generation; for what is according to nature for one, is contrary to nature for another. And let an example of these, if you wish, be for you the very godless and dark which Socrates in the Theaetetus [176e] also showed form of evil, which of necessity haunts mortal nature [ib. 176a]. For souls, by making themselves like to existing evils , exchange the life of these for likeness to the better. For the soul beholds the paradigms of good things when it has turned towards itself and the things better than itself, with which are the primarily good things and the summits of beings on a pure pedestal [Pl. Phaedr. 254 b] and they themselves are established separately. But of evils, by looking away to the things outside itself and after itself, as many things as are particulars and outside themselves, being disordered and indefinite and dissonant in their own nature, which are also insensible of the goods, by which the eye of the soul is nourished and watered [Pl. Phaedr. 246e2] and lives its own life. Therefore, neither are the productive causes of evils principles and powers, but powerlessness and weakness and an incommensurate communion and mixture of likes, nor, again, are their paradigms certain immovable things that are always the same, but infinite and indefinite and borne in other things, and these infinite. 49 But that for the sake of which all things are must in no way be posited in these things; for it would not be fitting for the good to be the end of evils. But since souls, in pursuing the good in every way and doing all things for its sake, also do evil things, for this reason someone might perhaps think that the end of evils is also the good. For all things are for the sake of the good, both as many as are good and as many as are contrary; for we do these things too out of ignorance of their own nature, while desiring the good. And perhaps it would be well to posit neither a primary efficient cause of evils nor a paradigm according to nature nor a final cause in itself; for both their form and their nature is a deficiency and indefiniteness and privation, and the manner of their subsistence---. Whence, indeed, it has often been said that evil is involuntary. For how could it be voluntary, having come to be for the sake of the good, but in itself being what it is, being neither desirable nor wished for by any of the beings? But these things in other places. But that evil arises in souls through weakness and the strength of the worse-for the horse of vice, partaking, is weighed down, he himself says , tending towards the earth and weighing it down [Pl. Phaedr. 247 b] -, and in bodies through the mixture of unlikes, of the form, I say, and of the formless , and again of contrary principles, is clear through these things. 50 But what is the manner and how did evil subsist from these things--- next we must speak of the so-called parasubsistence, positing it here; for it is not possible otherwise for that to subsist which has neither come to be from a primary cause in any way nor has reference to a definite end and that for the sake of which, nor has obtained its passage into being in virtue of itself, since it is necessary for anything whatsoever that properly subsists both to have come to be from a cause according to nature; for it is impossible for anything to have generation without a cause and to refer the order of its own generation to some end. Must we then posit that evil is one of those things for which being is accidental and through another and not from its own principle? --- one thing therefore is what is desired by us and another is what comes to be and what is attained. --- for to subsist belongs to things proceeding from a principle to an end, but to parasubsist belongs to things neither appearing from a principle according to nature nor ending in a definite end. But the generations of evils have obtained neither a primary cause said to produce them-for neither is nature the cause of the contrary-to-nature, nor is reason the cause of things that happen contrary to reason-nor do they arrive at an end for the sake of which everything that comes to be is by nature. Therefore such a generation must be called a parasubsistence, incomplete and being without purpose and in a way without cause and indefinite. For neither does its cause one, nor that which is a cause in itself and properly a cause produce by looking to evil itself and to the nature of evil , nor that which is neither a cause in itself nor properly a cause; but quite the contrary; for everything that comes to be comes to be for the sake of the good, but evil is from without and incidental, a failure to attain the end proper to each thing. And the failure is due to the weakness of the agent; and this, because it has obtained such a nature, of which one part is worse, and the other more beautiful, ---

γένεσιν· τὸ γὰρ ἄλλῳ κατὰ φύσιν, ἄλλῳ παρὰ φύσιν. παράδειγμα δέ, εἰ βούλει, καὶ τούτων ἔστω σοι αὐτὸ τὸ ἄθεον καὶ σκοτεινὸν <ὃ καὶ ὁ ἐν Θεαιτήτῳ [176e] Σωκράτης ἔδειξε> τῆς κακίας εἶδος, τὴν θνητὴν φύσιν ἐξ ἀνάγκης περιπολοῦν [ib. 176a]. ὁμοιούμεναι γὰρ αἱ ψυχαὶ <τοῖς οὖσι κακοῖς> ἀνταλλάττονται τὴν τούτων ζωὴν τῆς πρὸς τὸ κρεῖττον ὁμοιώσεως. καὶ γὰρ τῶν μὲν ἀγαθῶν τὰ παραδείγ- ματα βλέπει ἡ ψυχὴ στραφεῖσα πρὸς ἑαυτὴν καὶ τὰ ἑαυτῆς κρείττω, παρ' οἷς τὰ πρώτως <ἀγαθὰ καὶ αἱ τῶν ὄντων ἀκρότητες> ἐν ἁγνῷ βά- θρῳ [Pl. Phaedr. 254 b] καὶ αὐτὰ χωριστῶς ἱδρυμένα. τῶν δ' αὖ κακῶν ἀποβλέπουσα εἰς τὰ ἔξω ἑαυτῆς καὶ τὰ μεθ' ἑαυτήν, ὅσα καθέκαστα καὶ ἔξω ἑαυτῶν, ἄτακτα ὄντα καὶ ἀόριστα καὶ πλημμελῆ τῇ ἑαυτῶν φύσει, ἃ καὶ ἀνεπαίσθητα τῶν ἀγαθῶν, οἷς τρέφεται τὸ τῆς ψυχῆς ὄμμα καὶ ἄρδεται [Pl. Phaedr. 246e2] καὶ ζῇ τὴν ἑαυτοῦ ζωήν. οὔτ' οὖν τὰ ποιητικὰ τῶν κακῶν λόγοι καὶ δυνάμεις, ἀλλ' ἀδυναμία καὶ ἀσθένεια καὶ τῶν ὁμοίων ἀσύμμετρος κοινωνία καὶ μίξις, οὔτε αὖ τὰ παραδείγματα ἀκίνητα ἄττα καὶ ἀεὶ ὡσαύτως ἔχοντα, ἀλλ' ἄπειρα καὶ ἀόριστα καὶ ἐν ἄλλοις φερόμενα, καὶ τούτοις ἀπείροις. 49 Τὸ δὲ οὗ ἕνεκα πάντα οὐδαμῶς θετέον ἐν τούτοις· οὐ γὰρ ἂν πρέπῃ τέλος εἶναι τῶν κακῶν τὸ ἀγαθόν. ἀλλ' ἐπείπερ αἱ ψυχαὶ τὸ πανταχῇ ἀγαθὸν θηρώμεναι καὶ τούτου ἕνεκα πάντα ποιοῦσαι καὶ τὰ κακὰ πράττουσι, ταύτῃ τὶς ἂν ἴσως οἰηθείη καὶ τῶν κακῶν τέλος εἶναι τὸ ἀγαθόν. τοῦ γὰρ ἀγαθοῦ ἕνεκα πάντα, καὶ ὅσα ἀγαθὰ καὶ ὅσα ἐναντία· καὶ γὰρ ταῦτα ἀγνοίᾳ τῆς ἑαυτῶν φύσεως πράττομεν τὸ ἀγαθὸν ποθοῦντες. καὶ ἴσως εὖ ἂν ἔχοι μήτε τὸ ποιοῦν προηγούμενον τίθεσθαι τῶν κακῶν μήτε τὸ παράδειγμα κατὰ φύσιν μήτε τὸ οὗ ἕνεκα καθ' αὑτό· καὶ γὰρ τὸ εἶδος καὶ ἡ φύσις αὐτῶν ἔλλειψίς ἐστι καὶ ἀοριστία καὶ στέρησις, καὶ ὁ τῆς ὑποστάσεως αὐτῶν τρόπος---. ὅθεν δὴ καὶ ἀκούσιον εἶναι τὸ κακὸν πολλάκις εἴρηται. καὶ πῶς γὰρ ἂν ἑκούσιον εἴη τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ μὲν γενόμενον ἕνεκα, καθ' αὑτὸ δὲ ὅ ἐστι μήτε ἐφετὸν μήτε βουλητὸν μηδενὶ τῶν ὄντων ὑπάρχον; ἀλλὰ ταῦτα μὲν ἐν ἄλλοις. ὅτι δὲ τὸ κακὸν ἐν ψυχαῖς μὲν δι' ἀσθένειαν φύεται καὶ τὴν τοῦ χείρονος ἀλκήν-βρίθει γὰρ ὁ τῆς κάκης ἵππος μετέχων, <φησὶν αὐτός>, ἐπὶ τὴν γῆν ῥέπων τε καὶ βαρύνων [Pl. Phaedr. 247 b] -, ἐν δὲ σώ- μασι διὰ τὴν τῶν ἀνομοίων σύμμιξιν, <τοῦ εἴδους λέγω καὶ τοῦ ἀνειδέου>, καὶ αὖ τῶν ἐναντίων λόγων, διὰ τούτων δῆλον. 50 Τίς δὲ ὁ τρόπος καὶ πῶς ὑπέστη τὸ κακὸν ἐκ τούτων--- ἐφεξῆς ἡμῖν ῥητέον τὴν λεγομένην παρυπόστασιν ἐνταῦθα τιθεμένοις· οὐ γάρ ἐστιν <ἄλλως> ὑφεστάναι τὸ μήτε ἐκ προηγουμένης αἰτίας κἂν ὁπωσοῦν γεγονὸς μήτε εἰς ὡρισμένον τέλος καὶ τὸ οὗ ἕνεκα τὴν ἀνα- φορὰν ἔχον μήτε καθ' αὑτὸ τὴν εἰς τὸ εἶναι πάροδον λαχόν, δέον πᾶν τὸ ὁτιοῦν καὶ κυρίως ὑποστὰν ἔκ τε αἰτίας γεγονέναι κατὰ φύσιν· παντὶ γὰρ ἀδύνατον χωρὶς αἰτίου γένεσιν ἔχειν καὶ πρός τι τέλος τὴν τάξιν τῆς ἑαυτοῦ γενέσεως ἀναφέρειν. θετέον οὖν τὸ κακὸν ἓν τούτων εἶναι οἷς τὸ εἶναι κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς καὶ δι' ἄλλο καὶ οὐκ ἐξ ἀρχῆς οἰκείας; --- ἄλλο <ἄρα> τὸ ἐφετὸν ἡμῖν καὶ ἄλλο τὸ γινόμενον καὶ οὗ ἡ τεῦξις. --- τὸ μὲν ὑφίστασθαι τῶν ἐξ ἀρχῆς εἰς τέλος πορευομένων ἦν, τὸ δὲ παρ- υφίστασθαι τῶν μήτε ἐκ τῆς ἀρχῆς κατὰ φύσιν ἐκφαινομένων μήτε εἰς ὡρισμένον τέλος τελευτώντων. αἱ δὲ τῶν κακῶν γενέσεις οὔτε προη- γουμένην ἔλαχον τὴν τοῦ ποιεῖν αὐτὰ λεγομένην αἰτίαν-οὔτε γὰρ <ἡ φύσις τοῦ παρὰ φύσιν οὔτε> ὁ λόγος τῶν παρὰ λόγον γινομένων αἴτιος-οὔτε ἀφικνοῦνται εἰς τέλος τὸ οὗ ἕνεκεν πᾶν τὸ γινόμενον πέφυκε. παρυπόστασιν ἄρα τὴν τοιαύτην γένεσιν ῥητέον <ἀτελῆ καὶ> ἄσκοπον καὶ ἀναίτιόν πως οὖσαν καὶ ἀόριστον. οὔτε γὰρ τὸ αἴτιον <αὐτῆς ἕν, οὐθ' ὃ καὶ αἴτιόν ἐστι καθ' αὑτὸ καὶ κυρίως αἴτιον> εἰς τὸ κακὸν αὐτὸ <καὶ τὴν τοῦ κακοῦ φύσιν> βλέπων ποιεῖ, οὐθ' ὃ μήτε καθ' αὑτὸ μήτε κυρίως αἴτιον· πᾶν δὲ τοὐναντίον· ἀγαθοῦ γὰρ ἕνεκα πᾶν τὸ γινόμενον γίνεται, τὸ δὲ κακὸν ἔξωθεν καὶ ἐπεισοδιῶδες, ἀτευξία τοῦ προσήκοντος ἑκάστῳ τέλους. ἡ δὲ ἀτευξία διὰ τὴν τοῦ ποιοῦντος ἀσθέ- νειαν· τοῦτο δέ, ὅτι ἔλαχε φύσιν <τοιαύτην>, ἧς τὸ μὲν χεῖρον, τὸ δὲ κάλλιον, ---