...ute the resurrection, those who disbelieve it? But if by the first, the argument is false; for the diagonal does not become incommensurable with the side by a re-creation, but those who are raised are raised according to a re-creation. But if by 'for some', yet for God all things are possible that are impossible for some. 8. If in the present life the pious man differs from the impious only by hope, how does he who destroys the hope of future things not destroy the difference between the pious and the impious? 9. If without the particular it is impossible for the universal to exist, how, if the particular is created, will the universal not also be created? But if this is so, how is it not false that man and the other parts of creation are co-eternal with God? For instance, if Plato is created, how is man not created? 10. How did the Greeks, supposing the world to be eternal, dogmatize the things that necessarily follow from the hypothesis? But if indeed the world were eternal according to them, they would reasonably say that there would not be a re-creation of the world; for re-creation is of a created world and not of an uncreated one. But that the world is not eternal is clear from the fact that man is not co-eternal with God. For if the universal is co-eternal with God, so necessarily is the particular; but if not the particular, neither is the universal. 11. To transfer all men at once through re-creation into being incorruptible is a far more divine thing in its greatness than to bring them into this mortal state in which we now are. But He kept for us the fitting and more divine thing for later, since in it lies the end of our existence. If we were deprived of this, according to those who disbelieve the resurrection, how much better would it have been for us not to be than to be? For everything that is deprived of its proper end is useless. 12. If it is impossible for anyone to prefer death to his own life for the sake of a non-existent thing, how then, when according to you the dogma of the resurrection is not true, did the martyrs prefer their own death to their own lives for its sake? And of what other religion was the dogma confirmed by manifold tortures and deaths than of their own religion, I mean that of the Christians concerning the resurrection of the dead? 13. If what the Greeks do not believe, these things neither are nor will be, then the existence of things lies in the knowledge of the Greeks. How then are they shown to be fighting with themselves and with each other in most of the most important dogmas? For such a conflict does not allow the existence of things to lie in the knowledge of the Greeks. 14. If they disbelieve the tradition of those who saw the author of the resurrection risen from the dead to immortal life, but to refute the dogma of the resurrection with irrefutable proof

λουσι τὴν ἀνάστασιν οἱ ταύτην ἀπιστοῦντες; Ἀλλ' εἰ μὲν τῷ πρώτῳ, ψευδής ἐστιν ὁ λόγος· οὐ γὰρ κατὰ ἀνάκτισιν ἀσύμ μετρος γίνεται ἡ διάμετρος τῇ πλευρᾷ, οἱ δὲ ἀνιστάμενοι κατὰ ἀνάκτισιν ἀνίστανται. Eἰ δὲ τῷ τινί, ἀλλὰ τῷ θεῷ πάντα δυνατὰ τὰ τινὶ ἀδύνατα. η. Eἰ ἐπὶ τοῦ παρόντος βίου ὁ εὐσεβὴς τοῦ ἀσεβοῦς ἐλ πίδι μόνῃ διαφέρει, πῶς ὁ ἀναιρῶν τῶν μελλόντων τὴν ἐλπίδα οὐκ ἀναιρεῖ εὐσεβοῦς τε καὶ ἀσεβοῦς τὴν διαφοράν; θ. Eἰ χωρὶς τοῦ καθέκαστον ἀδύνατόν ἐστιν ὑπάρχειν τὸ καθόλου, πῶς, εἰ κτιστὸν τὸ καθέκαστον, οὐ κτιστὸν ἔσται καὶ τὸ καθόλου; Ἀλλ' εἰ τοῦτο, πῶς οὐκ ἔστι ψευδὲς τὸ συν αΐδιον εἶναι τὸν ἄνθρωπον καὶ τὰ λοιπὰ μέρη τῆς κτίσεως τῷ θεῷ; Oἷον εἰ κτιστὸς ὁ Πλάτων, πῶς οὐ κτιστὸς ὁ ἄν θρωπος; ι. Πῶς οἱ Ἕλληνες, ὑποθέμενοι τὸ ἀΐδιον εἶναι τὸν κό σμον, τὰ τῇ ὑποθέσει ἐξ ἀνάγκης ἑπόμενα ἐδογμάτισαν; Ἀλλ' εἰ μὲν ἦν κατ' αὐτοὺς ἀΐδιος ὁ κόσμος, εὐλόγως ἂν ἔλεγον μὴ ἔσεσθαι τοῦ κόσμου τὴν ἀνάκτισιν· τοῦ γὰρ κτιστοῦ κόσμου ἐστὶν ἡ ἀνάκτισις καὶ οὐχὶ τοῦ ἀκτίστου. Ὅτι δὲ οὐκ ἔστιν ἀΐδιος ὁ κόσμος, δῆλον ἐκ τοῦ μὴ εἶναι τὸν ἄνθρωπον συν αΐδιον τῷ θεῷ. Eἰ γὰρ συναΐδιον τῷ θεῷ τὸ καθόλου, ἐξ ἀνάγκης καὶ τὸ καθέκαστον· εἰ δὲ μὴ τὸ καθέκαστον, οὐδὲ τὸ καθόλου. ια. Τὸ ἐφάπαξ πάντας τοὺς ἀνθρώπους διὰ τῆς ἀνακτί σεως εἰς τὸ εἶναι αὐτοὺς ἀφθάρτους μεταγαγεῖν πολὺ θειω δέστερον ὑπάρχει κατὰ μέγεθος τοῦ αὐτοὺς εἰς τὴν θνητὴν ταύτην κατάστασιν, ἐν ᾗ νῦν ἐσμεν, εἰσαγαγεῖν. Ἐφύλαττε δὲ ἡμῖν τὸ κατάλληλον καὶ θειωδέστερον εἰς ὕστερον, ὡς ἐν αὐτῷ τὸ τέλος τῆς ἡμῶν ὑποστάσεως κείμενον. Oὗ εἰ ἀπε στερημένοι ἦμεν κατὰ τοὺς ἀπιστοῦντας τὴν ἀνάστασιν, πόσῳ μᾶλλον ἂν ἦν κάλλιον τὸ μὴ εἶναι τοῦ εἶναι ἡμᾶς; Ἄχρηστον γὰρ πᾶν τὸ στερούμενον τοῦ οἰκείου τέλους. ιβ. Eἰ ἀδύνατόν τινι ὑπὲρ τοῦ μὴ ὄντος πράγματος τῆς ἑαυτοῦ ζωῆς προτιμῆσαι τὸν θάνατον, πῶς οὖν, καθ' ὑμᾶς οὐκ ὄντος ἀληθοῦς τοῦ περὶ τῆς ἀναστάσεως δόγματος, ὑπὲρ τούτου τῆς ἑαυτῶν ζωῆς προετίμησαν οἱ μάρτυρες τὸν ἑαυτῶν θάνατον; Ποίας δὲ ἄλλης θρησκείας πολυτρόποις βα σάνοις τε καὶ θανάτοις ἐβεβαιώθη τὸ δόγμα ἢ τῆς ἑαυτῶν θρησκείας, λέγω δὲ τῶν Χριστιανῶν περὶ τῆς τῶν νεκρῶν ἀναστάσεως; ιγ. Eἰ, ἃ μὴ πιστεύουσιν Ἕλληνες, ταῦτα οὔτε ἐστὶν οὔτε ἔσται, ἐν τῇ γνώσει ἄρα τῶν Ἑλλήνων κεῖται τῶν ὄντων ἡ ὕπαρξις. Πῶς οὖν ἐν τοῖς πλείστοις τῶν κυριωτάτων δογμά των ἑαυτοῖς τε καὶ ἀλλήλοις μαχόμενοι δείκνυνται; Ἡ γὰρ τοιαύτη μάχη οὐκ ἐᾷ κεῖσθαι ἐν τῇ γνώσει τῶν Ἑλλήνων τῶν ὄντων τὴν ὕπαρξιν. ιδ. Eἰ τῇ παραδόσει τῶν θεασαμένων τὸν ἀρχηγὸν τῆς ἀναστάσεως ἀναστάντα ἐκ τῶν νεκρῶν εἰς ἀθάνατον ζωὴν ἀπι στοῦσιν, ἀλύτῳ δὲ ἀποδείξει λύειν τὸ τῆς ἀναστάσεως δόγμα