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for man is. But when man is removed and does not exist, it is possible for an animal to exist; for there will be a horse, a dog, and such things, which are animals. Again, when man is introduced, an animal is by all means introduced; for man is an animal. But when an animal is introduced, it is not by all means that man is co-introduced, but a horse or a dog or one of such things; for they too are animals. Therefore, neither is Peter by nature prior to Paul, nor is the rational animal to the irrational animal. For when Peter is removed and does not exist, Paul will exist; and when Paul is introduced, Peter is not co-introduced, and when Peter is co-introduced, Paul is not co-introduced, and neither is Peter more, that is, a greater man than Paul, nor Paul than Peter. But one finds a medicine more healthful than another medicine and a medical book more medical than another book. 14 On definition. A definition is a concise statement that makes clear the nature of the underlying thing, that is, the statement signifying in brief the nature of the underlying thing, for example, man is a rational, mortal animal, receptive of intellect and knowledge. For many have made statements about the nature of man at length, that is, extended and long, but they are not concise; therefore they are not definitions. There are also concise statements, such as apothegms, but since they do not make clear the nature of a thing, they are not definitions. And a name often makes clear the nature of the underlying thing, but it is not a definition; for a name is a single word, but a definition is a statement. And a statement is composed of at least two words. So that a definition must be composed of different words and be concise and make clear the nature of the thing defined by it. A definition is composed of a genus and constitutive, that is, essential, differences, as in the case of the definition of animal: for an animal is an ensouled, sentient substance. Behold, substance is the genus, and 'ensouled' and 'sentient' are constitutive differences. It is also derived from matter and form, for example, a statue is something made of bronze, signifying the form of a man; the bronze, therefore, is the matter, and the form of the man is the form. Matter corresponds to genus, and form to difference. It is also derived from a subject and a goal, for example, medicine is an art concerned with human bodies that aims to produce health. Behold, the subjects of medicine are human bodies, and its goal is health. A description is composed of non-essential things, that is, properties and accidents, for example, man is laughing, walking upright, having broad nails; for all these are non-essential. For which reason it is also called a description, as it outlines and does not make clear the essential existence of the subject but its concomitants. A descriptive definition is a mixture of essential and non-essential things, for example, man is a rational animal, walking upright, having broad nails. Definition is so called by a metaphor from the boundaries of land; for just as a boundary separates the property of each one, so also a definition separates the nature of each one from the nature of another. The soundness of a definition is to be neither deficient nor excessive in its words, and its defect is to be deficient and excessive. A perfect definition is one that is convertible with the thing defined, and an imperfect one is one that is not convertible. Therefore, neither the one that is deficient in words is convertible nor the one that is excessive. For when it is excessive in words, it is deficient in things; and when it is deficient in words, it is excessive in things. For example, the perfect definition of man is "a rational, mortal animal." Behold, it is convertible; for every rational, mortal animal is a man, and every man is a rational, mortal animal. If, therefore, it is deficient by one word, it is excessive in things, for example, a rational animal. Behold, it was deficient in the word, for not

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γάρ ἐστιν ὁ ἄνθρωπος. Ἀνθρώπου δὲ ἀναιρουμένου καὶ μὴ ὄντος δυνατὸν εἶναι ζῷον· ἔσται γὰρ ἵππος, κύων καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα, ἅτινα ζῷά εἰσι. Πάλιν εἰσφερομένου ἀνθρώπου πάντως καὶ ζῷον εἰσφέρεται· ζῷον γάρ ἐστιν ὁ ἄνθρωπος. Ζῴου δὲ εἰσφερομένου οὐ πάντως, ὅτι συνεισφέρεται ἄνθρωπος ἀλλ' ἵππος ἢ κύων ἤ τι τῶν τοιούτων· ζῷα γάρ εἰσι καὶ αὐτά. Οὔτε οὖν ὁ Πέτρος ἐστὶ φύσει πρότερος τοῦ Παύλου οὔτε τὸ λογικὸν ζῷον τοῦ ἀλόγου ζῴου. Πέτρου γὰρ ἀναιρουμένου καὶ μὴ ὄντος ἔσται Παῦλος· καὶ Παύλου εἰσφερομένου οὐ συνεισφέρεται Πέτρος, τοῦ δὲ Πέτρου συνεισφερομένου οὐ συνεισφέρεται Παῦλος, καὶ οὔτε Πέτρος ἐστὶ μᾶλλον ἤγουν πλέον τοῦ Παύλου ἄνθρωπος οὔτε Παῦλος τοῦ Πέτρου. Εὑρίσκεται δὲ φάρμακον ὑγιεινότερον φαρμάκου καὶ βιβλίον ἰατρικώτερον βιβλίου ἄλλου. 14 Περὶ ὁρισμοῦ. `Ὁρισμός ἐστι λόγος σύντομος δηλωτικὸς τῆς φύσεως τοῦ ὑποκειμένου πράγματος ἤγουν ὁ λόγος ὁ δι' ὀλίγου σημαίνων τὴν φύσιν τοῦ ὑποκειμένου πράγματος, οἷον ἄνθρωπός ἐστι ζῷον λογικόν, θνητόν, νοῦ καὶ ἐπιστήμης δεκτικόν. Πολλοὶ μὲν γὰρ ἐποίησαν περὶ φύσεως ἀνθρώπου λόγους κατεπεκτάδην ἤγουν ἐκτεταμένους καὶ μεγάλους, ἀλλ' οὔκ εἰσι σύντομοι διὸ οὐδὲ ὁρισμοί εἰσιν. Εἰσὶ δὲ καὶ σύντομοι λόγοι ὡς τὰ ἀποφθέγματα, ἀλλ' ἐπειδὴ οὐ δηλοῦσι φύσιν πράγματος, οὔκ εἰσιν ὁρισμοί. Καὶ τὸ ὄνομα δὲ πολλάκις δηλοῖ τὴν φύσιν τοῦ ὑποκει μένου πράγματος, ἀλλ' οὐκ ἔστιν ὁρισμός· τὸ γὰρ ὄνομα μία λέξις ἐστίν, ὁ δὲ ὁρισμὸς λόγος ἐστί. Λόγος δὲ ἐκ δύο τὸ ἐλάχιστον σύγκειται λέξεων. Ὥστε ὁ ὁρισμὸς θέλει ἐκ διαφόρων λέξεων συγκεῖσθαι καὶ σύντομος εἶναι καὶ δηλοῦν τὴν φύσιν τοῦ ὑπ' αὐτοῦ ὁριζομένου πράγματος. Συνίσταται δὲ ὁ ὁρισμὸς ἐκ γένους καὶ συστατικῶν διαφορῶν ἤγουν οὐσιωδῶν, ὡς ἐπὶ τοῦ ὅρου τοῦ ζῴου· ζῷον γάρ ἐστιν οὐσία ἔμψυχος αἰσθητική. Ἰδοὺ ἡ μὲν οὐσία γένος ἐστί, τὸ δὲ ἔμψυχον καὶ τὸ αἰσθητικὸν συστατικαὶ διαφοραί. Λαμβάνεται δὲ καὶ ἐξ ὕλης καὶ εἴδους, οἷον ἀνδριάς ἐστιν ἐκ χαλκοῦ πεποιημένος, ἀνδρὸς εἶδος σημαίνων· ὁ μὲν οὖν χαλκὸς ὕλη ἐστί, τὸ δὲ τοῦ ἀνδρὸς εἶδος εἶδος. Ἀναλογεῖ δὲ ἡ μὲν ὕλη τῷ γένει, τὸ δὲ εἶδος διαφορᾷ. Λαμβάνεται δὲ καὶ ἐξ ὑποκειμένου καὶ τέλους, οἷον ἰατρική ἐστι τέχνη περὶ τὰ ἀνθρώπινα σώματα καταγινομένη ὑγιείας περιποιητική. Ἰδοὺ ὑποκείμενά εἰσι τῇ ἰατρικῇ τὰ ἀνθρώπινα σώματα, τέλος δὲ αὐτῆς ἡ ὑγίεια. Ἡ δὲ ὑπογραφὴ ἐκ τῶν ἐπουσιωδῶν σύγκειται ἤγουν ἰδίων καὶ συμβεβηκότων, οἷον ἄνθρωπός ἐστι γελαστικόν, ὀρθοπεριπατητικόν, πλατυώνυχον· ταῦτα γὰρ ὅλα ἐπουσιώδη εἰσί. ∆ιὸ καὶ ὑπογραφὴ λέγεται, ὡς σκιάζουσα καὶ οὐ τὴν οὐσιώδη ὕπαρξιν τοῦ ὑποκειμένου δηλοῦσα ἀλλὰ τὰ παρεπόμενα. Ὁ δὲ ὑπογραφικὸς ὁρισμὸς μικτός ἐστιν ἐξ οὐσιωδῶν καὶ ἐπουσιωδῶν, οἷον ἄνθρωπός ἐστι ζῷον λογικόν, ὀρθοπεριπατητικόν, πλατυώνυχον. Εἴρηται δὲ ὁρισμὸς ἀπὸ μεταφορᾶς τῶν τῆς γῆς ὁροθεσίων· ὥσπερ γὰρ τὸ ὁροθέσιον χωρίζει τὸ ἴδιον ἑκάστου, οὕτω καὶ ὁ ὁρισμὸς τὴν φύσιν ἑκάστου χωρίζει ἐκ τῆς τοῦ ἑτέρου φύσεως. Ὑγίεια δὲ ὁρισμοῦ ἐστι τὸ μήτε ἐλλείπειν μήτε πλεονάζειν ταῖς λέξεσι, κακία δὲ τὸ ἐλλείπειν καὶ πλεονάζειν. Τέλειος δὲ ὁρισμός ἐστιν ὁ ἀντιστρέφων πρὸς τὸ ὁριστόν, ἀτελὴς δὲ ὁ μὴ ἀντιστρέφων. Οὔτε οὖν ὁ ἐλλείπων ταῖς λέξεσιν ἀντιστρέφει οὔτε ὁ πλεονάζων. Ὅτε μὲν γὰρ πλεονάσει ταῖς λέξεσι, λείπει τοῖς πράγμασιν· ὅτε δὲ λείψει ταῖς λέξεσι, πλεονάζει τοῖς πράγμασιν. Οἷον ὁ τέλειος ὁρισμὸς τοῦ ἀνθρώπου «ζῷον λογικὸν θνητόν». Ἰδοὺ ἀντιστρέφει· πᾶν γὰρ ζῷον λογικὸν θνητὸν ἄνθρωπός ἐστι, καὶ πᾶς ἄνθρωπος ζῷόν ἐστι λογικὸν θνητόν. Ἐὰν οὖν λείψῃ μιᾷ λέξει, πλεονάζει τοῖς πράγμασιν, οἷον ζῷον λογικόν. Ἰδοὺ ἔλειψε τῇ λέξει, οὐ γὰρ