For where the one is, there is also the good; <but the evil> ---; for there is asymmetry and disharmony and opposition in multitude, and from these come both weakness and need. --- and the multitude ... and the difference of powers, some things pulling towards others; ---but where multitude and otherness have shone forth because of the subsidence of unity, there is both the lack of power- for all power is what it is by the one and from the one-and disharmony and discord, as one thing is borne by its appetites against another. Now, how the origins of evils are, and what the so-called para-hypostasis is and whence it comes, has been said. 51 But what evil itself is must now be said. And it might seem the most difficult of all things to know the nature and form of evil in itself, since all knowledge is a contact with form, but evil is formless and like a privation. But perhaps this too might become clear, if looking to the good itself ... we should in this way contemplate what evil is. For just as the primarily good is beyond all things, so evil-in-itself is devoid of all goods, I mean insofar as it is evil, and is a lack and privation of them. --- But evil, if insofar as it is evil it is a privation of every good, is devoid, as evil, of the fount of goods, and as infinite, of the limit of all things, and as weakness, of the power in it, and as asymmetry and falsehood and ugliness, of beauty and truth and measure, ---; and as by its own nature ungrounded and unstable, of the abiding age in the one and of its power-for not being the same is of powerlessness; and as privation and life-lessness, of the first monad of forms and of the life there; and as destructive and divisive to whatever it is present in and incomplete, of the perfecting goodness of all things; for the corrupting leads from being to not-being, the divisive destroys the continuity and the unity of being, and the incomplete takes away both from its own perfection and from the natural disposition of each thing. <Furthermore> the indefinite ... is a lack and a failure of the unitary summit, the barren, of the fertile, the idle, of the demiurgic; for removal and weakness and indefiniteness are privations <of these goods>, <I mean> of the monadic cause and of the generative power and of the active creation. But if it <is> also the cause of unlikeness and division and disorder, <it is clear that in this way too> <it is necessary for it to lack> both the assimilative goods and the undivided providence for divided things and the order in divided things. --- <evil would be> inert and dark and material; or whence does it have each of these and such things, if not by the privations of those goods? For there primarily are the goods, of which the good in us is a portion and an image, the privation of which is evil; so also of those things, which we say the good resembles. And what need is there to say more, when even the evil in bodies is a privation not only of the good in them, but also before this of the good in souls? For the good in bodies is an image of the good in souls. --- But that evil in every way is a privation of goods and a lack, has been said. 52 But since it is such by its own nature <as we have said>, let us say whence its opposition to the good comes. For this too is a privation, but not a complete one; for being present with the state of the good, the privation of this, by its own presence, makes that state weak, but it itself acquires power and form from that state. Hence, of the privations, those of forms, being complete privations, are only absences of the states, not fighting against them; but those of goods fight against their states and are in a way contrary to them; for they are not entirely powerless and inert, being present with the powers of those states and, as it were, being led by them into form and activity. And this <Plato, knowing,> <says> that injustice itself, in itself, is weak and inactive, but by the presence of justice it has power and is brought to activity, not remaining in its own nature--- but evil, having come to be in an alien power, <is contrary to the good>, by <its>

ὅπου γὰρ τὸ ἕν, ἅμα καὶ τὸ ἀγαθόν· <τὸ δὲ κακὸν> ---· ἀσυμμετρία γὰρ καὶ ἀναρμοστία καὶ ἐναντιότης ἐν τῷ πλήθει, ἐκ δὲ τούτων ἥ τε ἀσθένεια καὶ τὸ ἐνδεές. --- καὶ τὸ πλῆθος ... καὶ ἡ τῶν δυνάμεων διαφορότης, ἄλλων πρὸς ἄλλα τὴν ὁλκὴν ποιουμένων· ---ὅπου δὲ τὸ πλῆθος καὶ ἡ ἑτερότης ἐξέλαμψε διὰ τὴν τῆς ἑνώσεως ὕφεσιν, ἐνταῦθα ἥ τε ἔνδεια τῆς δυνάμεως- πᾶσα γὰρ δύναμις τῷ ἑνὶ καὶ ἐξ ἑνός ἐστιν ὅ ἐστι-καὶ ἡ ἀναρμοστία καὶ ἡ στάσις ἄλλου πρὸς ἄλλο φερομένου ταῖς ὀρέξεσι. Πῶς μὲν οὖν ἔχουσι τῶν κακῶν αἱ γενέσεις καὶ τίς ἡ λεγομένη παρυ- πόστασις καὶ πόθεν, εἴρηται. 51 Αὐτὸ δὲ τὸ κακὸν ὃ τί ποτέ ἐστιν ἤδη λεκτέον. δόξειε δ' ἂν πάντων εἶναι χαλεπώτατον τὸ γνῶναι καθ' ἑαυτὴν τὴν τοῦ κακοῦ φύσιν καὶ τὸ εἶδος, εἴπερ πᾶσα γνῶσις εἴδους ἐστὶν ἐπαφή, τὸ δὲ κακὸν ἀνείδεον καὶ οἷον στέρησις. τάχα δ' ἂν γένοιτο καὶ τοῦτο φανερόν, εἰ πρὸς τὸ ἀγαθὸν αὐτὸ ... βλέποντες, οὕτω δὴ καὶ τὸ κακὸν ὃ τί ποτέ ἐστι θεωρήσαιμεν. ὡς γὰρ τὸ πρώτως ἀγαθὸν ἐπέκεινα πάντων, οὕτω τὸ αὐτοκακὸν πάντων ἄμοιρον ἀγαθῶν, λέγω δὲ ᾗ κακόν, καὶ ἔλλειψις ἐκείνων καὶ στέρησις. --- τὸ δὲ κακόν, εἰ ἐστὶ παντὸς τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ ᾗ κακὸν στέρησις, ἄμοιρόν ἐστιν ὡς μὲν κακὸν τῆς τῶν ἀγαθῶν πηγῆς, ὡς δὲ ἄπειρον τοῦ πάντων πέρατος, ὡς δὲ ἀσθένεια τῆς ἐν αὐτῷ δυνάμεως, ὡς δὲ ἀσυμμετρία καὶ ψεῦδος καὶ αἰσχρότης τοῦ τε κάλλους καὶ τῆς ἀληθείας καὶ τοῦ μέτρου, ---· ὡς δὲ ἀνίδρυτον τῇ ἑαυτοῦ φύσει καὶ ἄστατον τοῦ μένοντος αἰῶνος ἐν τῷ ἑνὶ καὶ τῆς ἐκείνου δυνάμεως-ἀδυναμίας γὰρ τὸ μὴ ὡσαύτως· ὡς δὲ στέρησις καὶ ἀζωΐα τῆς πρώτης τῶν εἰδῶν μονάδος καὶ τῆς ἐκεῖ ζωῆς· ὡς δὲ φθαρτικὸν καὶ διαιρετικὸν οἷς ἂν παρῇ καὶ ἀτελὲς τῆς τελεσιουργοῦ τῶν ὅλων ἀγαθότητος· τὸ γὰρ φθοροποιὸν μὲν ἀπὸ τοῦ ὄντος ἄγει πρὸς τὸ μὴ ὄν, τὸ δὲ διαιρετικὸν ἀναιρεῖ τὴν τοῦ ὄντος συνέχειάν τε καὶ τὴν ἕνωσιν, τὸ δὲ ἀτελὲς παραιρεῖται τῆς τε οἰκείας τελειότητος καὶ τῆς ἑκάστου κατὰ φύσιν διαθέσεως. <ἔτι τοίνυν> τὸ μὲν ἀόριστον ... ἔλλειψίς ἐστι καὶ ἁμαρτία τῆς ἑνιαίας ἀκρότητος, τὸ δὲ ἄγονον τῆς γονίμου, τὸ δὲ ἀργὸν τῆς δημιουργικῆς· παραίρεσις γὰρ καὶ ἀσθένεια καὶ ἀοριστία <τῶν ἀγαθῶν τούτων> στερήσεις εἰσί, τῆς τε μονα- δικῆς <λέγω> αἰτίας καὶ τῆς γεννητικῆς δυνάμεως καὶ τῆς δραστηρίου ποιήσεως. εἰ δὲ καὶ ἀνομοιότητός <ἐστι> καὶ μερισμοῦ καὶ ἀταξίας αἴτιον, <δῆλον ὅτι καὶ οὕτω> τῶν τε ἀφομοιωτικῶν ἀγαθῶν <ἐλλείπειν αὐτὸ> καὶ τῆς ἀμερίστου τῶν μεριστῶν προνοίας καὶ τῆς ἐν τοῖς μερισθεῖσι τάξεως <ἀναγκαῖον>. --- ἀδρανὲς <ἂν εἴη τὸ κακὸν> καὶ σκοτεινὸν καὶ ἔνυλον· ἢ πόθεν αὐτῷ τούτων τὲ καὶ τῶν τοιούτων ἕκαστον, εἰ μὴ ταῖς τῶν ἀγαθῶν ἐκείνων στερήσεσιν; ἐκεῖ γὰρ τὰ ἀγαθὰ πρώτως, ὧν μοῖρα καὶ εἰκών ἐστι καὶ τὸ ἐν ἡμῖν ἀγαθόν, οὗ ἡ στέρησις τὸ κακόν· ὥστε καὶ ἐκείνων, οἷς τὸ ἀγαθὸν ἐοικέναι φαμέν. καὶ τί δεῖ λέγειν, ὅπου καὶ τὸ ἐν σώμασι κακὸν οὐ τοῦ ἐν αὐτοῖς μόνον ἀγαθοῦ στέρησίς ἐστιν, ἀλλὰ καὶ πρὸ τούτου τοῦ ἐν ψυχαῖς; καὶ γὰρ τὸ ἐν σώμασιν ἀγαθὸν εἰκὼν τυγχάνον τοῦ ἐν ψυχαῖς. --- ἀλλ' ὅτι μὲν τὸ πάντῃ κακὸν στέρησις τῶν ἀγαθῶν καὶ ἔλλειψις, εἴρηται. 52 Ὄντι δὲ κατὰ τὴν ἑαυτοῦ φύσιν τοιούτῳ <ὥσπερ εἴπομεν>, πόθεν αὐτῷ ἡ πρὸς τὸ ἀγαθὸν ἐναντιότης λέγωμεν. ἔστι γὰρ καὶ τοῦτο στέ- ρησις, ἀλλ' οὐ παντελής· συνοῦσα γὰρ τῇ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ ἕξει ἡ ταύτης στέρησις αὐτῇ μὲν τῇ ἑαυτῆς παρουσίᾳ ἀσθενῆ ἐκείνην ποιεῖ, αὐτὸ δὲ ἀπ' ἐκείνης δύναμιν προσλαμβάνει καὶ εἶδος. ἔνθεν τοι τῶν στερήσεων αἱ μὲν τῶν εἰδῶν, παντελεῖς οὖσαι στερήσεις, ἀπουσίαι μόνον εἰσὶ τῶν ἕξεων, οὐ μαχόμεναι πρὸς αὐτάς· αἱ δὲ τῶν ἀγαθῶν μάχονται πρὸς τὰς ἕξεις αὐτῶν καὶ ἐναντίαι πως ἐκείναις εἰσίν· οὐ γὰρ ἀδύναμοι πάντῃ καὶ ἀδρανεῖς εἰσὶ ταῖς ἐκείνων συνοῦσαι δυνάμεσι καὶ οἷον εἰς εἶδος καὶ ἐνέρ- γειαν παρ' ἐκείνων ἀγόμεναι. ὃ καὶ <Πλάτων εἰδὼς> τὴν ἀδικίαν αὐτὴν καθ' ἑαυτὴν ἀσθενῆ τε εἶναί <φησι> καὶ ἄπρακτον, δικαιοσύνης δὲ παρ- ουσίᾳ καὶ δύναμιν ἔχειν καὶ εἰς τὸ ἐνεργεῖν ἄγεσθαι, μὴ μένουσαν ἐν τῇ ἑαυτῆς φύσει--- ἐν ἀλλοτρίᾳ δὲ γεγονὸς δυνάμει τὸ κακὸν <ἐναντίον ἐστὶ τῷ ἀγαθῷ>, τῇ <ἐκείνου>