Elements of Theology

 as one subsisting, but according to participation not one, the one will be multiplied, just as the multiplicity is unified through the one. Therefore

 activity is better than that which is not self-sufficient but has the cause of its perfection dependent on another substance. For if all beings by nat

 it desires that also, how most of all the good? or if it does not desire, how does it not desire the cause of all things, having proceeded from it? Bu

 is itself, and the mover and the moved are one and the same. For either it moves in one part and is moved in another part, or as a whole it moves and

 beginning from a monad, it proceeds into a multitude coordinate with the monad, and the multitude of every order is led back to one monad. For the mon

 the one being divided. But if it is in one of all things, it will no longer be of all things, but of one. If, therefore, it is both common to those ab

 the thing produced is other than it. Therefore, that which begets is established as unchangeable and undiminished, multiplying itself through a genera

 from something and reverting has a cyclical activity. For if it reverts to that from which it proceeds, it joins the end to the beginning, and the mot

 procession. For since each occurs through likeness, that which has proceeded immediately from something has also reverted immediately to it (for the l

 has reverted to itself according to nature and is perfect in its reversion to itself, and would have its being from itself for that to which the reve

 the self-subsistent is set apart from things measured by time in respect to its substance. For if the self-subsistent is ungenerated, it would not be

 having received the power to produce from the cause which is superior to it, it has from that cause its being the cause of those things of which it is

 Thus the producer in relation to the produced, taken in relation to each other, but that which is able to do more has a greater and more universal pow

 a cause has pre-contained in itself the effect, being primarily what that is secondarily or in the thing produced the producer (for this too, partici

 suffers from the former) and when the second in turn acts, that also co-acts, because whatever the second does, the more causal also co-begets with i

 being, or needing it somehow in order to be, would be in this respect more imperfect than the effect. But that which is in the result is a co-cause ra

 passible, being in every way divisible, and in every way to infinity. But the incorporeal, being simple, is impassible for the indivisible can neithe

 undiminished it contains in itself. But surely infinity in respect to magnitude and in respect to multitude is a complete privation and a falling away

 set apart and if all things enter into it, yet it has something hidden and incomprehensible to secondary things and if it unfolds the powers within

 but nowhere for thus it would be divided and separate from itself, if indeed one part of it is everywhere and in all things, but the other part nowhe

 all things. For since each thing exists either according to cause or according to existence or according to participation, in the first the rest exist

 a turning back as if through similars, dissimilar <being>. For the one is similar as a particular to a particular, the other is kindred as being of th

 a hypostasis but no longer a henad, it would be assigned to another order on account of the alteration of its property. 115 Every god is supra-essenti

 supra-essential, being nothing other than the one for each is not one thing, and then good, but only good, just as it is not one thing, and then one,

 is and in beings has the power of apprehending truth (for it both grasps thoughts and has its subsistence in acts of intellection) but the gods are b

 having set the same before itself, is most self-sufficient and such is all that is divine. Therefore it needs neither other things, being goodness-it

 is more unified than beings. All divine genera, therefore, are bound together by their proper intermediaries, and the first do not proceed immediately

 of a henad working, with which it is connate. This, then, is that which in itself defines the being that partakes of it and shows essentially the supr

 to the gods so that, while they are present to all things in the same way, all things are not present to them in the same way, but as each is able, i

 For the one, having a most unitive power, sends itself through the entire union and unifies all from above, while remaining in itself. But the mean, s

 proceeds from the infinity of the divine power, multiplying itself and passing through all things, and pre-eminently demonstrating the unfailing in th

 presides over composites and of their order and of their division according to number, and is of the same series as the paternal in more partial produ

 they have intelligible [qualities]. In the same way, therefore, that those, by illuminating Being, are intelligible, so also these, by illuminating th

 and sees itself. But seeing that it is thinking and seeing, it knows that it is Intellect in actuality and knowing this, it knows that it thinks, and

 Therefore it has the causes of all things intellectually. So that every intellect is all things intellectually, both the things before it and the thin

 more akin, contracted in quantity, in power surpasses the things after it and conversely the things further from the one. Therefore, those that are h

 on the one hand, but being only intellectual, is participated by souls that are neither divine nor come to be in a state of change from intellect to u

 by its very being, if the participant is suitable, it immediately becomes ensouled and living, not by the soul reasoning and choosing, nor giving life

 and to the soul that substantiates the essential principles of all things in it for everything that produces by its being, which it is primarily, thi

 of the motions it will also have restorations for every period of the eternal things is restorative. 200 Every period of a soul is measured by time

 the relation to the secondary ones, which the divine has to the intellectual, and this to the psychical and the quantities of the lower ones are grea

 it admits of every kind of change, being moved together with their own ruling causes. But indeed that it is also indivisible, is clear. For everything

having received the power to produce from the cause which is superior to it, it has from that cause its being the cause of those things of which it is the cause, being measured from thence according to its hypostatic power. If this is so, the things which proceed from it are effects because of that which is before it; for that which has constituted the one a cause constitutes the other an effect. If this is so, the effect is constituted as such from thence. But indeed, that it is so in a greater degree from thence, is clear. For if it has given to the second cause the power of producing it, it therefore possessed this causality primarily, and for this reason the second also generates, having received from thence the power of generating in a secondary manner. If the one became productive by participation, but the other by communication and primarily, that is in a greater degree a cause which has communicated to another the generative power over the things that come after it. 57 Every cause both acts prior to its effect and after it is constitutive of a greater number of things. For if it is a cause, it is more perfect and more powerful than that which is after it. And if this is so, it is the cause of more things; for it is the mark of a greater power to produce more things, of an equal power to produce equal things, and of a lesser power to produce fewer; and the power which is capable of producing greater things among similars is also capable of producing lesser things, but the power which is capable of producing lesser things will not necessarily be capable of producing greater things. If, therefore, the cause is more powerful, it is productive of more things. But indeed, whatever the effect is capable of, that the cause is capable of in a greater degree. For everything that is produced by secondary causes is produced in a greater degree by the prior and more causal causes. It therefore co-establishes with it all things that it is its nature to produce. But if it also produces prior things, it is surely clear that it acts prior to it according to its own productive activity. Every cause, therefore, both acts prior to its effect, and with it, and after it establishes other things. From these things, then, it is manifest that of whatever things Soul is a cause, Intellect is also a cause, but it is not the case that of whatever things Intellect is a cause, Soul is also a cause; but it also acts prior to Soul, and what Soul gives to secondary things, Intellect also gives in a greater degree, and when Soul is no longer active, Intellect radiates its own gifts, to those things to which Soul has not given itself; for even that which is without soul, inasmuch as it has participated in form, participates in Intellect and in the creation of Intellect. And indeed, of whatever things Intellect is a cause, the Good is also a cause; but not conversely. For even the privations of forms are from thence (for all things are from thence); but Intellect, being form, is not the hypostasis of privation. 58 Everything produced by more causes is more composite than that which is produced by fewer. For if every cause gives something to that which proceeds from it, more causes will make the gifts more numerous, and fewer causes will make them fewer. So that of the participants, some will derive from more, and others from fewer, of the things in which they severally participated, the one because of their procession from more causes, the others because of their procession from fewer. Those which derive from more are more composite, and those from fewer of the same are simpler. Therefore, everything produced by more causes is more composite, and that by fewer is simpler; for what the one participates in, the other does also; but not conversely. 59 Everything simple in essence is either superior to composite things or inferior. For if the extremes of beings are produced by fewer and simpler causes, and the intermediates by more, these latter will be composite, while the extremes will be simpler, some in a superior way, others in an inferior way. But indeed, that the extremes are produced by fewer causes is clear; because the higher principles both begin before the more subordinate ones and extend beyond them to things to which the latter do not proceed because of a remission of power. For because of this, the last of beings is most simple, just as the first is, because it proceeds from the first alone; but the one simplicity is superior to all composition, the other is inferior. And the same reasoning applies in all cases. 60 Every cause of more things is superior to that which has received its power for fewer things and which produces parts of that of which the other is constitutive of wholes. For if the one is the cause of fewer, and the other of more things, and the former things are parts of the latter, what the one produces, the other, which is constitutive of more things, will also produce; but of what this one produces, that one is not productive of them all. It is therefore more powerful and more comprehensive; for as the thing which has proceeded is to the thing which has proceeded,

τοῦ παράγειν δύναμιν ἀπὸ τῆς ὑπερκειμένης αἰτίας ἔλαχε, παρ' ἐκείνης ἔχει τὸ εἶναι αἴτιον ὧν ἐστιν αἴτιον, μετρηθὲν ἐκεῖθεν κατὰ τὴν ὑποστατικὴν δύναμιν. εἰ δὲ τοῦτο, καὶ τὰ ἀπ' αὐτοῦ προϊόντα αἰτιατά ἐστι διὰ τὸ πρὸ αὐτοῦ· τὸ γὰρ θάτερον ἀποτελέσαν αἴτιον καὶ θάτερον αἰτιατὸν ἀπο τελεῖ. εἰ δὲ τοῦτο, καὶ τὸ αἰτιατὸν ἐκεῖθεν ἀποτελεῖται τοιοῦτον. ἀλλὰ μὴν ὅτι καὶ μειζόνως ἐκεῖθεν, δῆλον. εἰ γὰρ τὴν αἰτίαν τῷ δευτέρῳ τοῦ παράγειν αὐτὸ δέδωκεν, εἶχεν ἄρα πρώτως ταύτην τὴν αἰτίαν, καὶ διὰ τοῦτο καὶ τὸ δεύτερον γεννᾷ, τὴν τοῦ δευτέρως γεννᾶν δύναμιν ἐκεῖθεν λαβόν. εἰ δὲ τὸ μὲν κατὰ μέθεξιν ἐγένετο παρακτικόν, τὸ δὲ κατὰ μετάδοσιν καὶ πρώτως, μειζόνως αἴτιον ἐκεῖνο τὸ καὶ ἄλλῳ τῆς γεννητικῆς τῶν ἐφεξῆς δυνάμεως μεταδεδωκός. 57 Πᾶν αἴτιον καὶ πρὸ τοῦ αἰτιατοῦ ἐνεργεῖ καὶ μετ' αὐτὸ πλειόνων ἐστὶν ὑποστατικόν. εἰ γάρ ἐστιν αἴτιον, τελειότερόν ἐστι καὶ δυνατώτερον τοῦ μετ' αὐτό. καὶ εἰ τοῦτο, πλειόνων αἴτιον· δυνάμεως γὰρ μείζονος τὸ πλείω παράγειν, ἴσης δὲ τὰ ἴσα, καὶ τῆς ἐλάττονος ἐλάττω· καὶ ἡ μὲν τὰ μείζονα ἐν τοῖς ὁμοίοις δυναμένη δύναμις καὶ τὰ ἐλάττονα δύναται, ἡ δὲ τὰ ἐλάττονα δυναμένη οὐκ ἐξ ἀνάγκης τὰ μείζω δυνήσεται. εἰ οὖν δυνατώτερον τὸ αἴτιον, πλειόνων ἐστὶ παρακτικόν. ἀλλὰ μὴν καὶ ὅσα δύναται τὸ αἰτιατόν, μειζόνως ἐκεῖνο δύναται. πᾶν γὰρ τὸ ὑπὸ τῶν δευτέρων παραγόμενον ὑπὸ τῶν προτέρων καὶ αἰτιωτέρων παράγεται μειζόνως. συνυφίστησιν ἄρα αὐτῷ πάντα ὅσα πέφυκε παράγειν. εἰ δὲ καὶ αὐτὸ πρότερον παράγει, δῆλον δήπουθεν ὅτι πρὸ αὐτοῦ ἐνεργεῖ κατὰ τὴν παρακτικὴν αὐτοῦ ἐνέργειαν. ἅπαν ἄρα αἴτιον καὶ πρὸ τοῦ αἰτιατοῦ ἐνεργεῖ καὶ σὺν αὐτῷ καὶ μετ' αὐτὸ ἄλλα ὑφίστησιν. ἐκ δὴ τούτων φανερὸν ὅτι ὅσων μὲν αἰτία ψυχή, καὶ νοῦς αἴτιος, οὐχ ὅσων δὲ νοῦς, καὶ ψυχὴ αἰτία· ἀλλὰ καὶ πρὸ ψυχῆς ἐνεργεῖ, καὶ ἃ δίδωσι ψυχὴ τοῖς δευτέροις, δίδωσι καὶ νοῦς μει ζόνως, καὶ μηκέτι ψυχῆς ἐνεργούσης νοῦς ἐλλάμπει τὰς ἑαυτοῦ δόσεις, οἷς μὴ δέδωκε ψυχὴ ἑαυτήν· καὶ γὰρ τὸ ἄψυχον, καθόσον εἴδους μετέσχε, νοῦ μετέχει καὶ τῆς τοῦ νοῦ ποιήσεως. καὶ δὴ καὶ ὅσων νοῦς αἴτιος, καὶ τὸ ἀγαθὸν αἴτιον· οὐκ ἔμπαλιν δέ. καὶ γὰρ αἱ στερήσεις τῶν εἰδῶν ἐκεῖθεν (πάντα γὰρ ἐκεῖθεν)· νοῦς δὲ στερήσεως ὑποστάτης οὐκ ἔστιν, εἶδος ὤν. 58 Πᾶν τὸ ὑπὸ πλειόνων αἰτίων παραγόμενον συνθετώτερόν ἐστι τοῦ ὑπὸ ἐλαττόνων παραγομένου. εἰ γὰρ πᾶν αἴτιον δίδωσί τι τῷ ἀπ' αὐτοῦ προϊόντι, τὰ μὲν πλείονα αἴτια πλείονας ποιήσεται τὰς δόσεις, τὰ δὲ ἐλάττονα ἐλάττους. ὥστε καὶ τῶν μετασχόντων τὰ μὲν ἐκ πλειόνων ἔσται, τὰ δὲ ἐξ ἐλαττόνων, ὧν ἑκάτερα μετέσχε, τὰ μὲν διὰ τὴν ἐκ πλειόνων αἰτίων πρόοδον, τὰ δὲ διὰ τὴν ἐκ τῶν ἐλαττόνων. τὰ δὲ ἐκ πλειόνων συνθετώτερα, τὰ δὲ ἐξ ἐλαττόνων τῶν αὐτῶν ἁπλούστερα. πᾶν ἄρα τὸ ὑπὸ πλειόνων αἰτίων παραγόμενον συνθετώτερον, τὸ δὲ ὑπὸ ἐλαττόνων ἁπλούστερον· ὧν γὰρ θάτερον μετέχει, καὶ θάτερον· ἀλλ' οὐκ ἔμπαλιν. 59 Πᾶν τὸ ἁπλοῦν κατ' οὐσίαν ἢ κρεῖττόν ἐστι τῶν συν θέτων ἢ χεῖρον. εἰ γὰρ τὰ ἄκρα τῶν ὄντων ὑπὸ ἐλαττόνων καὶ ἁπλουστέρων παράγεται, τὰ δὲ μέσα ὑπὸ πλειόνων, ταῦτα μὲν ἔσται σύνθετα, τὰ δὲ ἄκρα τὰ μὲν κατὰ τὸ κρεῖττον ἁπλούστερα, τὰ δὲ κατὰ τὸ χεῖρον. ἀλλὰ μὴν ὅτι τὰ ἄκρα ὑπὸ ἐλαττόνων παράγεται, δῆλον· διότι τὰ ἀνωτέρω καὶ ἄρχεται πρὸ τῶν καταδεεστέρων καὶ ὑπερεκτείνεται αὐτῶν ἐφ' ἃ μὴ πρόεισιν ἐκεῖνα δι' ὕφεσιν δυνάμεως. διὰ γὰρ τοῦτο καὶ τὸ ἔσχατον τῶν ὄντων ἁπλούστα τον, ὥσπερ τὸ πρῶτον, ὅτι ἀπὸ μόνου πρόεισι τοῦ πρώτου· ἀλλ' ἡ ἁπλότης ἡ μὲν κατὰ τὸ κρεῖττόν ἐστι πάσης συνθέσεως, ἡ δὲ κατὰ τὸ χεῖρον. καὶ ἐπὶ πάντων ὁ αὐτός ἐστι λόγος. 60 Πᾶν τὸ πλειόνων αἴτιον κρεῖττόν ἐστι τοῦ πρὸς ἐλάττονα τὴν δύναμιν λαχόντος καὶ μέρη παράγοντος ὧν θάτερον ὅλων ὑποστατικόν ἐστιν. εἰ γὰρ τὸ μὲν ἐλαττόνων, τὸ δὲ πλειόνων αἴτιον, μέρη δὲ τὰ ἕτερα τῶν ἑτέρων, ἃ μὲν ποιεῖ θάτερον, καὶ τὸ λοιπὸν ποιήσει, τὸ τῶν πλειόνων ὑποστατικόν· ἃ δὲ τοῦτο παράγει, τούτων οὐ πάντων ἐστὶν ἐκεῖνο παρακτικόν. δυνατώτερον ἄρα καὶ περι ληπτικώτερον· ὡς γὰρ τὸ προελθὸν πρὸς τὸ προελθόν,