Chapter IX.—Marcion’s Gnostic Pretensions Vain, for the True God is Neither Unknown Nor Uncertain.  The Creator, Whom He Owns to Be God, Alone Supplies an Induction, by Which to Judge of the True God.

Now I know full well by what perceptive faculty they boast of their new god; even their knowledge.100    Agnitione. The distinctive term of the Gnostic pretension was the Greek equivalent Γνῶσις.    Elogium. It is, however, this very discovery of a novel thing—so striking to common minds—as well as the natural gratification which is inherent in novelty, that I wanted to refute, and thence further to challenge a proof of this unknown god.  For him whom by their knowledge101    Agnitione.    Ergo. they present to us as new, they prove to have been unknown previous to that knowledge. Let us keep within the strict limits and measure of our argument.  Convince me there could have been an unknown god. I find, no doubt,102    Plane.    Delator. that altars have been lavished on unknown gods; that, however, is the idolatry of Athens. And on uncertain gods; but that, too, is only Roman superstition.  Furthermore, uncertain gods are not well known, because no certainty about them exists; and because of this uncertainty they are therefore unknown. Now, which of these two titles shall we carve for Marcion’s god? Both, I suppose, as for a being who is still uncertain, and was formerly unknown. For inasmuch as the Creator, being a known God, caused him to be unknown; so, as being a certain God, he made him to be uncertain. But I will not go so far out of my way, as to say:103    Non evagabor, ut dicam.    Deferendo, in reference to the word delator, our author’s synonyme for διάβολος. If God was unknown and concealed, He was overshadowed in such a region of darkness, as must have been itself new and unknown, and be even now likewise uncertain—some immense region indeed, one undoubtedly greater than the God whom it concealed. But I will briefly state my subject, and afterwards most fully pursue it, promising that God neither could have been, nor ought to have been, unknown. Could not have been, because of His greatness; ought not to have been, because of His goodness, especially as He is (supposed, by Marcion) more excellent in both these attributes than our Creator. Since, however, I observe that in some points the proof of every new and heretofore unknown god ought, for its test,104    Provocari.    Nisi. to be compared to the form of the Creator, it will be my duty105    Debebo.    Nisi. first of all to show that this very course is adopted by me in a settled plan,106    Ratione.    Ezek. xxviii. 11–16 (Sept.). such as I might with greater confidence107    Constantius.    Luke x. 18. use in support of my argument. Before every other consideration, (let me ask) how it happens that you,108    Quale est ut.    Læsuræ ="injuries.” ᾽Αδικήματα ἔν σοι—Iniquitates in te.”—Hieron. who acknowledge109    Agnoscis.    Censum. the Creator to be God, and from your knowledge confess Him to be prior in existence, do not know that the other god should be examined by you in exactly the same course of investigation which has taught you how to find out a god in the first case? Every prior thing has furnished the rule for the latter. In the present question two gods are propounded, the unknown and the known.  Concerning the known there is no110    Vacat.    Forma. question. It is plain that He exists, else He would not be known. The dispute is concerning the unknown god. Possibly he has no existence; because, if he had, he would have been known. Now that which, so long as it is unknown, is an object to be questioned, is an uncertainty so long as it remains thus questionable; and all the while it is in this state of uncertainty, it possibly has no existence at all. You have a god who is so far certain, as he is known; and uncertain, as unknown. This being the case, does it appear to you to be justly defensible, that uncertainties should be submitted for proof to the rule, and form, and standard of certainties?  Now, if to the subject before us, which is in itself full of uncertainty thus far, there be applied also arguments111    Argumenta ="proofs.”    Sustinens. derived from uncertainties, we shall be involved in such a series of questions arising out of our treatment of these same uncertain arguments, as shall by reason of their uncertainty be dangerous to the faith, and we shall drift into those insoluble questions which the apostle has no affection for. If, again,112    Sin.    [Kaye. p. 313.] in things wherein there is found a diversity of condition, they shall prejudge, as no doubt they will,113    Plane. uncertain, doubtful, and intricate points, by the certain, undoubted, and clear sides114    Regulæ partibus. of their rule, it will probably happen that115    Fortasse an. (those points) will not be submitted to the standard of certainties for determination, as being freed by the diversity of their essential condition116    Status principalis. from the application of such a standard in all other respects. As, therefore, it is two gods which are the subject of our proposition, their essential condition must be the same in both. For, as concerns their divinity, they are both unbegotten, unmade, eternal. This will be their essential condition. All other points Marcion himself seems to have made light of,117    Viderit. for he has placed them in a different118    In diversitate. category. They are subsequent in the order of treatment; indeed, they will not have to be brought into the discussion,119    Nec admittentur. since on the essential condition there is no dispute. Now there is this absence of our dispute, because they are both of them gods.  Those things, therefore, whose community of condition is evident, will, when brought to a test on the ground of that common condition,120    Sub eo. have to be submitted, although they are uncertain, to the standard121    Formam. of those certainties with which they are classed in the community of their essential condition, so as on this account to share also in their manner of proof. I shall therefore contend122    Dirigam. with the greatest confidence that he is not God who is to-day uncertain, because he has been hitherto unknown; for of whomsoever it is evident that he is God, from this very fact it is (equally) evident, that he never has been unknown, and therefore never uncertain.

CAPUT IX.

Scio quidem quo sensu novum deum jactitent, agnitione utique; sed et ipsam novitatis cognitionem , percutientem rudes animas, ipsamque naturalem novitatis gratiositatem volui repercutere, et hinc jam de ignoto deo provocare. Utique enim quem agnitione novum opponunt, ignotum ante agnitionem demonstrant. Age igitur, ad lineas rursum et in gradum; persuade deum ignotum esse potuisse. 0255C Invenio plane ignotis diis aras prostitutas; sed attica idololatria est: item, incertis diis; sed superstitio romana est. Porro, incerti dii minus noti, ut minus certi; et proinde ignoti, qua minus certi. Quem titulum incidemus ex duobus deo Marcionis? Utrumque, opinor, et nunc incerto, et retro ignoto. Sicut enim ignotum eum fecit Deus notus Creator, 0256A ita et incertum Deus certus. Sed non evagabor uti dicam. Deus si ignotus fuit latuitque, illum regio latebrarum obumbravit, nova utique et ipsa, et ignota, et similiter nunc quoque incerta; certe immensa aliqua, et major indubitate eo quem abscondit. Sed breviter proponam, et plenissime exsequar praescribens deum ignorari nec potuisse, nomine magnitudinis, nec debuisse, nomine benignitatis, praesertim in utroque praelatiorem nostro Creatore. Sed quoniam animadverto in quibusdam ad formam Creatoris provocari oportere omnis Dei novi et retro ignoti probationem, hoc ipsum ratione fieri a nobis prius commendare debebo, quo constantius utar rationis editae patrocinio. Ante omnia quidem, quale est, ut qui Deum agnoscis Creatorem, et priorem de 0256B notitia confiteris, non eisdem modis et alium scias tibi examinandum, quibus jam in alio didicisti Deum nosse? Omnis res anterior posteriori normam praeministravit. Duo nunc dii proponuntur, ignotus et notus. De noto vacat quaestio: esse eum constat, quia notus non fuisset, nisi esset. De ignoto instat altercatio: potest enim et non esse; quia si esset, notus fuisset. Quod ergo quaeritur quamdiu ignoratur, incertum est quamdiu quaeritur: et potest non esse, quamdiu incertum est. Habes Deum certum, qua notum; et incertum, qua ignotum. Si ita est, ecquid tibi videtur justa ratione defendi, ut ad normam et formam et regulam certorum probentur incerta? Caeterum, si ad hanc caussam, et ipsam adhuc incertam, etiam argumenta de incertis adhibeantur, 0256C series implicabitur quaestionum, ex ipsorum quoque argumentorum aeque incertorum retractatu, periclitantium de fide per incertum; et ibitur in illas jam indeterminabiles quaestiones, quas Apostolus (I Tim. I, 4) non amat. Sin de certis, et indubitatis, et absolutis regulae, partibus incertis, et dubiis et inexpeditis praejudicabunt plane, in quibus diversitas status 0257A invenitur, fortasse an non provocentur incerta ad formam certorum, ut liberata a reliqua comparationis provocatione per diversitatem status principalis. Cum vero duo dii proponuntur, communis est illis status principalis. Quod enim Deus est ambo sunt; innati, infecti, aeterni. Hic erit status principalis. Caetera viderit Marcion, si in diversitate disposuit; posteriora enim sunt in retractatu: imo nec admittentur, si de principali statu constet. Porro constat quia dii ambo, et ita de quorum statu constat communem esse, cum sub eo ad probationem devocantur; si incerta sunt, ad eorum certorum formam provocanda erunt, cum quibus de communione status principalis censentur, ut proinde et de probatione communicent. Hinc itaque constantissime 0257B dirigam deum non esse qui fit hodie incertus, quia retro ignotus: quando quem constat esse, ex hoc ipso constat quod numquam fuerit ignotus, ideo nec incertus.