Elements of Theology

 as one subsisting, but according to participation not one, the one will be multiplied, just as the multiplicity is unified through the one. Therefore

 activity is better than that which is not self-sufficient but has the cause of its perfection dependent on another substance. For if all beings by nat

 it desires that also, how most of all the good? or if it does not desire, how does it not desire the cause of all things, having proceeded from it? Bu

 is itself, and the mover and the moved are one and the same. For either it moves in one part and is moved in another part, or as a whole it moves and

 beginning from a monad, it proceeds into a multitude coordinate with the monad, and the multitude of every order is led back to one monad. For the mon

 the one being divided. But if it is in one of all things, it will no longer be of all things, but of one. If, therefore, it is both common to those ab

 the thing produced is other than it. Therefore, that which begets is established as unchangeable and undiminished, multiplying itself through a genera

 from something and reverting has a cyclical activity. For if it reverts to that from which it proceeds, it joins the end to the beginning, and the mot

 procession. For since each occurs through likeness, that which has proceeded immediately from something has also reverted immediately to it (for the l

 has reverted to itself according to nature and is perfect in its reversion to itself, and would have its being from itself for that to which the reve

 the self-subsistent is set apart from things measured by time in respect to its substance. For if the self-subsistent is ungenerated, it would not be

 having received the power to produce from the cause which is superior to it, it has from that cause its being the cause of those things of which it is

 Thus the producer in relation to the produced, taken in relation to each other, but that which is able to do more has a greater and more universal pow

 a cause has pre-contained in itself the effect, being primarily what that is secondarily or in the thing produced the producer (for this too, partici

 suffers from the former) and when the second in turn acts, that also co-acts, because whatever the second does, the more causal also co-begets with i

 being, or needing it somehow in order to be, would be in this respect more imperfect than the effect. But that which is in the result is a co-cause ra

 passible, being in every way divisible, and in every way to infinity. But the incorporeal, being simple, is impassible for the indivisible can neithe

 undiminished it contains in itself. But surely infinity in respect to magnitude and in respect to multitude is a complete privation and a falling away

 set apart and if all things enter into it, yet it has something hidden and incomprehensible to secondary things and if it unfolds the powers within

 but nowhere for thus it would be divided and separate from itself, if indeed one part of it is everywhere and in all things, but the other part nowhe

 all things. For since each thing exists either according to cause or according to existence or according to participation, in the first the rest exist

 a turning back as if through similars, dissimilar <being>. For the one is similar as a particular to a particular, the other is kindred as being of th

 a hypostasis but no longer a henad, it would be assigned to another order on account of the alteration of its property. 115 Every god is supra-essenti

 supra-essential, being nothing other than the one for each is not one thing, and then good, but only good, just as it is not one thing, and then one,

 is and in beings has the power of apprehending truth (for it both grasps thoughts and has its subsistence in acts of intellection) but the gods are b

 having set the same before itself, is most self-sufficient and such is all that is divine. Therefore it needs neither other things, being goodness-it

 is more unified than beings. All divine genera, therefore, are bound together by their proper intermediaries, and the first do not proceed immediately

 of a henad working, with which it is connate. This, then, is that which in itself defines the being that partakes of it and shows essentially the supr

 to the gods so that, while they are present to all things in the same way, all things are not present to them in the same way, but as each is able, i

 For the one, having a most unitive power, sends itself through the entire union and unifies all from above, while remaining in itself. But the mean, s

 proceeds from the infinity of the divine power, multiplying itself and passing through all things, and pre-eminently demonstrating the unfailing in th

 presides over composites and of their order and of their division according to number, and is of the same series as the paternal in more partial produ

 they have intelligible [qualities]. In the same way, therefore, that those, by illuminating Being, are intelligible, so also these, by illuminating th

 and sees itself. But seeing that it is thinking and seeing, it knows that it is Intellect in actuality and knowing this, it knows that it thinks, and

 Therefore it has the causes of all things intellectually. So that every intellect is all things intellectually, both the things before it and the thin

 more akin, contracted in quantity, in power surpasses the things after it and conversely the things further from the one. Therefore, those that are h

 on the one hand, but being only intellectual, is participated by souls that are neither divine nor come to be in a state of change from intellect to u

 by its very being, if the participant is suitable, it immediately becomes ensouled and living, not by the soul reasoning and choosing, nor giving life

 and to the soul that substantiates the essential principles of all things in it for everything that produces by its being, which it is primarily, thi

 of the motions it will also have restorations for every period of the eternal things is restorative. 200 Every period of a soul is measured by time

 the relation to the secondary ones, which the divine has to the intellectual, and this to the psychical and the quantities of the lower ones are grea

 it admits of every kind of change, being moved together with their own ruling causes. But indeed that it is also indivisible, is clear. For everything

the self-subsistent is set apart from things measured by time in respect to its substance. For if the self-subsistent is ungenerated, it would not be measured by time in respect to its being; for generation is concerned with the nature that is measured by time. Therefore none of the self-subsistent things subsists in time. 52 Everything eternal is whole at once; whether it has only its substance as eternal, having it present all at once, and not part of it having already subsisted, and part about to subsist hereafter, which does not yet exist, but however much it is able to be, so much it possesses already as a whole without diminution and without increase; or whether its activity in addition to its substance, having this also all together and standing in the same measure of perfection and as it were fixed according to one and the same limit immovably and unchangeably. For if the eternal is (as its name also indicates) that which always is, and "to be at some time" and "to become" are different from "always being", there must not be a "before" and an "after"; for it will be generation, and not being. But where there is neither "before" and "after" nor "was" and "will be", but only the "to be" which is, each thing that is, is whole at once. And the same applies also to its activity. From this it is clear that eternity is the cause for things to be wholes, if indeed everything eternal, whether in respect to substance or to activity, has its whole substance or activity present to it at once. 53 Before all eternal things eternity pre-exists, and before all things in time time pre-subsists. For if everywhere the participated exist before the participants and the unparticipated before the participated, it is clear that the eternal thing is one thing, the eternity in the eternal thing is another, and eternity in itself is another; the first as participant, the second as participated, and the third as unparticipated; and the temporal thing is another (for it is a participant), and the time in it is another (for it is participated), and the time before this, being unparticipated. And of these, each of the unparticipated is everywhere and in all things the same; but the participated is only in those things by which it is participated. For many are both the eternal things and the temporal things, in all of which there is eternity by participation and divided time; but the indivisible eternity and the one time are prior to these, the one being the eternity of eternities, and the other the time of times, being the principles of subsistence for the participated things. 54 All eternity is the measure of eternal things, and all time of things in time; and these two are the only measures among beings of life and of motion. For everything that measures either measures part by part or is applied all at once as a whole to the thing measured. Therefore, that which measures as a whole is eternity, and that which measures part by part is time; therefore there are only two measures, the one of eternal things, the other of things that are in time. 55 Everything that subsists in time either exists for all time or has its subsistence at some time in a part of time. For if all processions are through likeness, and prior to things that are in every way unlike there subsist things continuous with the first principles that are more like them than unlike, and it is impossible for things that come to be in a part of time to be joined to eternal things (for they are distinct both as things that come to be from things that are, and as things that exist 'at some time' from things that subsist 'always'), and intermediate between these and those are the things that are in some way like those, and in some way unlike, therefore, the intermediate between things that come to be 'at some time' and things that 'always are' is either that which 'always comes to be' or that which 'is at some time'—and this is either 'that which at some time is not truly' or 'that which at some time truly is'. But it is impossible for 'that which at some time truly is' to exist, and 'that which at some time is not truly' is the same as that which 'comes to be'; therefore, 'that which is at some time' is not an intermediate. It remains, therefore, that 'that which always comes to be' is the intermediate between both, by its 'coming to be' joined to the inferior things, and by its 'always' imitating the eternal nature. From these things, then, it is clear that perpetuity is twofold, one being eternal, and the other in time; the one a static perpetuity, the other a perpetuity that comes to be; and the one having its being gathered and all at once, the other poured out and unfolded according to temporal extension; and the one is a whole in itself, the other consists of parts, each of which is separate according to before and after. 56 Everything produced by secondary beings is also produced in a greater degree from the prior and more causal beings, from which the secondary beings themselves were produced. For if the secondary being has its whole substance from that which is prior to it, its power of producing also comes from there; for the productive powers are in the producers according to substance, and they complete their substance. But if the

αὐθυπόστατον ἐξῄρηται τῶν ὑπὸ χρόνου μετρου μένων κατὰ τὴν οὐσίαν. εἰ γὰρ ἀγένητόν ἐστι τὸ αὐθυπόστατον, οὐκ ἂν ὑπὸ χρόνου κατὰ τὸ εἶναι μετροῖτο· γένεσις γὰρ περὶ τὴν ὑπὸ χρόνου μετρουμένην φύσιν ἐστίν. οὐδὲν ἄρα τῶν αὐθυποστάτων ἐν χρόνῳ ὑφέστηκεν. 52 Πᾶν τὸ αἰώνιον ὅλον ἅμα ἐστίν· εἴτε τὴν οὐσίαν ἔχει μόνον αἰώνιον, ὅλην ἅμα παροῦσαν αὐτὴν ἔχον, καὶ οὐ τὸ μὲν αὐτῆς ὑποστὰν ἤδη, τὸ δὲ εἰσαῦθις ὑποστησόμενον, ὃ μήπω ἔστιν, ἀλλ' ὁπόσον εἶναι δύναται, τοσοῦτον ὅλον ἤδη κεκτημένον ἀνελαττώτως καὶ ἀνεπιτάτως· εἴτε τὴν ἐνέργειαν πρὸς τῇ οὐσίᾳ, καὶ ταύτην ἀθρόαν ἔχον καὶ ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ μέτρῳ τῆς τελειότητος ἑστηκυῖαν καὶ οἷον παγεῖσαν καθ' ἕνα καὶ τὸν αὐτὸν ὅρον ἀκινήτως καὶ ἀμεταβάτως. εἰ γὰρ αἰώνιόν ἐστιν (ὡς καὶ τοὔνομα ἐμφαίνει) τὸ ἀεὶ ὄν, τὸ δὲ ποτὲ εἶναι καὶ τὸ γίνεσθαι ἕτερον τοῦ ἀεὶ ὄντος, οὐ δεῖ τὸ μὲν πρότερον εἶναι, τὸ δὲ ὕστερον· γένεσις γὰρ ἔσται, καὶ οὐκ ὄν. ὅπου δὲ μήτε τὸ πρότερον καὶ ὕστερον μήτε τὸ ἦν καὶ τὸ ἔσται, ἀλλὰ τὸ εἶναι μόνον ὅ ἐστιν, ὅλον ἅμα ἐστὶν ἕκαστον ὅ ἐστι. τὸ δὲ αὐτὸ καὶ ἐπὶ τοῦ ἐνεργεῖν. ἐκ δὴ τούτου φανερὸν ὅτι τοῦ ὅλοις εἶναι ὁ αἰὼν αἴτιος, εἴπερ πᾶν τὸ αἰώνιον ἢ κατ' οὐσίαν ἢ κατ' ἐνέργειαν ὅλην ἅμα τὴν οὐσίαν ἢ τὴν ἐνέργειαν ἔχει παροῦσαν αὐτῷ. 53 Πάντων τῶν αἰωνίων προϋπάρχει ὁ αἰών, καὶ πάντων τῶν κατὰ χρόνον ὁ χρόνος προϋφέστηκεν. εἰ γὰρ πανταχοῦ πρὸ τῶν μετεχόντων ἔστι τὰ μετεχόμενα καὶ πρὸ τῶν μετεχομένων τὰ ἀμέθεκτα, δῆλον ὅτι ἄλλο μὲν τὸ αἰώνιον, ἄλλο δὲ ὁ ἐν τῷ αἰωνίῳ αἰών, ἄλλο δὲ ὁ καθ' αὑτὸν αἰών, τὸ μὲν ὡς μετέχον, τὸ δὲ ὡς μετεχόμενον, ὁ δὲ ὡς ἀμέθ εκτος· καὶ τὸ ἔγχρονον ἄλλο (μετέχον γάρ), καὶ ὁ ἐν τούτῳ χρόνος ἄλλος (μετεχόμενος γάρ), καὶ ὁ πρὸ τούτου χρόνος, ἀμέθεκτος ὤν. καὶ τούτων μὲν ἑκάτερος τῶν ἀμεθέκτων παντα χοῦ καὶ ἐν πᾶσιν ὁ αὐτός· ὁ δὲ μετεχόμενος ἐν ἐκείνοις μόνον, ὑφ' ὧν μετέχεται. πολλὰ γὰρ καὶ τὰ αἰώνια καὶ τὰ ἔγχρονα, ἐν οἷς πᾶσιν αἰών ἐστι κατὰ μέθεξιν καὶ χρόνος διῃρημένος· ὁ δὲ ἀδιαίρετος αἰὼν καὶ ὁ εἷς χρόνος πρὸ τούτων, καὶ ὁ μὲν αἰὼν αἰώνων, ὁ δὲ χρόνων χρόνος, τῶν μετεχομένων ὄντες ὑποστάται. 54 Πᾶς αἰὼν μέτρον ἐστὶ τῶν αἰωνίων, καὶ πᾶς χρόνος τῶν ἐν χρόνῳ· καὶ δύο ταῦτα μέτρα μόνα ἐστὶν ἐν τοῖς οὖσι τῆς ζωῆς καὶ τῆς κινήσεως. πᾶν γὰρ τὸ μετροῦν ἢ κατὰ μέρος μετρεῖ ἢ ὅλον ἅμα ἐφαρμο σθὲν τῷ μετρουμένῳ. τὸ μὲν οὖν καθ' ὅλον μετροῦν αἰών ἐστι, τὸ δὲ κατὰ μέρη χρόνος· δύο ἄρα μόνα τὰ μέτρα, τὸ μὲν τῶν αἰωνίων, τὸ δὲ τῶν ἐν χρόνῳ ὄντων. 55 Πᾶν τὸ κατὰ χρόνον ὑφεστὸς ἢ τὸν ἀεὶ χρόνον ἔστιν ἢ ποτὲ ἐν μέρει χρόνου τὴν ὑπόστασιν κεκτημένον. εἰ γὰρ αἱ πρόοδοι πᾶσαι δι' ὁμοιότητός εἰσι, καὶ πρὸ τῶν πάντῃ ἀνομοίων συνεχῆ τοῖς πρώτοις ὑφίσταται τὰ ὅμοια πρὸς αὐτὰ μᾶλλον ὄντα ἢ ἀνόμοια, τοῖς δὲ αἰωνίοις συνάπτειν τὰ ἐν μέρει χρόνου γινόμενα ἀδύνατον (καὶ γὰρ ὡς γινόμενα ἐκείνων ὄντων καὶ ὡς ποτὲ τῶν ἀεὶ ὑφεστηκότων διέστηκε), μέσα δὲ τούτων τε καὶ ἐκείνων ἐστὶ τὰ πῇ μὲν ὅμοια ἐκείνοις, πῇ δὲ ἀνόμοια, οὐκοῦν τῶν ποτὲ γινομένων καὶ τῶν ἀεὶ ὄντων μέσον ἢ τὸ ἀεὶ γινόμενον ἢ τὸ ποτὲ ὄν-τοῦτο δέ ἐστιν ἢ τὸ ποτὲ οὐκ ὄντως ὂν ἢ τὸ ποτὲ ὄντως ὄν. ἀλλὰ τὸ ποτὲ ὄντως ὂν ἀδύνατον εἶναι, τὸ δὲ ποτὲ οὐκ ὄντως ὂν τῷ γινομένῳ ταὐτόν· οὐκ ἄρα μέσον τὸ ποτὲ ὄν. λείπεται ἄρα τὸ ἀεὶ γινόμενον εἶναι τὸ μέσον ἀμφοῖν, τῷ μὲν γίνεσθαι συνάπτον τοῖς χείροσι, τῷ δὲ ἀεὶ μιμούμενον τὴν αἰώνιον φύσιν. ἐκ δὴ τούτων φανερὸν ὅτι διττὴ ἦν ἡ ἀϊδιότης, αἰώνιος μὲν ἄλλη, κατὰ χρόνον δὲ ἄλλη· ἡ μὲν ἑστῶσα ἀϊδιότης, ἡ δὲ γινομένη· καὶ ἡ μὲν ἠθροισμένον ἔχουσα τὸ εἶναι καὶ ὁμοῦ πᾶν, ἡ δὲ ἐκχυθεῖσα καὶ ἐξαπλωθεῖσα κατὰ τὴν χρονικὴν παράτασιν· καὶ ἡ μὲν ὅλη καθ' αὑτήν, ἡ δὲ ἐκ μερῶν, ὧν ἕκαστον χωρίς ἐστι κατὰ τὸ πρότερον καὶ ὕστερον. 56 Πᾶν τὸ ὑπὸ τῶν δευτέρων παραγόμενον καὶ ἀπὸ τῶν προτέρων καὶ αἰτιωτέρων παράγεται μειζόνως, ἀφ' ὧν καὶ τὰ δεύτερα παρήγετο. εἰ γὰρ τὸ δεύτερον ὅλην ἔχει τὴν οὐσίαν ἀπὸ τοῦ πρὸ αὐτοῦ, καὶ ἡ δύναμις αὐτῷ τοῦ παράγειν ἐκεῖθεν· καὶ γὰρ αἱ δυνάμεις αἱ παρακτικαὶ κατ' οὐσίαν εἰσὶν ἐν τοῖς παράγουσι, καὶ συμπλη ροῦσιν αὐτῶν τὴν οὐσίαν. εἰ δὲ τὴν