13

whole in each and not existing from a part, just as also the principle of the ship in the shipbuilder, being one, is multiplied, coming to be in many subjects. So also the theorem in the teacher, being one in its own principle, when it comes to be in those being taught, is multiplied along with them, coming to be whole in each. Furthermore, the impression in the ring, being one, coming to be whole in each of many wax tablets, is henceforth both many and is called many. So that the many ships and the many men and the many wax tablets and the thoughts in the many disciples are, as individuals, more numerous according to number, and in this way are divided and not united, but in the common form the many men are one and the many ships one, and the thoughts likewise and the wax tablets possess the one by the identity of the impression. So that these are in one respect many and divided, but in another united and one. But even if we often apply number to continuous things, saying, for instance, that a piece of wood is two cubits, we say that the one is two in potentiality, not in actuality, since indeed it is one in actuality and not two; but because it is able to undergo division and become two, in this way we say that it is of two. From the same Arbiter, chapter 7. Let the seventh argument be that which seals its own truth from the very things that those who hold the opposite suppose; for while supposing that the natures of Christ are two, they claim that his hypostasis or person is one and only, likewise rejecting those who hold either that the nature of Christ is one after the union, or that his hypostases are two. But before we embark upon the refutations of this hypothesis, I think it reasonable first to define what the teaching of the churches means by the name of nature, and what by that of person and of hypostasis. Nature, then, it considers to be the common principle of being for those partaking of the same substance, as for every man, the rational, mortal animal, receptive of intellect and knowledge; for in this no man differs. And it treats substance and nature as the same. But hypostasis or person [it considers to be] the individually constituted existence of each one’s nature and, so to speak, a circumscription composed of certain properties, by which those who have partaken of the same nature differ from one another and, to speak concisely, what the Peripatetics are fond of calling individuals, in which the division of common genera and species ends, these the teachers of the church have called hypostases, and sometimes also persons. For as animal is divided into the rational and the irrational, and the rational in turn into man and angel and demon, the things into which each of these last species is then subdivided—man, for example, into Peter and Paul, and angel, say, into Gabriel and Michael and each of the other angels—they call atoms (individuals), because it is not possible for each of these to be further subdivided into other things that preserve their nature after the division. For the division of the man into soul and body works the destruction of the whole animal. Hence they are fond of calling these atoms. But ecclesiastical discourse has named such things hypostases, because in these the genera and species receive their existence. For even if animal, say, and man—of which the one is genus, the other species—has its own principle of being, yet they have their existence in the individuals, for example in Peter and Paul, not subsisting apart from these. What hypostasis is, then, and what nature is according to ecclesiastical exposition, we have said. This common nature, then, that of man, in which no man differs from any other, on coming to be in each of the individuals, becomes henceforth proper to that one and common to no other, as we defined in the fourth chapter. For the rational mortal animal in me is of no other

13

ὁλόκληρος ἐν ἑκάστῳ καὶ οὐκ ἀπὸ μέρους ὑπάρχων, ὥσπερ καὶ ὁ ἐν τῷ ναυπηγῷ τοῦ πλοίου λόγος εἷς ὢν πληθύνεται ἐν πολλοῖς ὑποκειμένοις γινόμενος. Οὕτω δὲ καὶ τὸ ἐν τῷ διδασκάλῳ θεώρημα ἓν ὂν τῷ ἰδίῳ λόγῳ, ὅταν ἐν τοῖς διδασκομένοις γίνηται, συμπληθύνεται αὐτοῖς ὅλον ἐν ἑκάστῳ γινόμενον. Προσέτι δὲ καὶ ὁ ἐν τῷ δακτυλίῳ τύπος εἷς ὢν ἐν πλείοσιν ἐκμαγείοις ὅλος ἐν ἑκάστῳ γινόμενος πολλὰ λοιπὸν ἔστι τε καὶ λέγεται. Ὥστε τὰ πολλὰ πλοῖα καὶ οἱ πολλοὶ ἄνθρωποι καὶ τὰ ἐκμαγεῖα τὰ πολλὰ καὶ τὰ ἐν τοῖς πλείοσι μαθηταῖς νοήματα τοῖς μὲν ἀτόμοις πλείονα τυγχάνει κατὰ τὸν ἀριθμὸν καὶ ταύτῃ διῃρημένα ἐστὶ καὶ οὐχ ἡνωμένα, τῷ κοινῷ δὲ εἴδει οἱ πολλοὶ ἄνθρωποι εἷς τυγχάνουσι καὶ τὰ πολλὰ πλοῖα ἓν καὶ τὰ νοήματα δὲ ὡσαύτως καὶ τὰ ἐκμαγεῖα τῇ ταυτότητι τοῦ ἐκτυπώματος τὸ ἓν ἔχουσιν. Ὥστε ταῦτα κατ' ἄλλο μὲν πολλά ἐστι καὶ διῃρημένα, κατ' ἄλλο δὲ ἡνωμένα καὶ ἕν. Ἀλλὰ κἂν ἐπὶ τῶν συνεχῶν πολλάκις φέρωμεν τὸν ἀριθμόν, δύο φέρε πήχεων εἶναι τὸ ξύλον λέγοντες, ἀλλὰ δυνάμει δύο φαμὲν εἶναι τὸ ἕν, οὐκ ἐνεργείᾳ, ἐπεί τοί γε ἕν ἐστιν ἐνεργείᾳ καὶ οὐ δύο· τῷ δὲ δύνασθαι τομὴν ὑπομένον δύο γενέσθαι, ταύτῃ φαμὲν αὐτὸ δύο τινῶν εἶναι. Ἐκ τοῦ αὐτοῦ ∆ιαιτητοῦ κεφάλαιον ζʹ. Ἕβδομος ἔστω λόγος ὁ, ἐξ ὧν οἱ τἀναντία πρεσβεύοντες ὑποτίθενται, τὴν ἰδίαν ἐπισφραγίζειν ἀλήθειαν· δύο γὰρ εἶναι τὰς τοῦ Χριστοῦ φύσεις ὑποτιθέμενοι μίαν αὐτοῦ καὶ μόνην ἀξιοῦσιν εἶναι τὴν ὑπόστασιν ἤγουν πρόσωπον, ὁμοίως ἀποσκευαζόμενοι τοὺς ἢ μίαν εἶναι τὴν Χριστοῦ φύσιν μετὰ τὴν ἕνωσιν ἢ δύο τούτου τὰς ὑποστάσεις πρεσβεύοντας. Ἀλλὰ πρὶν εἰς τοὺς ἐλέγχους ἡμᾶς ἐμβαλεῖν ταύτης τῆς ὑποθέσεως, εὔλογον οἶμαι πρότερον ἀφορίσασθαι, τί μὲν τὸ τῆς φύσεως ἡ τῶν ἐκκλησιῶν διδασκαλία σημαίνειν βούλεται ὄνομα, τί δὲ τὸ τοῦ προσώπου καὶ τῆς ὑποστάσεως. Φύσιν μὲν οὖν οἴεται τὸν κοινὸν τοῦ εἶναι λόγον τῶν τῆς αὐτῆς μετεχόντων οὐσίας, ὡς ἀνθρώπου παντὸς τὸ ζῷον λογικὸν θνητὸν νοῦ καὶ ἐπιστήμης δεκτικόν· τούτῳ γὰρ οὐδεὶς ἀνθρώπων διενήνοχεν. Οὐσίαν δὲ καὶ φύσιν εἰς ταυτὸν ἄγει. Ὑπόστασιν δὲ ἤγουν πρόσωπον τὴν ἰδιοσύστατον τῆς ἑκάστου φύσεως ὕπαρξιν καί, ἵν' οὕτως εἴπω, περιγραφὴν ἐξ ἰδιοτήτων τινῶν συγκειμένην, καθ' ἃς ἀλλήλων οἱ τῆς αὐτῆς κεκοινωνηκότες φύσεως διαφέρουσι καί, συντόμως εἰπεῖν, ἅπερ ἄτομα προσαγορεύειν τοῖς ἐκ τοῦ Περιπάτου φίλον, ἐν οἷς ἡ τῶν κοινῶν γενῶν τε καὶ εἰδῶν ἀποτελευτᾷ διαίρεσις, ταῦτα οἱ τῆς ἐκκλησίας διδάσκαλοι ὑποστάσεις, ἔσθ' ὅτε καὶ πρόσωπα προσηγόρευσαν. Τοῦ γὰρ ζῴου εἰς τὸ λογικὸν διαιρουμένου καὶ τὸ ἄλογον, καὶ τοῦ λογικοῦ πάλιν εἰς ἄνθρωπον καὶ ἄγγελον καὶ δαίμονα, τὰ εἰς ἃ λοιπὸν ὑποτέμνεται ἐσχάτων τῶν εἰδῶν τούτων ἕκαστον, οἷον ἄνθρωπος μὲν εἰς Πέτρον καὶ Παῦλον, ἄγγελος δὲ εἰς Γαβριὴλ καὶ Μιχαὴλ φέρε καὶ τῶν λοιπῶν ἀγγέλων ἕκαστον, ἄτομα προσαγορεύουσι, διότι μὴ οἷόν τε τούτων ἕκαστον ὑποτέμνεσθαι λοιπὸν εἰς ἕτερα τὴν φύσιν αὐτῶν μετὰ τὴν τομὴν διασῴζοντα. Ἡ μὲν γὰρ εἰς ψυχὴν καὶ σῶμα τοῦ ἀνθρώπου διαίρεσις τοῦ παντὸς ζῴου φθορὰν ἐργάζεται. Ἔνθεν ἄτομα ταῦτα καλεῖν ἐκείνοις φίλον. Ὑποστάσεις δὲ τὰ τοιαῦτα ὁ ἐκκλησιαστικὸς ὠνόμασε λόγος, διότι ἐν τούτοις τὰ γένη καὶ εἴδη λαμβάνει τὴν ὕπαρξιν. Εἰ γὰρ καὶ ἴδιον ἔχει τὸν τοῦ εἶναι λόγον τὸ ζῷον, φέρε καὶ ὁ ἄνθρωπος, ὧν τὸ μέν ἐστι γένος, τὸ δὲ εἶδος, ἀλλ' ἐν τοῖς ἀτόμοις τὴν ὕπαρξιν ἔχουσιν, οἷον Πέτρῳ καὶ Παύλῳ, χωρὶς τούτων οὐχ ὑφιστάμενα. Τί μὲν οὖν ὑπόστασίς ἐστι καὶ τί φύσις κατὰ τὴν ἐκκλησιαστικὴν ὑφήγησιν, εἴπομεν. Αὕτη δὴ οὖν ἡ κοινὴ φύσις, ἡ ἀνθρώπου, καθ' ἣν οὐδεὶς ἄνθρωπος οὐδενὸς διενήνοχεν, ἐν ἑκάστῳ τῶν ἀτόμων γινομένη ἰδία λοιπὸν ἐκείνου καὶ οὐδενὸς ἑτέρου κοινὴ γίνεται, καθὼς ἐν τῷ τετάρτῳ κεφαλαίῳ ὡρισάμεθα. Τὸ γὰρ ἐν ἐμοὶ ζῷον λογικὸν θνητὸν οὐδενὸς ἄλλου