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is common. Indeed, when a certain man or ox or horse suffers, it is not impossible for the individuals of the same species to remain unaffected. For when Paul has died, it is possible for none of the other men to have died, and when Peter came to be and was brought into being, the men who will be after him are not yet among those who exist. Therefore each nature is spoken of as that which it is not in one way, but in two. In one way, when we contemplate the common principle of each nature in and of itself, such as the nature of man or of horse not existing in any of the individuals, but in another, when we perceive this very common nature existing in the individuals and receiving a most particular existence in each of them, applying henceforth to no other than to that one alone. For the rational mortal animal in me is common to none of the other men, nor could the nature of the animal in this particular horse exist in any other, as we have just shown. That the teaching of the church holds these concepts concerning both natures and hypostases is clear from the fact that we confess one nature of the Father and of the Son and of the Holy Spirit, but we dogmatically affirm their three hypostases, or persons, according to which each is distinguished from the others by a certain property. For what would the one nature of the Godhead be, if not the common principle of the divine nature contemplated in and of itself and separated in thought from the property of each hypostasis? And that we know the name of nature again in a more particular sense—contemplating the common principle of the nature as having become proper to each of the individuals, or of each of the hypostases, and as no longer able to apply to any other of those under the common species—is clear again from the fact that in Christ we profess a union of two natures, I mean the divine and the human. For we do not say that the common [nature] of the Godhead, understood in the Holy Trinity, was made flesh; for in that case we would be predicating the incarnation of the Father and of the Holy Spirit. Nor do we profess that the common principle of human nature was united to the God Logos; for in that case, again, the Logos of God would rightly be said to have been united both to the men who existed before the advent of the Logos and to all who will exist after it. But it is clear that here we speak of the nature of the Godhead as the nature of the common Godhead made proper in the hypostasis of the Logos. Whence we also confess one incarnate nature of the God Logos, having distinguished it from that of the Father and of the Holy Spirit by the very addition "of the God Logos." So that here too, having understood the common principle of the divine nature as henceforth proper to the God Logos, we say that the nature of the Logos has been made flesh. And again we say that a nature of humanity was united to the Logos, that most particular existence which the Logos alone assumed from among all. So that, according to this signification of nature, nature and hypostasis would be almost the same, except that the name of hypostasis also has conceptually connected with it the properties that accrue to each of the individuals beyond the common nature, by which they are separated from one another. Whence it is possible to find many of our writers saying in different ways that a union of natures or of hypostases has occurred. For if hypostasis, as we have shown, signifies the proper and individual existence of each. And they often use these names interchangeably, it is clear, as they wish to signify to us through them the most particular nature, since both in the present discourse and in the usage of those who have treated such natural subjects, it is the custom for all to call the common principle of the nature "man," as when they say that "man" is a species of animal, even if none of the individuals is either the species under the genus or is called so. But we also say that man differs from horse, obviously speaking of the universal natures themselves. And again we say that Peter is a man and

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κοινόν ἐστιν. Ἀμέλει παθόντος ἀνθρώπου τινὸς ἢ βοὸς ἢ ἵππου ἀπαθῆ μένειν τὰ ὁμοειδῆ τῶν ἀτόμων οὐκ ἀδύνατον. Καὶ γὰρ Παύλου τεθνεῶτος μηδένα τεθνάναι τῶν λοιπῶν ἀνθρώπων ἐνδέχεται, καὶ γενομένου Πέτρου καὶ εἰς τὸ εἶναι παρενεχθέντος οἱ ἐσόμενοι μετ' αὐτὸν ἄνθρωποι οὔπω τῶν ὄντων εἰσίν. Οὐκοῦν ἑκάστη φύσις οὐ μοναχῶς λέγεται τοῦθ' ὅπερ ἐστίν, ἀλλὰ διχῶς. Καθ' ἕνα μὲν τρόπον, ὅταν τὸν κοινὸν ἑκάστης φύσεως λόγον αὐτὸν ἐφ' ἑαυτοῦ θεωρῶμεν, οἷον τὴν ἀνθρώπου φύσιν ἢ τὴν ἵππου ἐν οὐδενὶ τῶν ἀτόμων γινομένην, καθ' ἕτερον δέ, ὅταν αὐτὴν δὴ ταύτην τὴν κοινὴν φύσιν ἐν τοῖς ἀτόμοις γινομένην κατίδωμεν καὶ μερικωτάτην ἐν ἑκάστῳ αὐτῶν λαμβάνουσαν ὕπαρξιν, οὐδενὶ ἄλλῳ πλὴν ἐκείνῳ καὶ μόνῳ λοιπὸν ἐφαρμόζουσαν. Τὸ γὰρ ἐν ἐμοὶ ζῷον λογικὸν θνητὸν οὐδενὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἀνθρώπων ἐστὶ κοινὸν οὐδὲ ἡ ἐν τῷδε τῷ ἵππῳ τοῦ ζῴου φύσις ἐν ἄλλῳ τινὶ γένοιτ' ἄν, ὡς ἀρτίως δεδείχαμεν. Ὅτι δὲ ταύτας τὰς ἐννοίας περί τε φύσεων ἔχει καὶ ὑποστάσεων ἡ τῆς ἐκκλησίας διδασκαλία, δῆλον ἐξ ὧν μίαν μὲν φύσιν πατρός τε καὶ υἱοῦ καὶ ἁγίου πνεύματος ὁμολογοῦμεν, τρεῖς δὲ τὰς τούτων ὑποστάσεις ἤγουν τὰ πρόσωπα δογματίζομεν, καθ' ἃς ἕκαστον ἰδιότητί τινι ἐκ τῶν λοιπῶν διακρίνεται. Τί γὰρ ἂν εἴη μία φύσις θεότητος ἢ ὁ κοινὸς τῆς θείας φύσεως λόγος αὐτὸς καθ' ἑαυτὸν θεωρούμενος καὶ τῇ ἐπινοίᾳ τῆς ἑκάστης ὑποστάσεως ἰδιότητος κεχωρισμένος; Ὅτι δὲ καὶ ἰδικώτερον πάλιν τὸ τῆς φύσεως γινώσκομεν ὄνομα, τὸν κοινὸν λόγον τῆς φύσεως ἐφ' ἑκάστου τῶν ἀτόμων ἤγουν τῶν ὑποστάσεων ἑκάστης ἴδιον γενόμενον θεωροῦντες καὶ οὐδενὶ λοιπὸν ἑτέρῳ τῶν ὑπὸ τὸ κοινὸν εἶδος ἐφαρμόζειν δυνάμενον, δῆλον πάλιν ἐξ ὧν ἐπὶ Χριστοῦ δύο φύσεων ἕνωσιν, τῆς θείας φημὶ καὶ τῆς ἀνθρωπείας, πρεσβεύομεν. Οὐ γὰρ δὴ τὴν κοινὴν ἐπὶ τῆς ἁγίας τριάδος νοουμένην τῆς θεότητος σεσαρκῶσθαί φαμεν· οὕτω γὰρ ἂν τοῦ πατρὸς καὶ τοῦ ἁγίου πνεύματος κατηγοροῦμεν τὴν ἐνανθρώπησιν. Ἀλλ' οὐδὲ τὸν κοινὸν τῆς ἀνθρωπίνης φύσεως λόγον ἡνῶσθαι τῷ θεῷ λόγῳ πρεσβεύομεν· οὕτω γὰρ πάλιν καὶ τοῖς πρὸ τῆς τοῦ λόγου ἐπιδημίας γενομένοις ἀνθρώποις καὶ τοῖς μετ' αὐτὴν ἐσομένοις ἅπασιν ἡνῶσθαι ἂν ὁ τοῦ θεοῦ λόγος δικαίως ἐλέγετο. Ἀλλὰ δῆλον, ὅτι φύσιν θεότητος ἐνταῦθά φαμεν τὴν ἐν τῇ ὑποστάσει τοῦ λόγου τῆς κοινῆς θεότητος ἐξιδιασθεῖσαν φύσιν. Ὅθεν καὶ μίαν φύσιν τοῦ θεοῦ λόγου σεσαρκωμένην ὁμολογοῦμεν, αὐτῷ τῷ προσθεῖναι τοῦ θεοῦ λόγου ἀποκρίναντες αὐτὴν τοῦ τε πατρὸς καὶ τοῦ ἁγίου πνεύματος. Ὥστε κἀνταῦθα τὸν κοινὸν τῆς θείας φύσεως λόγον ἴδιον λοιπὸν τοῦ θεοῦ λόγου νενοηκότες σεσαρκῶσθαί φαμεν τοῦ λόγου τὴν φύσιν. Καὶ φύσιν πάλιν ἀνθρωπότητος λέγομεν ἡνῶσθαι τῷ λόγῳ τὴν μερικωτάτην ἐκείνην ὕπαρξιν, ἣν μόνην ἐκ πασῶν ὁ λόγος προσείληφεν. Ὥστε σχεδὸν κατὰ τοῦτο τῆς φύσεως τὸ σημαινόμενον ταυτὸν ἂν εἴη φύσις καὶ ὑπόστασις, πλὴν ὅτι τὸ τῆς ὑποστάσεως ὄνομα συνεπινοουμένας ἔχει καὶ τὰς ἐπιγινομένας παρὰ τὴν κοινὴν φύσιν ἑκάστῳ τῶν ἀτόμων ἰδιότητας, καθ' ἃς ἀλλήλων κεχώρισται. Ἔνθεν τῶν ἡμετέρων πολλοὺς διαφόρως εὑρεῖν ἔστι λέγοντας φύσεων ἤγουν ὑποστάσεων ἕνωσιν γεγονέναι. Εἰ γὰρ ἡ ὑπόστασις, ὡς ἐδείξαμεν, τὴν ἰδικὴν ἑκάστου καὶ ἄτομον σημαίνει ὕπαρξιν. Ἐκ παραλλήλου δὲ τούτοις πολλάκις κέχρηνται τοῖς ὀνόμασι, δῆλον, ὡς καὶ τὴν ἰδικωτάτην φύσιν σημαίνειν ἡμῖν διὰ τούτων ἐθέλουσιν, ἐπεὶ καὶ ἐν τῇ ἀνὰ χεῖρα ὁμιλίᾳ καὶ ἐν τῇ χρήσει τῶν τὰ τοιαῦτα πεφυσιολογηκότων ἔθος ἅπασι καὶ τὸν κοινὸν τῆς φύσεως λόγον ἄνθρωπον προσαγορεύειν, ὡς ὅταν λέγωσιν εἶδος εἶναι τοῦ ζῴου τὸν ἄνθρωπον, εἴπερ μηδὲν τῶν ἀτόμων μήτε ἔστιν εἶδος τὸ ὑπὸ τὸ γένος μήτε λέγεται. Ἀλλὰ καὶ ἄνθρωπον ἵππου διαφέρειν λέγομεν, αὐτὰς δηλονότι τὰς καθόλου λέγοντες φύσεις. Καὶ πάλιν Πέτρον ἄνθρωπον εἶναί φαμεν καὶ