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introducing, that after the union one must not confuse the natures, the union of which we do not concede that he speaks, so long as he is ignorant of their difference after the union. For the difference of the things united is observed after the union, even if Nestorius is mad; and the union of the things that differ after the union, even if Severus draws himself up for battle, and makes a great defense on behalf of the lie.

If, therefore, according to Nestorius, a union of only gnomic wills has occurred, let him also speak of their difference after the union, setting aside the division of things that were in no way united; and he has brought together with the difference of the gnomic wills, also the variation of the gnomic will; according to which it is not the natural difference that is apt to be shown, but the hypostatic one, which produces in the difference of the gnomic wills, a relaxation and intensification; and he has made a sinner, the man deified by him through progress; as not having in every way and manner the same gnomic volition as God. For the difference of the gnomic wills, as I said, produces the variation of the gnomic will; 0045 and the variation of the gnomic will introduces the diminution of goodness; by which one who is in any way still held, has not yet become completely sinless according to his gnomic will.

Therefore Nestorius, by not accepting the one [Christ] as being hypostatically from the coming together of the natures, also dissolved the union of the gnomic wills, not finding how to say what is the one thing demonstrated from the union of the gnomic wills. For he cannot speak of an identity of goodness, since the difference of the gnomic wills after the union clearly shows forth an otherness in them according to intensification and 15Α_058 relaxation. For of what things there is a coming together, of these it is entirely necessary to speak also of the difference. And in vain was the argument of identity of counsel devised by him, even if it is suitable for declaring the division of persons. For identity of counsel is a union of counsels, preserving the difference of those united according to it, if indeed it is unconfused, in which the division of the persons who are willing is contemplated along with it.

...WHEN THE FATHERS SPEAK OF TWO WILLS IN CHRIST, [THEY MEAN] THE NATURAL LAWS,

NOT... GNOMIC WILLS. FROM THE SAME TREATISE, CHAPTER 51

That when the Fathers speak of two wills in Christ, the natural laws,

not the gnomic wills, they signified. But let no one find fault with the argument, of the gnomic wills

forbidding a dyad; finding almost all the glorious teachers speaking of two wills; nor on the other hand, in the manner of Severus, should the pious mind for this reason be shifted over to one will, lest it make one evil the successor of another evil; I mean, confusion the successor of division. For the divinely-inspired Fathers did not speak of a quantity of gnomic wills in Christ, but of natural ones; rightly calling the essential and natural laws and principles of the united [natures] 'wills'. And for having conceived of an appetite that is natural to the rationally ensouled flesh—but not the gnomic will of a particular man—an appetite having the power of the natural desire of what is, and being naturally moved and formed by the Word for the fulfillment of the economy, they wisely designated it as 'will'; without which it is impossible for human nature to be. For a natural will is a power appetitive of that which is according to nature, and of the things essentially belonging to the nature, 0048 it is comprehensive of all properties; according to which, in that which is naturally volitional, the 15Α_060 'being naturally able to will' is always innate; but 'to be naturally able to will' is not the same as 'to will'; just as neither is 'to be naturally able to'

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εἰσηγούμενον, μετά τήν ἕνωσιν μή συγχεῖν τάς φύσεις, ὧν οὐ συγχωροῦμεν αὐτῷ λέγειν τήν ἕνωσιν, ἕως ἄν αὐτῶν ἀγνοεῖ τήν διαφοράν μετά τήν ἕνωσιν. Τῶν γάρ ἑνωθέντων ἡ διαφορά θεωρεῖται μετά τήν ἕνωσιν, κἄν Νεστόριος μέμηνε· καί τῶν μετά τήν ἕνωσιν διαφερόντων ἡ ἕνωσις, κἄν Σευῆρος παρατάττεται, καί πολλήν ὑπέρ τοῦ ψεύδους ποιεῖται τήν συνηγορίαν.

Εἰ μέν οὖν κατά τόν Νεστόριον, μόνων τῶν γνωμικῶν θελημάτων ἕνωσις γέγονε, τούτων εἰπάτω καί τήν διαφοράν μετά τήν ἕνωσιν, ἀφείς τήν τῶν μηδαμῶς ἑνωθέντων πραγμάτων διαίρεσιν· καί συνήγαγε τῇ τῶν γνωμικῶν θελημάτων διαφορᾷ, καί τήν τῆς γνώμης παραλλαγήν· καθ᾿ ἥν οὐχ ἡ κατά φύσιν διαφορά δείκνυσθαι πέφυκεν, ἀλλ᾿ ἡ καθ᾿ ὑπόστασιν, ποιουμένη τῆς ἀγαθότητος ἐν τῇ διαφορᾶ τῶν γνωμικῶν θελημάτων, ἄνεσιν καί ἐπίτασιν· καί πεποίηκεν ἁμαρτωλόν, τόν κατά προκοπήν παρ᾿ αὐτοῦ θεοποιούμενον ἄνθρωπον· ὡς μή κατά πάντα τρόπον τε καί λόγον τήν αὐτήν τῷ Θεῷ γνωμικήν ἔχοντα θέλησιν. Ἡ γάρ διαφορά τῶν γνωμικῶν θελημάτων, τήν τῆς γνώμης, ὡς ἔφην, ποιεῖται παραλλαγήν· 0045 ἡ δέ τῆς γνώμης παραλλαγή, τῆς ἀγαθότητος εἰσηγεῖται τήν μείωσιν· ὑφ᾿ ἧς ὁ καθοτιοῦν ἔτι κρατούμενος, τελείως οὔπω κατά τήν γνώμην γέγονεν ἀναμάρτητος.

Οὐκοῦν τό καθ᾿ ὑπόστασιν ἐκ τῆς συνόδου τῶν φύσεων ἕν μή δεχόμενος ὁ Νεστόριος, καί τήν τῶν γνωμικῶν θελημάτων διέλυσεν ἕνωσιν, οὐχ εὑρίσκων εἰπεῖν τέ ποτέ ἐστι τό ἐκ τῆς ἑνώσεως τῶν γνωμικῶν θελημάτων ἀποδεικνύμενον ἕν. Οὐ γάρ ἔχει ταυτότητα λέγειν τῆς ἀγαθότητος, τῆς τῶν γνωμικῶν θελημάτων σαφῶς διαφορᾶς μετά τήν ἕνωσιν, τήν κατ᾿ ἐπίτασιν καί 15Α_058 ἄνεσιν ταύταις ἑτερότητα προφαινούσης. Ὧν γάρ ἡ σύνοδος, τούτων ἀνάγκη πάντως λέγειν καί τήν διαφοράν. Καί μάτην αὐτῷ τῆς ταυτοβουλίας ὁ λόγος ἐπενοήθη, κἄν πρός δήλωσιν τῆς τῶν προσώπων διαιρέσεώς ἐστιν ἁρμόδιος. Ἡ γάρ ταυτοβουλία, βουλῶν ἐστιν ἕνωσις φυλάττουσα τήν τῶν κατ᾿ αὐτήν ἠνωμένων διαφοράν, εἴπερ ἀσύγχυτος αἷς ἡ τῶν βουλομένων προσώπων συνεπιθεωρεῖται διαίρεσις.

...∆ΥΟ ΘΕΛΗΜΑΤΑ ΛΕΓΟΝΤΕΣ ΟΙ ΠΑΤΕΡΕΣ ΕΠΙ ΧΡΙΣΤΟΥ, ΤΟΥΣ ΦΥΣΙΚΟΥΣ ΝΟΜΟΥΣ,

ΟΥ... ΓΝΩΜΑΣ ΕΚ ΤΗΣ ΑΥΤΗΣ ΠΡΑΓΜΑΤΕΙΑΣ ΚΕΦΑΛ. ΝΑ' Ὅτι δύο θελήματα λέγοντες οἱ Πατέρες ἐπί Χριστοῦ, τούς φυσικούς νόμους,

οὐ τάς γνώμας ἐσήμαναν. Ἀλλά μηδείς εὐθυνέτω τόν λόγον, τήν τῶν γνωστικῶν θελημάτων

ἀπαγορεύοντα δυάδα· πάντας εὑρίσκων σχεδόν τούς ἐνδόξους διδασκάλους, δύο θελήματα λέγοντας· μηδ' αὖ πάλιν κατά Σευῆρον, πρός ἕν θέλημα διά τοῦτο τόν εὐσεβῆ μεθορμήσοιτο νοῦν, ἵνα μή κακοῦ κακόν ποιῆται διάδοχον· τῆς διαιρέσεως λέγω τήν σύγχυσιν. Οὐ γάρ εἶπον οἱ θεσπέσιοι Πατέρες ἐπί Χριστοῦ ποσότητα γνωμικῶν θελημάτων, ἀλλά φυσικῶν· τούς οὐσιώδεις τε καί φυσικούς τῶν ἑνωθέντων νόμους τε καί λόγους, θελήματα καλῶς προσαγορεύσαντες. Καί γάρ φυσικήν τῆς νοερῶς ἐψυχωμένης σαρκός, ἀλλ᾿ οὐ τήν γνωμικήν τοῦ τινος ἀνθρώπου, τοῦ κινήμασι διανοήσαντες ὄρεξιν, ἔχουσαν τῆς τοῦ ὄντος φυσικήν ἐφέσεως δύναμιν, φυσικῶς κινουμένη τε καί τυπουμένην ὑπό τοῦ Λόγου πρός τήν τῆς οἰκονομίας ἐκπλήρωσιν, θέλημα σοφῶς προσηγόρευσαν· οὗ χωρίς εἶναι τήν ἀνθρωπίνην φύσιν, ἀδύνατον. Θέλημα γάρ ἐστι φυσικόν, δύναμις τοῦ κατά φύσιν ὄντος ὀρεκτική, καί τῶν οὐσιωδῶς τῇ φύσει προσόντων, 0048 συνεκτική πάντων ἰδιωμάτων· καθ᾿ ἥν ἀεί τῷ φύσει θελητικῷ, τό 15Α_060 πεφυκέναι θέλειν, ἐμπέφυκεν· οὐ ταυτόν δέ τό πεφυκέναι θέλειν, καί θέλειν· ὡς οὐδέ τό πεφυκέναι