--- 41 Therefore, against those who say there is one source of evils, what has been said is sufficient. For the gods <all and> are sources and causes of all good things, but of no evil are they nor may they ever be. For if, <as was said before and as Socrates in the Phaedrus wishes, all> the divine is beautiful, wise, good [Pl. Phaedr. 246dƒe], either it will act contrary to its own nature by contriving the generation of evils, or everything that subsists from it will be good-like and an offspring of the goodness remaining in it. But it is not the nature of fire <they say> to cool, nor of the good to produce evil from itself. Therefore, one of two things: either evil is not evil <it must be said>, if it is from a god, or <it both exists and> it is not from a god; and it has been shown before that it exists. Therefore the causes of evils are other things, and not a god, <as Plato somewhere teaches [resp. II 379c]>, <positing> the coming-to-be of all good things from one cause, but tracing back the generation of evils to many other causes and not the divine; for everything that subsists from there is good. --- But these are blessed <and truly happy> who say that evils are also ordered by the gods and their infinity is measured and their darkness is defined, in virtue of which indeed these things also receive a share of the good and obtain a power for existence; and the cause that orders and arranges these things they have called a source of evils, and not as a generative <mother> of them -for it was not right for the first causes of beings to initiate the generation of evils-, but as imposing on them limit and boundary and illuminating their lack of light with its own splendors. For indeed for evils their infinity comes from particular causes, but their limit from the wholes. Therefore for the former it is an evil <what it is>, but for the universals themselves it is not an evil. For infinity does not belong to them by virtue of power, so that it would have participated in the good even according to its own infinity, but through a lack of power; and it is somehow strengthened by the good through participation in limit. 42 <They, therefore> ... <being persuaded that> not even the generation of evils is disordered and <have made> god the cause of their order. --- <leaving> in the gods the knowledge of all things, both of good and of evil, and <giving> to the good things their generation directly from the gods, but to the evil things insofar as these also have received a share of good and a power for existence and a limit. For evil is not unmixed evil, as has been said many times, but in one way evil, and in another good; and as good it is from the gods, but as evil from <another cause> that is weak; for all evil is generated through weakness and deficiency, since the good also is from power and in power ...; for power is of it and in it. For if evil were unmixed evil and only evil, it would be unknowable to the gods, who are good and able to make all things good, all things whose being is from them, which is to say all things of which they have knowledge, since their cognitions are active powers and constitutive of all things, of which indeed they are said to be cognitions. But since it is at the same time evil and otherwise good, and not in one respect good, in another evil, but everything that it is is good and rather good because it is such for the whole, we must neither deny the knowledge in the gods nor its generation from there, but the gods know evil insofar as it is good and they make it. ... and with them the causes of evils are good-producing powers--- 43 But since the argument has shifted to the forms and the order of the forms, are not perhaps evils and the generations of evils also among these? Or from where do these also have their unfailing nature? For everything that is everlasting proceeds from some unmoved and definite cause. And if evil is eternal, hovering about mortal nature [Pl. Theaet. 176a], what is its eternal aspect and from where? For we would not say it is from another cause than the nature which is always in the same state and unmoved; <but this is the nature of the forms, and that which is everlasting> is good. For what could come to be in the intellect that is not good? If therefore it is good <itself>, each thing that comes to be in relation to them is good-for that which is made like the good is good; but evil, insofar as it is evil, is not by nature made like good things-; and the one who is made like the intelligible forms we say to be perfect <and happy>, but the evil one <quite the opposite>

--- 41 Πρὸς μὲν οὖν τοὺς λέγοντας μίαν πηγὴν τῶν κακῶν ἐξαρκεῖ τὰ εἰρημένα. θεοὶ γὰρ <πάντες καὶ> πηγαὶ πάντων τῶν ἀγαθῶν αἰτίαι, κακοῦ δὲ οὐδενὸς οὔτε εἰσὶν οὔτε μὴ γένοιντό ποτε. εἰ γάρ, <ὡς εἴρηται πρότερον καὶ ὁ ἐν Φαίδρῳ Σωκράτης βούλεται, πᾶν> τὸ θεῖον καλόν, σοφόν, ἀγαθόν [Pl. Phaedr. 246dƒe], ἢ παρὰ τὴν αὐτοῦ φύσιν ποιήσει τὴν τῶν κακῶν γένεσιν μηχανώμενον, ἢ πᾶν τὸ ἐκεῖθεν ὑποστὰν ἀγα- θοειδὲς ἔσται καὶ ἔκγονον τῆς ἐν αὐτῷ μενούσης ἀγαθότητος. ἀλλ' οὔτε πυρός <φασι> τὸ ψύχειν, οὔτε ἀγαθοῦ τὸ κακὸν ἀφ' ἑαυτοῦ παράγειν. δυοῖν οὖν θάτερον· ἢ μὴ εἶναι κακὸν <ῥητέον> τὸ κακόν, εἰ θεόθεν, ἢ <καὶ εἶναι καὶ> μὴ θεόθεν εἶναι· δέδεικται δὲ ἔμπροσθεν ὡς ἔστιν. ἄλλα ἄρα τὰ κακῶν αἴτια, καὶ οὐ θεός, <ὥς που καὶ Πλάτων διδάσκει [resp. II 379c]>, τοῖς μὲν ἀγαθοῖς πᾶσιν ἐκ μιᾶς αἰτίας τὴν πάροδον <ὑποτιθείς>, τῶν δὲ κακῶν τὴν γένεσιν ἐπ' ἄλλα πολλὰ αἴτια καὶ οὐ τὸ θεῖον ἀνάγων· πᾶν γὰρ τὸ ἐκεῖθεν ὑποστὰν ἀγαθόν. --- οὗτοι δὲ μακάριοι <καὶ ὄντως εὐδαίμονες> οἱ ἀπὸ θεῶν καὶ τὰ κακὰ κοσ- μεῖσθαι λέγοντες καὶ τὸ ἄπειρον αὐτῶν μετρεῖσθαι καὶ τὸ σκοτεινὸν ὁρίζεσθαι, καθ' ὃ δὴ καὶ ταῦτα μοῖραν τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ δέχεται καὶ λαγχάνει δύναμιν πρὸς τὸ εἶναι· καὶ τὴν ταῦτα κοσμοῦσαν καὶ τάττουσαν αἰτίαν πηγὴν προσειρήκασι κακῶν, καὶ οὐχ ὡς <μητέρα> γεννητικὴν αὐτῶν -οὐ γὰρ ἦν θέμις τὰς πρωτίστας τῶν ὄντων αἰτίας τῆς τῶν κακῶν ἐξάρχειν γενέσεως-, ἀλλ' ὡς τὸ πέρας αὐτοῖς καὶ τὸν ὅρον ἐπιβάλλουσαν καὶ τὸ ἀφεγγὲς αὐτῶν καταλάμπουσαν ταῖς ἑαυτῆς λαμπηδόσι. καὶ γὰρ τοῖς κακοῖς τὸ μὲν ἄπειρον ἐκ τῶν μερικῶν ὑπάρχει αἰτίων, τὸ δὲ πέρας ἐκ τῶν ὅλων. διὸ τοῖς μέν ἐστι κακὸν <ὅ ἐστιν>, αὐτοῖς δὲ τοῖς καθόλου οὐκ ἔστι κακόν. οὐ γὰρ κατὰ τὴν δύναμιν ὑπάρχει αὐτοῖς τὸ ἄπειρον, ἵνα ἂν καὶ κατὰ τὸ ἑαυτῶν ἄπειρον μετεῖχεν τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ, ἀλλὰ δι' ἔλλειψιν δυνάμεως· ῥώννυται δέ πως τῷ ἀγαθῷ τῇ τοῦ πέρατος μεθέξει. 42 <Ἐκεῖνοι μὲν οὖν> ... οὐδὲ τῶν κακῶν τὴν γένεσιν ἄτακτον <εἶναι πεπεισμένοι> καὶ τῆς τούτων τάξεως τὸν θεὸν αἴτιον <πεποιήκασιν>. --- ἐν θεοῖς πάντων τὴν γνῶσιν <ἀπολείποντες> ἀγαθῶν τε καὶ κακῶν, καὶ τοῖς μὲν ἀγαθοῖς αὐτόθεν ἐκ θεῶν <διδόναι> τὴν γένεσιν, τοῖς δὲ κακοῖς καθ' ὅσον ἀγαθοῦ μοῖραν ἔλαχε καὶ ταῦτα καὶ δύναμιν εἰς τὸ εἶναι καὶ πέρας. οὐ γὰρ ἀμιγὲς κακὸν τὸ κακόν, ὥσπερ εἴρηται πολλάκις, ἀλλ' ὡδὶ μὲν κακόν, ὡδὶ δὲ ἀγαθόν· καὶ ὡς μὲν ἀγαθὸν ἐκ θεῶν, ὡς δὲ κακὸν ἐξ <ἄλλης αἰτίας> ἀσθενοῦς· πᾶν γὰρ κακὸν δι' ἀσθένειαν γεννᾶται καὶ ἔλλειψιν, ἐπεὶ καὶ τὸ ἀγαθὸν ἐκ δυνάμεως καὶ ἐν δυνάμει ...· αὐτοῦ γὰρ ἡ δύναμις καὶ ἐν αὐτῷ. καὶ γὰρ εἰ μὲν ἄκρατον ἦν κακὸν τὸ κακὸν καὶ μόνον κακόν, ἄγνωστον ἦν ἂν θεοῖς, ἀγαθοῖς οὖσι καὶ πάντα ἀγαθύ- νειν δυναμένοις, ὅσοις τὸ εἶναι παρ' αὐτῶν, τοῦτο δέ ἐστιν ὅσων ἔχουσι τὴν γνῶσιν, ἐπείπερ αἱ γνώσεις αὐτῶν δραστήριοι δυνάμεις εἰσὶ καὶ ὑποστατικαὶ πάντων, ὧν δὴ καὶ εἶναι λέγονται γνώσεις. ἐπεὶ δὲ ἅμα τὲ κακὸν καὶ ἄλλως ἀγαθόν, καὶ οὐ πῇ μὲν ἀγαθόν, πῇ δὲ κακόν, ἀλλὰ πᾶν ὅ ἐστιν ἀγαθὸν καὶ μᾶλλον ἀγαθὸν ὅτι τῷ παντὶ τοιοῦτον, οὔτε τὴν ἐν θεοῖς γνῶσιν ἀναιρετέον οὔτε τὴν ἐκεῖθεν αὐτοῦ γένεσιν, ἀλλὰ γινώσκουσι οἱ θεοὶ τὸ κακὸν ᾗ ἀγαθὸν καὶ ποιοῦσι. ... καὶ παρ' αὐτοῖς αἱ αἰτίαι τῶν κακῶν δυνάμεις εἰσὶν ἀγαθοποιοί--- 43 Ἀλλά γε ὅτι πρὸς τὰ εἴδη καὶ τὴν τῶν εἰδῶν τάξιν ὁ λόγος μετα- βέβηκε, μήποτε γὰρ καὶ τούτοις τὰ κακὰ καὶ αἱ τῶν κακῶν γενέσεις; ἢ πόθεν καὶ τούτοις τὸ ἀνέκλειπτον; πᾶν γὰρ τὸ ἀεὶ ὂν ἐξ ἀκινήτου τινὸς πρόεισιν αἰτίας καὶ ὡρισμένης. καὶ εἰ τὸ κακὸν ἀΐδιον τὴν θνητὴν φύσιν περιπολοῦν [Pl. Theaet. 176a], τί τὸ ἀΐδιον αὐτοῦ καὶ πόθεν; οὐ γὰρ ἐξ ἄλλης αἰτίας εἴπωμεν ἢ τῆς ἀεὶ ὡσαύτως ἐχούσης καὶ ἀκινήτου φύσεως· <ἀλλ' αὕτη ἡ τῶν εἰδῶν φύσις, καὶ τὸ ἀεὶ ὂν> ἀγαθόν. καὶ τί γὰρ ἂν ἐν τῷ νῷ γίνοιτο μὴ ἀγαθόν; εἰ οὖν ἀγαθὸν <αὐτό>, ἕκαστον τὸ πρὸς αὐτὰ γινόμενον ἀγαθόν-τὸ γὰρ τῷ ἀγαθῷ ὁμοιούμενον ἀγαθόν· τὸ δὲ κακὸν ᾗ κακὸν ὁμοιοῦσθαι τοῖς ἀγαθοῖς οὐ πέφυκε-· καὶ τὸν μὲν ὁμοιούμενον τοῖς νοητοῖς εἴδεσι τέλειον <καὶ εὐδαίμονα> εἶναι φαμέν, τὸν δὲ κακὸν <πᾶν τοὐναντίον>