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of motion to the body? For to say that the elements move of themselves, some being light by nature, and others heavy, is false. For if lightness and heaviness are motion, then light and heavy things will never come to a standstill; but they do come to a standstill, having reached their proper place; therefore, heaviness and lightness are not the causes of the first motion, but qualities of the elements. And even if this is granted, how can reasoning and opining and judging be the works of lightness and heaviness? If not of these, then not of the elements; and if not of the elements, then not of bodies. Further, if the soul is moved incidentally, but the body of itself, then even without the soul, the body will be moved of itself; and if this is so, there will be a living creature without a soul; but these things are absurd; therefore, the initial premise is also absurd. But neither is it true to say that everything that is moved by nature is also moved by force, and everything that is moved by force is also moved by nature. For the cosmos, being moved by nature, is not moved by force; nor indeed, if something is moved according to nature, does it also rest according to nature. For both the cosmos and the sun and the moon, being moved according to nature, cannot rest according to nature, in the same way the soul also, being moved according to nature, cannot rest according to nature. For rest is the destruction of the soul and of everything perpetually in motion. Besides these things, the problem raised from the beginning remains unsolved, whence the body is held together, being by nature disposed to be scattered. These few points out of many are sufficient to prove that the soul is neither an entelechy, nor motionless, nor generated in a body. But Pythagoras, being accustomed always to represent symbolically both God and all things by numbers, defined the soul also as a self-moving number, whom Xenocrates also followed, not meaning that the soul is a number, but that it is among the numerable and the multiplied, and that it is the soul which distinguishes things by imposing forms and types on each. For it is this that separates forms from forms and shows them to be different both by the otherness of the forms and by the multitude of the number, and for this reason makes things numerable. Hence it is not entirely separated from the association with numbers. And he himself also testified to its self-moving nature. § But that it is not a number is clear from this. § Number is a quantity; but the soul is not a quantity but a substance; therefore the soul is not a number, even if they especially wish number to be a substance among the intelligibles, as we shall state in what follows. § Further, the soul is continuous; but number is not continuous; therefore the soul is not a number. § Further, a number is either even or odd; but the soul is neither even nor odd; therefore the soul is not a number. § Further, number increases by addition; but the soul does not increase by addition. § Further, the soul is self-moving; but a definite number is motionless. § Further, a number, remaining one and the same in nature, cannot alter any quality that comes to be in numbers; but the soul, remaining one and the same in substance, alters its qualities, passing from ignorance to knowledge and from vice to virtue; therefore the soul is not a number. Such, then, are the doctrines of the ancients concerning the soul. But Eunomius defined the soul as an incorporeal substance created in a body, having heaped all things together; for he has taken "incorporeal substance" from the truth, but "created in a body" from the teaching of Aristotle, not understanding, though he is sharp, that he attempts to bring together incompatible things. For everything that has a bodily and at the same time a temporal origin is corruptible and mortal. And the writings of Moses agree with these things; for in describing the generation of sensible things, he did not explicitly state that the nature of intelligible things also subsisted within it; but some conjecture this, with whom not all agree. But if anyone, from the fact that the soul was cast in after the formation of the body, should think that it came into being after the body, he errs from the truth. For neither does Moses say that it was created at the time it was cast into the body; nor does it stand to reason thus. Either, therefore, let him say it is mortal, like Aristotle, who said it is generated in a body, and like the Stoics; or, saying it is a substance

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κινήσεως τῷ σώματι; τὸ γὰρ λέγειν ἀφ' ἑαυτῶν κινεῖσθαι τὰ στοιχεῖα, τὰ μὲν κοῦφα ὄντα φύσει, τὰ δὲ βαρέα, ψεῦδός ἐστιν. εἰ γὰρ ἡ κουφότης καὶ βαρύτης κίνησίς ἐστιν, οὐδέποτε στήσεται τὰ κοῦφα καὶ βαρέα· ἵσταται δέ, τὸν οἰκεῖον καταλαβόντα τόπον· οὐκ ἄρα βαρύτης καὶ κουφότης αἰτίαι πρώτης κινήσεώς εἰσιν, ἀλλὰ ποιότητες τῶν στοιχείων. ἐὰν δὲ καὶ τοῦτο δοθῇ, πῶς τὸ λογίζεσθαι καὶ δοξάζειν καὶ κρίνειν δύναται κουφότητος καὶ βαρύτητος ἔργα εἶναι; εἰ δὲ μὴ τούτων, οὐδὲ τῶν στοιχείων· εἰ δὲ μὴ τῶν στοιχείων, οὐδὲ τῶν σωμάτων. ἔτι εἰ κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς ἡ ψυχὴ κινεῖται, τὸ δὲ σῶμα ἐξ ἑαυτοῦ, καὶ μὴ οὔσης τῆς ψυχῆς, ἐξ ἑαυτοῦ τὸ σῶμα κινηθήσεται· εἰ δὲ τοῦτο, καὶ ζῷον ἔσται χωρὶς τῆς ψυχῆς· ἄτοπα δὲ ταῦτα· ἄτοπον ἄρα καὶ τὸ ἐξ ἀρχῆς. ἀλλ' οὐδὲ τὸ λέγειν ὅτι πᾶν τὸ φύσει κινούμενον καὶ βίᾳ κινεῖται, καὶ πᾶν τὸ βίᾳ κινούμενον καὶ φύσει κινεῖται ἀληθές ἐστιν. ὁ γὰρ κόσμος, φύσει κινούμενος, βίᾳ οὐ κινεῖται· οὐ μὴν οὐδὲ εἴ τι κατὰ φύσιν κινεῖται τοῦτο καὶ κατὰ φύσιν ἠρεμεῖ. καὶ γὰρ ὁ κόσμος καὶ ὁ ἥλιος καὶ ἡ σελήνη, κατὰ φύσιν κινούμενοι, κατὰ φύσιν ἠρεμεῖν οὐ δύνανται, τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον καὶ ἡ ψυχή, κατὰ φύσιν κινουμένη, κατὰ φύσιν ἠρεμεῖν οὐ δύναται. ἡ γὰρ ἠρεμία φθορὰ τῆς ψυχῆς ἐστι καὶ παντὸς ἀεικινήτου. πρὸς τούτοις καὶ τὸ ἀπορούμενον ἐξ ἀρχῆς ἄλυτον μένει, πόθεν τὸ σῶμα συνέχεται, φύσει πεφυκὸς σκεδάννυσθαι. ἀρκεῖ καὶ ταῦτα ἐκ πολλῶν ἀποδεῖξαι τὴν ψυχὴν μήτε ἐντελέχειαν οὖσαν μήτε ἀκίνητον μήτε ἐν σώματι γεννωμένην. Πυθαγόρας δὲ συμβολικῶς εἰκάζειν ἀεὶ καὶ τὸν θεὸν καὶ πάντα τοῖς ἀριθμοῖς εἰωθώς, ὡρίσατο καὶ τὴν ψυχὴν ἀριθμὸν ἑαυτὸν κινοῦντα, ᾧ καὶ Ξενοκράτης ἠκολούθησεν, οὐχ ὅτι ἀριθμός ἐστιν ἡ ψυχὴ ἀλλ' ὅτι ἐν τοῖς ἀριθμητοῖς ἐστι καὶ ἐν τοῖς πεπληθυσμένοις, καὶ ὅτι ἡ ψυχή ἐστιν ἡ διακρίνουσα τὰ πράγματα τῷ μορφὰς καὶ τύπους ἑκάστοις ἐπιβάλλειν. αὕτη γάρ ἐστιν ἡ τὰ εἴδη ἀπὸ τῶν εἰδῶν χωρίζουσα καὶ διάφορα αὐτὰ ἀποφαίνουσα τῇ τε ἑτερότητι τῶν εἰδῶν καὶ τῷ πλήθει τοῦ ἀριθμοῦ, καὶ διὰ τοῦτο ἀριθμητὰ ποιοῦσα τὰ πράγματα. ὅθεν οὐ παντάπασιν ἀπήλλακται τῆς κατὰ τοὺς ἀριθμοὺς κοινωνίας. τὸ δὲ αὐτοκίνητον καὶ αὐτὸς αὐτῇ προσεμαρτύρησεν. § ὅτι δὲ ἀριθμὸς οὐκ ἔστι δῆλον ἐντεῦθεν. § ὁ ἀριθμὸς ποσόν ἐστιν· ἡ δὲ ψυχὴ οὐ ποσὸν ἀλλ' οὐσία· οὐκ ἄρα ἀριθμὸς ἡ ψυχή, εἰ καὶ τὰ μάλιστα καὶ τὸν ἀριθμὸν ἐν τοῖς νοητοῖς οὐσίαν εἶναι βούλονται, ὡς ἐν τοῖς ἑξῆς ἐροῦμεν. § ἔτι ἡ ψυχὴ συνεχής ἐστιν· ὁ δὲ ἀριθμὸς οὐ συνεχής· οὐκ ἄρα ἀριθμὸς ἡ ψυχή. § ἔτι ὁ ἀριθμὸς ἤτοι ἄρτιός ἐστιν ἢ περιττός· ἡ δὲ ψυχὴ οὔτε ἄρτιος οὔτε περιττή· οὐκ ἄρα ἀριθμὸς ἡ ψυχή. § ἔτι ὁ ἀριθμὸς κατὰ προσθήκην αὔξεται· ἡ δὲ ψυχὴ κατὰ προσθήκην οὐκ αὔξεται. § ἔτι ἡ ψυχὴ αὐτοκίνητός ἐστιν· ὁ δὲ ἀριθμὸς ὁ ὡρισμένος ἀκίνητος. § ἔτι ὁ μὲν ἀριθμὸς μένων εἷς καὶ ὁ αὐτὸς τὴν φύσιν οὐδεμίαν ποιότητα τὴν ἐν ἀριθμοῖς γινομένην ὑπαλλάξαι δύναται· ψυχὴ δὲ μία καὶ ἡ αὐτὴ μένουσα κατὰ τὴν οὐσίαν ὑπαλλάττει τὰς ποιότητας ἐξ ἀμαθίας εἰς ἐπιστήμην μεταπίπτουσα καὶ ἐκ κακίας εἰς ἀρετήν· οὐκ ἄρα ἀριθμὸς ἡ ψυχή. τὰ μὲν οὖν τῶν παλαιῶν δόγματα περὶ ψυχῆς τοιαῦτα. Εὐνόμιος δὲ ὡρίσατο τὴν ψυχὴν οὐσίαν ἀσώματον ἐν σώματι κτιζομένην, συμφορήσας ὁμοῦ πάντα χρήματα· τὸ μὲν γὰρ οὐσίαν ἀσώματον ἐκ τῆς ἀληθείας εἴληφεν, τὸ δὲ ἐν σώματι κτιζομένην ἐκ τῆς Ἀριστοτέλους διδασκαλίας, οὐκ ἐννοήσας καίπερ ὀξὺς ὢν ὅτι συνάγειν εἰς ταὐτὸ πειρᾶται τὰ ἀσύμβατα. πᾶν γὰρ τὸ γένεσιν ἔχον σωματικὴν ὁμοῦ καὶ χρονικὴν φθαρτόν ἐστι καὶ θνητόν. συνᾴδει δὲ τούτοις καὶ τὰ Μωϋσέως· τὴν γὰρ τῶν αἰσθητῶν γένεσιν ὑπογράφων, οὐκ ἐν αὐτῇ καὶ τὴν τῶν νοητῶν ῥητῶς ἔφησεν ὑποστῆναι φύσιν· ἀλλ' εἰκάζοντές τινες τοῦτο δοξάζουσιν, οἷς οὐ πάντες συμφέρονται. εἰ δέ τις ἐκ τοῦ μετὰ τὴν διάπλασιν τοῦ σώματος ἐμβεβλῆσθαι τὴν ψυχὴν ἡγοῖτο μετὰ τὸ σῶμα γεγενῆσθαι αὐτήν, διαμαρτάνει τῆς ἀληθείας. οὔτε γὰρ ὁ Μωϋσῆς τότε αὐτὴν ἐκτίσθαι λέγει ὅτε τῷ σώματι ἐνεβάλλετο· οὔτε κατὰ λόγον οὕτως ἔχει. ἢ τοίνυν θνητὴν αὐτὴν λεγέτω ὡς Ἀριστοτέλης, φήσας αὐτὴν ἐν σώματι γεννᾶσθαι, καὶ ὡς οἱ Στωϊκοί· ἢ λέγων οὐσίαν