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being altered together with the body in corruption and generation. But Chrysippus says: death is the separation of soul from body; but nothing incorporeal is separated from a body; for an incorporeal thing does not touch a body; but the soul both touches and is separated from the body; therefore the soul is not incorporeal. Of these statements, that death is the separation of soul from body is true; but that an incorporeal thing does not touch a body is false when stated universally, but true in the case of the soul; false, since a line, being incorporeal, touches a body and is separated, and likewise whiteness, but true in the case of the soul. For the soul does not touch the body; for if it touches, it clearly lies alongside it; and if this is so, it does not lie alongside the whole; for it is impossible for one body to lie alongside another, whole to whole; and thus the whole animal will not be ensouled. So if it touches, the soul will be a body, but the whole animal will not be ensouled; but if the whole is ensouled, the soul neither touches nor is a body; but the animal is wholly ensouled; therefore it neither touches nor is a body, and is separated while being incorporeal. That the soul is not a body, then, is clear from what has been said; but that it is not without substance must be said next. But since Deinarchus also defined the soul as a harmony and Simmias, arguing against Socrates, asserted that the soul is a harmony, saying that the soul is like a harmony and the body like a lyre, the refutations of this argument which are found in the Phaedo [of Plato] must be set forth. One, then, is from what he has previously demonstrated. For it has been previously demonstrated that learnings are recollections. Taking this, then, as something agreed upon, he constructs the argument thus. If learnings are recollections, our soul existed before it came to be in the human form; but if it is a harmony, it did not exist before, but came to be later when the body was harmonized. For every composite is in no other state than the state of those things of which it is composed. For the composite, being a harmony, is a sort of community of the things put together; and there is nothing to prevent it from not leading those things from which it was composed, but following them; therefore, the soul's being a harmony is in conflict with learnings being recollections; but the theory of recollections is true; therefore, it is false that the soul is a harmony. Further, the soul both opposes the body and holds the ruling principle, since it rules it; but a harmony neither leads nor opposes; therefore the soul is not a harmony. Further, a harmony is more and less a harmony than another harmony by being slackened and tightened (not in the principle of the harmony, for it is impossible for a principle to have more and less, but in the fitting together; for if a mixed high and low sound are then slackened, they preserve the same ratio in the magnitudes of the sounds, but the harmony takes on a variation according to the fitting, being more and less tightened); but a soul is not more and less a soul than another; therefore the soul is not a harmony. Further, the soul admits of virtue and vice; but a harmony does not admit of harmony and disharmony; therefore the soul is not a harmony. Further, the soul, by admitting opposites in turn, is a substance and a substrate; but a harmony is a quality and in a substrate; and substance is different from quality; and therefore the soul is different from a harmony. However, there is nothing strange in the soul participating in harmony, but it is not on account of this a harmony; for neither is the soul virtue because it participates in virtue. But Galen declares nothing, but even protests in his demonstrative arguments that he had declared nothing concerning the soul; but he seems from what he says to favor more the view that the soul is a temperament; for on this, he says, follows the difference of characters; constructing the argument from the works of Hippocrates. And if this is so, it is clear that he also thinks it to be mortal; not all of it, however, but only the irrational soul of man. But concerning the rational soul he is in doubt, speaking thus: But that the temperament of the body cannot be the soul is clear from this. Every body, both ensouled and soulless, has been mixed from the four elements. For the mixture of these produces bodies. If, therefore, the soul is the mixture of the body, nothing will be soulless. And the argument is concluded thus: if the mixture

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φθορᾷ καὶ τῇ γενέσει συναλλοιούμεναι τῷ σώματι. Χρύσιππος δέ φησιν· ὁ θάνατός ἐστι χωρισμὸς ψυχῆς ἀπὸ σώματος· οὐδὲν δὲ ἀσώματον ἀπὸ σώματος χωρίζεται· οὐδὲ γὰρ ἐφάπτεται σώματος ἀσώματον· ἡ δὲ ψυχὴ καὶ ἐφάπτεται καὶ χωρίζεται τοῦ σώματος· οὐκ ἄρα ἀσώματος ἡ ψυχή. τούτων τὸ μὲν τὸν θάνατον χωρισμὸν εἶναι ψυχῆς ἀπὸ σώματος ἀληθές ἐστιν· τὸ δὲ μὴ ἐφάπτεσθαι ἀσώματον σώματος ψεῦδος μέν ἐστι καθόλου λεγόμενον, ἐπὶ δὲ τῆς ψυχῆς ἀληθές· ψεῦδος μὲν ἐπειδὴ καὶ ἡ γραμμὴ ἀσώματος οὖσα ἐφάπτεται σώματος καὶ χωρίζεται, ὁμοίως καὶ ἡ λευκότης, ἐπὶ δὲ τῆς ψυχῆς ἀληθές. οὐ γὰρ ἐφάπτεται τοῦ σώματος ἡ ψυχή· εἰ γὰρ ἐφάπτεται, δηλονότι παράκειται αὐτῷ· εἰ δὲ τοῦτο, οὐχ ὅλῳ παράκειται· ἀδύνατον γὰρ σῶμα σώματι ὅλον ὅλῳ παρακεῖσθαι· καὶ οὕτως οὐκ ἔσται ὅλον ἔμψυχον τὸ ζῷον. ὥστε εἰ μὲν ἐφάπτεται, σῶμα μὲν ἔσται ἡ ψυχή, ὅλον δὲ οὐκ ἔσται ἔμψυχον τὸ ζῷον· εἰ δὲ ὅλον ἐστὶν ἔμψυχον, οὔτε ἐφάπτεται οὔτε σῶμά ἐστιν ἡ ψυχή· τὸ δὲ ζῷον ὅλον ἔμψυχόν ἐστιν· οὔτε ἄρα ἐφάπτεται οὔτε σῶμά ἐστιν, καὶ χωρίζεται ἀσώματος οὖσα. ὅτι μὲν οὖν οὐκ ἔστιν ἡ ψυχὴ σῶμα δῆλον ἐκ τῶν εἰρημένων· ὅτι δὲ οὐδὲ ἀνούσιος ἑξῆς ῥητέον. ἐπεὶ δὲ καὶ ∆είναρχος ἁρμο νίαν ὡρίσατο τὴν ψυχὴν καὶ Σιμμίας ἀντιλέγων τῷ Σωκράτει τὴν ψυχὴν ἁρμονίαν ἔφασκεν εἶναι λέγων ἐοικέναι τὴν μὲν ψυχὴν ἁρμονίᾳ τὸ δὲ σῶμα λύρᾳ, ἐκθετέον τὰς λύσεις τούτου τὰς ἐν τῷ Φαίδωνι [Πλάτωνος] κειμένας. μία μὲν οὖν ἐστιν ἡ ἐκ τῶν προαποδεδειγμένων αὐτῷ. προαποδέδεικται γὰρ ὅτι αἱ μαθήσεις ἀναμνήσεις εἰσίν. τοῦτο οὖν λαβὼν ὡς ὁμολογούμενον κατασκευάζει τὸν λόγον οὕτως. εἰ αἱ μαθήσεις ἀναμνήσεις εἰσὶν ἦν ἡμῶν ἡ ψυχὴ πρὶν ἐν τῷ ἀνθρωπείῳ εἴδει γενέσθαι· εἰ δὲ ἁρμονία ἐστὶ πρότερον μὲν οὐκ ἦν ὕστερον δὲ ἐγένετο ἁρμοσθέντος τοῦ σώματος. πᾶσα γὰρ σύνθεσις οὐκ ἄλλως ἔχει ἢ ὡς ἔχει ἐκεῖνα τὰ ἐξ ὧν σύγκειται. κοινωνία γάρ τίς ἐστι τῶν συντιθεμένων ἡ σύνθεσις ἁρμονία οὖσα· καὶ οὐ κωλύει τὸ μὴ ἡγεῖσθαι αὐτὴν ἐκείνων ἀφ' ὧν συνετέθη, ἀλλ' ἕπεσθαι αὐτοῖς· μάχεται τοίνυν τὸ ἁρμονίαν εἶναι τὴν ψυχὴν τῷ τὰς μαθήσεις ἀναμνήσεις εἶναι· τὸ δὲ τῶν ἀναμνήσεων ἀληθές ἐστι· ψεῦδος ἄρα τὸ τὴν ψυχὴν ἁρμονίαν εἶναι. ἔτι ἡ μὲν ψυχὴ καὶ ἐναντιοῦται τῷ σώματι καὶ τὸν ἀρχικὸν ἐπέχει λόγον, ἅτε ἄρχουσα αὐτοῦ· ἡ δὲ ἁρμονία οὔτε ἡγεῖται οὔτε ἐναντιοῦται· οὐκ ἄρα ἡ ψυχὴ ἁρμονία. ἔτι ἁρμονία ἁρμονίας μᾶλλον καὶ ἧττόν ἐστιν ἁρμονία τῷ χαλᾶσθαι καὶ ἐπιτείνεσθαι (οὐ τῷ λόγῳ δὲ τῆς ἁρμονίας· ἀδύνατον γάρ ἐστι λόγον τὸ μᾶλλον καὶ ἧττον ἔχειν· ἀλλ' ἐν τῇ ἁρμογῇ· ἐὰν γὰρ κεκραμένος ὀξὺς φθόγγος καὶ βαρὺς ἔπειτα ἀνεθῶσι, τὸν λόγον μὲν τὸν αὐτὸν σῴζουσιν ἐν τοῖς μεγέθεσι τῶν φθόγγων, παραλλαγὴν δὲ λαμβάνει ἡ ἁρμονία κατὰ τὴν ἁρμογὴν μᾶλλον καὶ ἧττον ἐπιτεινομένη)· ψυχὴ δὲ ψυχῆς οὐκ ἔστι μᾶλλον καὶ ἧττον· οὐκ ἄρα ἁρμονία ἐστὶν ἡ ψυχή. ἔτι ἡ ψυχὴ ἀρετὴν καὶ κακίαν ἐπιδέχεται· ἡ δὲ ἁρμονία ἁρμονίαν καὶ ἀναρμοστίαν οὐκ ἐπιδέχεται· οὐκ ἄρα ἁρμονία ἡ ψυχή. ἔτι ἡ ψυχὴ τῷ ἐπιδέχεσθαι τὰ ἐναντία παρὰ μέρος οὐσία ἐστὶ καὶ ὑποκείμενον· ἡ δὲ ἁρμονία ποιότης καὶ ἐν ὑποκειμένῳ· ἡ δὲ οὐσία ποιότητος ἕτερον· καὶ ἡ ψυχὴ ἄρα ἁρμονίας ἕτερον. ἁρμονίας μέντοι μετέχειν τὴν ψυχὴν οὐδὲν ἄτοπον, ἀλλ' οὐ παρὰ τοῦτο ἁρμονία ἐστίν· οὐδὲ γὰρ διότι ἀρετῆς μετέχει ἀρετή ἐστιν ἡ ψυχή. Γαληνὸς δὲ ἀποφαίνεται μὲν οὐδὲν ἀλλὰ καὶ διαμαρτύρεται ἐν τοῖς ἀποδεικτικοῖς λόγοις ὡς οὐδὲν εἴη περὶ ψυχῆς ἀποφηνάμενος· ἔοικεν δὲ ἐξ ὧν λέγει δοκιμάζειν μᾶλλον τὸ κρᾶσιν εἶναι τὴν ψυχήν· ταύτῃ γὰρ ἐπακολουθεῖν τὴν τῶν ἠθῶν διαφοράν· ἐκ τῶν Ἱπποκράτους κατασκευάζων τὸν λόγον. εἰ δὲ τοῦτο, δῆλον ὅτι καὶ θνητὴν αὐτὴν εἶναι οἴεται· οὐ πᾶσαν δέ, ἀλλὰ τὴν ἄλογον μόνην ψυχὴν τοῦ ἀνθρώπου. περὶ δὲ τῆς λογικῆς ἀμφιβάλλει, λέγων οὕτως· ὅτι δὲ οὐ δύναται τοῦ σώματος ἡ κρᾶσις εἶναι ψυχή, δῆλον ἐντεῦθεν. πᾶν σῶμα ἔμψυχόν τε καὶ ἄψυχον ἐκ τῶν τεσσάρων στοιχείων κέκραται. ἡ γὰρ τούτων κρᾶσις τὰ σώματα ἀπεργάζεται. εἰ τοίνυν ἡ τοῦ σώματος κρᾶσίς ἐστιν ἡ ψυχή, οὐδὲν ἄψυχον ἔσται. καὶ συνάγεται ὁ λόγος οὕτως· εἰ ἡ κρᾶσις