ὅτι τὸ πρᾶγμα πονηρόν· προκατειλήφει γὰρ ἡμᾶς τῷ λογισμῷ· ἀλλὰ μόνον ἀπηγόρευσεν, οὐ μοιχεύσεις, οὐ φονεύσεις. Ὅταν δὲ περὶ χηρῶν ὑπεροψίας καὶ παρακαταθηκῶν κακουργίας ἡμῖν διαλέγηται, καὶ λογισμοὺς τίθησιν, Ἐλέησον τὴν χήραν, φησὶ, καὶ τὸν προσήλυτον· καὶ γὰρ καὶ σὺ προσήλυτος ἦσθα ἐν γῇ Αἰγύπτῳ. Τὸ σάββατον ἀργίᾳ τίμα, φησίν· εἶτα καὶ λογισμὸν τίθησιν. Τὸ τοίνυν εἱμαρμένης ἀπέχεσθαι, οὐ τούτων ἐστὶ τῶν δεομένων λογισμοῦ, ἀλλ' ἐκείνων τῶν δήλων. Ὥσπερ γὰρ δῆλον ὅτι πονηρὸν τὸ φονεύειν καὶ τὸ μοιχεύειν φαῦλον, οὕτω δῆλον ὅτι τὸ προσέχειν εἱμαρμένῃ πονηρὸν καὶ ἀπηγορευμένον. Μὴ γὰρ ἀπὸ 50.758 τῶν πειθομένων νομίζετε αὐτὸ εἶναι τῶν μὴ κεκωλυμένων· ἐπεὶ καὶ φόνος τολμᾶται, καὶ κεκώλυται παρὰ τοῖς νόμοις, καὶ αἱ μοιχεῖαι καὶ αἱ ἁρπαγαὶ τῶν ἀπηγορευμένων εἰσὶ, καίτοι δρωμένων παρὰ τῶν πολλῶν. Ἐπεὶ ὅτι γε τῶν κεκωλυμένων ἐστὶν, ὥσπερ ὁ φόνος, παρὰ τοῖς νόμοις αὐτοῖς τοῖς τῶν Ἑλλήνων, τὸ τῇ γενέσει πείθεσθαι, παρελθών τις τῶν μοιχευσάντων τὴν τοῦ δεῖνος γυναῖκα, κατηγορούμενος ἐν δικαστηρίῳ λεγέτω, ὅτι οὐκ ἐγὼ, ἀλλ' ἡ γένεσις· ἐγὼ μὲν γὰρ σωφρονεῖν ἐβουλόμην, ἐκείνη δέ με ὦσε καὶ ἐνέβαλεν· ἆρα οὐ διὰ τοῦτο χαλεπωτέραν δώσει δίκην, ὡς καταγέλαστα ἀπολογούμενος; ἆρα συγγνώμης τεύξεταί τινος; Οὐδαμῶς. Καὶ μὴν ἐχρῆν κατ' ἐκείνους. Εἰ γὰρ γενέσει πάντα καὶ οὐ προαιρέσει γίνεται, ταύτης μείζων οὐκ ἔστιν ἀπολογία. Εἰ μὲν γὰρ κυρία καὶ δυνατωτέρα ἐστὶ τῆς γενέσεως ἡ προαίρεσις, οὐκ ἂν εἴη γένεσις· εἰ κἂν μυρία μηχανήσηταί τις, ἀνάγκη τὰ ἐπιτάγματα τὰ ἐκείνης πληροῦσθαι, μάτην οὗτος κολάζεται, καὶ οὐ τεύξεται συγγνώμης· ἀλλ' οὐδεὶς αὐτοῦ οὔτε ἀπολογουμένου, οὔτε τυχόντος συγγνώμης ἀκούσεται· οὕτω παρὰ πᾶσι τὸ πρᾶγμα διαβέβληται, καὶ μῦθος εἶναι καὶ λῆρος δοκεῖ. Πολλοί τε τῶν ἀρχόντων καίτοι γε εἰ παρὰ ἀνθρώπου πάθοι βίαν, ἀρκεῖ πρὸς ἀπολογίαν αὐτὸ τοῦτο ἐγκαλουμένῳ, μᾶλλον οὐδὲ ἔγκλημα λοιπὸν εἶναι δοκεῖ, πολλοὶ γοῦν τῶν ἀρχόντων, ἐπὶ φόνοις ἀδίκοις κατηγορηθέντες, δίκην ἔδοσαν, τοὺς δὲ δημίους τοὺς διακονουμένους τῷ φόνῳ, καὶ αὐτόχειρας γεγενημένους τῆς σφαγῆς, οὐδὲ εἰς δικαστήριον ἑλκύσαι τις, ἀλλ' οὐδὲ ζητῆσαι, τὴν ἀρχὴν, τῆς ἀνάγκης ὑπὲρ αὐτῶν ἀπολογουμένης, καὶ τοῦ τῆς ἀρχῆς ἀξιώματος, καὶ τοῦ τῆς ὑποταγῆς φόβου. Εἶτα ἀνθρώπῳ μὲν ἴσασι συγγινώσκειν, ὑπ' ἀν 50.759 θρώπου τοῦ ὁμοφύλου καὶ ὁμογενοῦς καταναγκαζομένου· τῷ δὲ ὑπὸ εἱμαρμένης οὐχὶ πολλῷ μᾶλλον συγγινώσκειν ἐχρῆν; Καὶ γὰρ διαδρᾶναι ἔδει. Ἐκείνης δὲ, ὥς φασιν, οὕτως ἀμήχανος ἡ ἀρχὴ, ὡς κἂν εἰς ἔρημον, κἂν εἰς θάλασσαν, κἂν ὅπου τις ἀφίκηται, τὰ νοήματα αὐτῆς οὐ διαφεύξεται. Πῶς οὖν οὐκ ἄτοπον τὸν μὲν ὑπὸ βαρβάρων βίας ἀγχόμενον, πλείστης συγγνώμης ἀπολαύειν, ὡς μηδὲ ἐγκαλεῖσθαι τὴν ἀρχὴν, τὸν δὲ ὑπὸ δυνατωτέρας, ὥς φασι, δυνάμεως καταναγκαζόμενον, δίκην διδόναι, καὶ μηδὲ λόγου μεταδιδόναι πρὸς ἀπολογίαν αὐτῷ τοιαύτην; Οὐδεὶς γάρ ποτε προβαλλόμενος εἱμαρμένην ἀπέφυγεν, οὐκ ἐν δικαστηρίοις κακοῦργος, οὐκ ἐν οἰκίᾳ οἰκέτης, οὐκ εἰς διδασκαλεῖον παῖδες, οὐκ ἐν ταῖς τέχναις μαθηταὶ, ἐν οἷς ἂν διαμάρτωσι. Πῶς οὖν τινες εἱμαρμένην πρεσβεύουσιν ἀτιμάζοντες αὐτὴν, καὶ τῇ ὑπ' αὐτῆς ἀνάγκῃ οὐδεμιᾶς μεταδιδόντες συγγνώμης; Οὕτω τῇ μὲν ἀληθείᾳ, καὶ τῷ συνειδότι σφόδρα πεπείκασιν ἑαυτοὺς, ὅτι μῦθος τὸ πρᾶγμά ἐστιν. Ὅταν δὲ εἰς ἁμαρτήματα ἐμπέσωσι χαλεπὰ, ἕτερον αὐτοῖς προστιθέασι πάλιν, ὡς ταύτῃ