cast it away, how is it not irrational to disbelieve God as if concerning an impossible thing, when He has promised to make the rest of humanity incorruptible unto incorruptible life, after the likeness of the one raised from the dead by Him? 32. Potentially the animal is in the seed by nature, potentially the couch is in the wood by art, potentially those who rise again are in the elements by God. But if this is so, how is it not absurd to believe nature in natural things, and art in artificial things, but to disbelieve God in divine things? 33. To the divine authority nothing is disobedient. If the sea and the earth at the divine command long ago gave what they had not received, how will they not now rather give what they have received, when God commands? 34. If, just as nature is not able to make the animal from the corrupted seed and art is not able to make the couch from the corrupted wood, so also God is not able to make an incorruptible human from the corrupted human, then the power of God will be measured, just like that of nature and of art. But if it is absurd to say this, then it is also absurd to disbelieve that God can make an incorruptible human from the corrupted human. 35. If, just as it seems impossible to unbelieving humans for the resurrection to happen, it is likewise impossible for God to bring about the resurrection, then in this respect God in no way differs from a human. But if He differs infinitely, as indeed He does, how is it not absurd to disbelieve God concerning the making of things which He has the power to make? 30. Of those things of which God has the power for a supernatural creation, how is it not absurd to disbelieve Him concerning their supernatural re-creation? 37. If what happens not according to nature, its creation must be supposed unbelievable and impossible, how will the creation of the first human not also be unbelievable and impossible, having come into being not according to nature? For it is impossible for a human to come from a human according to nature, unless a human first comes into being supernaturally. 38. If I do not become again what I was, how do I receive the recompense for virtue or for vice, which I did not obtain in the present life? For if the resurrection of the dead does not happen, how will those who inflict the martyrs' contests and those who endure them not be equal to one another? And if this is unjust, how is it not unjust for the resurrection of the dead not to happen, in which alone it is possible for the distinction to be made between those who have done unjust things and those who have endured them, according to the difference of honor and of punishment? 39. If what man was, he also is, how did he, having died, depart from the knowledge of God? It has not departed, that he should be again what he was. For the works of God are known to Him and possible; and if they are not possible for Him, they are not known to Him either.

ἀπέβαλε ταύτην, πῶς οὐκ ἔστιν ἄλογον τὸ ὡς ἐπ' ἀδυνάτῳ πράγματι ἀπιστεῖν θεῷ, ἐπαγγειλαμένῳ καθ' ὁμοίωσιν τοῦ ἐγερθέντος ἐκ τῶν νεκρῶν ὑπ' αὐτοῦ εἰς ἄφθαρτον ζωὴν ἀφθάρτους ποιεῖν καὶ τοὺς λοιποὺς ἀνθρώπους; λβ. ∆υνάμει τὸ ζῶον ἐν τῷ σπέρματι τῇ φύσει, δυνάμει ἡ κλίνη ἐν τῷ ξύλῳ τῇ τέχνῃ, δυνάμει οἱ ἀνιστάμενοι ἐν τοῖς στοιχείοις τῷ θεῷ. Ἀλλ' εἰ τοῦτο, πῶς οὐκ ἔστιν ἄτοπον τὸ πιστεύειν μὲν τῇ φύσει τὰ φυσικά, καὶ τῇ τέχνῃ τὰ τεχνητά, ἀπιστεῖν δὲ θεῷ τὰ θεῖα; λγ. Τῇ θείᾳ αὐθεντίᾳ οὐδέν ἐστιν ἀπειθές. Eἰ ἡ θά λασσα καὶ ἡ γῆ τῷ θείῳ προστάγματι πάλαι δέδωκεν ἃ οὐκ ἔλαβε, πῶς οὐ νῦν μᾶλλον δώσει ἃ ἔλαβε, προστάξαντος τοῦ θεοῦ; λδ. Eἰ, ὥσπερ ἡ φύσις ἐκ τοῦ φθαρέντος σπέρματος οὐ δύναται ποιεῖν τὸ ζῶον καὶ ἡ τέχνη ἐκ τοῦ φθαρέντος ξύλου οὐ δύναται ποιεῖν τὴν κλίνην, οὕτως οὐδὲ ὁ θεὸς δύναται ἐκ τοῦ φθαρέντος ἀνθρώπου ἄφθαρτον ποιεῖν ἄνθρωπον, ἔμμε τρος ἄρα ἔσται ἡ δύναμις τοῦ θεοῦ, ὥσπερ τῆς φύσεως καὶ τῆς τέχνης. Eἰ δὲ τοῦτο ἄτοπον λέγειν, ἄτοπον ἄρα καὶ τὸ ἀπιστεῖν θεῷ ποιεῖν ἐκ τοῦ φθαρέντος ἀνθρώπου ἄφθαρτον ἄνθρωπον. λε. Eἰ, ὥσπερ ἀπίστοις ἀνθρώποις ἀδύνατον φαίνεται γενέσθαι τὴν ἀνάστασιν, οὕτως ἀδύνατόν ἐστι τῷ θεῷ τὸ ποιεῖν τὴν ἀνάστασιν, οὐδὲν ἄρα κατὰ τοῦτο διαφέρει θεὸς ἀνθρώ που. Eἰ δὲ ἀπειράκις διαφέρει, ὥσπερ οὖν καὶ διαφέρει, πῶς οὐκ ἔστιν ἄτοπον τὸ ἀπιστεῖν θεῷ τὴν ποίησιν ὧν ἔχει τοῦ ποιεῖν τὴν δύναμιν; λ. Ὧν ἰσχύει θεὸς τὴν ὑπὲρ φύσιν ποίησιν, τούτων πῶς οὐκ ἔστιν ἄτοπον τὸ ἀπιστεῖν αὐτῷ τὴν ὑπὲρ φύσιν μετα ποίησιν; λζ. Eἰ τὸ μὴ κατὰ φύσιν γινόμενον, τούτου ἄπιστον καὶ ἀδύνατον τὴν ποίησιν χρὴ ὑπολαμβάνειν, πῶς οὐκ ἔσται καὶ τοῦ πρώτου γεγονότος ἀνθρώπου ἄπιστος καὶ ἀδύνατος ἡ ποίησις, μὴ κατὰ φύσιν γεγενημένου; Ἀδύνατον γὰρ γενέσθαι ἐξ ἀνθρώπου ἄνθρωπον κατὰ φύσιν, μὴ πρῶτον τοῦ ἀνθρώ που γινομένου ὑπὲρ φύσιν. λη. Eἰ μὴ γίνομαι πάλιν ὅπερ ἤμην, πῶς ἀπολαμβάνω τῆς ἀρετῆς ἢ τῆς κακίας τὰς ἀμοιβάς, ὧν ἐπὶ τοῦ παρόντος οὐκ ἔτυχον; Eἰ γὰρ οὐ γίνεται τῶν νεκρῶν ἡ ἀνάστασις, πῶς οὐκ ἔσονται ἴσοι ἀλλήλοις οἵ τε δρῶντες τοὺς μαρτυρικοὺς ἀγῶνας καὶ οἱ ὑπομένοντες; Eἰ δὲ ἄδικον τοῦτο, πῶς οὐκ ἄδι κον τὸ μὴ γίνεσθαι τῶν νεκρῶν τὴν ἀνάστασιν, ἐν ᾗ μόνῃ ἐν δέχεται γίνεσθαι τῶν πεποιηκότων τὰ ἄδικα καὶ τῶν ὑπομε μενηκότων τὴν διάκρισιν, κατὰ τὴν διαφορὰν τιμῆς τε καὶ τιμωρίας; λθ. Eἰ τὸ τί ἦν ὁ ἄνθρωπος καὶ ἔστι, πῶς προεχώ ρησεν ἀποθανὼν τῆς τοῦ θεοῦ γνώσεως; Oὐκ ἀπέστη τὸ εἶναι αὐτὸν πάλιν ὃ ἦν. Τὰ γὰρ ἔργα τοῦ θεοῦ γνωστὰ αὐτῷ καὶ δυνατά· καὶ εἰ μὴ δυνατὰ αὐτῷ, οὐδὲ γνωστὰ αὐτῷ.