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opposed and the absurdity of the unbelievers. For what need is there to speak of the correspondence of each of these to each and of their connection with one another, if indeed one must even speak of a connection, as of things separated by some difference, and not also to say that the possible is what is willed, and that what is willed by God is in every way possible and in accordance with the worth of the one who willed it? And that the argument concerning the truth is one thing, and the argument on behalf of the truth is another, has been stated moderately in what has gone before, in what respects each differs, and when and to whom it is useful. But perhaps nothing prevents, for the sake of both common security and the connection of what has been said with what remains, making a beginning again from these very things and from what is related to them. It is fitting for the one to have primacy by nature, and for the other to attend the first as a bodyguard, both to prepare the way and to clear away in advance everything that is an obstacle and an obstruction. For the argument concerning the truth, being necessary for all men for security and salvation, stands first both in nature and in order and in usefulness. In nature, as providing the knowledge of things; in order, as existing in and with those things of which it is the revealer; in usefulness, as being the agent of security and salvation for those who know. But the one on behalf of the truth is inferior in nature and in power, for it is a lesser thing to refute falsehood than to establish the truth; and second in order, for it has its strength against those who hold false opinions; and false opinion grew from an after-sowing and corruption. But even though these things are so, it is often put first and sometimes becomes more useful, as it removes and cleanses beforehand the unbelief that troubles some and for those just approaching, their doubt or false opinion. And each is referred to one end; for both the one that refutes falsehood and the one that establishes the truth has its reference to piety. Yet they are not altogether one, but the one is necessary, as I said, for all who believe and care for the truth and their own salvation, while the other is at times and for some and to some more useful. And let these things have been said by us in summary as a reminder of what has already been said. But we must proceed to the subject at hand, and show that the argument concerning the resurrection is true, both from its cause, according to which and for which the first man came to be, and those after him (even if they did not come to be in a similar manner), and from the common nature of all men as men, and further from the judgment of the maker upon these things, according to how much time each one lived and according to what laws he lived, a judgment which no one would dispute is just. The argument from the cause is, if we should consider whether

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ἀντικείμενον καὶ τὸ τῶν ἀπιστούντων παράλογον. τί γὰρ δεῖ λέγειν περὶ τῆς ἑκάστου τούτων πρὸς ἕκαστον ἀντιστροφῆς καὶ τῆς πρὸς ἄλληλα συναφείας, εἴ γε δεῖ καὶ συνάφειαν εἰπεῖν ὡς ἑτερότητί τινι κεχωρισμένων, οὐχὶ δὲ καὶ τὸ δυνατὸν λέγειν βουλητὸν καὶ τὸ τῷ θεῷ βουλητὸν πάντως εἶναι δυνατὸν καὶ κατὰ τὴν τοῦ βουληθέντος ἀξίαν; Καὶ ὅτι μὲν ἕτερος ὁ περὶ τῆς ἀληθείας λόγος, ἕτερος δὲ ὁ ὑπὲρ τῆς ἀληθείας, εἴρηται διὰ τῶν προλαβόντων μετρίως οἷς τε διενήνοχεν ἑκάτερος καὶ πότε καὶ πρὸς τίνας ἔχει τὸ χρήσιμον· κωλύει δὲ ἴσως οὐδὲν τῆς τε κοινῆς ἀσφαλείας ἕνεκεν καὶ τῆς τῶν εἰρημένων πρὸς τὰ λειπόμενα συναφείας ἀπ' αὐτῶν τούτων καὶ τῶν τούτοις προσηκόντων πάλιν ποιήσασθαι τὴν ἀρχήν. προσῆκεν δὲ τῷ μὲν τὸ πρωτεύειν κατὰ φύσιν, τῷ δὲ τὸ δορυφορεῖν τὸν πρῶτον ὁδοποιεῖν τε καὶ προανείργειν πᾶν ὁπόσον ἐμποδὼν καὶ πρόσαντες. ὁ μὲν γὰρ περὶ τῆς ἀληθείας λόγος ἀναγκαῖος ὢν πᾶσιν ἀνθρώ- ποις πρὸς ἀσφάλειαν καὶ σωτηρίαν πρωτοστατεῖ καὶ τῇ φύσει καὶ τῇ τάξει καὶ τῇ χρείᾳ· τῇ φύσει μὲν, ὡς τὴν τῶν πραγμάτων γνῶσιν παρεχόμενος, τῇ τάξει δὲ, ὡς ἐν τούτοις καὶ ἅμα τούτοις ὑπάρχων ὧν γίνεται μηνυτής, τῇ χρείᾳ δὲ, ὡς τῆς ἀσφαλείας καὶ τῆς σωτηρίας τοῖς γινώσκουσι γινόμενος πρόξενος. ὁ δ' ὑπὲρ τῆς ἀληθείας φύσει τε καὶ δυνάμει καταδεέστερος, ἔλαττον γὰρ τὸ τὸ ψεῦδος ἐλέγχειν τοῦ τὴν ἀλήθειαν κρατύνειν· καὶ τάξει δεύτερος, κατὰ γὰρ τῶν ψευδοδοξούντων ἔχει τὴν ἰσχύν· ψευδοδοξίᾳ δὲ ἐξ ἐπισπορᾶς ἐπεφύη καὶ παραφθορᾶς· ἀλλὰ δὴ καὶ τούτων οὕτως ἐχόντων προτάττεται πολλάκις καὶ γίνεταί ποτε χρειωδέστερος ὡς ἀναιρῶν καὶ προδιακαθαίρων τὴν ἐνοχλοῦσάν τισιν ἀπιστίαν καὶ τοῖς ἄρτι προσιοῦσι τὴν ἀμφιβολίαν ἢ ψευδοδοξίαν. καὶ πρὸς ἓν μὲν ἑκάτερος ἀναφέρεται τέλος· εἰς γὰρ τὴν εὐσέβειαν ἔχει τὴν ἀνα- φορὰν ὅ τε τὸ ψεῦδος ἐλέγχων καὶ ὁ τὴν ἀλήθειαν κρατύνων· οὐ μὴν καὶ καθάπαξ ἕν εἰσιν, ἀλλ' ὁ μὲν ἀναγκαῖος, ὡς ἔφην, πᾶσι τοῖς πιστεύουσι καὶ τοῖς τῆς ἀληθείας καὶ τῆς ἰδίας σωτηρίας φροντί- ζουσιν, ὁ δὲ ἔστιν ὅτε καί τισιν καὶ πρός τινας γίνεται χρειωδέσ- τερος. καὶ ταῦτα μὲν ἡμῖν κεφαλαιωδῶς προειρήσθω πρὸς ὑπόμνησιν τῶν ἤδη λεχθέντων· ἰτέον δὲ ἐπὶ τὸ προκείμενον, καὶ δεικτέον ἀληθῆ τὸν περὶ τῆς ἀναστάσεως λόγον ἀπό τε τῆς αἰτίας αὐτῆς, καθ' ἣν καὶ δι' ἣν ὁ πρῶτος γέγονεν ἄνθρωπος οἵ τε μετ' ἐκεῖνον, εἰ καὶ μὴ κατὰ τὸν ὅμοιον γεγόνασι τρόπον, ἀπό τε τῆς κοινῆς πάντων ἀνθρώπων ὡς ἀνθρώπων φύσεως, ἔτι δὲ ἀπὸ τῆς τοῦ ποιήσαντος ἐπὶ τούτοις κρίσεως, καθ' ὅσον ἕκαστος ἔζησε χρόνον καὶ καθ' οὓς ἐπολιτεύσατο νόμους, ἣν οὐκ ἄν τις ἀμφισβητήσειεν εἶναι δικαίαν. Ἔστι δὲ ὁ μὲν ἀπὸ τῆς αἰτίας λόγος, ἐὰν ἐπισκοπῶμεν πότερον