we call wretched ...; therefore the evil man, insofar as he is evil, is not likened to the intellect ... nor could there be paradigms of evils in the intellect; for every image is an image of a paradigm. And if Plato calls the forms the "3most divine"3 of beings—for to be always in the same state belongs only to the most divine of all things, says the Eleatic Stranger [Pl. pol. 269d 5-6]— , but the paradigm of evils is godless [Theaet. 176e] and dark, as has been said ; what device is there for those who suppose such a nature to be in those things, and to produce evil from there? And if the demiurge of the universe, with whom are all the forms and the number of the forms, should wish evil not to be in the universe and should want to beget all things like himself, and nothing evil, how could he still have a paradigm of evils, when he makes all things good and allows nothing to be base [Pl. Tim. 30a]? For he does not fashion and beget some of them, while being barren and inactive with respect to others, but by his very being he produces all things and acts indivisibly. And the form of evil would produce evils, and he will not only do what he wishes, nor will his will be in accordance with nature; as if fire, while heating other things and drying them, should wish one and not the other. So, one of two things is necessary: either the divine intellect wishes evils both to be and to come to be, if it is the father of these things in essence , or, not wishing them, neither begets them nor produces them nor has their logoi, by which it establishes each of the things in the world. 44 But this argument is not even sufficient to persuade itself that it is true, often changing to its opposite. But if, while saying that evil is eternal and the causes of eternally existing things are unmoved ..., we say that evil has been removed from such a principle, it is not surprising. For we call that eternal which has its passage into being according to nature, but not that which has come to be in just any way. Since this must be said to belong to evils too, that they circulate, not insofar as each is evil, but because the order of the universe arranges these things too ..., giving to generated things a share of eternity, to things moving in a straight line, that of circular periods, to disordered things, order, to undefined things, a limit, and to evil things, goodness—therefore everything that is according to nature and that is eternal is begotten from a definite cause, but evil is not according to nature; for there is no logos of lameness in nature, just as there is no logos of artlessness in art. How, then, is the unmoved principle to be sought here, and what is the logos of evils in the forms, when all things that have come to be according to them are forms and limits, but the nature of evils is in itself infinite and undefined? 45 Third, then, we must consider the soul, if we are to blame it for all evils, which we call an evil-doer ; for is it its being, just as it is of fire to heat and not to cool, and of other things to have other functions, so also for this soul to beget evils and to fill all things it approaches with evil? --- But if, as some say, it is evil by its essence and being, from where should we suppose this being of it comes? From elsewhere than from the demiurgic cause? --- But if from these, how is it evil in essence? For all the offspring of these are good; and in general all evil is outside of essence and is not essence; for nothing is contrary to essence, but the good is contrary to the evil ; essence is an image of being, and being is established in the good and begets all things according to the good, and nothing evil comes from there. --- 47 But if these are not the causes of evils, what should we ourselves blame for the generation of evils? We must by no means posit one cause of evils in itself. For if the cause of goods is one, the causes of evils are many and not one . --- For all things from one cause are friendly and sympathetic and akin to one another, some more, some less, --- but we must seek some other causes for evils [Pl. resp. II 379c] ---. For what monad or what limit or what eternal logos of evils is there, for which being is by nature through dissimilarity and indefiniteness down to the individuals? But the whole is everywhere without a share of evil. 48 The productive causes of evils, then--- for some lead them to evil, while others, fighting with one another, give a place to that which is contrary to nature for the

προσονομάζομεν ἄθλιον ...· οὐκ ἄρα ὁ κακὸς ᾗ κακὸς ὁμοιοῦται τῷ νῷ ... <οὔτ' ἂν> ἐν τῷ νῷ παραδείγματα <εἴη τῶν κακῶν· πᾶσα> γὰρ εἰκὼν παραδείγματός ἐστιν εἰκών. <εἰ δὲ καὶ Πλάτων τὰ μὲν εἴδη "3θειότατα"3 καλεῖ τῶν ὄντων-τὸ γὰρ ὡσαύτως ἔχειν ἀεὶ τοῖς πάντων θειοτάτοις προσήκει μόνοις ὁ Ἐλεάτης ξένος φησί [Pl. pol. 269d 5-6]->, τὸ δὲ τῶν κακῶν ἄθεον [Theaet. 176e] καὶ σκο- τεινὸν παράδειγμα, <ὥσπερ εἴρηται>· τίς μηχανὴ <τὴν τοιαύτην φύσιν> ἐν ἐκείνοις ὑποτιθέντας κἀκεῖθεν παράγειν τὸ κακόν; εἰ δὲ καὶ ὁ δημιουργὸς τοῦ παντός, παρ' ᾧ τὰ εἴδη πάντα καὶ ὁ τῶν εἰδῶν ἀριθμός, βούλοιτο μὴ εἶναι τὸ κακὸν ἐν τῷ παντὶ καὶ πάντα μὲν ὅμοια αὐτῷ γεννᾶν ἐθέλοι, κακὸν δὲ μηδέν, πῶς ἂν ἔτι παράδειγμα ἔχοι καὶ τῶν κακῶν, πάντα μὲν ἀγαθύνων, φλαῦρον δὲ μηδὲν εἶναι [Pl. Tim. 30a] συγχωρῶν; οὐ γὰρ τοῖς μὲν αὐτῶν δημιουργεῖ <καὶ γεννᾷ>, τοῖς δὲ <ἄγονος καὶ> ἀδρανής ἐστιν, ἀλλ' αὐτῷ τῷ εἶναι παράγων τὰ πάντα ἀμερίστως ἐνεργεῖ. καὶ <τὸ τοῦ κακοῦ εἶδος> παραγάγοι ἂν τὰ κακὰ καὶ οὐδὲ μόνον ἃ βούλεται ποιήσει ἐκεῖνος οὐδὲ ἡ βούλησις ἔσται αὐτῷ κατὰ φύσιν· ὡς εἰ καὶ τὸ πῦρ θερμαῖνον <ἄλλα> καὶ ξηραῖνον, τὸ μὲν ἐθέλοι, τὸ δὲ μή. δυοῖν οὖν ἀνάγκη θάτερον· ἢ καὶ βούλεσθαι τὰ κακὰ τὸν θεῖον νοῦν καὶ εἶναι καὶ γίνεσθαι, εἰ καὶ τούτων ἐστὶν <κατ' οὐσίαν> πατήρ, ἢ μὴ βουλόμενον μηδὲ γεννᾶν αὐτὰ μηδὲ παράγειν μηδὲ τοὺς λόγους ἔχειν αὐτῶν, οἷς ἕκαστα τῶν ἐγκοσμίων ὑφίστησιν. 44 Ἀλλ' οὗτος μὲν ὁ λόγος οὐδ' αὐτός ἐστιν ἱκανὸς πείθειν ἑαυτὸν ὡς ἔστιν ἀληθής, πολλάκις ἐπὶ τἀναντία μεταβαλλόμενος. εἰ δὲ λέγοντες ἀΐδιον τὸ κακὸν καὶ ἀκινήτους τῶν ἀϊδίως ὄντων τὰς αἰτίας ..., τῆς τοιαύτης ἀρχῆς παρῃρῆσθαι τὸ κακὸν λέγομεν, οὐ θαυμαστόν. <τὸ γὰρ ἀΐδιον ἐκεῖνο λέγομεν ὃ> κατὰ φύσιν ἔχει τὴν εἰς τὸ εἶναι πάροδον, ἀλλ' οὐ τὸ ὁπωσοῦν γενόμενον. ἐπεὶ καὶ τὸ τοῖς κακοῖς τοῦτο περιπολεῖν ῥητέον ὑπάρχειν αὐτό, οὐ καθ' ὅσον ἐστὶ κακὸν ἕκαστον, ἀλλ' ὅτι καὶ ταῦτα κοσμεῖ τοῦ παντὸς ἡ τάξις ..., διδοῦσα τοῖς μὲν γενητοῖς ἀϊδιό- τητος μετουσίαν, τοῖς δὲ εὐθυπορουμένοις περιόδων κυκλικῶν, τοῖς δὲ ἀτάκτοις τάξεως, τοῖς δὲ ἀορίστοις ὅρου, τοῖς δὲ κακοῖς ἀγαθότητος -πᾶν οὖν κατὰ φύσιν ὂν καὶ ἀεὶ ὂν ἐξ αἰτίας ὡρισμένης γεννᾶται, τὸ δὲ κακὸν οὐ κατὰ φύσιν· οὐδὲ γὰρ χωλείας ἐν τῇ φύσει λόγος ὡς οὐδὲ ἀτεχνίας ἐν τῇ τέχνῃ. πῶς οὖν κἀνταῦθα τὴν ἀκίνητον ἀρχὴν ζητητέον, καὶ τίς ὁ ἐν τοῖς εἴδεσι τῶν κακῶν λόγος, πάντων μὲν ὅσα κατ' ἐκεῖνα γέγονεν ὄντων εἰδῶν καὶ περάτων, τῆς δὲ τῶν κακῶν φύσεως οὔσης καθ' ἑαυτὴν ἀπείρου καὶ ἀορίστου; 45 <Τρίτον οὖν> τὴν ψυχὴν θεωρητέον, εἰ καὶ ταύτην πάντων τῶν κακῶν αἰτιασόμεθα, <ἣν κακεργέτιν ὀνομάζομεν>· πότερον γὰρ τὸ εἶναι αὐτῆς καὶ ὥσπερ πυρὸς τὸ θερμαίνειν καὶ μηδὲν ψύχειν, καὶ ἄλλων ἄλλο ἔργον, οὕτω δὴ καὶ ταύτης τὰ κακὰ γεννᾶν καὶ πάντα οἷς ἂν γειτνιάσῃ κακίας ἀναπιμπλάναι; --- εἰ δέ, ὥσπερ ἔνιοι φασί, τῇ οὐσίᾳ καὶ τῷ εἶναι, πόθεν τὸ εἶναι τοῦτο αὐτῆς ὑπολάβοιμεν; ἆρα ἀλλαχόθεν ἢ ἐκ τῆς δημιουργικῆς αἰτίας; --- ἀλλ' εἰ ἐκ τούτων, πῶς κατ' οὐσίαν κακόν; ἀγαθὰ γὰρ πάντα τὰ τούτων ἔκγονα· καὶ ὅλως πᾶν τὸ κακὸν ἔξω τῆς οὐσίας καὶ οὐκ οὐσία· <τῇ μὲν γὰρ οὐσίᾳ ἐναντίον οὐδέν, τῷ δὲ κακῷ ἐναντίωται τἀγαθόν>· ἡ μὲν οὐσία τοῦ ὄντος ἐστὶν εἰκών, τὸ δὲ ὂν ἵδρυται ἐν τῷ ἀγαθῷ καὶ <γεννᾷ> πάντα κατὰ τὸ ἀγαθόν, καὶ οὐδὲν ἐκεῖθεν κακόν. --- 47 Ἀλλ' εἰ μὴ αὗται τῶν κακῶν αἰτίαι, τί ποτε ἂν αὐτοὶ τῆς τῶν κακῶν αἰτιασαίμεθα γενέσεως; ἓν μὲν δὴ καθ' ἑαυτὸ τῶν κακῶν αἴτιον οὐδαμῶς θετέον. εἰ γὰρ τῶν ἀγαθῶν τὸ αἴτιον ἕν, τῶν κακῶν τὰ αἴτια πολλὰ <καὶ οὐχ ἕν>. --- τὰ γὰρ ἐκ μιᾶς αἰτίας πάντα φίλα τε καὶ συμπαθῆ καὶ προσήγορα ἀλλήλοις, τὰ μὲν μᾶλλον, τὰ δὲ ἧττον, --- ἄλλα δ' ἄττα δεῖ ζητεῖν τῶν κακῶν τὰ αἴτια [Pl. resp. II 379c] ---. ποία γὰρ μονὰς ἢ ποῖος ὅρος ἢ τίς ἀΐδιος λόγος τῶν κακῶν, οἷς τὸ εἶναι φύσει ἐστὶ δι' ἀνομοιότητος καὶ ἀοριστίας μέχρι τῶν ἀτόμων; τὸ δὲ ὅλον πανταχοῦ κακίας ἄμοιρον. 48 Ποιητικὰ μὲν οὖν τῶν κακῶν αἴτια--- <τὰ μὲν γὰρ> αὐτὰς ἄγει εἰς τὸ κακόν, τὰ δὲ ἀλλήλοις μαχόμενα δίδωσι τῷ παρὰ φύσιν χώραν εἰς τὴν