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of the contained individuals, that is, hypostases, as being more universal. But the individual, that is, the hypostasis, is not predicated of the species; for the hypostasis is more particular than the species. Thus Peter is a man and Paul is a man, but not every man is Peter or Paul; for there are also other hypostases under the species of man. And the differentiae are predicated of the species in which they inhere, and of their individuals. For the differentiae are more universal than the species; for "rational" is more universal than the species of man. For every man is rational, but not every rational being is a man; for an angel, being rational, is not a man. And this is predication in a broader sense; but predication in an equal sense is when it is convertible. For the properties are predicated of the species of which they are properties, but also the species are predicated of their own properties; for every man is capable of laughter, and everyone capable of laughter is a man. For even if an ape is said to laugh, it does not laugh with the heart but with its expressions; for it is an imitative animal. Therefore, the predication of genera of their species, and of differentiae of their species, and of species of their individuals is said to be in a broader sense, but that of properties in an equal sense. These which are equal are said to be convertible and counter-predicated. 16 Concerning synonymous and homonymous predication. Synonymous predication is when the subject receives both the name and the definition of that name, for instance, "animal" is predicated of man. And man receives both the name and the definition of animal; for an animal is an animate, sentient substance. And man admits this definition; for man is a substance and animate and sentient. But homonymous predication is when it receives the name, but by no means the definition, for instance, the image of a man receives the name "man," but does not receive the definition of man; for the definition of man is a rational, mortal animal, capable of intellect and knowledge. But the image is neither an animal—for it is not animate—nor rational, nor capable of intellect and knowledge. It is necessary to know that whatever is predicated of something as of a subject, that is, synonymously, will also be predicated of its subject, for instance, "animal" is predicated of man as of a subject, that is synonymously, and "man" of Peter; for Peter is subject to "man." Therefore, "animal" is also predicated of Peter; for Peter is an animal. 17 Concerning the subject. The subject is spoken of in two ways, one with respect to existence, the other with respect to predication. And with respect to existence, as substance is subject to accidents; for in it they have their being and outside it they do not subsist. But the subject with respect to predication is the particular; for the particular is subject to the more universal with respect to predication, since the more universal is predicated of the more particular, as "animal" is predicated of man. The universal is said to be "of a subject," while the more particular is a subject with respect to predication. The accident is said to be "in a subject," namely substance, while substance is a subject with respect to existence. 18 Concerning predication in the "what it is" and in the "of what kind it is." Predication in the "what it is" is the predication of genera of their species, that is, that which signifies what the subject is, and of species of their individuals; for being asked "what is man?" we say "an animal," and being asked "what is Peter?" we say "a man." But predication in the "of what kind it is" is that of the differentiae of the species in which they inhere, and of the accidents of the individuals in which they inhere, that is, that which signifies of what kind the subject is; for being asked "what kind of animal is man?" we say "rational, mortal." And "rational" and "mortal" are essential differentiae. Again, being asked "what kind of man is Peter?" we say "perhaps tall or maimed or snub-nosed or hook-nosed." But "why it is" signifies the end, that is, the cause for which the thing in question has come to be; for being asked "why a bed?" we say "for the rest of men." 19

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περιεχομένων ἀτόμων τουτέστιν ὑποστάσεων ὡς καθολικώτερον. Τὸ δὲ ἄτομον ἤγουν ἡ ὑπόστασις οὐ κατηγορεῖται τοῦ εἴδους· μερικωτέρα γάρ ἐστι τοῦ εἴδους ἡ ὑπόστασις. Καὶ Πέτρος τοίνυν ἄνθρωπός ἐστι καὶ Παῦλος ἄνθρωπός ἐστιν, οὐ πᾶς δὲ ἄνθρωπος Πέτρος ἢ Παῦλος· εἰσὶ γὰρ καὶ ἄλλαι ὑποστάσεις ὑπὸ τὸ εἶδος τοῦ ἀνθρώπου. Καὶ αἱ διαφοραὶ δὲ κατηγοροῦνται τῶν εἰδῶν, οἷς ἐνυπάρχουσι, καὶ τῶν ἀτόμων αὐτῶν. Καθολικώτεραι γάρ εἰσιν αἱ διαφοραὶ τῶν εἰδῶν· τὸ γὰρ λογικὸν καθολικώτερόν ἐστι τοῦ εἴδους τοῦ ἀνθρώπου. Καὶ γὰρ πᾶς μὲν ἄνθρωπος λογικός, οὐ πᾶς δὲ λογικὸς ἄνθρωπος· καὶ ὁ ἄγγελος γὰρ λογικὸς ὢν οὐκ ἔστιν ἄνθρωπος. Καὶ αὕτη μέν ἐστιν ἡ ἐπὶ πλέον κατηγορία· ἡ δὲ ἐπίσης κατηγορία, ὅτε ἀντιστρέφει. Κατηγοροῦνται γὰρ τὰ ἴδια τῶν εἰδῶν, ὧν ἐστιν ἴδια, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὰ εἴδη κατηγοροῦνται τῶν ἰδίων αὐτῶν· πᾶς γὰρ ἄνθρωπος γελαστικός, καὶ πᾶς γελαστικὸς ἄνθρωπος. Εἰ γὰρ καὶ γελᾶν λέγεται πίθηκος, οὐ γελᾷ τῇ καρδίᾳ ἀλλὰ τοῖς σχήμασι· μιμητικὸν γὰρ ζῷόν ἐστιν. Ὥστε ἡ μὲν τῶν γενῶν κατὰ τῶν εἰδῶν κατηγορία καὶ ἡ τῶν διαφορῶν κατὰ τῶν εἰδῶν καὶ ἡ τῶν εἰδῶν κατὰ τῶν ἀτόμων ἐπὶ πλέον λέγεται, ἡ δὲ τῶν ἰδίων ἐπίσης. Ταῦτα δὲ τὰ ἐπίσης ἀντιστρέφοντα καὶ ἀντικατηγορούμενα λέγονται. 16 Περὶ συνωνύμου καὶ ὁμωνύμου κατηγορίας. Συνώνυμος μὲν κατηγορία ἐστίν, ὅτε καὶ τὸ ὄνομα καὶ τὸν ὅρον αὐτοῦ τοῦ ὀνόματος δέχεται τὸ ὑποκείμενον, οἷον τὸ ζῷον κατηγορεῖται τοῦ ἀνθρώπου. Καὶ δέχεται ὁ ἄνθρωπος καὶ τὸ ὄνομα καὶ τὸν ὅρον τοῦ ζῴου· ζῷον γάρ ἐστιν οὐσία ἔμψυχος αἰσθητική. Καὶ ὁ ἄνθρωπος δὲ ἐπιδέχεται τὸν ὅρον τοῦτον· καὶ οὐσία γάρ ἐστιν ὁ ἄνθρωπος καὶ ἔμψυχος καὶ αἰσθητικός. Ὁμώνυμος δέ ἐστι κατηγορία, ὅτε τὸ μὲν ὄνομα δέχεται, τὸν δὲ ὅρον οὐδαμῶς, οἷον ἡ εἰκὼν τοῦ ἀνθρώπου τὸ μὲν ὄνομα τοῦ ἀνθρώπου δέχεται, τὸν δὲ ὅρον τοῦ ἀνθρώπου οὐ δέχεται· ὁ γὰρ ὅρος τοῦ ἀνθρώπου ζῷον λογικόν, θνητόν, νοῦ καὶ ἐπιστήμης δεκτικόν. Ἡ δὲ εἰκὼν οὔτε ζῷόν ἐστιν· οὐ γάρ ἐστιν ἔμψυχος οὔτε λογικὸν οὔτε νοῦ καὶ ἐπιστήμης δεκτικόν. Χρὴ γινώσκειν, ὅτι, ὅσα κατηγορεῖται κατά τινος καθ' ὑποκειμένου ἤγουν συνωνύμως, καὶ τοῦ ὑποκειμένου αὐτῷ κατηγορηθήσεται, οἷον τὸ ζῷον ὡς καθ' ὑποκειμένου κατηγορεῖται τοῦ ἀνθρώπου ἤγουν συνωνύμως καὶ ὁ ἄνθρωπος τοῦ Πέτρου· ὑκόκειται γὰρ τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ ὁ Πέτρος. Κατηγορεῖται οὖν καὶ τοῦ Πέτρου τὸ ζῷον· καὶ ὁ Πέτρος γὰρ ζῷόν ἐστι. 17 Περὶ ὑποκειμένου. Τὸ ὑποκείμενον δισσῶς λέγεται, τὸ μὲν πρὸς ὕπαρξιν, τὸ δὲ πρὸς κατηγορίαν. Καὶ πρὸς ὕπαρξιν μέν, ὥσπερ ὑπόκειται ἡ οὐσία τοῖς συμβεβηκόσιν· ἐν αὐτῇ γὰρ ἔχουσι τὸ εἶναι καὶ ἐκτὸς αὐτῆς οὐχ ὑφίστανται. Τὸ δὲ πρὸς κατηγορίαν ὑποκείμενόν ἐστι τὸ μερικόν· ὑπόκειται γὰρ τὸ μερικὸν τῷ καθολικωτέρῳ πρὸς κατηγορίαν, ἐπειδὴ τὸ καθολικώτερον κατηγορεῖται τοῦ μερικωτέρου, ὡς τὸ ζῷον κατηγορεῖται τοῦ ἀνθρώπου. Λέγεται δὲ τὸ μὲν καθόλου καθ' ὑποκειμένου, τὸ δὲ μερικώτερον ὑποκείμενον πρὸς κατηγορίαν. Λέγεται δὲ τὸ συμβεβηκὸς ἐν ὑποκειμένῳ τῇ οὐσίᾳ, ἡ δὲ οὐσία ὑποκείμενον πρὸς ὕπαρξιν. 18 Περὶ τῆς ἐν τῷ τί ἐστι καὶ τῆς ἐν τῷ ποῖόν τί ἐστι κατηγορίας. Ἐν τῷ τί μέν ἐστι κατηγορία ἐστὶν ἡ τῶν γενῶν κατὰ τῶν εἰδῶν αὐτῶν κατηγορία τουτέστιν ἡ τὸ τί ἐστι τὸ ὑποκείμενον σημαίνουσα καὶ ἡ τῶν εἰδῶν δὲ κατὰ τῶν ἀτόμων αὐτῶν· ἐρωτώμενοι γὰρ «τί ἐστιν ἄνθρωπος» λέγομεν «ζῷον» καὶ ἐρωτώμενοι «τί ἐστι Πέτρος» λέγομεν «ἄνθρωπος». Ἡ δὲ ἐν τῷ ποῖόν τί ἐστι κατηγορία ἐστὶν ἡ τῶν διαφορῶν κατὰ τῶν εἰδῶν, οἷς ἐνυπάρχουσι, καὶ τῶν συμβεβηκότων κατὰ τῶν ἀτόμων, οἷς ἐνυπάρχουσι, τουτέστιν ἡ τὸ ποῖόν τί ἐστι τὸ ὑποκείμενον σημαίνουσα· ἐρωτώμενοι γὰρ «ὁ ποῖον ζῷον ὁ ἄνθρωπος» φαμὲν «λογικὸν θνητόν». Τὸ δὲ λογικὸν καὶ τὸ θνητὸν διαφοραί εἰσιν οὐσιώδεις. Πάλιν ἐρωτώμενοι «ὁποῖος ἄνθρωπός ἐστιν ὁ Πέτρος» φαμὲν «μακρὸς τυχὸν ἢ κολοβὸς ἢ σιμὸς ἢ γρυπός». Τὸ δὲ διὰ τί ἐστι σημαίνει τὸ τέλος ἤγουν τὴν αἰτίαν, δι' ἣν τὸ ζητούμενον γέγονεν· ἐρωτώμενοι γὰρ «διὰ τί κλίνη» φαμὲν «διὰ τὴν τῶν ἀνθρώπων ἀνάπαυσιν». 19