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would be more absurd? Assume then my position also. Therefore the source is infinite and both are, and both are infinite, being made co-infinite with the principle as the source is made co-infinite with its effects or these themselves; for there will be no limit at which they will stop. For the father is moved with his offspring [the father] into the indefinite, and these run back together into the infinite, and in both ways they turn out to be infinite; for the argument has shown infinity in what is above and what is below. And if it has escaped what is on either side, yet it is surely characterized in these things above and below. For this reason the divine is indestructible, because being carried neither in the things above does it stop, nor indeed in the things below is it terminated by being emptied, imitating as it were a circular or spherical motion without moving, where the beginning is connatural with the end and it is unclear whence and where and what is the limit and the division; for all things are connatural and subsist together as into one.

2.16 Do you wish to become a hearer of another argument also; if the spirit also proceeds from the son, which is the same as to say is given substance, either the persons of the father and the son came together into one and both effected the procession—and how many absurdities there are in these things!—or, it is better to say, an impious confusion or a contraction of persons into one and a beginning, so to speak, a divine composite that later received its distinction, or also from both persons it is given substance while the division is kept unconfused. And behold the first and the later and the imperfect and the perfect; and again, as from a beginning the father and the son were either one person at first and the spirit received its existence as from one and so indeed the persons were later distinguished, or being two they were contracted into one, so that from both the spirit might proceed, the two having been blended together into the perfection of one consubstantial being. Will any pious person endure these things, confessing a trinity that is without beginning, without time, consubstantial, of equal power, and not wishing to diminish any one of the three? In these things do you honor the father or the spirit or the son? I do not know whose honor these things are, with many absurdities following which impiety also accompanies.

2.17 But if you bring up to me again that saying of Christ, the one that says "I and the father are one," and as from one you propose the spirit from both, I marvel at your sagacity and your precise knowledge and unfolding of the divine oracles. For what does Christ say? Are "I and the father one person"? Or an individual? Or a hypostasis? Or any of the things that are in every way indivisible? And indeed, how father and how son, if both are one? But if they were one in this way, he should have said "one [masc.]", and thus the persons would be joined into one; but by saying "one [neut.]" he has shown the union according to substance and the indivisible connection according to nature, according to which the spirit is also joined to them and the three happen to be one. For what? Is it not according to this reasoning that the son and the spirit are one, and the father and the spirit are one? And whichever two of the three you take and separate, will you not say they are one, even if you bring forth two, according to substance, according to nature, according to power and energy and agreement and harmony in all things? But this one is not established as one in such a way as to be in every way one and indivisible, but it is divided by properties and receives distinction by characteristics. And they are one and have not denied being two, and they are numbered as a dyad or even a triad, and are known as truly one. Do not, then, take the one in two as if it were an individual or a person and join these and work a Sabellian confusion, nor in this way the division as unnatural; for this is the blasphemy of Arius or rather, to say, of Satan who sows such things in the minds of men.

2.18 That which is from two as from one—for the next part of the argument must be taken up—or from one as from two, is in any case from two, unless perhaps you abolish the dyad before the triad, without which a triad could neither be nor be spoken of. For how is the spirit that proceeds from the father and the son from one person or individual or hypostasis? "But from two who are one according to

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ἂν εἴη τὸ ἀτοπώτε ρον; ὑπόθες οὖν καὶ σὺ τὸ ἐμόν. ἄπειρον οὖν τὸ ἐξ οὗ καὶ ἄμφω, καὶ ἄπειρα ἄμφω, συναπειρούμενα τῇ ἀρχῇ ὡς συναπειρουμένου τοῖς αἰτιατοῖς τοῦ ἐξ οὗ ἢ τούτων αὐτῶν· οὐκ ἔσται γὰρ ὅρος ἐν ᾧ σταθήσονται. συγκινεῖται γὰρ ὁ πατὴρ τοῖς αὐτοῦ βλαστήμασιν [ὁ πατὴρ] εἰς ἀόριστον, καὶ ταῦτα συνανατρέχουσιν εἰς τὸ ἄπειρον, καὶ κατ' ἄμφω τυγχάνουσιν ἄπειρα· τὴν γὰρ ἀπειρίαν ἐν τοῖς ἄνω καὶ κάτω ὁ λόγος ἐγνώρισεν. εἰ δὲ καὶ τὰ παρ' ἑκάτερα διαπέφευγεν, ἀλλά γε δὴ καὶ ἐν τούτοις τοῖς ἄνω καὶ κάτω κεχαρακτή ρισται. διὰ τοῦτο γὰρ τὸ θεῖον ἀνώλεθρον, ὅτι περ οὐκ ἐν τοῖς ἄνω φερόμενον ἵσταται οὔτε μὴν ἐν τοῖς κάτω τερμα τοῦται κενούμενον, κυκλικὴν οἷον ἢ σφαιρικὴν ἀκινήτως ἐκμιμούμενον κίνησιν, ὅπου τῷ τέλει συμπέφυκεν ἡ ἀρχὴ καὶ ἄδηλον τὸ ὅθεν καὶ τὸ ὅπου καὶ ὁ ὅρος καὶ ἡ τομή· συμφυᾶ γὰρ τὰ πάντα καὶ ὡς εἰς ἓν συνυφίσταται.

2.16 Βούλει καὶ ἑτέρου λόγου γενέσθαι σε ἀκροάμονα· εἰ καὶ ἐκ τοῦ υἱοῦ ἐκπορεύεται τὸ πνεῦμα, ταὐτὸν δὲ εἰπεῖν οὐσιοῦται, ἢ εἰς ἓν συνῆλθον τὰ πρόσωπα τοῦ πατρὸς καὶ τοῦ υἱοῦ καὶ ἄμφω εἰργάσαντο τὴν ἐκπόρευσιν-καὶ πόσα γε ἐν τούτοις τὰ ἄτοπα!-ἢ κρεῖττόν γε εἰπεῖν ἀσεβὴς σύγχυσις ἢ συστολὴ προσώπων εἰς ἓν καὶ ἀρχὴ οὕτως εἰπεῖν σύγκριμα θεῖον ἐσύστερον λαβὸν τὴν διάκρισιν, ἢ καὶ ἐξ ἀμφοῖν τοῖν προσώποιν οὐσίωται φυλλαττομένης ἀσυγχύτου τῆς διαιρέσεως. καὶ ἰδοὺ τὸ πρῶτον καὶ ὕστερον καὶ τὸ ἀτελὲς καὶ τὸ τέλειον· καὶ αὖθις ὡς ἐξ ἀρχῆς ὁ πατὴρ καὶ ὁ υἱὸς ἢ ἓν πρόσωπον πρώτως ἦν καὶ τὸ πνεῦμα ὡς ἐξ ἑνὸς τὴν ὕπαρξιν εἴληφε καὶ οὕτω δὴ ἐσύστερον τὰ πρόσωπα διεστάλησαν, ἢ δύο ὄντα εἰς ἓν συνέσταλται, ἵν' ἐξ ἀμφοῖν τὸ πνεῦμα ἐκπορευθῇ, συναλοιφέντοιν τοῖν δυοῖν εἰς ἑνὸς ὁμοουσίου τελείωσιν. ἀνέξεται ταῦτά τις εὐσεβής, τριάδα ὁμολογῶν ἄναρχον ἄχρονον ὁμοούσιον ὁμοδύναμον καὶ μηδὲ ἓν θέλων καταβάλλειν ἐκ τῶν τριῶν; τὸν πατέρα ἐν τούτοις τιμᾷς ἢ τὸ πνεῦμα ἢ τὸν υἱόν; οὐκ οἶδα τίνος ταῦτα τιμή, πολλῶν ἀκολουθούντων ἀτόπων οἷς καὶ τὸ δυσσεβὲς συνεφέπεται.

2.17 Εἰ δὲ προστίθης μοι πάλιν ῥῆσιν ἐκείνην τὴν τοῦ Χριστοῦ τὴν «ἐγὼ καὶ ὁ πατὴρ ἕν ἐσμεν» φάσκουσαν, καὶ ὡς ἐξ ἑνὸς ἀμφοῖν τὸ πνεῦμα προβάλλεις, θαυμάζω σε τῆς ἀγχινοίας καὶ τῆς περὶ τὰ θεῖα τῶν λογίων ἀκριβοῦς ἐπι στήμης καὶ ἀναπτύξεως. τί γάρ φησιν ὁ Χριστός; ἆρ' ἐγὼ καὶ ὁ πατὴρ πρόσωπόν ἐσμεν ἕν; ἢ ἄτομον; ἢ ὑπόστασις; ἤ τι τῶν πάντη ἀδιαιρέτων; καὶ μήν, πῶς πατὴρ καὶ πῶς υἱός, εἰ ἄμφω ἕν; ἀλλ' εἴπερ καὶ ἓν οὕτως, εἷς ἐχρῆν ἐρεῖν, καὶ οὕτως ἂν συνήπτοντο τὰ πρόσωπα εἰς τὸ ἕν· ἀλλ' ἓν εἰρηκὼς τὴν κατ' οὐσίαν ἐνέφηνεν ἕνωσιν καὶ τὴν κατὰ φύσιν ἀδιάτμητον συναφήν, καθ' ἣν αὐτοῖς καὶ τὸ πνεῦμα συνάπτεται καὶ ἓν τὰ τρία τυγχάνουσιν. τί γάρ; οὐχὶ κατὰ τοῦτον τὸν λόγον καὶ ὁ υἱὸς καὶ τὸ πνεῦμα ἓν καὶ ὁ πατὴρ καὶ τὸ πνεῦμα ἕν; καὶ ὁπότερα ἂν λάβῃς τῶν τριῶν ἀπο τεμόμενος, οὐχ ἓν ἐρεῖς, κἂν δύο προφέρῃς, κατὰ τὴν οὐσίαν, κατὰ τὴν φύσιν, κατὰ τὴν δύναμίν τε καὶ τὴν ἐνέργειαν καὶ τὴν εἰς ἅπαντα συμφωνίαν καὶ σύμπνοιαν; ἀλλὰ τὸ ἓν αὐτὸ οὐχ οὕτως καθέστηκεν ἕν, ὡς πάντη ἓν εἶναι καὶ ἀδιαίρετον, ἀλλὰ τοῖς ἰδιώμασι τέμνεται καὶ τοῖς χαρακτῆρσι διαστολὴν δέχεται. καὶ εἰσὶν ἓν καὶ τὸ δύο οὐκ ἀπηρνή σαντο, καὶ ἀριθμοῦνται δυάδι ἢ καὶ τριάδι, καὶ ἓν ὡς ὄντως γνωρίζονται. μὴ γοῦν λάβῃς τὸ ἓν ἐν δυοῖν ὥσπερ ἄτομον εἴτουν πρόσωπον καὶ συνάψῃς ταῦτα καὶ σύγχυσιν ἐργάσῃ Σαβέλλειον, ταύτῃ μηδὲ τὴν διαίρεσιν ὡς ἀξυμφυῆ· Ἀρείου γὰρ ἡ βλασφημία ἢ μᾶλλον εἰπεῖν τοῦ τὰ τοιαῦτα ἐπισπείροντος ταῖς τῶν ἀνθρώπων διανοίαις σατάν.

2.18 Ὃ γοῦν ἐκ δυοῖν ὡς ἐξ ἑνός-ἀναληπτέον γὰρ τὸ ἑξῆς τοῦ λόγου-ἢ ἐξ ἑνὸς ὡς ἐκ δυοῖν, ἐκ δυοῖν πάντως ἐστίν, εἰ μήπως ἀναιρεῖς πρὸ τριάδος δυάδα, ἧς ἄνευ οὐκ ἂν τριὰς οὔτ' ἂν εἴη οὔτε λεχθείη. πῶς γὰρ ἐξ ἑνὸς προσώπου τὸ ἐκ πατρὸς καὶ υἱοῦ ἐκπορευόμενον πνεῦμα ἢ ἀτόμου ἢ ὑπο στάσεως; «ἀλλ' ἐκ δυοῖν ἑνὸς κατὰ