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man was made simply and in vain, or for some purpose; and if for some purpose, whether it was for him, having been made, to live and to remain in the nature in which he was made, or because of some need; and if because of a need, either that of the maker himself, or of some other of those belonging to him and deemed worthy of greater care. And indeed, examining this more generally, we find that everyone who is of sound mind and is moved by rational judgment to do something, does nothing that he does intentionally in vain, but either for the sake of his own use, or because of the need of another for whom he cares, or for the sake of the thing made itself, being moved by some natural attraction and affection toward its creation. For example (for let it be said by means of an image, so that the subject at hand may become clear), a man builds a house for his own need, and he makes for oxen and camels or the other animals of which he is in need, the shelter suitable for each of these, not for the sake of his own use, as it appears, but in respect to the final end for this reason, and in respect to the immediate purpose because of his care for these for which he has provided. And he also begets children neither because of his own need nor for any other of those belonging to him, but so that those begotten by him may both be and continue as far as is possible, consoling himself for his own end by the succession of his children and grandchildren, and by this thinking to make his mortal nature immortal. But these things are so with men; God, however, would not have made man in vain; for he is wise, and no work of wisdom is in vain. Nor for his own need; for he is in need of nothing, and for one who needs nothing at all, none of the things made by him could contribute to his own need. But neither did he make man for the sake of any of the works made by him. For none of those endowed with reason and judgment, neither the greater nor the lesser, has been or is made for the need of another, but for their own life and continuance. For reason does not find any need as a cause of the generation of men, since the immortals are without need and require absolutely no contribution from men for their being, and since the irrational are ruled by nature and fulfill for men the needs for which each is naturally suited, but are not naturally suited to make use of them; for it was not, nor is it, right to subject the ruling and governing principle to the use of the lesser, or to subordinate the rational to the irrational, which are unsuited to rule. Therefore, if man was made neither without cause and in vain (for none of the things made by God is in vain, at least according to the mind of the maker) nor for the need of the maker himself or of any other of the creations made by God, it is clear that according to the first and more general reason, God made man for his own sake and for the goodness and wisdom seen in all of creation, but according to the reason more immediate to the things made, for the life of the things made themselves, not

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ἁπλῶς καὶ μάτην γέγονεν ἄνθρωπος ἢ τινὸς ἕνεκεν· εἰ δὲ τινὸς ἕνεκεν, πότερον ἐπὶ τῷ γενόμενον αὐτὸν ζῆν καὶ διαμένειν καθ' ἣν ἐγένετο φύσιν ἢ διὰ χρείαν τινός· εἰ δὲ κατὰ χρείαν, ἤτοι τὴν αὐτοῦ τοῦ ποιήσαντος ἢ ἄλλου τινὸς τῶν αὐτῷ προσηκόντων καὶ πλείονος φροντίδος ἠξιωμένων. ὃ δὴ καὶ κοινότερον σκοποῦντες εὑρίσκομεν ὅτι πᾶς εὖ φρονῶν καὶ λογικῇ κρίσει πρὸς τὸ ποιεῖν τι κινούμενος οὐδὲν ὧν κατὰ πρόθεσιν ἐνεργεῖ ποιεῖ μάτην, ἀλλ' ἤτοι τῆς ἰδίας ἕνεκεν χρήσεως ἢ διὰ χρείαν ἄλλου τινὸς ὧν πεφρόντικεν ἢ δι' αὐτὸ τὸ γινόμενον, ὁλκῇ τινι φυσικῇ καὶ στοργῇ πρὸς τὴν αὐτοῦ γένεσιν κινούμενος· οἷον (λεγέσθω γὰρ δι' εἰκόνος τινὸς, ἵνα σαφὲς γένηται τὸ προκείμενον) ἄνθρωπος ποιεῖ μὲν οἶκον διὰ τὴν ἰδίαν χρείαν, ποιεῖ δὲ βουσὶ καὶ καμήλοις ἢ τοῖς ἄλλοις ζῴοις, ὧν ἐστιν ἐνδεής, τὴν ἑκάστῳ τούτων ἁρμόζουσαν σκέπην οὐκ ἰδίας ἕνεκεν χρήσεως κατὰ τὸ φαινόμενον, ἀλλὰ κατὰ μὲν τὸ τέλος διὰ τοῦτο, κατὰ δὲ τὸ προσεχὲς διὰ τὴν τούτων ὧν πεφρόντικεν ἐπιμέ- λειαν· ποιεῖται δὲ καὶ παῖδας οὔτε διὰ χρείαν ἰδίαν οὔτε δι' ἕτερόν τι τῶν αὐτῷ προσηκόντων, ἀλλ' ἐπὶ τῷ εἶναί τε καὶ διαμένειν καθόσον οἷόν τε τοὺς ὑπ' αὐτοῦ γεννωμένους, τῇ τῶν παίδων καὶ τῶν ἐγγόνων διαδοχῇ τὴν ἑαυτοῦ τελευτὴν παραμυθούμενος καὶ ταύτῃ τὸ θνητὸν ἀπαθανατίζειν οἰόμενος. ἀλλὰ ταῦτα μὲν ὑπὸ τούτων· ὁ μέντοι θεὸς οὔτ' ἂν μάτην ἐποίησεν τὸν ἄνθρωπον· ἔστι γὰρ σοφός, οὐδὲν δὲ σοφίας ἔργον μάταιον· οὔτε διὰ χρείαν ἰδίαν· παντὸς γάρ ἐστιν ἀπροσδεής, τῷ δὲ μηδενὸς δεομένῳ τὸ παράπαν οὐδὲν τῶν ὑπ' αὐτοῦ γενομένων συντελέσειεν ἂν εἰς χρείαν ἰδίαν. ἀλλ' οὐδὲ διά τινα τῶν ὑπ' αὐτοῦ γενομένων ἔργων ἐποίησεν ἄνθρωπον. οὐδὲν γὰρ τῶν λόγῳ καὶ κρίσει χρωμένων οὔτε τῶν μειζόνων οὔτε τῶν καταδεεστέρων γέγονεν ἢ γίνεται πρὸς ἑτέρου χρείαν, ἀλλὰ διὰ τὴν ἰδίαν αὐτῶν τῶν γενομένων ζωήν τε καὶ διαμονήν. οὐδὲ γὰρ ὁ λόγος εὑρίσκει τινὰ χρείαν τῆς τῶν ἀνθρώπων γενέσεως αἰτίαν, τῶν μὲν ἀθανάτων ἀνενδεῶν ὄντων καὶ μηδεμιᾶς μηδαμῶς παρ' ἀνθρώπων συντελείας πρὸς τὸ εἶναι δεομένων, τῶν δὲ ἀλόγων ἀρχομένων κατὰ φύσιν καὶ τὰς πρὸς ὃ πέφυκεν ἕκαστον χρείας ἀνθρώποις ἀπο- πληρούντων ἀλλ' οὐκ αὐτῶν τούτοις χρῆσθαι πεφυκότων· θέμις γὰρ οὔτε ἦν οὔτε ἐστὶ τὸ ἄρχον καὶ ἡγεμονοῦν ὑπάγειν εἰς χρῆσιν τοῖς ἐλάττοσιν ἢ τὸ λογικὸν ὑποτάττειν ἀλόγοις, οὖσιν πρὸς τὸ ἄρχειν ἀνεπιτηδείοις. οὐκοῦν εἰ μήτε ἀναιτίως καὶ μάτην γέγονεν ἄνθρωπος (οὐδὲν γὰρ τῶν ὑπὸ θεοῦ γενομένων μάταιον κατά γε τὴν τοῦ ποιήσαντος γνώμην) μήτε χρείας ἕνεκεν αὐτοῦ τοῦ ποιήσαντος ἢ ἄλλου τινὸς τῶν ὑπὸ θεοῦ γενομένων ποιημάτων, εὔδηλον ὅτι κατὰ μὲν τὸν πρῶτον καὶ κοινότερον λόγον δι' ἑαυτὸν καὶ τὴν ἐπὶ πάσης τῆς δημιουργίας θεωρουμένην ἀγαθότητα καὶ σοφίαν ἐποίησεν ὁ θεὸς ἄνθρωπον, κατὰ δὲ τὸν προσεχέστερον τοῖς γενομένοις λόγον διὰ τὴν αὐτῶν τῶν γενομένων ζωὴν, οὐκ