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is the soul of the body, and every body has a temperament, every body has a soul; and if every body has a soul, then no body is soulless; therefore neither stone nor wood nor iron nor anything else will be soulless. But if one should say that not every temperament of a body is a soul, but a specific kind, it must be asked what sort of temperament it is that makes a living being and holds the place of a soul? For whatever sort of temperament he might name, such we shall find also in inanimate things. For since there are nine temperaments, as he himself showed in his work *On Temperaments*—eight of the ill-tempered and one of the well-tempered—he says that man is tempered according to the well-tempered one, not all men but the one of the medial temperament, and according to the other distemperaments the other animals according to their kind, with variation of degree towards more and less; both of relaxation and of intensity; and the nine temperaments are also found in inanimate things with variation of more and less, as he himself again demonstrated in his work on simple drugs. Further, if the soul is a temperament, and temperaments change according to ages and seasons and diets, the soul changes; and if it changes, we do not have the same soul, but according to the temperament sometimes that of a lion, sometimes that of a sheep, sometimes that of something else, which is absurd. Furthermore, the temperament does not oppose the desires of the body, but even cooperates with them; for it is what moves them. But the soul opposes them; therefore, the temperament is not the soul. Again, if the temperament is the soul, and the temperament is a quality, and a quality both comes to be and ceases to be without the destruction of its substratum, then the soul too will be separated without the destruction of its substratum; but this is not true; therefore, the soul is not a temperament, nor is it a quality. For they will surely not say that one of the opposites is naturally present in the living being as heat is in fire. For that is unchangeable. But the temperament is seen to change, or rather, they themselves are the ones who through the medical art change the temperaments. Moreover, the qualities of any body are perceptible to the senses; but the soul is not perceptible to the senses but to the intellect; therefore, the soul is not a quality of the body. Again, the good temperament of the body and pneuma, along with the disposition of flesh and sinews and the other parts, is strength; and the good temperament of the hot and cold and dry and wet is health; and the symmetry of the members along with a good complexion makes for the beauty of the body; if, therefore, the harmony of health and strength and beauty is the soul, it would be necessary for a living person neither to be sick nor to be weak nor to be misshapen; but it often happens that not just one but all three of these good temperaments are lost, and the person lives; for it happens that the same person is at once misshapen and weak and sick; therefore, the good temperament of the body is not the soul. How then do certain natural vices and virtues attend upon humans? This truly comes from the temperament of the body. For just as people are naturally healthy or sickly from their temperament, so some, being naturally bilious, are irascible, others cowardly, others prone to passion. But some control and overcome it; and it is clear that they control their temperament. But that which controls is one thing, and that which is controlled is another; therefore, temperament is one thing and soul is another. For the body, being an instrument of the soul, if it is suitably constructed, cooperates with the soul and is itself in a suitable condition; but if unsuitably, it hinders it, and then the soul has need of efforts, fighting against the unsuitability of its instrument; and if it is not very sober, it is also perverted along with it, just as a musician makes mistakes along with the discord of the lyre if he does not first tune it well. Wherefore the soul also has need of care for the body in order to prepare it as an instrument suitable for itself. And this it does through both reason and habits, as in a harmony, slackening some things and tightening others, in order that it may make it suitable for itself and use it as a fit instrument, unless it too is perverted along with it; for this also happens. But Aristotle, in calling the soul an entelechy, no less agrees with those who call it a quality. But let us first clarify what he calls an entelechy. He speaks of substance in three ways: one as underlying matter, which in itself is nothing, but has the potentiality for coming into being; another as form and species, according to which

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τοῦ σώματος ψυχή ἐστιν, πᾶν δὲ σῶμα κρᾶσιν ἔχει, πᾶν σῶμα ψυχὴν ἔχει· εἰ δὲ πᾶν σῶμα ψυχὴν ἔχει, οὐδὲν σῶμά ἐστιν ἄψυχον· οὔτε λίθος ἄρα οὔτε ξύλον οὔτε σίδηρος οὔτε ἄλλο τι ἄψυχον ἔσται. εἰ δὲ μὴ καθόλου πᾶσαν κρᾶσιν σώματος λέγοι ψυχὴν εἶναι ἀλλὰ τὴν τοιάνδε, ἐρωτητέον ποία κρᾶσίς ἐστιν ἡ ποιοῦσα ζῷον καὶ ψυχῆς λόγον ἐπέχουσα; ὁποίαν γὰρ ἂν εἴποι τὴν κρᾶσιν τοιαύτην εὑρήσομεν καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἀψύχοις. ἐννέα γὰρ οὐσῶν κράσεων ὡς αὐτὸς ἐν τῷ περὶ κράσεων ἔδειξεν, ὀκτὼ μὲν τῶν δυσκράτων μιᾶς δὲ τῆς εὐκράτου, κατὰ μὲν τὴν εὔκρατον λέγει κεκρᾶσθαι τὸν ἄνθρωπον, οὐ πάντα δὲ ἀλλὰ τὸν τῆς μέσης κράσεως, κατὰ δὲ τὰς ἄλλας δυσκρασίας τὰ ἄλλα ζῷα κατ' εἶδος μετὰ τῆς ἐπὶ τὸ μᾶλλον καὶ ἧττον ἀνέσεώς· τε καὶ ἐπιτάσεως· εὑρίσκονται δὲ καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἀψύχοις αἱ ἐννέα κράσεις μετὰ τοῦ μᾶλλον καὶ ἧττον, ὡς αὐτὸς πάλιν ἐν τοῖς ἁπλοῖς ἀπέδειξεν. ἔτι εἰ ἡ ψυχὴ κρᾶσίς ἐστιν, αἱ δὲ κράσεις ἐναλλάσσονται κατά τε τὰς ἡλικίας καὶ τὰς ὥρας καὶ τὰς διαίτας, ἡ ψυχὴ ἐναλλάσσεται· εἰ δὲ ἐναλλάσσεται, οὐ τὴν αὐτὴν ἔχομεν ψυχήν, ἀλλὰ κατὰ τὴν κρᾶσιν ποτὲ μὲν λέοντος ποτὲ δὲ προβάτου, ποτὲ δὲ ἄλλου τινός, ὅπερ ἄτοπον. ἔτι ἡ κρᾶσις οὐκ ἐναντιοῦται ταῖς ἐπιθυμίαις τοῦ σώματος, ἀλλὰ καὶ συνεργεῖ· αὐτὴ γάρ ἐστιν ἡ κινοῦσα· ἡ δὲ ψυχὴ ἐναντιοῦται· οὐκ ἄρα ἡ κρᾶσίς ἐστι ψυχή. ἔτι εἰ ἡ κρᾶσίς ἐστιν ἡ ψυχή, ἡ δὲ κρᾶσις ποιότης, ποιότης δὲ καὶ γίνεται καὶ ἀπογίνεται χωρὶς τῆς τοῦ ὑποκειμένου φθορᾶς, καὶ ἡ ψυχὴ ἄρα χωρισθήσεται χωρὶς τῆς τοῦ ὑποκειμένου φθορᾶς· τοῦτο δὲ οὐκ ἀληθές· οὐκ ἄρα κρᾶσις, οὐδὲ ποιότης ἐστὶν ἡ ψυχή. οὐ γὰρ δήπου τὸ ἕτερον τῶν ἀντικειμένων φυσικῶς προσεῖναι φήσουσι τῷ ζῴῳ ὡς ἐπὶ τοῦ πυρὸς τὸ θερμόν. ἀμετάθετον γὰρ τοῦτο. φαίνεται δὲ μετατιθεμένη ἡ κρᾶσις, μᾶλλον δὲ αὐτοί εἰσιν οἱ διὰ τῆς ἰατρικῆς τέχνης τὰς κράσεις μεταβάλλοντες. ἔτι παντὸς σώματος αἱ ποιότητες αἰσθηταί εἰσιν· ἡ δὲ ψυχὴ οὐκ αἰσθητὴ ἀλλὰ νοητή· οὐκ ἄρα ποιότης σώματός ἐστιν ἡ ψυχή. ἔτι ἡ τοῦ σώματος καὶ πνεύματος μετὰ παραθέσεως σαρκῶν καὶ νεύρων καὶ τῶν ἄλλων εὐκρασία ἰσχύς ἐστιν· καὶ ἡ τῶν θερμῶν δὲ καὶ ψυχρῶν καὶ ξηρῶν καὶ ὑγρῶν εὐκρασία ὑγεία ἐστίν· ἡ δὲ συμμετρία τῶν μελῶν μετὰ τῆς εὐχροίας τὸ κάλλος ποιεῖ τοῦ σώματος· εἰ τοίνυν ἡ ἁρμονία τῆς ὑγείας καὶ τῆς ἰσχύος καὶ τοῦ κάλλους ψυχή ἐστιν, ἀνάγκη ἦν τὸν ἄνθρωπον ζῶντα μήτε νοσεῖν μήτε ἀσθενεῖν μήτε ἄμορφον εἶναι· συμβαίνει δὲ πολλάκις οὐ μίαν μόνην ἀλλ' ὁμοῦ τὰς τρεῖς ταύτας εὐκρασίας ἀπόλλυσθαι καὶ ζῆν τὸν ἄνθρωπον· συμβαίνει γὰρ τὸν αὐτὸν ὁμοῦ καὶ ἄμορφον εἶναι καὶ ἀσθενεῖν καὶ νοσεῖν· οὐκ ἄρα ἡ εὐκρασία τοῦ σώματός ἐστιν ἡ ψυχή. πῶς οὖν φυσικαί τινες κακίαι καὶ ἀρεταὶ τοῖς ἀνθρώποις ἕπονται; τοῦτο ἐκ τῆς τοῦ σώματος ἀληθῶς κράσεως γίνεται. ὡς γὰρ φυσικῶς ὑγιεινοὶ καὶ νοσώδεις εἰσὶν ἐκ τῆς κράσεως· οὕτω τινὲς φυσικῶς πικρόχολοι ὄντες ὀργίλοι εἰσίν, ἄλλοι δειλοί, ἄλλοι καταφερεῖς. ἀλλ' ἔνιοι κρατοῦσι καὶ περιγίνονται· δῆλον δὲ ὅτι τῆς κράσεως κρατοῦσιν· ἄλλο δέ ἐστιν τὸ κρατοῦν καὶ ἄλλο τὸ κρατούμενον· ἄλλο ἄρα κρᾶσις καὶ ἄλλο ψυχή. ὄργανον γὰρ ὂν τὸ σῶμα τῆς ψυχῆς ἐὰν μὲν ἐπιτηδείως κατασκευασθῇ συνεργεῖ τῇ ψυχῇ καὶ αὐτὸ ἔχει ἐπιτηδείως· ἐὰν δὲ ἀνεπιτηδείως, ἐμποδίζει, καὶ τότε χρεία τῇ ψυχῇ πραγμάτων ἀπομαχομένῃ πρὸς τὴν ἀνεπιτηδειότητα τοῦ ὀργάνου· καὶ ἐὰν μὴ σφόδρα νήψῃ, καὶ συνδιαστρέφεται αὐτῷ καθάπερ μουσικὸς συνεξαμαρτάνει τῇ τῆς λύρας διαστροφῇ ἐὰν μὴ πρότερον αὐτὴν καταστήσῃ καλῶς. διὸ καὶ χρεία τῇ ψυχῇ τῆς ἐπιμελείας τοῦ σώματος ἵνα καταρτίσῃ αὐτὸ ὄργανον ἐπιτήδειον ἑαυτῇ. τοῦτο δὲ ποιεῖ διά τε τοῦ λόγου καὶ τῶν ἠθῶν, ὡς ἐν ἁρμονίᾳ τὰ μὲν χαλῶσα τὰ δὲ ἐπιτείνουσα, ἵνα ἁρμόδιον αὐτὸ ἑαυτῇ κατασκευάσῃ καὶ χρήσηται ἐπιτηδείῳ ὀργάνῳ, ἐὰν μὴ καὶ αὐτὴ συνδιαστραφῇ αὐτῷ· συμβαίνει γὰρ καὶ τοῦτο. Ἀριστοτέλης δὲ τὴν ψυχὴν ἐντελέχειαν λέγων οὐδὲν ἧττον συμφέρεται τοῖς ποιότητα λέγουσιν αὐτήν. διασαφήσωμεν δὲ πρότερον ἐντελέχειαν τίνα καλεῖ. τὴν οὐσίαν τριχῶς λέγει, τὸ μὲν ὡς ὕλην ὑποκείμενον, ὃ καθ' ἑαυτὸ μὲν οὐδέν ἐστιν, δύναμιν δὲ ἔχει πρὸς γένεσιν· ἕτερον δὲ μορφὴν καὶ εἶδος, καθ' ἣν