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10

had been left having received no law, he would have differed in nothing from an irrational creature, having no distinction of good and evil, but simply and randomly doing whatever came to hand. Therefore, he did not know that doing something contrary to the divine laws was a sin, nor indeed that it was good to do those things that were in accordance with them; for how was it fitting for one who had not received a law to know this? The giving of the commandment, therefore, also provided him a distinction between the good and the evil; for the power of both obedience and disobedience lay before him, being able to incline toward either of them, as he wished. And it made known to him what was sin and what was righteousness, making known that it is good to obey the laws, but a sin to do something foreign to the divine laws. And since he transgressed the divine command, and then received the punishment for the transgression, he acquired a greater hatred against sin, having been taught long ago by word that sin is something evil and productive of death, but later having come to know the depravity of sin by its effects; for inasmuch as it happened that he came under punishment because of the transgression, to that degree he was prepared to hate sin as the cause of his evils. Therefore, "that sin might appear sin" is instead of "so that sin might appear what it is." And what is this, this very sin? That is to say, evil. And from where did this appear? Through the good, that is to say, through the commandment, and how it appeared, working death from those things of which it becomes a cause of death. Therefore, the good, that is to say, the commandment, contributed for me to the knowing of sin, that it is indeed the cause of evils and worse things, so that I also hate it for this reason. The commandment is therefore good, having provided us the cause of the distinction and of the hatred toward sin; for "in order that" does not usually speak of cause, but of what follows. And according to the meaning, "through what is good to me" should be assigned to "that sin might appear sin," not to what follows, "working death"; for he says that through the good, that is, the commandment, sin appeared to me and it became manifest how great an evil it is, so as even to bring about death against those who practice it. Then also another thing: "that sin through the commandment might become exceedingly sinful." Here too, "in order that" does not speak of cause, but usually of what follows. And according to the meaning it is elliptical, attached to what precedes it; for it does not say "that it might become" in the sense of making, but in the sense of revealing, instead of "that sin might become manifest to us through the commandment as being exceedingly sinful." And what he says is something like this: we call sinful the one who is inclined toward contrary things and practices them; and thus also says the divine scripture, from which the apostle also calls sin "sinful" in the present case, as having become for us the cause of the inclination toward sinning. And through all this he wants to say of what good the giving of the commandment became the cause; for he says that through sin we became mortal by nature, and having become mortal we acquired a great inclination toward stumbling. We therefore have come to know the depravity of sin from every side; on the one hand, from its having become a cause of death for us, and on the other hand, from its having produced in us through death a great inclination toward sinning, so that from every side the hatred against it necessarily increases in us. But the giving of the commandment is the cause of all these things, without which it was not possible for us to know the nature of sin, nor of what great evils it becomes the cause. Most wonderfully, therefore, he spoke of the usefulness of the commandment, if indeed it both pointed out sin and prepared us to hate it, so that even in the continuation of stumbling we undertake a greater hatred against it because of the annoyance, having once learned what a great cause of evils it becomes for those who practice it. Having answered these things, the statement "did that which is good, then, become death to me?" holds to its proper sequence, and since through all this he has sufficiently shown the usefulness of the law, which provided us the universal distinction of what we ought to do and what we ought to abstain from, he then shows its weakness, so that

10

κατελείφθη μηδένα νόμον δεξάμενος, οὐδὲν ἂν διήλλαττεν ἀλόγου, διάκρισιν μὲν οὐδεμίαν ἔχων καλοῦ τε καὶ χείρονος, πᾶν δὲ τὸ προστυχὸν ἁπλῶς καὶ ὡς ἔτυχε διαπραττόμενος. οὔτε οὖν ἁμάρτημα εἶναι τὸ ποιῆσαί τι τοῖς θείοις ὑπεναντίον νόμοις ἠπίστατο, οὔτε μὴν ἀγαθὸν τὸ ποιεῖν ὅσα ἐκείνοις ἀκόλουθα· πόθεν γὰρ καὶ εἰδέναι τοῦτο προσῆκεν νόμον οὐκ εἰληφότι; οὐκοῦν ἡ δόσις τῆς ἐντολῆς καὶ διάκρισιν αὐτῷ τοῦ τε καλοῦ καὶ τοῦ χείρονος παρέσχεν· ὑπακοῆς τε γὰρ ἐξουσία καὶ παρακοῆς αὐτῷ προύκειτο πρὸς ἑκάτερον αὐτῶν δυναμένῳ ῥέπειν, ὡς ἂν ἐβούλετο. καὶ ἐγνώρισεν αὐτῷ, τί μὲν ἁμάρτημα, τί δὲ δικαιο σύνη, καλὸν μὲν εἶναι τὸ πεισθῆναι τοῖς νόμοις γνωρίζουσα, ἁμάρτημα δὲ τὸ ποιεῖν τι τῶν θείων νόμων ἀλλότριον. καὶ ἐπειδὴ παρέβη τὸ θεῖον ἐπίταγμα, εἶτα τὴν ὑπὲρ τοῦ πλημμελήματος τιμωρίαν ἐδέξατο, μεῖζον κατὰ τῆς ἁμαρτίας τὸ μῖσος ἐκτήσατο, πάλαι μὲν λόγῳ παιδευθεὶς ὡς ἡ ἁμαρτία κακόν τι καὶ θανάτου παρεκτικόν, ὕστερον δὲ ἐπὶ τῶν ἔργων τῆς ἁμαρτίας ἐγνωκὼς τὴν φαυλότητα· καὶ γὰρ ὅσῳ διὰ τὴν παράβασιν ὑπὸ τὴν τιμωρίαν αὐτὸν καταστῆναι συνέβη, τοσούτῳ μισεῖν τὴν ἁμαρτίαν ὡς αἰτίαν αὐτῷ τῶν κακῶν παρεσκευάζετο. τὸ οὖν ἡ ἁμαρτία ἵνα φανῇ ἁμαρτία, ἀντὶ τοῦ ὥστε φανῆναι τὴν ἁμαρτίαν ὅ πέρ ἐστιν. τί δὲ τοῦτο, αὐτὸ τοῦτο ἁμαρτία; ἵνα εἴπῃ κακόν. πόθεν δὲ τοῦτο ἐφάνη; διὰ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ, ἵνα εἴπῃ διὰ τῆς ἐντολῆς, καὶ ὅπως ἐφάνη , κατεργαζομένη θάνατον ἀφ' ὧν θανάτου γίνεται πρόξενος. συνεβάλλετο οὖν μοι τὸ ἀγαθόν, ἵνα εἴπῃ ἡ ἐντολή, πρὸς τὸ γνῶναι τὴν ἁμαρτίαν ὅτι δὴ κακῶν καὶ χειρόνων αἴτιον, ὥστε καὶ μισεῖν αὐτὴν διὰ τοῦτο. ἀγαθὸν ἄρα ἡ ἐντολὴ τῆς διακρίσεως καὶ τοῦ πρὸς τὴν ἁμαρτίαν μίσους τὴν αἰτίαν ἡμῖν παρασχομένη· τὸ γὰρ ἵνα οὐκ ἐπ' αἰτίας, ἀλλὰ τὸ ἑπόμενον συνήθως λέγει. ἀποδοτέον δὲ κατὰ τὴν ἔννοιαν τὸ διὰ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ μοι τῷ ἡ ἁμαρτία ἵνα φανῇ ἁμαρτία, οὐ τῷ ἑξῆς τῷ κατεργα ζομένη θάνατον· λέγει γὰρ ὅτι διὰ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ τουτ' ἔστι τῆς ἐντολῆς, ἐφάνη μοι ἡ ἁμαρτία καὶ κατάδηλος ἐγένετο ἡλίκον ἐστὶ κακόν, ὡς καὶ θάνατον ἀποτελεῖν κατὰ τῶν ἐπιτηδευόντων αὐτήν. εἶτα καὶ ἕτερον· ἵνα γένηται καθ' ὑπερβολὴν ἁμαρ τωλὸς ἡ ἁμαρτία διὰ τῆς ἐντολῆς. τὸ ἵνα κἀνταῦθα οὐκ ἐπ' αἰτίας, ἀλλὰ τὸ ἑπόμενον συνήθως λέγει. ἴστι δὲ κατὰ τὴν ἔννοιαν ἐλλειπές, ἐπισυνημμένον τῷ πρὸ αὐτοῦ· οὐ γὰρ κατὰ ποίησιν τὸ ἵνα γένηται λέγει, ἀλλὰ κατὰ φανέρωσιν, ἀντὶ τοῦ ἵνα γένηται ἡμῖν κατάδηλος ἡ ἁμαρτία διὰ τῆς ἐντολῆς ἄγαν οὖσα ἁμαρτωλός. ὃ δὲ λέγει τοιοῦτόν ἐστιν· ἁμαρτωλὸν καλοῦμεν τὸν πρὸς τἀναντία ῥέποντα καὶ ταῦτα ἐπιτηδεύοντα· οὕτω δὲ καὶ ἡ θεία λέγει γραφή, ὅθεν καὶ ἁμαρτωλὸν ὁ ἀπόστολος ἐπὶ τοῦ παρόντος τὴν ἁμαρτίαν καλεῖ, ὡς ἂν πρόξενον ἡμῖν τῆς περὶ τὸ ἁμαρτάνειν καταστᾶσαν ῥοπῆς. βούλεται δὲ διὰ πάντων εἰπεῖν, τίνος αἴτιος ἀγαθοῦ τῆς ἐντολῆς ἡ δόσις ἐγένετο· λέγει γὰρ ὅτι ὑπὸ μὲν τῆς ἁμαρτίας ἐγενόμεθα θνητοὶ τὴν φύσιν, θνητοὶ δὲ γεγονότες πολλὴν περὶ τὸ πταίειν τὴν ῥοπὴν ἐκτησάμεθα. ἔγνωμεν οὖν λοιπὸν πανταχόθεν τῆς ἁμαρτίας τὴν φαυλότητα· τοῦτο μὲν ἀφ' ὧν θανάτου πρόξενος ἡμῖν ἐγένετο, τοῦτο δὲ ἀφ' ὧν πολλήν τινα διὰ τοῦ θανάτου περὶ τὸ ἁμαρτάνειν τὴν ῥοπὴν ἡμῖν ἐνεποίησεν, ὡς πανταχόθεν τὸ κατ' αὐτῆς μῖσος ἀναγκαίως αὐξάνεσθαι ἐν ἡμῖν. ἀλλὰ τούτων ἁπάντων αἰτία τῆς ἐντολῆς ἡ δόσις, ἧς ἐκτὸς οὔτε ἁμαρτήματος φύσιν εἰδέναι ἦν ἡμῖν δυνατόν, οὔτε ἡλίκων γίνεται πρόξενον κακῶν. θαυμασιώτατα οὖν τῆς ἐντολῆς τὸ χρήσιμον ἔφη, εἴγε καὶ τὴν ἁμαρτίαν ὑπέδειξε καὶ μισεῖν αὐτὴν παρεσκεύασεν, ὡς καὶ ἐν τῇ τοῦ πταίειν συνεχείᾳ μεῖζον κατ' αὐτῆς διὰ τὴν ἐνόχλησιν ἀναδέχεσθαι μῖσος, ἐγνωκότας ἅπαξ ὅσον αἴτιον κακῶν τοῖς ἐπιτηδεύουσι γίγνεται. ταῦτα ἀποκρινάμενος τὸ οὖν ἀγαθὸν ἐμοὶ ἐγένετο θάνατος ἔχεται τῆς οἰκείας ἀκολουθίας, καὶ ἐπειδὴ διὰ πάντων ἔδειξεν αὐτάρκως τοῦ νόμου τὸ χρήσιμον, παρασχόντος ἡμῖν τὴν καθόλου διάκρισιν ὧν τε ποιεῖν ἡμᾶς καὶ ὧν ἀπέχεσθαι προσήκει, δείκνυσι λοιπὸν αὐτοῦ καὶ τὸ ἄτονον, ὥστε