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is said from the true cause of man, but others as from something derivative, like a medical scalpel and such things. And this is the universal division, according to which everything divisible is divided, either as a genus into species, or as a species into individuals, or as a whole into parts, or as a homonymous word into its different meanings, or as a substance into its accidents, or as an accident into its substances, or as an accident into its accidents, or as things from one and to one. But some reject the division from species into individuals, saying it is rather an enumeration; for every division is made into two or three or very rarely into four. But the species is divided into an infinite number; for individual men are infinite in number. But one must know that in not one type of division is there observed in the divisions the naturally prior and posterior, nor the more and the less. But in those things divided as from one and to one, both the naturally prior and posterior are observed, and the more and the less, and from which is the naming. 7 Concerning the naturally prior. Therefore, that is naturally prior which is co-introduced but does not co-introduce, and co-destructive but not co-destroyed, for example, animal is naturally prior to man. For if animal is destroyed and does not exist, of necessity man will not exist either; for man is an animal. But if man is destroyed and does not exist, it is possible for animal to exist; for there will be a horse, a dog, and such things, which are animals. Again, if man is introduced, in every case animal is also introduced; for man is an animal. But if animal is introduced, man is not in every case introduced, but either a horse or a dog or something of that sort. Therefore, neither is Peter naturally prior to Paul, nor the rational animal to the irrational. For if Peter is destroyed and does not exist, Paul will exist; and if Paul is introduced, Peter is not co-introduced, nor if Peter is introduced, is Paul co-introduced, and neither is Peter more, that is, a greater man or animal than Paul, nor Paul more than Peter. But one medicine is found to be more healthful than another medicine, and one medical book more medical than another book. 8 Concerning definition. Definition is a concise account declaring the nature of the subject matter, that is, the account briefly signifying the nature of the subject matter, for example, man is a rational, mortal animal, receptive of intellect and knowledge. For many have set forth accounts about the nature of man in a drawn-out manner, that is, extended and long, but they are not definitions, because they are not concise. There are also concise accounts, such as apophthegms, but since they do not declare the nature of a thing, they are not definitions. And the name often declares the nature of the subject matter, but it is not a definition; for the name is a single word, but the definition is an account. And an account is composed of at least two words. Therefore, the definition is an unfolded name, and the name is a definition in summary. And the definition is composed of a genus and constitutive, that is, essential, differentiae, as in the case of the definition of animal; for animal is an animate, sentient substance. Behold, substance is the genus, and 'animate' and 'sentient' are constitutive differentiae. It is also derived from matter and form, for example, a statue is made of bronze, signifying the form of a man; therefore, the bronze is matter, and the form of the man is form. And the matter is analogous to the genus, and the form to the differentia. It is also derived from a subject and an end, for example, medicine is an art concerned with human bodies, productive of health. Behold, the subjects for medicine are human bodies, and its end is health. And the description is composed of non-essential things, that is, properties and accidents, for example, man is capable of laughter, walks upright, has broad nails; for these are all non-essential. For this reason it is also called a description, as if sketching and not declaring the essential existence of the subject but its concomitants. And the descriptive definition is a mixture of essential and non-essential things, for example, man is a rational animal, walks upright, has broad nails. And 'definition' is said by metaphor from the setting of boundaries on land; just as

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ἐξ ἀληθινοῦ αἰτίου τοῦ ἀνθρώπου λέγεται, τὰ δὲ ὡς ἀπό τινος ἐξῃρημένου ὡς ἰατρικὸν σμιλίον καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα. Καὶ αὕτη μέν ἐστιν ἡ καθόλου διαίρεσις, καθ' ἣν διαιρεῖται πᾶν διαιρούμενον, ἢ ὡς γένος εἰς εἴδη ἢ ὡς εἶδος εἰς ἄτομα ἢ ὡς ὅλον εἰς μέρη ἢ ὡς ὁμώνυμος φωνὴ εἰς διάφορα σημαινόμενα ἢ ὡς οὐσία εἰς συμβεβηκότα ἢ ὡς συμβεβηκὸς εἰς οὐσίας ἢ ὡς συμβεβηκὸς εἰς συμβεβηκότα ἢ ὡς τὰ ἀφ' ἑνὸς καὶ πρὸς ἕν. Τινὲς δὲ ἀπαγορεύουσι τὴν ἀπὸ εἴδους εἰς ἄτομα διαίρεσιν μᾶλλον ἀπαρίθμησιν φάσκοντες· πᾶσα γὰρ διαίρεσις εἰς δύο ἢ τρία ἢ σπανίως πάνυ εἰς τέσσαρα γίνεται. Τὸ δὲ εἶδος εἰς ἄπειρα τῷ πλήθει διαιρεῖται· ἄπειροι γὰρ τῷ πλήθει οἱ κατὰ μέρος ἄνθρωποι. ∆εῖ δὲ γινώσκειν, ὡς οὐδὲ ἑνὶ τρόπῳ τῆς διαιρέσεως θεωρεῖται ἐν τοῖς τμήμασι τὸ φύσει πρότερον καὶ ὕστερον οὐδὲ τὸ μᾶλλον καὶ ἧττον. Ἐν δὲ τοῖς ὡς ἀφ' ἑνὸς καὶ πρὸς ἓν διαιρουμένοις καὶ τὸ φύσει πρότερον καὶ ὕστερον θεωρεῖται καὶ τὸ μᾶλλον καὶ ἧττον καὶ ἐξ οὗ ἡ ὀνομασία. 7 Περὶ τοῦ φύσει προτέρου. Φύσει οὖν πρότερόν ἐστι τὸ συνεισφερόμενον καὶ μὴ συνεισφέρον καὶ συναναιροῦν καὶ μὴ συναναιρούμενον, οἷον τὸ ζῷον φύσει πρότερόν ἐστι τοῦ ἀνθρώπου. Ἀναιρουμένου γὰρ καὶ μὴ ὄντος ζῴου ἐξ ἀνάγκης οὐδὲ ἄνθρωπος ἔσται· ζῷον γάρ ἐστιν ὁ ἄνθρωπος. Ἀνθρώπου δὲ ἀναιρουμένου καὶ μὴ ὄντος δυνατὸν εἶναι ζῷον· ἔσται γὰρ ἵππος, κύων καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα, ἅτινά εἰσι ζῷα. Πάλιν εἰσφερομένου ἀνθρώπου πάντως καὶ ζῷον εἰσφέρεται· ζῷον γάρ ἐστιν ὁ ἄνθρωπος. Ζῴου δὲ εἰσφερομένου οὐ πάντως εἰσφέρεται ἄνθρωπος ἀλλ' ἢ ἵππος ἢ κύων ἤ τι τῶν τοιούτων. Οὔτε οὖν ὁ Πέτρος ἐστὶ φύσει πρότερος τοῦ Παύλου οὔτε τὸ λογικὸν ζῷον τοῦ ἀλόγου. Πέτρου γὰρ ἀναιρουμένου καὶ μὴ ὄντος ἔσται Παῦλος· καὶ Παύλου εἰσφερομένου οὐ συνεισφέρεται Πέτρος, οὔτε Πέτρου εἰσφερομένου συνεισφέρεται Παῦλος, καὶ οὔτε Πέτρος ἐστὶ μᾶλλον ἤγουν πλέον τοῦ Παύλου ἄνθρωπος ἢ ζῷον οὔτε Παῦλος τοῦ Πέτρου μᾶλλον. Εὑρίσκεται δὲ φάρμακον ὑγιεινότερον φαρμάκου καὶ βιβλίον ἰατρικώτερον βιβλίου ἄλλου. 8 Περὶ ὁρισμοῦ. Ὁρισμός ἐστι λόγος σύντομος δηλωτικὸς τῆς φύσεως τοῦ ὑποκειμένου πράγματος τουτέστιν ὁ λόγος ὁ δι' ὀλίγου σημαίνων τὴν φύσιν τοῦ ὑποκειμένου πράγματος, οἷον ἄνθρωπός ἐστι ζῷον λογικόν, θνητόν, νοῦ καὶ ἐπιστήμης δεκτικόν. Πολλοὶ μὲν γὰρ ἐξέθεντο περὶ φύσεως ἀνθρώπου λόγους κατεπεκτάδην ἤγουν ἐκτεταμένους καὶ μεγάλους, ἀλλ' οὔκ εἰσιν ὁρισμοί, διότι οὔκ εἰσι σύντομοι. Εἰσὶ δὲ καὶ σύντομοι λόγοι ὡς τὰ ἀποφθέγματα, ἀλλ' ἐπειδὴ οὐ δηλοῦσι φύσιν πράγματος, οὔκ εἰσιν ὁρισμοί. Καὶ τὸ ὄνομα δὲ πολλάκις δηλοῖ τὴν φύσιν τοῦ ὑποκειμένου πράγματος, ἀλλ' οὐκ ἔστιν ὁρισμός· τὸ μὲν γὰρ ὄνομα μία λέξις ἐστίν, ὁ δὲ ὁρισμὸς λόγος. Λόγος δὲ ἐκ δύο τὸ ἐλάχιστον σύγκειται λέξεων. Ἔστιν οὖν ὁ μὲν ὅρος ὄνομα ἐξηπλωμένον, ὄνομα δὲ ὅρος κατὰ σύνοψιν. Συνίσταται δὲ ὁ ὁρισμὸς ἐκ γένους καὶ συστατικῶν διαφορῶν ἤγουν οὐσιωδῶν, ὡς ἐπὶ τοῦ ὅρου τοῦ ζῴου· ζῷον γάρ ἐστιν οὐσία ἔμψυχος αἰσθητική. Ἰδοὺ ἡ μὲν οὐσία γένος ἐστί, τὸ δὲ ἔμψυχον καὶ αἰσθητικὸν συστα τικαὶ διαφοραί. Λαμβάνεται δὲ καὶ ἐξ ὕλης καὶ εἴδους, οἷον ἀνδριάς ἐστιν ἐκ χαλκοῦ πεποιημένος, ἀνδρὸς εἶδος σημαίνων· ὁ μὲν οὖν χαλκὸς ὕλη ἐστί, τὸ δὲ τοῦ ἀνδρὸς εἶδος εἶδος. Ἀναλογεῖ δὲ ἡ μὲν ὕλη τῷ γένει, τὸ δὲ εἶδος τῇ διαφορᾷ. Λαμβάνεται δὲ καὶ ἐξ ὑποκειμένου καὶ τέλους, οἷον ἰατρική ἐστι τέχνη περὶ ἀνθρώπεια σώματα καταγινομένη ὑγιείας περιποιητική. Ἰδοὺ ὑποκείμενά εἰσι τῇ ἰατρικῇ τὰ ἀνθρώπεια σώματα, τέλος δὲ αὐτῆς ἡ ὑγίεια. Ἡ δὲ ὑπογραφὴ ἐκ τῶν ἐπουσιωδῶν σύγκειται ἤγουν ἰδίων καὶ συμβεβηκότων, οἷον ἄνθρωπός ἐστι γελαστικόν, ὀρθοπεριπατητικόν, πλατυώνυχον· ταῦτα γὰρ ὅλα ἐπουσιώδη εἰσί. ∆ιὸ καὶ ὑπογραφὴ λέγεται, ὡς οἷον σκιάζουσα καὶ οὐ τὴν οὐσιώδη ὕπαρξιν τοῦ ὑποκειμένου δηλοῦσα ἀλλὰ τὰ παρεπόμενα. Ὁ δὲ ὑπογραφικὸς ὁρισμὸς μικτός ἐστιν ἐξ οὐσιωδῶν καὶ ἐπουσιωδῶν, οἷον ἄνθρωπός ἐστι ζῷον λογικόν, ὀρθοπεριπατητικόν, πλατυώνυχον. Εἴρηται δὲ ὁρισμὸς ἀπὸ μεταφορᾶς τῶν τῆς γῆς ὁροθεσίων· ὥσπερ