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Plato, an intelligible substance, self-moving according to a harmonious number; Aristotle, the first entelechy of a natural, organic body, having life potentially. Deinarchos, a harmony of the four elements, that is, a mixture and symphony of the elements. For he wishes to speak not of that which is composed of sounds, but of the harmonious mixture and symphony in the body of hot, cold, wet, and dry things. And it is clear that of these, the others say that the soul is a substance; but Aristotle and Deinarchos, that it is insubstantial. Furthermore, in addition to these things, some have held that the soul of all things is one and the same, fragmented into each individual thing, and coming together again into itself, as the Manicheans and some others; others, that they are many and different in kind; and others, both one and many. It is therefore altogether necessary to lengthen the argument by refuting so many opinions. In general, then, against all those who say the soul is a body, what has been said by Ammonius, the teacher of Plotinus, and by Numenius the Pythagorean will suffice. And these are they. Bodies, being by their own nature changeable and dispersible and altogether divisible ad infinitum, with nothing unchangeable remaining in them, require that which composes and gathers and, as it were, binds and holds them together, which we call soul. If, therefore, the soul is a body of any kind, even the most fine-parted, what then is that which holds it together? For it was shown that every body needs that which holds it together, and so on ad infinitum, until we arrive at something incorporeal. But if they should say, like the Stoics, that there is a certain tensional motion concerning bodies, moving simultaneously inward and outward, and that the outward motion is productive of magnitudes and qualities, but the inward motion of unity and substance, they must be asked, since every motion is from some power, what is this power and in what is it substantiated? If, then, the power is also some kind of matter, we will use the same arguments again; but if it is not matter but enmattered (for the enmattered is different from matter, for that which partakes of matter is called enmattered), what then is that which partakes of matter, is it itself also matter or immaterial? If, then, it is matter, how is it enmattered and not matter? But if it is not matter, then it is immaterial; and if immaterial, not a body, for every body is enmattered. But if they should say that bodies are three-dimensionally extended, and the soul, extending through the whole body, is three-dimensionally extended and for this reason is certainly also a body, we will say that while every body is three-dimensionally extended, not everything that is three-dimensionally extended is a body; for both place and quality, being incorporeal in themselves, are accidentally quantified in bulk. So then also to the soul in itself belongs the unextended, but accidentally, because that in which it is is three-dimensionally extended, it too is contemplated as three-dimensionally extended. Further, every body is moved either from without or from within; but if from without, it will be soulless; but if from within, ensouled. But if the soul is a body, if it were moved from without, it is soulless; if from within, ensouled; but it is absurd to call the soul soulless and ensouled; therefore the soul is not a body. Further, if the soul is nourished, it is nourished by the incorporeal, for learning nourishes it; but no body is nourished by the incorporeal; therefore the soul is not a body. (Xenocrates reasoned thus: but if it is not nourished, whereas every body of an animal is nourished, the soul is not a body.) And these things are in general against all those who say that the soul is a body. But specifically against those who hold that the soul is blood or breath, since when the breath or the blood is separated the animal becomes a corpse, one must not say that which some of those who think they are saying something have written: therefore when a part of the blood flows away, a part of the soul has flowed away; for such a thing is foolish talk. For in the case of homogeneous things, the remaining part is the same as the whole; at any rate, both much water and little are the same, likewise also silver and gold and all things whose parts do not differ from one another in substance; so then also the remaining blood, however much there is, is soul, if indeed blood is soul. Therefore one should rather say that if that is soul whose removal causes the animal to die, then certainly phlegm is also soul

8

Πλάτων δὲ οὐσίαν νοητὴν ἐξ ἑαυτῆς κινητὴν κατὰ ἀριθμὸν ἐναρμόνιον· Ἀριστοτέλης δὲ ἐντελέχειαν πρώτην σώματος φυσικοῦ, ὀργανικοῦ, δυνάμει ζωὴν ἔχοντος. ∆είναρχος δὲ ἁρμονίαν τῶν τεσσάρων στοιχείων, ἀντὶ τοῦ κρᾶσιν καὶ συμφωνίαν τῶν στοιχείων. οὐ γὰρ τὴν ἐκ τῶν φθόγγων συνισταμένην, ἀλλὰ τὴν ἐν τῷ σώματι θερμῶν καὶ ψυχρῶν καὶ ὑγρῶν καὶ ξηρῶν ἐναρμόνιον κρᾶσιν καὶ συμφωνίαν βούλεται λέγειν. δῆλον δὲ ὅτι καὶ τούτων οἱ μὲν ἄλλοι τὴν ψυχὴν οὐσίαν εἶναι λέγουσιν· Ἀριστοτέλης δὲ καὶ ∆είναρχος ἀνούσιον. ἔτι δὲ πρὸς τούτοις οἱ μὲν μίαν εἶναι καὶ τὴν αὐτὴν τῶν πάντων ψυχὴν νενομίκασιν, κατακερματιζομένην εἰς τὰ καθ' ἕκαστα, καὶ πάλιν εἰς ἑαυτὴν συνιοῦσαν, ὡς οἱ Μανιχαῖοι καὶ ἄλλοι τινές· οἱ δὲ πολλὰς καὶ διαφόρους κατ' εἶδος· οἱ δὲ καὶ μίαν καὶ πολλάς. πᾶσα τοίνυν ἀνάγκη μηκῦναι τὸν λόγον τοσαύταις δόξαις ἀντιλέγοντα. κοινῇ μὲν οὖν πρὸς πάντας τοὺς λέγοντας σῶμα τὴν ψυχὴν ἀρκέσει τὰ παρ' Ἁμμωνίου τοῦ διδασκάλου Πλωτίνου καὶ Νουμηνίου τοῦ Πυθαγορικοῦ εἰρημένα. ἔστι δὲ ταῦτα. τὰ σώματα, τῇ οἰκείᾳ φύσει τρεπτὰ ὄντα καὶ σκεδαστὰ καὶ διόλου εἰς ἄπειρον τμητά, μηδενὸς ἐν αὐτοῖς ἀμεταβλήτου ὑπολειπομένου, δεῖται τοῦ συντιθέντος καὶ συνάγοντος καὶ ὥσπερ συσφίγγοντος καὶ συγκρατοῦντος αὐτά, ὅπερ ψυχὴν λέγομεν. εἰ τοίνυν σῶμά ἐστιν ἡ ψυχὴ οἱονδήποτε εἰ καὶ λεπτομερέστατον, τί πάλιν ἐστὶ τὸ συνέχον ἐκείνην; ἐδείχθη γὰρ πᾶν σῶμα δεῖσθαι τοῦ συνέχοντος, καὶ οὕτως εἰς ἄπειρον, ἕως ἂν καταντήσωμεν εἰς ἀσώματον. εἰ δὲ λέγοιεν καθάπερ οἱ Στωϊκοὶ τονικήν τινα εἶναι κίνησιν περὶ τὰ σώματα εἰς τὸ εἴσω ἅμα καὶ εἰς τὸ ἔξω κινουμένην, καὶ τὴν μὲν εἰς τὸ ἔξω μεγεθῶν καὶ ποιοτήτων ἀποτελεστικὴν εἶναι, τὴν δὲ εἰς τὸ εἴσω ἑνώσεως καὶ οὐσίας, ἐρωτητέον αὐτοὺς ἐπειδὴ πᾶσα κίνησις ἀπό τινός ἐστι δυνάμεως τίς ἡ δύναμις αὕτη καὶ ἐν τίνι οὐσίωται; εἰ μὲν οὖν καὶ ἡ δύναμις ὕλη τίς ἐστιν, τοῖς αὐτοῖς πάλιν χρησόμεθα λόγοις· εἰ δὲ οὐχ ὕλη ἀλλ' ἔνυλον (ἕτερον δέ ἐστιν τὸ ἔνυλον παρὰ τὴν ὕλην, τὸ γὰρ μετέχον ὕλης ἔνυλον λέγεται) τί ποτε ἄρα ἐστὶ τὸ μετέχον τῆς ὕλης, πότερον ὕλη καὶ αὐτὸ ἢ ἄϋλον; εἰ μὲν οὖν ὕλη, πῶς ἔνυλον καὶ οὐχ ὕλη; εἰ δὲ οὐχ ὕλη, ἄϋλον ἄρα· εἰ δὲ ἄϋλον, οὐ σῶμα, πᾶν γὰρ σῶμα ἔνυλον. εἰ δὲ λέγοιεν ὅτι τὰ σώματα τριχῇ διαστατά ἐστι, καὶ ἡ ψυχὴ δὲ δι' ὅλου διήκουσα τοῦ σώματος τριχῇ διαστατή ἐστι καὶ διὰ τοῦτο πάντως καὶ σῶμα, ἐροῦμεν ὅτι πᾶν μὲν σῶμα τριχῇ διαστατόν, οὐ πᾶν δὲ τὸ τριχῇ διαστατὸν σῶμα· καὶ γὰρ ὁ τόπος καὶ τὸ ποιόν, ἀσώματα ὄντα καθ' ἑαυτά, κατὰ συμ βεβηκὸς ἐν ὄγκῳ ποσοῦται. οὕτως οὖν καὶ τῇ ψυχῇ καθ' ἑαυτὴν μὲν πρόσεστι τὸ ἀδιάστατον, κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς δὲ τῷ ἐν ᾧ ἐστι τριχῇ διαστατῷ ὄντι συνθεωρεῖται καὶ αὐτὴ τριχῇ διαστατή. ἔτι πᾶν σῶμα ἤτοι ἔξωθεν κινεῖται ἢ ἔνδοθεν· ἀλλ' εἰ μὲν ἔξωθεν, ἄψυχον ἔσται· εἰ δὲ ἔνδοθεν, ἔμψυχον. εἰ δὲ σῶμα ἡ ψυχή, εἰ μὲν ἔξωθεν κινοῖτο, ἄψυχός ἐστιν· εἰ δὲ ἔνδοθεν, ἔμψυχος· ἄτοπον δὲ καὶ τὸ ἄψυχον καὶ τὸ ἔμψυχον λέγειν τὴν ψυχήν· οὐκ ἄρα σῶμα ἡ ψυχή. ἔτι ἡ ψυχὴ εἰ μὲν τρέφεται ὑπὸ ἀσωμάτου τρέφεται, τὰ γὰρ μαθήματα τρέφει αὐτήν· οὐδὲν δὲ σῶμα ὑπὸ ἀσωμάτου τρέφεται· οὐκ ἄρα σῶμα ἡ ψυχή. (Ξενοκράτης οὕτω συνῆγεν· εἰ δὲ μὴ τρέφεται, πᾶν δὲ σῶμα ζῴου τρέφεται, οὐ σῶμα ἡ ψυχή.) καὶ ταῦτα μὲν κοινῇ πρὸς πάντας τοὺς λέγοντας σῶμα εἶναι τὴν ψυχήν. ἰδίᾳ δὲ πρὸς τοὺς δοξάζοντας αἷμα ἢ πνεῦμα εἶναι τὴν ψυχὴν ἐπειδὴ τοῦ πνεύματος ἢ τοῦ αἵματος χωριζομένου νεκροῦται τὸ ζῷον, οὐκ ἐκεῖνο ῥητέον ὅπερ τινὲς τῶν οἰομένων εἶναί τι γεγράφασι λέγοντες· οὐκοῦν ὅταν μέρος ἀπορρυῇ τοῦ αἵματος μέρος ἀπερρύη τῆς ψυχῆς· κουφολογία γὰρ τὸ τοιοῦτον· ἐπὶ γὰρ τῶν ὁμοιομερῶν καὶ τὸ ὑπολειπόμενον μέρος ταὐτόν ἐστιν τῷ παντί· ὕδωρ γοῦν καὶ τὸ πολὺ καὶ τὸ βραχὺ ταὐτόν, ὁμοίως καὶ ἄργυρος καὶ χρυσὸς καὶ πάντα ὧν τὰ μέρη οὐ διαλλάττει ἀλλήλων κατὰ τὴν οὐσίαν· οὕτως οὖν καὶ τὸ ὑπολειπόμενον αἷμα, ὅσον ἂν ᾖ, ψυχή ἐστιν, εἴπερ ψυχὴ τὸ αἷμα. ἐκεῖνο οὖν μᾶλλον λεκτέον ὅτι εἰ τοῦτό ἐστι ψυχὴ οὗ ἐξαιρουμένου θνήσκει τὸ ζῷον, πάντως καὶ τὸ φλέγμα ψυχή ἐστι