John of Damascus, Dialectic Fuller Recension

ceases to be without the destruction of the subject. And again, that which can both be and not be in the same thing; for it is possible for a man to be both white and not be white, and likewise tall and wise and snub-nosed. This neither preserves the species when present, for it is not included in the definition of the species, nor destroys it when absent; for even if an Ethiopian is not white, he will be in no way harmed in respect to being a man. It comes to be, therefore, and ceases to be, and does not harm the underlying substance. For we have said that substance is a subject and a kind of matter for the accident. This accident is divided into two: into that which is commonly called difference and that which is properly difference. Commonly, then, a difference is a separable accident, as when one person sits and another stands; it is possible, when the one sitting stands up and the one standing sits down, for their difference to be separated and for one to take on another in place of the other. And one is said to differ from oneself according to a separable accident; for one differs from oneself in sitting and standing, in being young and growing old, in being sick and being healthy, and such things. Properly, however, a difference is an inseparable accident, as when someone is snub-nosed; it is impossible for the snub-nosedness to be separated from him, and likewise grey-eyedness and such things. According to these inseparable accidents, therefore, an individual differs from an individual, that is, a hypostasis from a hypostasis, but never from itself. But these do not contribute to the definition of the nature; for it is possible for a man to be snub-nosed and not to be. And if grey-eyedness ceases to be, the man nonetheless remains a man. 14 Concerning the proper. The proper is spoken of in four ways. First, that which belongs to the species alone, but not to every member, as the practice of geometry belongs to man; for only man is a geometer, but not every man is a geometer. Second, that which belongs to every member of the species, but not to it alone, as being two-footed; for every man is two-footed, but not only man is two-footed, but also a dove and such things. Third, that which belongs to every member and to it alone, but not always, as growing grey-haired belongs to man; for this applies to every man and to man alone, but not always, but in old age. Fourth, that which comes from the combination of the first three, that is, belonging to every member, and to it alone, and always, which is also convertible, as the ability to laugh belongs to man and the ability to neigh belongs to a horse and such things; for only man has the ability to laugh, and every man, and always, even if he does not always use it. For if something is a man, it is by all means capable of laughter, and if something is capable of laughter, it is by all means a man. This is what it is to be convertible. Among the philosophers, the discussion is about this meaning. Which we also state in outline: The proper is that which belongs to every member of the species, to it alone, and always. They divide this in three ways: from the organization, that is, the physical structure, as having broad nails and walking upright belongs to man; from activity, as for fire to be borne to the highest place; from potentiality, as we say that fire has a heating power exceeding the heats of other bodies. The proper is also called non-essential. 15 Concerning predicates. Every predication is either more extensive or of equal extent, but never less extensive. And more extensive, when the more universal are predicated of the more particular; the higher, therefore, are more universal, and the lower more particular. The most universal of all, then, is being, wherefore it is predicated of all things; for both substance is called being and accident is called being. But we cannot say that being is substance; for being is not only substance but also accident. Likewise also genera are predicated of species as being more universal, but species are not predicated of their genera; for species are more particular than genera. Substance, therefore, is predicated of animal and animal of man; for animal is substance and man is an animal. But it is not convertible; for every man is an animal, but not every animal is a man. For both the horse and the dog are animals; likewise also every animal is a substance, but not every substance is an animal; for both the stone and the wood are substances, which are not animals. Likewise also the species is predicated of those under it

ἀπογίνεται χωρὶς τῆς τοῦ ὑποκειμένου φθορᾶς. Καὶ πάλιν, ὃ ἐνδέχεται τῷ αὐτῷ καὶ εἶναι καὶ μὴ εἶναι· καὶ γὰρ ἐνδέχεται ἄνθρωπον καὶ λευκὸν εἶναι καὶ μὴ εἶναι λευκόν, ὁμοίως καὶ μακρὸν καὶ φρόνιμον καὶ σιμόν. Τοῦτο οὔτε παρὸν σῴζει τὸ εἶδος, οὐ γὰρ λαμβάνεται εἰς τὸν τοῦ εἴδους ὁρισμόν, οὔτε ἀπὸν φθείρει· κἂν γὰρ μὴ ᾖ ὁ Αἰθίοψ λευκός, οὐδὲν παραβλαβήσεται πρὸς τὸ εἶναι ἄνθρωπος. Γίνεται οὖν καὶ ἀπογίνεται καὶ τὴν ὑποκειμένην οὐσίαν οὐ παραβλάπτει. Ἔφημεν γάρ, ὡς ἡ οὐσία ὑποκείμενον καὶ ὕλη τίς ἐστι τῷ συμβεβηκότι. Τοῦτο τὸ συμβεβηκὸς διαιρεῖται εἰς δύο, εἰς τὴν κοινῶς λεγομένην διαφορὰν καὶ εἰς τὴν ἰδίως διαφοράν. Κοινῶς μὲν οὖν διαφορά ἐστι τὸ χωριστὸν συμβεβηκός, οἷον κάθηταί τις καὶ ἕτερος ἵσταται· ἐνδέχεται ἐν τῷ ἀναστῆναι τὸν καθήμενον καὶ καθίσαι τὸν ἱστάμενον χωρισθῆναι τὴν διαφορὰν αὐτῶν καὶ λαβεῖν ἄλλην ἀντ' ἄλλης. Καὶ ἑαυτοῦ δέ τις λέγεται διαφέρειν κατὰ τὸ χωριστὸν συμβεβηκός· διαφέρει γὰρ ἑαυτοῦ ἐν τῷ καθῆσθαι καὶ ἀνίστασθαι, ἐν τῷ νεάζειν καὶ γηρᾶν, ἐν τῷ νοσεῖν καὶ ὑγιαίνειν καὶ τοῖς τοιούτοις. Ἰδίως δὲ διαφορά ἐστι τὸ ἀχώριστον συμβεβηκός, οἷόν ἐστί τις σιμός· ἀδύνατον χωρισθῆναι αὐτοῦ τὴν σιμότητα, ὁμοίως καὶ τὴν γλαυκότητα καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα. Κατὰ ταῦτα οὖν τὰ ἀχώριστα συμβεβηκότα ἄτομον ἀτόμου τουτέστιν ὑπόστασις ὑποστάσεως διαφέρει, αὐτὸς δὲ ἑαυτοῦ οὐδέποτε. Ταῦτα δὲ οὐ συντελοῦσιν εἰς τὸν ὁρισμὸν τῆς φύσεως· ἐνδέχεται γὰρ ἄνθρωπον εἶναι σιμὸν καὶ μὴ εἶναι. Καὶ ἀπογινομένης τῆς γλαυκότητος οὐδὲν ἧττον ὁ ἄνθρωπος μένει ἄνθρωπος. 14 Περὶ ἰδίου. Τὸ ἴδιον τετραχῶς λέγεται. Πρῶτον, ὃ μόνῳ μὲν ὑπάρχει τῷ εἴδει, οὐ παντὶ δέ, ὥσπερ τὸ γεωμετρεῖν τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ· μόνος γὰρ ὁ ἄνθρωπος γεωμέτρης, ἀλλ' οὐ πᾶς ἄνθρωπος γεωμέτρης. ∆εύτερον, ὅπερ παντὶ μὲν τῷ εἴδει ὑπάρχει, οὐ μόνῳ δέ, ὡς τὸ δίπουν· πᾶς γὰρ ἄνθρωπος δίπους, οὐ μόνον δὲ ἄνθρωπος δίπους ἀλλὰ καὶ περιστερὰ καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα. Τρίτον, ὅπερ παντὶ μὲν καὶ μόνῳ, οὐκ ἀεὶ δέ, ὥσπερ τὸ πολιοῦσθαι τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ· τοῦτο γὰρ παντὶ μὲν καὶ μόνῳ ἀνθρώπῳ ἁρμόζει, οὐκ ἀεὶ δὲ ἀλλ' ἐν τῷ γήρᾳ. Τέταρτον, ὅπερ γίνεται τῶν τριῶν τῶν πρώτων συνερχομένων, τουτέστι παντὶ καὶ μόνῳ καὶ ἀεί, ὅπερ καὶ ἀντιστρέφει, ὥσπερ τὸ γελαστικὸν τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ καὶ τὸ χρεμετιστικὸν τῷ ἵππῳ καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα· μόνος γὰρ ἄνθρωπος ἔχει τὸ γελαστικὸν καὶ πᾶς ἄνθρωπος καὶ ἀεί, εἰ καὶ μὴ ἀεὶ κέχρηται αὐτῷ. Εἴ τι γὰρ ἄνθρωπος, πάντως γελαστικόν, καὶ εἴ τι γελαστικόν, πάντως ἄνθρωπος. Τοῦτό ἐστι τὸ ἀντιστρέφειν. Περὶ τούτου τοῦ σημαινομένου παρὰ τοῖς φιλοσόφοις ὁ λόγος. Ὃ καὶ ὑπογράφοντές φαμεν· Ἴδιόν ἐστι, ὃ παντὶ καὶ μόνῳ τῷ εἴδει καὶ ἀεὶ ὑπάρχει. Τοῦτο δὲ τριχῶς διαιροῦσιν· ἀπὸ τῆς διοργανώσεως τουτέστι διαπλάσεως, ὡς τὸ πλατυώνυχον καὶ τὸ ὀρθοπεριπατητικὸν τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ· ἀπὸ τῆς ἐνεργείας, ὡς τῷ πυρὶ τὸ ἀνωτάτω φέρεσθαι· ἀπὸ τῆς δυνάμεως, ὡς λέγομεν τῷ πυρὶ ὑπάρχειν τὴν θερμαντικὴν δύναμιν ὑπερβάλλουσαν τὰς τῶν ἄλλων σωμάτων θερμότητας. Λέγεται δὲ τὸ ἴδιον ἐπουσιῶδες. 15 Περὶ τῶν κατηγορουμένων. Πᾶσα κατηγορία ἢ ἐπὶ πλέον γίνεται ἢ ἐπίσης, ἐπ' ἔλαττον δὲ οὐδέποτε. Καὶ ἐπὶ πλέον μέν, ὅτε τὰ καθολικώτερα κατηγοροῦνται τῶν μερικωτέρων· καθολικώτερα οὖν εἰσι τὰ ἐπάνω, μερικώτερα δὲ τὰ ὑποκάτω. Καθολικώτερον μὲν οὖν ἐστι πάντων τὸ ὄν, διὸ πάντων κατηγορεῖται· καὶ γὰρ καὶ ἡ οὐσία ὂν λέγεται καὶ τὸ συμβεβηκὸς ὂν λέγεται. Οὐ δυνάμεθα δὲ εἰπεῖν, ὅτι τὸ ὂν οὐσία ἐστίν· οὐ μόνον γὰρ οὐσία ἐστὶ τὸ ὂν ἀλλὰ καὶ συμβεβηκός. Ὁμοίως καὶ τὰ γένη κατηγοροῦνται τῶν εἰδῶν ὡς καθολικώτερα, τὰ δὲ εἴδη οὐ κατηγοροῦνται τῶν γενῶν αὐτῶν· τὰ γὰρ εἴδη μερικώτερα τῶν γενῶν εἰσι. Κατηγορεῖται τοίνυν ἡ οὐσία τοῦ ζῴου καὶ τὸ ζῷον τοῦ ἀνθρώπου· καὶ γὰρ τὸ ζῷον οὐσία ἐστὶ καὶ ὁ ἄνθρωπος ζῷόν ἐστιν. Οὐκ ἀντιστρέφει δέ· πᾶς μὲν γὰρ ἄνθρωπος ζῷον, οὐ πᾶν δὲ ζῷον ἄνθρωπος. Καὶ ὁ ἵππος γὰρ καὶ ὁ κύων ζῷά εἰσιν, ὁμοίως καὶ πᾶν ζῷον οὐσία ἐστίν, οὐ πᾶσα δὲ οὐσία ζῷόν ἐστιν· καὶ ὁ λίθος γὰρ καὶ τὸ ξύλον οὐσία ἐστίν, ἅτινα οὔκ εἰσι ζῷα. Ὁμοίως καὶ τὸ εἶδος κατηγορεῖται τῶν ὑπ' αὐτοῦ