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of my knowing wisdom and knowledge, as I would not have learned those things, unless both labor and study of their knowledge had led the way; but 'I also knew parables,' he says, 'and science,' that is, the comprehension of that which is transcendent, which comes about through analogy, by the comparison of known things. and these things he says 5.309 he has learned; for 'Parables,' he says, 'and science I knew,' just as in the gospel, when teaching the hearers, the Lord brings the discourse concerning the kingdom into view, relating a pearl or a treasure or a wedding or a seed or leaven or some such thing, not saying that the kingdom is these things, but through the likeness of the things signified in these, he shows parabolically to his hearers certain sparks and riddles of things beyond comprehension. and for this purpose, he says, the preference of the spirit came to me, that a multitude of wisdom might be mine, so that by becoming wise I might not fail to attain the knowledge of things that are, nor fall short of the discovery of what is profitable. For from wisdom, knowledge is constituted, and knowledge makes the judgment of what is superior easier for us. But this is not wont to come to the diligent without effort, but he who adds knowledge to himself always intensifies the labor with the learning. Wherefore he says, 'He that increases knowledge increases sorrow.' and having become such, he then condemns pleasures as vain. For he says, 'I said in my heart, Come now, I will test you with gladness, and see what is good, and behold, this also is vanity.' For he did not immediately give himself over to such a trial, nor, untasted of the hardened and more austere life, did he slip down to the participation of pleasures, but having been trained 5.310 in those things and having established in his character the unsmiling and unyielding, through which especially the lessons of wisdom come to the diligent, he then descends to what is considered pleasant to the senses, not drawn down to these things by passion, but for the sake of examining whether the perception that comes to be in these things contributes anything to the knowledge of the truly good. Since, at the beginning, he makes laughter his enemy and calls the passion distraction, which is equivalent in thought to madness and paranoia; or what else might one properly call laughter, which is neither word nor deed accomplished for some purpose, but an unseemly dissolution of the body and a convulsion of the spirit and a heaving of the whole body and a parting of the cheeks and a baring of teeth and gums and palate and a bending of the neck and an irrational breaking of the voice being cut short together with the breaking of the breath; what else could this be, he says, and not paranoia? Wherefore he says 'To laughter I said, distraction,' as if he were saying to laughter: You are mad and out of your mind and you do not remain within a composed state, willfully behaving unseemly and distorting 5.311 your form in passion, working this distortion for no useful end. and I said 'And to mirth, What do you do?' which is equivalent to saying: I took a stand against pleasure, suspecting its approach, as if some thief were secretly slipping into the chambers of the soul, I never allowed it to overpower the mind. For if I but recognized pleasure, like some wild beast, creeping around my senses, I would immediately fight against it and resist it, saying 'What are you doing?' to this slavish and irrational mirth; why do you effeminate the manliness of nature? why do you soften the intensity of the mind? why do you unnerve the tone of the soul? why do you corrupt the thoughts? why do you cast a gloom with your own mist upon the clear sky of my thoughts? Having done these and similar things, he says, 'I considered whether my heart will draw my flesh as with wine,' that is, how the care for intelligible things might become stronger than the movements of the flesh, so that nature might not be at odds with itself, the mind choosing one thing, but the flesh pulling away to others, but so as to make the disposition of our flesh 5.312 obedient and subject to the intelligible part of the soul, with the lesser part being drawn in and swallowed up in the

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μου τοῦ γνῶναι σοφίαν καὶ γνῶσιν, ὡς οὐκ ἂν μαθὼν ἐκεῖνα, εἰ μὴ πόνος τε καὶ μελέτη τῆς γνώσεως αὐτῶν καθηγήσατο· ἀλλὰ καὶ Παραβολάς, φησί, καὶ ἐπιστήμην ἔγνων, τουτέστι τὴν ἐξ ἀναλογίας γινομένην τοῦ ὑπερκειμένου κατάληψιν διὰ τῆς παραθέσεως τῶν γινωσκομένων. καὶ ταῦτα μεμαθηκέναι 5.309 λέγει· Παραβολὰς γάρ, φησί, καὶ ἐπιστήμην ἔγνων, καθάπερ καὶ ἐν τῷ εὐαγγελίῳ διδάσκων τοὺς ἀκροωμένους ὁ κύριος τὸν περὶ τῆς βασιλείας λόγον ὑπ' ὄψιν ἄγει, ἢ μαργαρίτην ἢ θησαυρὸν ἢ γάμον ἢ κόκκον ἢ ζύμην ἤ τι τοιοῦτον διηγησά μενος, οὐ ταῦτα λέγων εἶναι τὴν βασιλείαν, ἀλλὰ διὰ τῆς ὁμοιώσεως τῶν ἐν τούτοις σημαινομένων ἐναύσματά τινα καὶ αἰνίγματα τῶν ὑπὲρ κατάληψιν πραγμάτων παραβολικῶς τοῖς ἀκούουσιν ὑποδείκνυσιν. καὶ εἰς τοῦτό μοι γέγονε, φησίν, ἡ προαίρεσις τοῦ πνεύματος, τὸ γενέσθαι μοι πλῆθος σοφίας, ὡς ἂν διὰ τοῦ γενέσθαι σοφὸς μὴ διαμάρτοιμι τῆς τῶν ὄντων γνώσεως μηδὲ ἐκτὸς γενοίμην τῆς τοῦ λυσιτελοῦντος εὑρέσεως. ἐκ γὰρ σοφίας ἡ γνῶσις συνίσταται, ἡ δὲ γνῶσις εὐκολωτέραν ἡμῖν ποιεῖ τὴν τοῦ ὑπερέχοντος κρίσιν. τοῦτο δὲ οὐκ ἀκμητὶ τοῖς σπουδάζουσι παραγίνεσθαι πέφυκεν, ἀλλ' ὁ προστιθεὶς ἑαυτῷ γνῶσιν συνεπιτείνει πάντως τῇ μαθήσει τὸν πόνον. διὸ φησίν, ὅτι Ὁ προστιθεὶς γνῶσιν προσθήσει ἄλγημα. καὶ τοιοῦτος γεγονὼς τότε τῶν ἡδέων ὡς ματαίων καταψηφίζεται. Λέγει γὰρ ὅτι Εἶπα ἐγὼ ἐν τῇ καρδίᾳ μου, δεῦρο δή, πειράσω σε ἐν εὐφροσύνῃ, καὶ ἰδὲ ἐν ἀγαθοῖς, καί γε τοῦτο ματαιότης. οὐ γὰρ εὐθὺς ἔδωκεν ἑαυτὸν τῇ τοιαύτῃ πείρᾳ οὐδὲ ἄγευστος τοῦ κατεσκληκότος τε καὶ σεμνοτέρου βίου πρὸς τὴν τῶν ἡδέων μετουσίαν κατώλισθεν, ἀλλ' ἐνασκηθεὶς 5.310 ἐκείνοις καὶ κατορθώσας τῷ ἤθει τὸ ἀμειδὲς καὶ ἀνένδοτον, δι' ὧν μάλιστα τὰ τῆς σοφίας μαθήματα τοῖς σπουδάζουσι γίνεται, τότε καθίησι πρὸς τὰ τῇ αἰσθήσει τερπνὰ νομιζόμενα, οὐ πάθει πρὸς ταῦτα καθελκυσθείς, ἀλλὰ τοῦ ἐπισκέψασθαι χάριν, εἴ τι συντελεῖ πρὸς τὴν τοῦ ἀληθινῶς ἀγαθοῦ γνῶσιν ἐν τούτοις γενομένη ἡ αἴσθησις. ἐπεὶ τό γε κατ' ἀρχὰς ἐχθρὸν ἑαυτοῦ ποιεῖται τὸν γέλωτα καὶ περιφορὰν ὀνομάζει τὸ πάθος, ὅπερ ἴσον ἐστὶ κατὰ διάνοιαν τῇ παραφορᾷ τε καὶ παρανοίᾳ· ἦ τί γὰρ ἂν ἄλλο τις ὀνομάσειε κυρίως τὸν γέλωτα, ὃς μήτε λόγος ἐστὶ μήτε ἔργον ἐπί τινι σκοπῷ κατορθούμενον, διάχυσις δὲ σώματος ἀπρεπὴς καὶ πνεύματος κλόνος καὶ βρασμὸς ὅλου τοῦ σώματος καὶ διαστολὴ παρειῶν καὶ γύμνωσις ὀδόντων τε καὶ οὔλων καὶ ὑπερῴας αὐχένος τε λυγισμὸς καὶ φωνῆς παράλογος θρύψις συνεπικοπτομένης τῇ κλάσει τοῦ πνεύματος· τί ἂν ἄλλο εἴη τοῦτο, φησί, καὶ οὐ παράνοια; διό φησι Τῷ γέλωτι εἶπον περιφοράν, ὡς ἂν εἰ ἔλεγε τῷ γέλωτι, ὅτι· μαίνῃ καὶ παρεξέστηκας καὶ οὐκ ἐντὸς τοῦ καθεστῶτος μένεις, ἑκουσίως ἀσχημονῶν καὶ διαστρέφων 5.311 ἐν τῷ πάθει τὸ εἶδος, ἐπ' οὐδενὶ χρησίμῳ τὴν διαστροφὴν ἐργαζόμενος. εἶπον δὲ Καὶ τῇ εὐφροσύνῃ, τί τοῦτο ποιεῖς; ὅπερ ἴσον ἐστὶ τῷ λέγειν, ὅτι· πρὸς τὴν ἡδονὴν ἀντιστατικῶς ἔσχον ὑποπτεύων αὐτῆς τὸν προσεγγισμόν, οἱονεὶ κλέπτου τινὸς λαθραίως ἐντὸς παραδυομένου τῶν τῆς ψυχῆς ταμιείων, οὐκ ἀφῆκά ποτε κατακρατῆσαι τῆς διανοίας αὐτήν. εἰ γὰρ ἔγνων μόνον τὴν ἡδονὴν οἷόν τι θηρίον τὰς αἰσθήσεις μου περιέρπουσαν, εὐθὺς <ἂν> ἀπεμαχόμην τε πρὸς αὐτὴν καὶ ἀντέβαινον, Τί ταῦτα ποιεῖς λέγων πρὸς τὴν ἀνδραποδώδη ταύτην καὶ ἄλογον εὐφροσύνην· τί ἐκθηλύνεις τὸ ἀνδρῶδες τῆς φύσεως; τί καταμαλάσσεις τῆς διανοίας τὸ σύντονον; τί ἐκνευρίζεις τῆς ψυχῆς τὸν τόνον; τί διαλυμαίνῃ τοῖς λογισμοῖς; τί μοι τὸ καθαρὸν τῆς τῶν νοημάτων αἰθρίας τῇ παρ' ἑαυτῆς ὁμίχλῃ ζόφον ποιεῖς; Ταῦτα, φησί, καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα ποιήσας Ἐσκεψάμην εἰ ἡ καρδία μου ἑλκύσει ὡς οἶνον τὴν σάρκα μου, τουτέστιν ὅπως ἂν ἐπικρατεστέρα γένοιτο ἡ τῶν νοητῶν ἐπιμέλεια τῶν τῆς σαρκὸς κινημάτων, ὥστε μὴ στασιάζειν πρὸς ἑαυτὴν τὴν φύσιν, ἄλλα μὲν τῆς διανοίας προαιρουμένης, πρὸς ἕτερα δὲ τῆς σαρκὸς ἀφελκούσης, ἀλλ' ὡς καταπειθὲς καὶ ὑποχείριον ποιῆσαι τῷ νοητῷ τῆς ψυχῆς μέρει τὸ τῆς σαρκὸς ἡμῶν 5.312 φρόνημα, ἑλκυσθέντος τε καὶ καταποθέντος τοῦ ἐλαττουμένου ἐν τῷ