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matter is informed; and third, the composite of both, that which has come to be from matter and form, which is, finally, ensouled. Therefore, matter is potentiality, and form is actuality. And this in two ways: the one as knowledge, the other as contemplating according to knowledge; that is, the one as a state, the other as an activity. As knowledge, because in the soul's existing there is both sleep and waking; and waking is analogous to contemplating, but sleep to having and not being active. And knowledge is prior to the activity. For this reason he calls the form the first actuality, and the activity the second. For example, an eye consists of a substratum and a form; and the substratum in it is that which has received sight, the matter of the eye. And this too is homonymously called an eye; but the form and first actuality of the eye is sight itself, that which provides it with the ability to see; and the second actuality of the eye is the activity by which it sees. Therefore, just as a newborn puppy has neither actuality, but the potentiality to receive actuality, so too one must understand the case of the soul; for just as sight, having come into being there, perfects the eye, so here the soul, having come into being in the body, perfects the living being, such that the soul is never without a body, nor is it a body. For it is not a body, but is of a body, and for this reason it exists in a body, and in such a body; but it does not exist in itself. But first, he calls the passible part of the soul 'soul', separating the rational part from it. But one should have taken the whole soul of man together, and not make declarations about the whole from a part, and that the weakest part. Then he says the body has life potentially even before the soul comes to be; for he says the body potentially has life in itself. But the body that potentially has life must first be a body in actuality; but it cannot be a body in actuality before it receives its form, for it is qualityless matter and not a body. It is impossible, therefore, for that which is not in actuality to have the potentiality for something to come from it. And if it is also potentially a body, how can the potential body potentially have life in itself? Besides, in other cases it is possible for one who has something not to use it; for instance, for one having sight not to use it; but in the case of the soul, this is impossible. For not even one who is sleeping is without psychical activity. For he is nourished and grows and has impressions and breathes, which is especially a proof of life. From these things, therefore, it is clear that living cannot belong to something potentially, but in every case in actuality. For what principally gives form to the soul is nothing other than life. For life is congenital to the soul, but to the body by participation. He who says, therefore, that health is analogous to life is not speaking of the life of the soul but that of the body, and thus he plays the sophist. For corporeal substance is receptive of opposites in turn; but substance according to form is not at all. For if the difference according to form should change, the living being also changes. So it is not the substance according to form that is receptive of opposites, but that according to the substratum, that is, the corporeal. The soul, therefore, can in no way be the actuality of the body, but is a self-subsistent, incorporeal substance. For it admits of opposites in turn, vice and virtue, which the form was not able to admit. Then he says that the soul, being an actuality, is unmoved in itself, but is moved accidentally. And it is not at all unlikely that, being unmoved, it moves us. For beauty too, being unmoved, moves us. But even if this, being unmoved, moves, yet it moves that which has a nature to be moved, and not that which is unmoved. If, therefore, the body also had motion in itself, it would not be absurd for it to be moved by an unmoved thing; but as it is, it is impossible for the unmoved to be moved by the unmoved. From where, then, does the body get its being moved, if not from the soul? For the body is not self-moved. Therefore, wishing to show the first origin of motion, he showed not the first, but the second. For if, not being moved, it moved something, it would be causing a first motion; but if that which is moved of itself also moves something else, he explains the origin of a second motion. From where, then, is the first origin of the

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εἰδοποιεῖται ἡ ὕλη· τρίτον δὲ τὸ συναμφότερον, τὸ ἐκ τῆς ὕλης καὶ τοῦ εἴδους γεγενημένον, ὅ ἐστι λοιπὸν ἔμψυχον. ἔστιν οὖν ἡ μὲν ὕλη δύναμις, τὸ δὲ εἶδος ἐντελέχεια. καὶ τοῦτο δὲ διχῶς· τὸ μὲν ὡς ἐπιστήμη, τὸ δὲ ὡς τὸ θεωρεῖν κατ' ἐπιστήμην, τουτέστι τὸ μὲν ὡς διάθεσις τὸ δὲ ὡς ἐνέργεια. ὡς ἐπιστήμη μέν, ὅτι ἐν τῷ ὑπάρχειν τὴν ψυχὴν καὶ ὕπνος καὶ ἐγρήγορσίς ἐστιν· ἀνάλογον δὲ ἡ μὲν ἐγρήγορσίς ἐστι τῷ θεωρεῖν, ὁ δὲ ὕπνος τῷ ἔχειν καὶ μὴ ἐνεργεῖν. προτέρα δέ ἐστιν ἡ ἐπιστήμη τῆς ἐνεργείας. διὸ πρώτην ἐντελέχειαν καλεῖ τὸ εἶδος, δευτέραν δὲ τὴν ἐνέργειαν. οἷον ὀφθαλμὸς ἐξ ὑποκειμένου ἐστὶ καὶ εἴδους· καὶ ἔστι τὸ μὲν ὑποκείμενον ἐν αὐτῷ τὸ δεδεγμένον τὴν ὄψιν, ὕλη ὀφθαλμοῦ. καλεῖται δὲ καὶ αὕτη ὁμωνύμως ὀφθαλμός· εἶδος δὲ καὶ ἐντελέχεια ἡ πρώτη ὀφθαλμοῦ αὐτὴ ἡ ὄψις, ἡ τὸ δύνασθαι ὁρᾶν αὐτῷ παρεχομένη· δευτέρα δὲ ἐντελέχειά ἐστιν τοῦ ὀφθαλμοῦ ἡ ἐνέργεια καθ' ἣν ὁρᾷ. ὥσπερ οὖν ὁ ἄρτι τεχθεὶς σκύλαξ οὐδετέραν μὲν ἔχει ἐντελέχειαν, δύναμιν δὲ τοῦ δέξασθαι τὴν ἐντελέχειαν, οὕτω δεῖ λαβεῖν καὶ τὸ τῆς ψυχῆς· ὡς γὰρ ἐκεῖ γεννηθεῖσα ἡ ὄψις τελειοῖ τὸν ὀφθαλμόν, οὕτως ἐνταῦθα γεννηθεῖσα ἡ ψυχὴ ἐν τῷ σώματι τελειοῖ τὸ ζῷον, ὡς μήτε ἄνευ σώματος εἶναί ποτε τὴν ψυχὴν μήτε σῶμα. σῶμα μὲν γὰρ οὐκ ἔστιν, σώματος δέ ἐστιν, καὶ διὰ τοῦτο ἐν σώματι ὑπάρχει καὶ σώματι τοιῷδε· καθ' ἑαυτὴν δὲ οὐχ ὑπάρχει. ἀλλὰ πρῶτον μὲν τὸ παθητικὸν μέρος τῆς ψυχῆς ψυχὴν καλεῖ χωρίζων αὐτῆς τὸ λογικόν. ἔδει δὲ πᾶσαν ὁμοῦ λαβεῖν τὴν ψυχὴν τὴν ἀνθρώπου, καὶ μὴ ἀπὸ μέρους καὶ ταῦτα τοῦ ἀσθενεστάτου περὶ τοῦ παντὸς ἀποφαίνεσθαι. ἔπειτα τὸ σῶμά φησιν δυνάμει τὸ ζῆν ἔχειν καὶ πρὸ τοῦ γενέσθαι τὴν ψυχήν· λέγει γὰρ τὸ σῶμα δυνάμει ζωὴν ἔχειν ἐν ἑαυτῷ. δεῖ δὲ τὸ σῶμα τὸ δυνάμει ζωὴν ἔχον πρότερον ἐνεργείᾳ εἶναι σῶμα· οὐ δύναται δὲ ἐνεργείᾳ εἶναι σῶμα πρὸ τοῦ δέξασθαι τὸ εἶδος, ὕλη γάρ ἐστιν ἄποιος καὶ οὐ σῶμα· ἀδύνατον ἄρα τὸ μὴ ὂν ἐνεργείᾳ δύναμιν ἔχειν πρὸς τὸ ἐξ αὐτοῦ τι γίνεσθαι. εἰ δὲ καὶ σῶμα δυνάμει ἐστίν, πῶς τὸ δυνάμει σῶμα δυνάμει ζωὴν ἔχειν ἐν ἑαυτῷ δύναται; ἄλλως τε, ἐπὶ μὲν τῶν ἄλλων δυνατὸν ἔχοντά τι μὴ χρῆσθαι αὐτῷ· οἷον ὄψιν ἔχοντα μὴ χρῆσθαι αὐτῇ· ἐπὶ δὲ τῆς ψυχῆς ἀδύνατον. οὐδὲ γὰρ ὁ καθεύδων ἄνευ ψυχικῆς ἐνεργείας ἐστίν. καὶ γὰρ τρέφεται καὶ αὔξεται καὶ φαντασιοῦται καὶ ἀναπνεῖ, ὅπερ μάλιστα τῆς ζωῆς ἐστι τεκμήριον. ἐκ τούτων οὖν φανερὸν ὅτι δυνάμει τὸ ζῆν οὐ δύναται προσεῖναί τινι, ἀλλὰ πάντως ἐνεργείᾳ. προηγουμένως γὰρ τὸ εἰδοποιοῦν τὴν ψυχὴν οὐδὲν ἄλλο ἐστὶν ἀλλ' ἡ ζωή. τῇ μὲν γὰρ ψυχῇ σύμφυτός ἐστιν ἡ ζωή· τῷ δὲ σώματι κατὰ μέθεξιν. ὁ λέγων τοίνυν τὴν ὑγείαν ἀνάλογον εἶναι τῇ ζωῇ οὐ τὴν τῆς ψυχῆς ζωὴν λέγει ἀλλὰ τὴν τοῦ σώματος, καὶ οὕτω σοφίζεται. ἡ μὲν γὰρ σωμα τικὴ οὐσία παρὰ μέρος τῶν ἐναντίων ἐστὶ δεκτική· ἡ δὲ κατὰ τὸ εἶδος οὐδαμῶς. ἐὰν γὰρ ἡ κατὰ τὸ εἶδος διαφορὰ μεταλλαγῇ, μεταλλάττεται καὶ τὸ ζῷον. ὥστε οὐχ ἡ κατὰ τὸ εἶδος οὐσία τῶν ἐναντίων ἐστὶ δεκτική, ἀλλ' ἡ κατὰ τὸ ὑποκείμενον, τουτέστιν, ἡ σωματική. οὐ δύναται τοίνυν ἡ ψυχὴ κατ' οὐδένα τρόπον ἐντελέχεια τοῦ σώματος εἶναι· ἀλλ' οὐσία αὐτοτελής, ἀσώματος. παρὰ μέρος γὰρ ἐπιδέχεται τὰ ἐναντία, κακίαν καὶ ἀρετήν, ὅπερ οὐκ ἠδύνατο τὸ εἶδος ἐπιδέξασθαι. ἔπειτά φησιν ἐντελέχειαν οὖσαν τὴν ψυχὴν ἀκίνητον εἶναι καθ' ἑαυτήν, κινεῖσθαι δὲ κατὰ συμβεβηκός. οὐδὲν δὲ ἀπεικὸς ἀκίνητον οὖσαν κινεῖν ἡμᾶς. καὶ γὰρ τὸ κάλλος, ἀκίνητον ὄν, κινεῖ ἡμᾶς. ἀλλ' εἰ καὶ τοῦτο, ἀκίνητον ὄν, κινεῖ· ἀλλὰ τὸ φύσιν ἔχον κινεῖσθαι κινεῖ, καὶ οὐχὶ τὸ ἀκίνητον. εἰ τοίνυν καὶ τὸ σῶμα καθ' ἑαυτὸ κίνησιν εἶχεν, οὐδὲν ἦν ἄτοπον αὐτὸ κινεῖσθαι ὑπὸ ἀκινήτου· νῦν δὲ ἀδύνατον τὸ ἀκίνητον ὑπὸ ἀκινήτου κινεῖσθαι· πόθεν οὖν τῷ σώματι τὸ κινεῖσθαι, εἰ μὴ ἀπὸ τῆς ψυχῆς; οὐ γὰρ αὐτοκίνητόν ἐστι τὸ σῶμα. πρώτην οὖν γένεσιν κινήσεως βουλόμενος δεῖξαι, οὐ πρώτην ἀλλὰ δευτέραν ἔδειξεν. εἰ μὲν γὰρ μὴ κινούμενον ἐκίνει, πρώτην ἐποίει κίνησιν· εἰ δὲ τὸ κινούμενον ἀφ' ἑαυτοῦ καὶ ἄλλως κινεῖ, δευτέρας κινήσεως γένεσιν ἐξηγεῖται. πόθεν οὖν πρώτη γένεσις τῆς