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and both biles. For whichever of these should fail brings an end to life. Furthermore, the liver, the brain, the heart, the stomach, the kidneys, the intestines, and many others. For if which of these were removed would the animal not die? Besides, there are many creatures that are bloodless yet ensouled, such as cartilaginous fish and mollusks, like cuttlefish, squids, and sea-snails, and all the ostracoderms and soft-shelled creatures, such as crayfish, crabs, and lobsters. If, therefore, they are ensouled but bloodless, it is clear that the soul is not blood. And against those who say that the soul is water, because water appears to give life to all things, and it is impossible to live without water, there are many objections. For it is not possible to live without food either; therefore, according to them, all kinds of food, each in its turn, should be called soul. Then, there are many animals that do not drink, as has been recorded of certain eagles. And a partridge can live without drinking. Why is water soul rather than air? For one can abstain from water for a very long time, but not from breathing air for even the briefest moment. But neither is air soul. For there are many things that are alive but do not breathe the air, such as all insects, like bees, wasps, and ants, and the bloodless animals, and most sea creatures, and all those that do not have lungs. For nothing that does not have lungs breathes the air; and conversely, nothing that does not breathe the air has lungs. And since certain not-to-be-despised arguments of Cleanthes the Stoic and Chrysippus are in circulation, we must also set forth their refutations as the Platonists refuted them. Cleanthes constructs such a syllogism: Not only, he says, do we become like our parents in body, but also in soul, in passions, in character, in dispositions. But likeness and unlikeness belong to body, not to what is bodiless. Therefore, the soul is a body. But, in the first place, universals are not constructed from particulars. In addition to this, the statement "not to what is bodiless" is false. For we say that numbers are similar whose sides are in proportion, such as six and twenty-four. For the sides of six are two and three; and of twenty-four, four and six. And two is to four as three is to six. For it is observed in a double ratio. For four is double two, and six is double three. But numbers are bodiless. And shapes are similar to shapes which have equal angles and the sides about the equal angles in proportion. And they themselves agree that a shape is bodiless. Further, just as equal and unequal are proper to quantity, so too similar and dissimilar are proper to quality. But quality is bodiless. Therefore, what is bodiless can also be similar to what is bodiless. He says further: nothing bodiless suffers with a body, nor a body with what is bodiless. But the soul suffers with the body when it is sick and cut, and the body with the soul. For when the soul is ashamed, the body turns red, and when it is afraid, pale. Therefore, the soul is a body. But the other of the premises is false, lying in its additional assumption, the one that says nothing bodiless suffers with a body. For what if this is peculiar to the soul alone? Just as if one were to say: no animal moves its upper jaw; but the crocodile moves its upper jaw; therefore, the crocodile is not an animal. For the premise is false, and here too, in its additional assumption, the one that says no animal moves its upper jaw. For behold, the crocodile is both an animal and moves its upper jaw. In the same way also when he says that nothing bodiless suffers with a body. For he assumes what is sought by the negation. But if one were to suppose it true that nothing bodiless suffers with a body, still the conclusion is not agreed upon, that the soul suffers with the body when it is sick and cut. For it is debated whether it is the body alone that feels pain, having received sensation from the soul, while the soul itself remains unaffected, or whether it also feels pain along with the body. And the former view prevails more among the more esteemed thinkers. But one must not draw syllogisms from what is debated but from what is agreed upon. And it is shown superabundantly that certain bodiless things do suffer with bodies. Qualities, for instance, being bodiless, when bodies are affected, they too are affected, both in the

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καὶ αἱ χολαὶ ἀμφότεραι. ὁποῖον γὰρ ἂν τούτων ἐκλείπῃ, τέλος ἐπάγει τῇ ζωῇ. ἔτι δὲ καὶ τὸ ἧπαρ καὶ ὁ ἐγκέφαλος καὶ ἡ καρδία καὶ ὁ στόμαχος καὶ οἱ νεφροὶ καὶ τὰ ἔντερα καὶ ἄλλα πολλά. τίνος γὰρ τούτων ἐξαιρεθέντος οὐ τεθνήξεται τὸ ζῷον; ἄλλως τε πολλά ἐστιν ἄναιμα μὲν ἔμψυχα δέ, ὡς τὰ σελάχη καὶ μαλάκια, οἷον σηπίαι καὶ τευθίδες καὶ σμύλοι καὶ πάντα τὰ ὀστρα κόδερμα καὶ ἁπαλόστρακα, ὡς οἱ κάραβοι καὶ καρκίνοι καὶ ἀστακοί. εἰ τοίνυν ἐστὶν ἔμψυχα μὲν ἄναιμα δέ, δῆλον ὡς οὐκ ἔστιν αἷμα ἡ ψυχή. πρὸς δὲ τοὺς λέγοντας ὕδωρ εἶναι τὴν ψυχὴν ὅτι τὸ ὕδωρ ζωογονοῦν φαίνεται πάντα, καὶ χωρὶς ὕδατος βιοτεύειν ἀδύνατον, πολλὰ τὰ ἀντιπίπτοντα. οὐδὲ γὰρ χωρὶς τροφῆς ζῆν οἷόν τε· ψυχὴν ἄρα καὶ τὰς τροφὰς πάσας καθ' ἑκάστην ῥητέον κατ' αὐτούς. ἔπειτα πολλὰ τῶν ζῴων ἐστὶ μὴ πίνοντα, ὡς ἐπί τινων ἀετῶν ἱστόρηται. καὶ πέρδιξ δὲ δύναται ζῆν χωρὶς τοῦ πίνειν. διατί δὲ μᾶλλον τὸ ὕδωρ ψυχή, καὶ μὴ ὁ ἀήρ; ὕδατος μὲν γὰρ καὶ ἐπιπολὺ δυνατὸν ἀποσχέσθαι· τοῦ δὲ ἀναπνεῖν τὸν ἀέρα οὐδὲ τὸ βραχύτατον· ἀλλ' οὐδὲ ὁ ἀὴρ ψυχή. πολλὰ γάρ ἐστι ζῶντα μὲν μὴ ἀναπνέοντα δὲ τὸν ἀέρα, ὡς τὰ ἔντομα πάντα, οἷον μέλιτται καὶ σφῆκες καὶ μύρμηκες, καὶ τὰ ἄναιμα, καὶ τῶν θαλασσίων τὰ πολλά, καὶ πάντα ὅσα οὐκ ἔχει πνεύμονα. οὐδὲν γὰρ μὴ ἔχον πνεύμονα ἀναπνεῖ τὸν ἀέρα· καὶ ἀντιστρέφει, οὐδὲν μὴ ἀναπνέον τὸν ἀέρα πνεύμονα ἔχει. ἐπειδὴ δὲ καὶ Κλεάνθους τοῦ Στωϊκοῦ καὶ Χρυσίππου φέρονται λόγοι τινὲς οὐκ εὐκαταφρόνητοι, ἐκθετέον καὶ τούτων τὰς λύσεις ὡς ἐπέλυσαν οἱ ἀπὸ Πλάτωνος. ὁ Κλεάνθης τοιόνδε πλέκει συλλογισμόν. οὐ μόνον, φησὶν, ὅμοιοι τοῖς γονεῦσιν γινόμεθα κατὰ τὸ σῶμα, ἀλλὰ καὶ κατὰ τὴν ψυχήν, τοῖς πάθεσι, τοῖς ἤθεσι, ταῖς διαθέσεσι· σώματος δὲ τὸ ὅμοιον καὶ τὸ ἀνόμοιον οὐχὶ δὲ ἀσωμάτου· σῶμα ἄρα ἡ ψυχή. ἀλλὰ πρῶτον μὲν ἐκ τῶν ἐπὶ μέρους τὰ καθόλου οὐ συγκατασκευάζεται. πρὸς τούτῳ δὲ καὶ τὸ οὐχὶ δὲ ἀσωμάτου ψεῦδός ἐστιν. λέγομεν γὰρ ἀριθμοὺς ὁμοίους εἶναι ὧν αἱ πλευραὶ ἀνάλογοί εἰσιν, ὡς τὸν ἓξ καὶ τὸν εἰκοσιτέσσαρα. πλευρὰ γὰρ τοῦ ἓξ ὁ δύο καὶ ὁ τρία· τοῦ δὲ εἰκοσιτέσσαρα ὁ τέσσαρα καὶ ὁ ἕξ. ἀναλογίαν δὲ ἔχει τὰ μὲν δύο πρὸς τὰ τέσσαρα, τὰ δὲ τρία πρὸς τὰ ἕξ. ἐν διπλασίονι γὰρ λόγῳ θεωρεῖται. τὰ γὰρ τέσσαρα τῶν δύο διπλασίονα καὶ τὰ ἓξ τῶν τριῶν· ἀσώματοι δὲ οἱ ἀριθμοί. καὶ σχήματα δὲ σχήμασιν ὅμοιά ἐστιν ὅσα τάς τε γωνίας ἴσας ἔχει καὶ τὰς περὶ τὰς ἴσας γωνίας πλευρὰς ἀνάλογον· τὸ δὲ σχῆμα καὶ αὐτοὶ ἀσώματον ὁμολογοῦσιν εἶναι. ἔτι ὡς τοῦ ποσοῦ ἴδιόν ἐστι τὸ ἴσον καὶ ἄνισον, οὕτω καὶ τοῦ ποιοῦ τὸ ὅμοιον καὶ τὸ ἀνόμοιον· ἀσώματον δὲ ἡ ποιότης. ἔστιν ἄρα καὶ ἀσώματον ἀσωμάτῳ ὅμοιον. ἔτι φησίν· οὐδὲν ἀσώματον συμπάσχει σώματι, οὐδὲ ἀσωμάτῳ σῶμα· συμπάσχει δὲ ἡ ψυχὴ τῷ σώματι νοσοῦντι καὶ τεμνομένῳ καὶ τὸ σῶμα τῇ ψυχῇ· αἰσχυνομένης γοῦν ἐρυθρὸν γίνεται καὶ φοβουμένης ὠχρόν· σῶμα ἄρα ἡ ψυχή. ἔστι δὲ τὸ ἕτερον τῶν λημμάτων ψεῦδος, κατὰ πρόσληψιν ἐγκείμενον, τὸ λέγον οὐδὲν ἀσώματον σώματι συμπάσχει. τί γάρ, εἰ μόνῃ τῇ ψυχῇ τοῦτο πρόσεστιν; ὥσπερ τις εἰ λέγοι οὐδὲν ζῷον τὴν ἄνω γένυν κινεῖ· ὁ δὲ κροκόδειλος τὴν ἄνω γένυν κινεῖ· οὐ ζῷον ἄρα ὁ κροκόδειλος. ψευδὴς γάρ ἐστιν ἡ πρότασις καὶ ἐνταῦθα κατὰ πρόσληψιν ἡ λέγουσα οὐδὲν ζῷον τὴν ἄνω γένυν κινεῖ. ἰδοὺ γὰρ ὁ κροκόδειλος καὶ ζῷον καὶ τὴν ἄνω γένυν κινεῖ. τὸν αὐτὸν δὲ τρόπον καὶ ὅταν λέγῃ μηδὲν ἀσώματον σώματι συμπάσχειν. προσλαμβάνει γὰρ τὸ ζητούμενον τῇ ἀποφάσει. εἰ δέ τις ὑπόθοιτο ἀληθὲς εἶναι τὸ μηδὲν ἀσώματον σώματι συμπάσχειν· ἀλλὰ τὸ ἐπαγόμενον οὐκ ἔστιν ὁμολογούμενον, ὅτι συμπάσχει ἡ ψυχὴ νοσοῦντι καὶ τεμνομένῳ τῷ σώματι. ἀμφιβάλλεται γὰρ εἴτε τὸ σῶμα μόνον ἐστὶ τὸ ἀλγοῦν, λαβὸν παρὰ τῆς ψυχῆς τὴν αἴσθησιν, αὐτὴ δὲ μένει ἀπαθής, εἴτε καὶ συναλγεῖ τῷ σώματι· καὶ κρατεῖ μᾶλλον παρὰ τοῖς ἐνδοξοτέροις τὸ πρότερον· οὐ δεῖ δὲ ἐκ τῶν ἀμφιβαλλομένων συνάγειν τοὺς συλλογισμοὺς ἀλλ' ἐκ τῶν ὁμολογουμένων. ἐκ περιουσίας δὲ δείκνυται καί τινα ἀσώματα συμπάσχοντα τοῖς σώμασιν· αἱ ποιότητες γοῦν ἀσώματοι οὖσαι πασχόντων τῶν σωμάτων καὶ αὐταὶ συμπάσχουσιν, ἔν τε τῇ