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below as containing them. For what is contained by a genus is a species, and that which contains individuals, that is, hypostases, is a species. This, then, is the most specific species, which exists immediately above the individuals; which they also say when defining it: A species is that which is predicated of several things differing in number, in respect of what they are. Similarly, horse and dog and such things are most specific species. But the things between the most general genus and the most specific species are subordinate genera and species, species of those above and genera of those below. And these are the essential and natural differentiae and qualities, which are called divisive and constitutive, divisive of those above and constitutive of those below; for "body" and "incorporeal" divide substance, similarly "ensouled" and "soulless" divide body, similarly "sensitive" and "insensitive" divide the ensouled. These, then, constitute the animal. For I take ensouled, sensitive substance and I make the animal; for an animal is an ensouled, sensitive substance. Again I take soulless, insensitive substance and I make the stone. Again I take ensouled, insensitive substance and I make a plant. Again, "rational" and "irrational" divide the animal, "mortal" and "immortal" divide the rational, "terrestrial" and "aquatic" divide the irrational. I take the animal, which is the genus of these, and the rational and the mortal, and I constitute man; for man is a rational, mortal animal. And I take the animal and the irrational and the mortal and the terrestrial, and I constitute a horse, a dog, and such things. And I take the animal and the irrational and the mortal and the aquatic, and I constitute a fish. And they are called essential and natural differentiae, because these make one species differ from another species, and one nature and substance from another substance and nature. 11 Concerning the individual. The individual is spoken of in four ways. For an individual is that which is not cut nor divided, like the point and the now and the monad, which are also called without quantity. Individual is also said of that which is hard to cut, that is, what is cut with difficulty, like the diamond stone and such things. Individual is also said of the species, which is no longer cut into other species, that is, the most specific species, like man, horse and such things. And an individual is properly so called, which is cut, but after the cutting does not preserve the first form, just as Peter is cut into soul and body, but neither is the soul by itself a complete man or a complete Peter, nor is the body. The discourse among the philosophers is about this individual, which in the case of substance signifies the hypostasis. 12 Concerning differentia. Differentia and quality and property are one with respect to the subject, but different with respect to their operation; for rationality is called both a quality of man and a property and a differentia, but in different ways. For insofar as it makes and, as it were, forms the substance, it is called quality, then insofar as it has become proper to this substance, it is called property. But in comparison to the irrational, perhaps an ox or a mule or a dog, it is called a differentia; for in it man differs from the irrational animals. And this is spoken of in three ways, commonly, properly, and most properly. For it is impossible for two things not to differ from each other in some respect. Therefore, a species differs from a species in some respects, and a hypostasis from a hypostasis of the same species and substance in others, and a hypostasis from itself in others. For the species of man differs from the species of horse in respect of the rational and irrational. And the rational and irrational is called an essential differentia. Similarly, all things by which one species differs from another are called a natural and essential and constitutive differentia and quality, and a natural property, which exists in every species unvaryingly, which is called by the philosophers a most proper differentia, as being more akin to and representative of the nature. Again, a man differs from a man, or a horse from a horse, or a dog from a dog, that is, an individual from an individual of the same species, in that one is tall, another short, one old, another young, one snub-nosed, another hook-nosed, one wise, the other foolish. All these are called non-essential differentiae and qualities, which is the accident, concerning which we shall speak subsequently. 13 Concerning accident. An accident is that which comes to be and

12

ὑποκάτω ὡς περιέχον αὐτά. Τό τε γὰρ ὑπὸ γένους περιεχόμενον εἶδός ἐστι, καὶ τὸ περιέχον τὰ ἄτομα τουτέστιν ὑποστάσεις εἶδός ἐστι. Τοῦτο οὖν ἐστι τὸ εἰδικώτατον εἶδος τὸ προσεχῶς ἐπάνω τῶν ἀτόμων ὑπάρχον· ὃ καὶ ὁριζόμενοί φασι· Εἶδός ἐστι τὸ κατὰ πλειόνων καὶ διαφερόντων τῷ ἀριθμῷ ἐν τῷ τί ἐστι κατηγορούμενον. Ὁμοίως καὶ ὁ ἵππος καὶ ὁ κύων καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα εἴδη εἰσὶν εἰδικώτατα. Τὰ δὲ μεταξὺ τοῦ γενικωτάτου γένους καὶ τῶν εἰδικωτάτων εἰδῶν γένη εἰσὶν ὑπάλληλα καὶ εἴδη, εἴδη μὲν τῶν ἐπάνω γένη δὲ τῶν ὑποκάτω. Καὶ αὗταί εἰσιν αἱ οὐσιώδεις καὶ φυσικαὶ διαφοραὶ καὶ ποιότητες, αἵτινες λέγονται διαιρετικαὶ καὶ συστατικαί, διαιρετικαὶ μὲν τῶν ἐπάνω συστατικαὶ δὲ τῶν ὑποκάτω· τὸ γὰρ σῶμα καὶ τὸ ἀσώματον διαιροῦσι τὴν οὐσίαν, ὁμοίως τὸ ἔμψυχον καὶ τὸ ἄψυχον διαιροῦσι τὸ σῶμα, ὁμοίως τὸ αἰσθητικὸν καὶ τὸ ἀναίσθητον διαιροῦσι τὸ ἔμψυχον. Αὗται οὖν συνιστῶσι τὸ ζῷον. Λαμβάνω γὰρ οὐσίαν ἔμψυχον αἰσθητικὴν καὶ ποιῶ τὸ ζῷον· ζῷον γάρ ἐστιν οὐσία ἔμψυχος αἰσθητική. Λαμβάνω πάλιν οὐσίαν ἄψυχον ἀναίσθητον καὶ ποιῶ τὸν λίθον. Πάλιν λαμβάνω οὐσίαν ἔμψυχον ἀναίσθητον καὶ ποιῶ φυτόν. Πάλιν τὸ λογικὸν καὶ τὸ ἄλογον τὸ ζῷον διαιροῦσι, τὸ θνητὸν καὶ ἀθάνατον διαιροῦσι τὸ λογικόν, τὸ χερσαῖον καὶ τὸ ἔνυδρον διαιροῦσι τὸ ἄλογον. Λαμβάνω τὸ ζῷον γένος ὂν τούτων καὶ τὸ λογικὸν καὶ τὸ θνητὸν καὶ συνιστῶ τὸν ἄνθρωπον· ἄνθρωπος γάρ ἐστι ζῷον λογικὸν θνητόν. Καὶ λαμβάνω τὸ ζῷον καὶ τὸ ἄλογον καὶ τὸ θνητὸν καὶ τὸ χερσαῖον καὶ συνιστῶ ἵππον, κύνα καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα. Καὶ λαμβάνω τὸ ζῷον καὶ τὸ ἄλογον καὶ τὸ θνητὸν καὶ τὸ ἔνυδρον καὶ συνιστῶ ἰχθύν. ∆ιαφοραὶ δὲ λέγονται οὐσιώδεις καὶ φυσικαί, ὅτι αὗται ποιοῦσι διαφέρειν εἶδος ἄλλου εἴδους καὶ φύσιν καὶ οὐσίαν ἑτέρας οὐσίας καὶ φύσεως. 11 Περὶ ἀτόμου. Τὸ ἄτομον τετραχῶς λέγεται. Ἄτομον γάρ ἐστι τὸ μὴ τεμνόμενον μηδὲ μεριζόμενον, ὡς ἡ στιγμὴ καὶ τὸ νῦν καὶ ἡ μονάς, ἅτινα καὶ ἄποσα λέγονται. Ἄτομον λέγεται καὶ τὸ δύστμητον τουτέστι τὸ δυσχερῶς τεμνόμενον ὡς ὁ ἀδάμας λίθος καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα. Ἄτομον λέγεται καὶ τὸ εἶδος, ὅπερ οὐκέτι εἰς ἕτερα εἴδη τέμνεται ἤτοι τὸ εἰδικώτατον εἶδος ὡς ἄνθρωπος, ἵππος καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα. Ἄτομον δὲ κυρίως λέγεται, ὅπερ τέμνεται μέν, οὐ σῴζει δὲ μετὰ τὴν τομὴν τὸ πρῶτον εἶδος, ὥσπερ Πέτρος τέμνεται εἰς ψυχὴν καὶ σῶμα, ἀλλ' οὔτε ἡ ψυχὴ καθ' αὑτήν ἐστι τέλειος ἄνθρωπος ἢ Πέτρος τέλειος οὔτε τὸ σῶμα. Περὶ τούτου τοῦ ἀτόμου παρὰ τοῖς φιλοσόφοις ὁ λόγος, ὅπερ ἐπὶ τῆς οὐσίας δηλοῖ τὴν ὑπόστασιν. 12 Περὶ διαφορᾶς. ∆ιαφορὰ καὶ ποιότης καὶ ἰδίωμα κατὰ μὲν τὸ ὑποκείμενον ἕν εἰσιν, κατὰ δὲ τὴν ἐνέργειαν ἕτερον καὶ ἕτερον· ἡ γὰρ λογικότης λέγεται καὶ ποιότης τοῦ ἀνθρώπου καὶ ἰδίωμα καὶ διαφορά, ἀλλὰ καθ' ἕτερον καὶ ἕτερον τρόπον. Ὡς μὲν γὰρ ποιοῦσα καὶ οἱονεὶ μορφοῦσα τὴν οὐσίαν λέγεται ποιότης, εἶτα ὡς ἰδία γενομένη ταύτης τῆς οὐσίας λέγεται ἰδίωμα. Ἐν δὲ τῇ πρὸς τὸ ἄλογον συγκρίσει, βοῦν τυχὸν ἢ ἡμίονον ἢ κύνα, λέγεται διαφορά· ἐν αὐτῇ γὰρ ἄνθρωπος τῶν ἀλόγων διαφέρει. Αὕτη δὲ τριχῶς λέγεται, κοινῶς τε καὶ ἰδίως καὶ ἰδιαίτατα. Ἀδύνατον γὰρ μὴ διαφέρειν ἀλλήλων δύο τινὰ κατά τι. Ἄλλοις οὖν διαφέρει εἶδος εἴδους, καὶ ἄλλοις ὑπόστασις τῆς ὁμοειδοῦς καὶ ὁμοουσίου ὑποστάσεως καὶ ἄλλοις ὑπόστασις ἑαυτῆς. ∆ιαφέρει μὲν γὰρ τὸ εἶδος τοῦ ἀνθρώπου τοῦ εἴδους τοῦ ἵππου κατὰ τὸ λογικὸν καὶ ἄλογον. Καὶ λέγεται τὸ λογικὸν καὶ ἄλογον οὐσιώδης διαφορά. Ὁμοίως καὶ πάντα, οἷς διαφέρει εἶδος εἴδους, φυσικὴ καὶ οὐσιώδης καὶ συστατικὴ διαφορὰ καὶ ποιότης λέγεται καὶ φυσικὸν ἰδίωμα, ὅπερ παντὶ τῷ εἴδει ἐνυπάρχει ἀπαραλλάκτως, ἥτις καλεῖται παρὰ τοῖς φιλοσόφοις ἰδιαίτατα διαφορὰ ὡς οἰκειοτέρα καὶ τῆς φύσεως παραστατική. Πάλιν διαφέρει ἄνθρωπος ἀνθρώπου ἢ ἵππος ἵππου ἢ κύων κυνός, τουτέστιν ἄτομον ὁμοειδοῦς ἀτόμου, καθὸ ὁ μέν ἐστι μακρὸς ὁ δὲ κολοβός, ὁ μὲν παλαιὸς ὁ δὲ νέος, ὁ μὲν σιμὸς ὁ δὲ γρυπός, ὁ μὲν φρόνιμος ὁ ἕτερος μωρός. Ταῦτα πάντα ἐπουσιώδεις διαφοραὶ καὶ ποιότητες λέγονται, ὅπερ ἐστὶ τὸ συμβεβηκός, περὶ οὗ ἀκολούθως ἐροῦμεν. 13 Περὶ συμβεβηκότος. Συμβεβηκός ἐστιν, ὃ γίνεται καὶ