Elements of Theology

 as one subsisting, but according to participation not one, the one will be multiplied, just as the multiplicity is unified through the one. Therefore

 activity is better than that which is not self-sufficient but has the cause of its perfection dependent on another substance. For if all beings by nat

 it desires that also, how most of all the good? or if it does not desire, how does it not desire the cause of all things, having proceeded from it? Bu

 is itself, and the mover and the moved are one and the same. For either it moves in one part and is moved in another part, or as a whole it moves and

 beginning from a monad, it proceeds into a multitude coordinate with the monad, and the multitude of every order is led back to one monad. For the mon

 the one being divided. But if it is in one of all things, it will no longer be of all things, but of one. If, therefore, it is both common to those ab

 the thing produced is other than it. Therefore, that which begets is established as unchangeable and undiminished, multiplying itself through a genera

 from something and reverting has a cyclical activity. For if it reverts to that from which it proceeds, it joins the end to the beginning, and the mot

 procession. For since each occurs through likeness, that which has proceeded immediately from something has also reverted immediately to it (for the l

 has reverted to itself according to nature and is perfect in its reversion to itself, and would have its being from itself for that to which the reve

 the self-subsistent is set apart from things measured by time in respect to its substance. For if the self-subsistent is ungenerated, it would not be

 having received the power to produce from the cause which is superior to it, it has from that cause its being the cause of those things of which it is

 Thus the producer in relation to the produced, taken in relation to each other, but that which is able to do more has a greater and more universal pow

 a cause has pre-contained in itself the effect, being primarily what that is secondarily or in the thing produced the producer (for this too, partici

 suffers from the former) and when the second in turn acts, that also co-acts, because whatever the second does, the more causal also co-begets with i

 being, or needing it somehow in order to be, would be in this respect more imperfect than the effect. But that which is in the result is a co-cause ra

 passible, being in every way divisible, and in every way to infinity. But the incorporeal, being simple, is impassible for the indivisible can neithe

 undiminished it contains in itself. But surely infinity in respect to magnitude and in respect to multitude is a complete privation and a falling away

 set apart and if all things enter into it, yet it has something hidden and incomprehensible to secondary things and if it unfolds the powers within

 but nowhere for thus it would be divided and separate from itself, if indeed one part of it is everywhere and in all things, but the other part nowhe

 all things. For since each thing exists either according to cause or according to existence or according to participation, in the first the rest exist

 a turning back as if through similars, dissimilar <being>. For the one is similar as a particular to a particular, the other is kindred as being of th

 a hypostasis but no longer a henad, it would be assigned to another order on account of the alteration of its property. 115 Every god is supra-essenti

 supra-essential, being nothing other than the one for each is not one thing, and then good, but only good, just as it is not one thing, and then one,

 is and in beings has the power of apprehending truth (for it both grasps thoughts and has its subsistence in acts of intellection) but the gods are b

 having set the same before itself, is most self-sufficient and such is all that is divine. Therefore it needs neither other things, being goodness-it

 is more unified than beings. All divine genera, therefore, are bound together by their proper intermediaries, and the first do not proceed immediately

 of a henad working, with which it is connate. This, then, is that which in itself defines the being that partakes of it and shows essentially the supr

 to the gods so that, while they are present to all things in the same way, all things are not present to them in the same way, but as each is able, i

 For the one, having a most unitive power, sends itself through the entire union and unifies all from above, while remaining in itself. But the mean, s

 proceeds from the infinity of the divine power, multiplying itself and passing through all things, and pre-eminently demonstrating the unfailing in th

 presides over composites and of their order and of their division according to number, and is of the same series as the paternal in more partial produ

 they have intelligible [qualities]. In the same way, therefore, that those, by illuminating Being, are intelligible, so also these, by illuminating th

 and sees itself. But seeing that it is thinking and seeing, it knows that it is Intellect in actuality and knowing this, it knows that it thinks, and

 Therefore it has the causes of all things intellectually. So that every intellect is all things intellectually, both the things before it and the thin

 more akin, contracted in quantity, in power surpasses the things after it and conversely the things further from the one. Therefore, those that are h

 on the one hand, but being only intellectual, is participated by souls that are neither divine nor come to be in a state of change from intellect to u

 by its very being, if the participant is suitable, it immediately becomes ensouled and living, not by the soul reasoning and choosing, nor giving life

 and to the soul that substantiates the essential principles of all things in it for everything that produces by its being, which it is primarily, thi

 of the motions it will also have restorations for every period of the eternal things is restorative. 200 Every period of a soul is measured by time

 the relation to the secondary ones, which the divine has to the intellectual, and this to the psychical and the quantities of the lower ones are grea

 it admits of every kind of change, being moved together with their own ruling causes. But indeed that it is also indivisible, is clear. For everything

has reverted to itself according to nature and is perfect in its reversion to itself, and would have its being from itself; for that to which the reversion according to nature is directed, from this is also the procession according to being for each thing. If therefore it furnishes its own well-being to itself, it will surely also furnish its own being to itself, and will be lord of its own hypostasis. Therefore, that which is able to revert to itself is self-subsistent. 44 Everything that is revertible to itself in activity has also reverted to itself in being. For if it is able to revert to itself in activity, but should exist as non-revertible in being, it would be better in respect of its activity rather than in respect of its being, the one being revertible, the other non-revertible; for that which belongs to itself is better than that which belongs only to another, and that which preserves itself is more perfect than that which is only preserved by another. If, therefore, something is revertible to itself according to the activity which proceeds from its being, it has also received a revertible being, so as not only to act towards itself, but also to belong to itself and to be held together and perfected by itself. 45 Everything that is self-subsistent is ungenerated. For if it were generated, on the one hand, because it is generated, it will be imperfect in itself and in need of perfection from another; but on the other hand, because it produces itself, it is perfect and self-sufficient. For everything generated is perfected by another which furnishes it with generation when it is not; for generation is a path from the imperfect to its opposite, the perfect. But if something produces itself, it is always perfect, always being together with its own cause, or rather, immanent in it, for the perfection of its being. 46 Everything that is self-subsistent is indestructible. For if it should be destroyed, it will abandon itself and will be apart from itself. But this is impossible. For being one, it is at once both cause and caused. But everything that is destroyed is destroyed by departing from its own cause; for in so far as it depends on that which holds it together and preserves it, each thing is held together and preserved. But the self-subsistent never abandons its cause, since it does not abandon itself; for it is its own cause. Therefore, everything that is self-subsistent is indestructible. 47 Everything that is self-subsistent is without parts and simple. For if it were divisible, being self-subsistent, it will substantiate itself as divisible, and as a whole it will be turned towards itself and all will be in all of itself. But this is impossible. Therefore the self-subsistent is without parts. But further, it is also simple. For if it were composite, there would be in it a worse part and a better part, and the better would come from the worse and the worse from the better, if indeed the whole proceeds from the whole of itself; and further it would not be self-sufficient, being in need of its own elements, out of which it has its subsistence. Therefore, everything that is self-subsistent is simple. 48 Everything that is not eternal is either composite, or subsists in another. For it is either dissoluble into those things from which it is, and it is in every way composed of those things into which it is dissolved; or it is in need of a substrate, and abandoning its substrate it passes into non-being. But if it should be simple and in itself, it will be indissoluble and indispersible. 49 Everything that is self-subsistent is eternal. For there are two modes, according to which something must be non-eternal, that which arises from composition and that which arises from things that are in another. But the self-subsistent is neither composite, but simple; nor in another, but in itself. Therefore it is eternal. 50 Everything that is measured by time, either in its being or in its activity, is a coming-to-be in that respect in which it is measured by time. For if it is measured by time, it would be proper for it to exist or to act according to time, and its 'was' and its 'will be' are different from one another; for if its 'was' and its 'will be' were numerically the same, it would have suffered nothing from time as it proceeds and always has a different before and after. If, therefore, its 'was' is one thing and its 'will be' another, it is therefore coming-to-be and never is, but it travels along with time, by which it is measured, existing in coming-to-be and not standing still in the same being, but always receiving a different being, just as the 'now' in time is always different due to the passage of time. Therefore it is not all at once, existing in the dispersion of temporal extension, and being extended along with it; and this is to have its being in not-being; for that which is coming-to-be what it is coming-to-be, is not. Therefore, that which exists in this way is a coming-to-be. 51 Everything that

ἐπέστραπται πρὸς ἑαυτὸ κατὰ φύσιν καὶ ἔστι τέλειον ἐν τῇ πρὸς ἑαυτὸ ἐπιστροφῇ, καὶ τὴν οὐσίαν ἂν παρ' ἑαυτοῦ ἔχοι· πρὸς ὃ γὰρ ἡ κατὰ φύσιν ἐπιστροφή, ἀπὸ τούτου καὶ ἡ πρόοδος ἡ κατ' οὐσίαν ἑκάστοις. εἰ οὖν ἑαυτῷ τὸ εὖ εἶναι παρέχει, καὶ τὸ εἶναι δήπου ἑαυτῷ παρέξει, καὶ ἔσται τῆς ἑαυτοῦ κύριον ὑποστάσεως. αὐθυπόστατον ἄρα ἐστὶ τὸ πρὸς ἑαυτὸ δυνάμενον ἐπιστρέφειν. 44 Πᾶν τὸ κατ' ἐνέργειαν πρὸς ἑαυτὸ ἐπιστρεπτικὸν καὶ κατ' οὐσίαν ἐπέστραπται πρὸς ἑαυτό. εἰ γὰρ τῇ μὲν ἐνεργείᾳ δύναται ἐπιστρέφεσθαι πρὸς ἑαυτό, τῇ δὲ οὐσίᾳ ἀνεπίστροφον ὑπάρχοι, κρεῖττον ἂν εἴη κατὰ τὴν ἐνέργειαν μᾶλλον ἢ κατὰ τὴν οὐσίαν, τῆς μὲν ἐπιστρεπτικῆς οὔσης, τῆς δὲ ἀνεπιστρόφου· τὸ γὰρ ἑαυτοῦ ὂν κρεῖττον ἢ τὸ ἄλλου μόνον, καὶ τὸ ἑαυτοῦ σωστικὸν τελειότερον ἢ τὸ ὑπ' ἄλλου μόνον σωζόμενον. εἰ ἄρα τι κατ' ἐνέργειάν ἐστι τὴν ἀπὸ τῆς οὐσίας πρὸς ἑαυτὸ ἐπιστρεπτικόν, καὶ τὴν οὐσίαν ἐπιστρε πτικὴν ἔλαχεν, ὡς μὴ ἐνεργεῖν πρὸς ἑαυτὸ μόνον, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἑαυτοῦ εἶναι καὶ ὑφ' ἑαυτοῦ συνέχεσθαι καὶ τελειοῦσθαι. 45 Πᾶν τὸ αὐθυπόστατον ἀγένητόν ἐστιν. εἰ γὰρ γενητόν, διότι μὲν γενητόν, ἀτελὲς ἔσται καθ' ἑαυτὸ καὶ τῆς ἀπ' ἄλλου τελειώσεως ἐνδεές· διότι δὲ αὐτὸ ἑαυτὸ παράγει, τέλειον καὶ αὔταρκες. πᾶν γὰρ γενητὸν ὑπ' ἄλλου τελειοῦται τοῦ παρέχοντος αὐτῷ γένεσιν οὐκ ὄντι· καὶ γὰρ ἡ γένεσις ὁδός ἐστιν ἐκ τοῦ ἀτελοῦς εἰς τὸ ἐναντίον τέλειον. εἰ δ' ἑαυτό τι παράγει, τέλειον ἀεί ἐστιν, ἀεὶ τῇ ἑαυτοῦ αἰτίᾳ συνόν, μᾶλλον δὲ ἐνυπάρχον, πρὸς τὸ τῆς οὐσίας τελειωτικόν. 46 Πᾶν τὸ αὐθυπόστατον ἄφθαρτόν ἐστιν. εἰ γὰρ φθαρήσεται, ἀπολείψει ἑαυτὸ καὶ ἔσται ἑαυτοῦ χωρίς. ἀλλὰ τοῦτο ἀδύνατον. ἓν γὰρ ὄν, ἅμα καὶ αἴτιόν ἐστι καὶ αἰτιατόν. πᾶν δὲ τὸ φθειρόμενον ἀποστὰν τῆς ἑαυτοῦ αἰτίας φθείρεται· ἐν ὅσῳ γὰρ ἂν ἐξέχηται τοῦ συνέχοντος αὐτὸ καὶ σώζοντος, ἕκαστον συνέχεται καὶ σώζεται. οὐδέποτε δὲ ἀπο λείπει τὴν αἰτίαν τὸ αὐθυπόστατον, ἅτε ἑαυτὸ οὐκ ἀπολεῖπον· αἴτιον γὰρ αὐτὸ ἑαυτῷ ἐστιν. ἄφθαρτον ἄρα ἐστὶ τὸ αὐθυπό στατον πᾶν. 47 Πᾶν τὸ αὐθυπόστατον ἀμερές ἐστι καὶ ἁπλοῦν. εἰ γὰρ μεριστόν, αὐθυπόστατον ὄν, ὑποστήσει μεριστὸν ἑαυτό, καὶ ὅλον αὐτὸ στραφήσεται πρὸς ἑαυτὸ καὶ πᾶν ἐν παντὶ ἑαυτῷ ἔσται. τοῦτο δὲ ἀδύνατον. ἀμερὲς ἄρα τὸ αὐθυπόστατον. ἀλλὰ μὴν καὶ ἁπλοῦν. εἰ γὰρ σύνθετον, τὸ μὲν χεῖρον ἔσται ἐν αὐτῷ, τὸ δὲ βέλτιον, καὶ τό τε βέλτιον ἐκ τοῦ χείρονος ἔσται καὶ τὸ χεῖρον ἐκ τοῦ βελτίονος, εἴπερ ὅλον ἀφ' ὅλου ἑαυτοῦ πρόεισιν· ἔτι δὲ οὐκ αὔταρκες, προσδεὲς ὂν τῶν ἑαυτοῦ στοι χείων, ἐξ ὧν ὑφέστηκεν. ἁπλοῦν ἄρα ἐστὶ πᾶν ὅπερ ἂν αὐθυπόστατον ᾖ. 48 Πᾶν τὸ μὴ ἀΐδιον ἢ σύνθετόν ἐστιν, ἢ ἐν ἄλλῳ ὑφέστη κεν. ἢ γὰρ διαλυτόν ἐστιν εἰς ταῦτα ἐξ ὧν ἐστι, καὶ πάντως σύγκειται ἐξ ἐκείνων εἰς ἃ διαλύεται· ἢ ὑποκειμένου δεόμενον, καὶ ἀπολεῖπον τὸ ὑποκείμενον οἴχεται εἰς τὸ μὴ ὄν. εἰ δὲ ἁπλοῦν εἴη καὶ ἐν ἑαυτῷ, ἀδιάλυτον ἔσται καὶ ἀσκέδαστον. 49 Πᾶν τὸ αὐθυπόστατον ἀΐδιόν ἐστι. δύο γάρ εἰσι τρόποι, καθ' οὓς ἀνάγκη τι μὴ ἀΐδιον εἶναι, ὅ τε ἀπὸ τῆς συνθέσεως καὶ ὁ ἀπὸ τῶν ἐν ἄλλῳ ὄντων. τὸ δὲ αὐθ υπόστατον οὔτε σύνθετόν ἐστιν, ἀλλ' ἁπλοῦν· οὔτε ἐν ἄλλῳ, ἀλλ' ἐν ἑαυτῷ. ἀΐδιον ἄρα ἐστίν. 50 Πᾶν τὸ χρόνῳ μετρούμενον ἢ κατὰ τὴν οὐσίαν ἢ κατὰ τὴν ἐνέργειαν γένεσίς ἐστι ταύτῃ, ᾗ μετρεῖται κατὰ χρόνον. εἰ γὰρ ὑπὸ χρόνου μετρεῖται, προσήκοι ἂν αὐτῷ τὸ κατὰ χρόνον εἶναι ἢ ἐνεργεῖν, καὶ τὸ ἦν καὶ τὸ ἔσται διαφέροντα ἀλλήλων· εἰ γὰρ ταὐτὸν κατὰ ἀριθμὸν τὸ ἦν καὶ τὸ ἔσται, οὐδὲν ὑπὸ χρόνου πέπονθε πορευομένου καὶ ἀεὶ ἄλλο τὸ πρότερον ἔχοντος καὶ τὸ ὕστερον. εἰ οὖν ἄλλο τὸ ἦν καὶ ἄλλο τὸ ἔσται, γινόμενον ἄρα ἐστὶ καὶ οὐδέποτε ὄν, ἀλλὰ τῷ χρόνῳ συμπορεύε ται, ὑφ' οὗ μετρεῖται, ἐν τῷ γίνεσθαι ὂν καὶ οὐχ ἱστάμενον ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ εἶναι, ἀλλ' ἀεὶ δεχόμενον τὸ εἶναι ἄλλο καὶ ἄλλο, ὡς τὸ νῦν κατὰ τὸν χρόνον ἄλλο ἀεὶ καὶ ἄλλο διὰ τὴν τοῦ χρόνου πορείαν. οὐχ ἅμα ἄρα ὅλον ἐστίν, ἐν τῷ σκιδναμένῳ τῆς χρονικῆς παρατάσεως ὄν, καὶ συνεκτεινόμενον· τοῦτο δέ ἐστιν ἐν τῷ μὴ εἶναι τὸ εἶναι ἔχειν· τὸ γὰρ γινόμενον ὃ γίνεται οὐκ ἔστι. γένεσις ἄρα ἐστὶ τὸ οὕτως ὄν. 51 Πᾶν τὸ