18 For the wise thing said by them is this, that just as we see that when the soul is separated from the body the body itself is destroyed, so too when the power releases matter, what is left, which is matter, will be dissolved and pass away. For first, they do not see that none of the things that exist can be destroyed into non-existence, for non-existence does not exist; but when bodies are scattered and have undergone some change, a dissolution occurs, so that one part departs to earth, another to air, another to something else. Then, they do not remember that they suppose matter to be disordered motion. But how is it reasonable that what is moved by itself and whose essence is motion, and does not possess it accidentally, should cease from what it was before the power came down into it, when the power departs? But they do not see the difference, that every body devoid of soul is motionless—for even plants have a vegetative soul—but they say that the very essence of matter is motion, though a disordered one. But it would have been better, just as when harmony comes to a lyre that is playing discordantly and makes the whole harmonious, so the divine power, having been mixed with the disordered motion which according to them is matter, imposed a certain order upon it in place of the inherent disorder, and always imposes an order worthy of the divine chorus. For how was Manichaeus himself ever capable of distinguishing these things, and to whom did he ever relate them? For they admit that he himself became a mixture of matter and of the power trapped in it. If, therefore, he said these things by the disordered motion which he had, how is the opinion not worthless? Or if by the divine power, the dogma is now ambiguous; on the one hand, in being from the divine power, it partakes of truth, but on the other hand [from the disordered motion] in partaking of the other part, it changes to falsehood.

19 But if it had been said that the divine power ordered matter and orders it, it would have been by far wiser and would contribute more to the credibility of the words of Manichaeus. But "God sent down another power." Now, what has been said about the former power is common also to this one, and whatever absurdities follow the account of their first power, these can be said now as well. But who could endure the rest? For why did not God send down some one power that was capable of all things? Or is the human mind so versatile for all things, that the same man is a geometrician, and the same an astronomer and a craftsman and anything of that sort, but for God, then, was it impossible to find such a power as would be sufficient for Him for all things, so that he would not need a first and a second? And why is one power creative, and the other more passive, so that it is fitting for it to be mixed with matter? For I do not see here again the cause of the order of the good and its pre-eminence, if evil was not in the house of God. For if God alone is good and matter alone is evil, it is necessary to say that the other things are intermediate and in between. But some different maker is found for the intermediate things, when they say one is the creative cause, and the other is mixed with matter. Perhaps, then, this is the "preferred" and the "rejected," which the younger philosophers also speak of in the discussion concerning things indifferent. And they say that when the creative power undertook the making of the world, that part of matter which remained in its own virtue even in the mixture was separated off and became the sun and moon, and that which had partaken of a moderate amount of evil became the heaven and stars, and that the rest of the other things within these were included as they chanced to be, being mixtures of the divine power and of matter.

20 But I, beyond all these things, wonder how they do not perceive that they are making the divine power corporeal and cutting it just like its parts. For why not also matter and

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18 τὸ μὲν γὰρ δὴ σοφὸν τὸ λεγόμενον ὑπ' αὐτῶν ἐκεῖνό ἐστιν, ὅτι ὥσπερ ὁρῶμεν τῆς ψυχῆς τοῦ σώμα τος ἀποζευχθείσης τὸ σῶμα αὐτὸ ἀπολλύμενον, οὕτω καὶ τῆς δυνάμεως ἀφείσης τὴν ὕλην τὸ λειπόμενον ὅπερ ἐστὶν ἡ ὕλη διαλυθὲν οἰχήσεται. πρῶτον μὲν γὰρ οὐχ ὁρῶσιν ὅτι τῶν ὄντων οὐδὲν οἷόν ἐστιν φθείρε σθαι εἰς τὸ μὴ ὄν, τὸ γὰρ μὴ ὂν οὐκ ἔστιν· διασκε δασθέντων δὲ τῶν σωμάτων καὶ μεταβολήν τινα σχόν των διάλυσις γίνεται, ὥστε τὸ μὲν εἰς γῆν ἀπελθεῖν τὸ δὲ εἰς ἀέρα τὸ δὲ εἰς ἄλλο τι. ἔπειτα δὲ οὐ μέμνηνται ὅτι κίνησιν ἄτακτον ὑποτίθενται εἶναι τὴν ὕλην. τὸ δὲ δι' αὑτὸ κινούμενον καὶ οὗ ἐστιν οὐσία ἡ κίνησις, ἀλλὰ μὴ κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς ὑπάρχει αὐτῷ, πῶς εὔλογον τῆς δυνάμεως ἀπελθούσης παύσασθαι τοῦ ὅπερ ἦν πρὶν καὶ τὴν δύναμιν εἰς αὐτὸ κατελ θεῖν; οὐχ ὁρῶσι δὲ τὸ παραλλάττον, ὅτι πᾶν μὲν σῶμα ψυχῆς ἄμοιρον ἀκίνητον ἔχει γὰρ καὶ τὰ φυτὰ τὴν φυτικὴν ψυχήν, τῆς δὲ ὕλης αὐτὴν τὴν οὐσίαν κίνησιν εἶναί φασιν, ἄτακτον μέντοι. κάλλιον δὲ ἦν, καθάπερ ἐπὶ λύρας ἀνάρμοστα μελῳδούσης ἡ ἁρμονία ἐλθοῦσα τὸ πᾶν ἡρμοσμένον ἀπειργάσατο, οὕτω δὲ μιχθεῖσαν τὴν θείαν δύναμιν τῇ ἀτάκτῳ κινήσει ὅπερ ἐστὶν κατ' αὐτοὺς ἡ ὕλη ἀντὶ τῆς ἐνούσης ἀκοσμίας κόσμον τινὰ αὐτῇ ἐπιτεθεικέναι καὶ ἀεὶ ἐπι θεῖναι τοῦ θείου χοροῦ ἐπάξιον. ἐπεὶ πῶς ποτε αὐτὸς ὁ Μανιχαῖος περὶ τούτων ἐγένετο ἱκανὸς διαλαβεῖν καὶ τῷ ποτε αὐτὰ ἀφηγήσατο; ὡς γὰρ μῖγμα γέγονεν καὶ αὐτὸς τῆς ὕλης καὶ τῆς ἐναποληφθείσης αὐτῇ δυνάμεως, συγχωροῦσιν. εἴτε οὖν ᾧ εἶχεν τῇ ἀτάκτῳ κινήσει ταῦτα ἔλεγεν, πῶς οὐ φαύλη ἡ δόξα; εἴτε τῇ θείᾳ δυνάμει, ἀμφίδοξον ἤδη τὸ δόγμα· τῷ μὲν ἀπὸ τῆς θείας δυνάμεως εἶναι, μέτοχον ἀληθείας, τῷ δὲ [ἀπὸ τῆς ἀτάκτου κινήσεως] τοῦ ἑτέρου μέρους μετέ χειν, μεθιστάμενον εἰς τὸ ψεῦδος.

19 εἰ δὲ εἴρητο ὡς ἡ θεία δύναμις τὴν ὕλην ἐκόσμησεν καὶ κοσμεῖ, μακρῷ ἂν ἦν σοφώτερον καὶ πρὸς ἀξιοπιστίαν τῶν Μανιχαίου λόγων συμβαλλόμενον μᾶλλον. Ἀλλὰ γὰρ «ἑτέραν δύναμιν κατέπεμψεν ὁ θεός». ἃ μὲν δὴ εἴρηται περὶ τῆς προτέρας δυνάμεως, κοινὰ καὶ περὶ ταύτης ἐστίν, καὶ ὅσα ἄτοπα ἕπεται τῷ λόγῳ τῷ περὶ τῆς πρώτης αὐτῶν δυνάμεως, ταῦτα καὶ νῦν ἔστι λέγειν. τὸ δὲ ἄλλο τίς <ἂν> ἀνάσχοιτο; διὰ τί γὰρ δὴ οὐ πάντα μίαν τινὰ δυναμένην δύναμιν κατέ πεμψεν ὁ θεός; ἢ ἀνθρώπου μὲν νοῦς οὕτως ἐστὶν πρὸς πάντα ποικίλος, ὥστε <ὁ> αὐτὸς μὲν εἶναι γεω μετρικός, ὁ αὐτὸς δὲ ἀστρονομικὸς καὶ τεκτονικὸς καὶ εἴ τι τοιοῦτον, θεῷ δὲ ἄρα ἦν ἄπορον εὑρεῖν τοιαύτην δύναμιν ἥτις αὐτῷ πρὸς πάντα ἦν ἱκανή, ἵνα μὴ πρώτης καὶ δευτέρας δέηται; διὰ τί δὲ ἡ μὲν δύναμίς ἐστιν δημιουργική, ἣ δὲ παθητικὴ μᾶλλον, ὡς καλῶς αὐτῇ ἔχειν πρὸς τὴν ὕλην κεράννυσθαι; οὐχ ὁρῶ γὰρ πάλιν ἐνταῦθα τὸ αἴτιον τῆς τάξεως τοῦ καλοῦ καὶ τῆς κατ' αὐτοῦ ὑπεροχῆς, εἰ κακὸν [ἦν] οὐκ ἦν ἐν τῷ τοῦ θεοῦ οἴκῳ. εἰ γὰρ μόνον καλὸν ὁ θεὸς καὶ μόνον κακὸν ἡ ὕλη, μέσα τὰ ἄλλα καὶ μεταξὺ ἀνάγκη φάναι. ἀλλὰ εὑρίσκεταί τις ποιητὴς διάφορος περὶ τὰ μέσα, ὅταν φῶσιν τὴν μὲν δημιουργικὴν αἰτίαν, τὴν δὲ μικτὴν πρὸς τὴν ὕλην. τάχα οὖν ἐστιν τὸ προηγού μενον καὶ ἀποπροηγησάμενον τοῦτο, ὃ καὶ οἱ νεώτεροι λέγουσιν ἐν τῷ περὶ τῶν ἀδιαφόρων λόγῳ. Τῆς δὲ δημιουργικῆς φασιν δυνάμεως ἐπιχειρησά σης τῇ κοσμοποιίᾳ ἀποκεκρίσθαι τῆς ὕλης τὸ μεῖναν ἐπὶ τῆς ἰδίας ἀρετῆς κἀν τῇ συμμίξει καὶ γεγονέναι ἥλιον καὶ σελήνην, τὸ δὲ μετρίας μετειληφὸς κακίας οὐρανὸν καὶ ἀστέρας, λοιπὸν δὲ τὰ ἄλλα ἐντὸς τούτων περιειλῆφθαι ὡς ἔτυχεν μίγματα ὄντα τῆς τε θείας δυνάμεως καὶ τῆς ὕλης.

20 ἐγὼ δὲ παρὰ πάντα ταῦτα θαυμάζω πῶς οὐκ αἰσθάνονται σωματικὴν ποιοῦντες τὴν θείαν δύναμιν καὶ τέμνοντες καθάπερ τὰ μέρη. διὰ τί γὰρ οὐχ ὕλη καὶ

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