Elements of Theology

 as one subsisting, but according to participation not one, the one will be multiplied, just as the multiplicity is unified through the one. Therefore

 activity is better than that which is not self-sufficient but has the cause of its perfection dependent on another substance. For if all beings by nat

 it desires that also, how most of all the good? or if it does not desire, how does it not desire the cause of all things, having proceeded from it? Bu

 is itself, and the mover and the moved are one and the same. For either it moves in one part and is moved in another part, or as a whole it moves and

 beginning from a monad, it proceeds into a multitude coordinate with the monad, and the multitude of every order is led back to one monad. For the mon

 the one being divided. But if it is in one of all things, it will no longer be of all things, but of one. If, therefore, it is both common to those ab

 the thing produced is other than it. Therefore, that which begets is established as unchangeable and undiminished, multiplying itself through a genera

 from something and reverting has a cyclical activity. For if it reverts to that from which it proceeds, it joins the end to the beginning, and the mot

 procession. For since each occurs through likeness, that which has proceeded immediately from something has also reverted immediately to it (for the l

 has reverted to itself according to nature and is perfect in its reversion to itself, and would have its being from itself for that to which the reve

 the self-subsistent is set apart from things measured by time in respect to its substance. For if the self-subsistent is ungenerated, it would not be

 having received the power to produce from the cause which is superior to it, it has from that cause its being the cause of those things of which it is

 Thus the producer in relation to the produced, taken in relation to each other, but that which is able to do more has a greater and more universal pow

 a cause has pre-contained in itself the effect, being primarily what that is secondarily or in the thing produced the producer (for this too, partici

 suffers from the former) and when the second in turn acts, that also co-acts, because whatever the second does, the more causal also co-begets with i

 being, or needing it somehow in order to be, would be in this respect more imperfect than the effect. But that which is in the result is a co-cause ra

 passible, being in every way divisible, and in every way to infinity. But the incorporeal, being simple, is impassible for the indivisible can neithe

 undiminished it contains in itself. But surely infinity in respect to magnitude and in respect to multitude is a complete privation and a falling away

 set apart and if all things enter into it, yet it has something hidden and incomprehensible to secondary things and if it unfolds the powers within

 but nowhere for thus it would be divided and separate from itself, if indeed one part of it is everywhere and in all things, but the other part nowhe

 all things. For since each thing exists either according to cause or according to existence or according to participation, in the first the rest exist

 a turning back as if through similars, dissimilar <being>. For the one is similar as a particular to a particular, the other is kindred as being of th

 a hypostasis but no longer a henad, it would be assigned to another order on account of the alteration of its property. 115 Every god is supra-essenti

 supra-essential, being nothing other than the one for each is not one thing, and then good, but only good, just as it is not one thing, and then one,

 is and in beings has the power of apprehending truth (for it both grasps thoughts and has its subsistence in acts of intellection) but the gods are b

 having set the same before itself, is most self-sufficient and such is all that is divine. Therefore it needs neither other things, being goodness-it

 is more unified than beings. All divine genera, therefore, are bound together by their proper intermediaries, and the first do not proceed immediately

 of a henad working, with which it is connate. This, then, is that which in itself defines the being that partakes of it and shows essentially the supr

 to the gods so that, while they are present to all things in the same way, all things are not present to them in the same way, but as each is able, i

 For the one, having a most unitive power, sends itself through the entire union and unifies all from above, while remaining in itself. But the mean, s

 proceeds from the infinity of the divine power, multiplying itself and passing through all things, and pre-eminently demonstrating the unfailing in th

 presides over composites and of their order and of their division according to number, and is of the same series as the paternal in more partial produ

 they have intelligible [qualities]. In the same way, therefore, that those, by illuminating Being, are intelligible, so also these, by illuminating th

 and sees itself. But seeing that it is thinking and seeing, it knows that it is Intellect in actuality and knowing this, it knows that it thinks, and

 Therefore it has the causes of all things intellectually. So that every intellect is all things intellectually, both the things before it and the thin

 more akin, contracted in quantity, in power surpasses the things after it and conversely the things further from the one. Therefore, those that are h

 on the one hand, but being only intellectual, is participated by souls that are neither divine nor come to be in a state of change from intellect to u

 by its very being, if the participant is suitable, it immediately becomes ensouled and living, not by the soul reasoning and choosing, nor giving life

 and to the soul that substantiates the essential principles of all things in it for everything that produces by its being, which it is primarily, thi

 of the motions it will also have restorations for every period of the eternal things is restorative. 200 Every period of a soul is measured by time

 the relation to the secondary ones, which the divine has to the intellectual, and this to the psychical and the quantities of the lower ones are grea

 it admits of every kind of change, being moved together with their own ruling causes. But indeed that it is also indivisible, is clear. For everything

from something and reverting has a cyclical activity. For if it reverts to that from which it proceeds, it joins the end to the beginning, and the motion is one and continuous, the one part being from that which abides, and the other towards that which has abided; whence indeed all things proceed in a circle from their causes to their causes. And there are greater and lesser circles, some of the reversions being made immediately to the things situated above, others to those yet higher and up to the principle of all; for from that are all things and to that. 34 Everything that reverts according to nature makes its reversion to that from which it also had the procession of its own subsistence. For if it reverts according to nature, it possesses the desire according to its substance for that to which it reverts. And if this is so, its entire being is also dependent upon that to which it makes its essential reversion, and it is like that according to its substance; wherefore it is also sympathetic to that according to nature, as being akin to it in substance. And if this is so, either the being of both is the same, or the one is from the other, or both have derived their likeness from another one. But if the being of both is the same, how has the one reverted to the other according to nature? And if both are from one, the natural reversion for both would be to that one. It remains, therefore, that the one has its being from the other. And if this is so, the procession is also from that, to which is the reversion according to nature. From these things, then, it is manifest that Intellect is also desired by all, and all things proceed from Intellect, and the whole cosmos has its substance from Intellect, even if it is eternal. And it is not for this reason that it does not proceed from Intellect, because it is eternal; for neither for this reason has it not reverted, because it is always ordered; but it both proceeds always and is eternal according to its substance, and it has reverted always and is indissoluble according to its order. 35 Every effect both abides in its own cause and proceeds from it and reverts to it. For if it were to abide only, it would differ in no way from its cause, being undistinguished; for with distinction comes procession. But if it were to proceed only, it would be unconnected with it and unsympathetic, in no way participating in the cause. And if it were to revert only, how can that which does not have its substance from it make an essential reversion to something foreign? And if it were to abide and proceed, but not revert, what of the natural desire in each thing for the well and the good, and the stretching up towards that which begat it? But if it were to proceed and revert, but not abide, how does it, having departed from the cause, hasten to be joined to it, when it was unconnected before the departure? For if it were joined, in that respect it certainly abode. And if it were to abide and revert, but not proceed, how is it possible for that which is not distinguished to revert? For everything that reverts is like that which is resolved into that from which it has been substantially divided. But it is necessary either to abide only, or to revert only, or to proceed only, or to connect the extremes with each other, or the middle with each of the extremes, or all things together. It remains, therefore, that everything both abides in its cause, and proceeds from it, and reverts to it. 36 Of all things which are multiplied in procession, the first are more perfect than the second, and the second than those after them, and so on in succession. For if processions distinguish the things produced from their causes, and the second are diminutions with respect to the first, then the first things which have proceeded are more joined to their causes, springing forth from those very causes, but the second things are further from their causes, and so on likewise. But those things nearer and more akin to their causes are more perfect (for causes are more perfect than their effects); but those further away are less perfect, becoming unlike their causes. 37 Of all things which subsist by reversion, the first are less perfect than the second, and the second than those that follow; but the last are most perfect. For if reversions occur in a circle, and the reversion is to that from which the procession was, and the procession is from the most perfect, the reversion therefore is to the most perfect. And if the reversion is first from that to which the procession is last, and the procession is to the most imperfect as its last stage, the reversion is also from the most imperfect. Therefore, in things that subsist by reversion, the first are the most imperfect, and the last the most perfect. 38 Everything that proceeds from a plurality of causes, through as many as it proceeds, through so many it also reverts; and every reversion is through the same things through which also the

ἀπό τινος καὶ ἐπιστρέφον κυκλικὴν ἔχει τὴν ἐνέργειαν. εἰ γάρ, ἀφ' οὗ πρόεισιν, εἰς τοῦτο ἐπιστρέφει, συνάπτει τῇ ἀρχῇ τὸ τέλος, καὶ ἔστι μία καὶ συνεχὴς ἡ κίνησις, τῆς μὲν ἀπὸ τοῦ μένοντος, τῆς δὲ πρὸς τὸ μεῖναν γινομένης· ὅθεν δὴ πάντα κύκλῳ πρόεισιν ἀπὸ τῶν αἰτίων ἐπὶ τὰ αἴτια. μείζους δὲ κύκλοι καὶ ἐλάττους, τῶν μὲν ἐπιστροφῶν πρὸς τὰ ὑπερκείμενα προσεχῶς γινομένων, τῶν δὲ πρὸς τὰ ἀνωτέρω καὶ μέχρι τῆς πάντων ἀρχῆς· ἀπὸ γὰρ ἐκείνης πάντα καὶ πρὸς ἐκείνην. 34 Πᾶν τὸ κατὰ φύσιν ἐπιστρεφόμενον πρὸς ἐκεῖνο ποιεῖται τὴν ἐπιστροφήν, ἀφ' οὗ καὶ τὴν πρόοδον ἔσχε τῆς οἰκείας ὑποστάσεως. εἰ γὰρ κατὰ φύσιν ἐπιστρέφεται, τὴν κατ' οὐσίαν ὄρεξιν πρὸς ἐκεῖνο κέκτηται, πρὸς ὃ ἐπιστρέφεται. εἰ δὲ τοῦτο, καὶ τὸ εἶναι αὐτοῦ πᾶν εἰς ἐκεῖνο ἀνήρτηται, πρὸς ὃ τὴν οὐσιώδη ποιεῖται ἐπιστροφήν, καὶ ὅμοιόν ἐστιν ἐκείνῳ κατ' οὐσίαν· διὸ καὶ συμπαθὲς ἐκείνῳ κατὰ φύσιν, ὡς τῇ οὐσίᾳ συγγενές. εἰ δὲ τοῦτο, ἢ ταὐτόν ἐστι τὸ εἶναι ἀμφοτέρων ἢ ἐκ θατέρου θάτερον ἢ ἄμφω ἐξ ἑνὸς ἄλλου τὸ ὅμοιον ἔλαχεν. ἀλλ' εἰ μὲν ταὐτὸν τὸ εἶναι ἀμφοτέρων, πῶς κατὰ φύσιν θάτερον πρὸς θάτερον ἐπέστραπται; εἰ δὲ ἐξ ἑνὸς ἄμφω, πρὸς ἐκεῖνο ἂν εἴη τὸ κατὰ φύσιν ἐπιστρέφειν ἀμφοτέροις. λείπεται ἄρα ἐκ θατέρου θάτερον τὸ εἶναι ἔχειν. εἰ δὲ τοῦτο, καὶ ἡ πρόοδος ἀπ' ἐκείνου, πρὸς ὃ ἡ κατὰ φύσιν ἐπιστροφή. ἐκ δὴ τούτων φανερὸν ὅτι καὶ ὀρεκτὸν πᾶσι νοῦς, καὶ πρόεισι πάντα ἀπὸ νοῦ, καὶ πᾶς ὁ κόσμος ἀπὸ νοῦ τὴν οὐσίαν ἔχει, κἂν ἀΐδιος ᾖ. καὶ οὐ διὰ τοῦτο οὐχὶ πρόεισιν ἀπὸ νοῦ, διότι ἀΐδιος· οὐδὲ γὰρ διὰ τοῦτο οὐκ ἐπέστραπται, διότι ἀεὶ τέτακται· ἀλλὰ καὶ πρόεισιν ἀεὶ καὶ ἀΐδιος κατ' οὐσίαν, καὶ ἐπέστραπται ἀεὶ καὶ ἄλυτος κατὰ τὴν τάξιν. 35 Πᾶν τὸ αἰτιατὸν καὶ μένει ἐν τῇ αὐτοῦ αἰτίᾳ καὶ πρόεισιν ἀπ' αὐτῆς καὶ ἐπιστρέφει πρὸς αὐτήν. εἰ γὰρ μένοι μόνον, οὐδὲν διοίσει τῆς αἰτίας, ἀδιάκριτον ὄν· ἅμα γὰρ διακρίσει πρόοδος. εἰ δὲ προΐοι μόνον, ἀσύναπτον ἔσται πρὸς αὐτὴν καὶ ἀσυμπαθές, μηδαμῇ τῇ αἰτίᾳ κοινωνοῦν. εἰ δὲ ἐπιστρέφοιτο μόνον, πῶς τὸ μὴ τὴν οὐσίαν ἀπ' αὐτῆς ἔχον κατ' οὐσίαν ποιεῖται τὴν πρὸς τὸ ἀλλότριον ἐπιστροφήν; εἰ δὲ μένοι μὲν καὶ προΐοι, μὴ ἐπιστρέφοιτο δέ, πῶς ἡ κατὰ φύσιν ὄρεξις ἑκάστῳ πρὸς τὸ εὖ καὶ τὸ ἀγαθὸν καὶ ἡ ἐπὶ τὸ γεννῆσαν ἀνάτασις; εἰ δὲ προΐοι μὲν καὶ ἐπιστρέφοιτο, μὴ μένοι δέ, πῶς ἀποστὰν μὲν τῆς αἰτίας συνάπτεσθαι σπεύδει πρὸς αὐτήν, ἀσύναπτον δὲ ἦν πρὸ τῆς ἀποστάσεως; εἰ γὰρ συνῆπτο, κατ' ἐκεῖνο πάντως ἔμενεν. εἰ δὲ μένοι καὶ ἐπιστρέφοιτο, μὴ προέρχοιτο δέ, πῶς τὸ μὴ διακριθὲν ἐπιστρέφειν δυνατόν; τὸ γὰρ ἐπιστρέφον πᾶν ἀναλύοντι ἔοικεν εἰς ἐκεῖνο, ἀφ' οὗ διῄρηται κατ' οὐσίαν. ἀνάγκη δὲ ἢ μένειν μόνον ἢ ἐπιστρέφειν μόνον ἢ προϊέναι μόνον ἢ συνδεῖν τὰ ἄκρα μετ' ἀλλήλων ἢ τὸ μεταξὺ μεθ' ἑκατέρου τῶν ἄκρων ἢ τὰ σύμπαντα. λείπεται ἄρα καὶ μένειν πᾶν ἐν τῷ αἰτίῳ καὶ προϊέναι ἀπ' αὐτοῦ καὶ ἐπιστρέφειν πρὸς αὐτό. 36 Πάντων τῶν κατὰ πρόοδον πληθυνομένων τὰ πρῶτα τελειότερα τῶν δευτέρων ἐστί, καὶ τὰ δεύτερα τῶν μετ' αὐτά, καὶ ἐφεξῆς ὡσαύτως. εἰ γὰρ αἱ πρόοδοι διακρίνουσιν ἀπὸ τῶν αἰτίων τὰ παρ αγόμενα, καὶ ὑφέσεις εἰσὶ πρὸς τὰ πρῶτα τῶν δευτέρων, τὰ μὲν πρῶτα προελθόντα συνῆπται μᾶλλον τοῖς αἰτίοις, ἀπ' αὐτῶν ἐκείνων ἐκβλαστάνοντα, τὰ δὲ δεύτερα πορρωτέρω τῶν αἰτίων ἐστί, καὶ ἑξῆς ὁμοίως. τὰ δὲ ἐγγυτέρω καὶ τὰ συγγενέστερα τοῖς αἰτίοις τελειότερα (καὶ γὰρ τὰ αἴτια τῶν αἰτιατῶν)· τὰ δὲ πορρώτερον ἀτελέστερα, ἀνομοιούμενα τοῖς αἰτίοις. 37 Πάντων τῶν κατ' ἐπιστροφὴν ὑφισταμένων τὰ πρῶτα ἀτελέστερα τῶν δευτέρων, καὶ τὰ δεύτερα τῶν ἑξῆς· τὰ δὲ ἔσχατα τελεώτατα. εἰ γὰρ αἱ ἐπιστροφαὶ γίνονται κατὰ κύκλον, καὶ ἀφ' οὗ ἡ πρόοδος, εἰς τοῦτο ἡ ἐπιστροφή, ἀπὸ δὲ τοῦ τελειοτάτου ἡ πρόοδος, ἡ ἐπιστροφὴ ἄρα εἰς τὸ τελειότατον. καὶ εἰ, ἐφ' ὃ ἡ πρόοδος ἔσχατον, ἀπὸ τούτου πρώτου ἡ ἐπιστροφή, ἡ δὲ πρόοδος εἰς ἔσχατον τὸ ἀτελέστατον, καὶ ἡ ἐπιστροφὴ ἀπὸ τοῦ ἀτελε στάτου. πρῶτα μὲν ἄρα ἐν τοῖς κατ' ἐπιστροφὴν τὰ ἀτελέστατα, ἔσχατα δὲ τὰ τελεώτατα. 38 Πᾶν τὸ προϊὸν ἀπό τινων πλειόνων αἰτίων, δι' ὅσων πρόεισι, διὰ τοσούτων καὶ ἐπιστρέφεται· καὶ πᾶσα ἐπιστροφὴ διὰ τῶν αὐτῶν, δι' ὧν καὶ ἡ