Proclus, On the Subsistence of Evils

On the subsistence of evils

Letting out a cry--- it is surely necessary to say one of two things: either that virtue is not contrary to vice, the whole to the whole and the parts

We speak of more or less intemperance, or are all intemperate and unjust in the same way? we shall say, by no means. and what then? is it not that, in

Evil, being a falling away and as it were a departure from the first of goods, is reasonably also deprived of being for what, being unable to share i

Evil but this is impossible for there cannot be two first principles for whence could they come at all, if the monad does not exist? for if each of

That evil is not of matter nor in bodies is clear from these things for matter and that which moves discordantly are not the same. and that matter is

Is unmixed nor is it primary evil. for if evil were contrary to every good, it would be necessary, since the good exists in itself and primarily befor

--- 41 therefore, against those who say there is one source of evils, what has been said is sufficient. for the gods <all and> are sources and causes

We call wretched ... therefore the evil man, insofar as he is evil, is not likened to the intellect ... nor could there be paradigms of evils in the

Generation for what is according to nature for one, is contrary to nature for another. and let an example of these, if you wish, be for you the very

For where the one is, there is also the good <but the evil> --- for there is asymmetry and disharmony and opposition in multitude, and from these co

Using its power for fighting and rather when greater power is present, the activities and works of evil are greater, and when less, lesser. if indeed

In particulars and in individuals, in which indeed there is also a lack of power because of the subsidence of being and an increase of division, as un

Things that are by nature are not diseases for even monsters are deformities of nature <and the deformity of these> is according to nature as a whol

Things that are by nature are not diseases; for even monsters are deformities of nature; <and the deformity of these> is according to nature as a whole ..., but contrary to partial nature; for in partial nature there is one principle, and what is contrary to this is for it contrary to nature; but in the whole of nature, all principles and all forms exist naturally; and sometimes from one form comes one thing that is generated, to speak more properly; for a human begets a human; but sometimes from one, many; for the principle of the shape is one, but the things according to it are many; but sometimes from many, one, as are the mixtures of forms concerning matter, which also seem to be monsters in relation to the individual nature that loves to be dominated by one form and to subsist according to one; but sometimes from many, many-for both equality and inequality are in many things. Therefore, all the forms, both the unmixed and those that are mixed, are according to nature and from the principles in nature, since all things are there. But disease is according to nature in another way, because each of these has come to be ... both in partial nature and in the whole; but it is destructive according to nature as a whole, but contrary to partial nature; for that into which the perishing thing changes has a form and principle from the whole of nature, contrary to the nature of this thing and not having its form from that .... Insofar, then, as the change is from there, it is according to nature ..., it corrupts some things, but provides generation for others; but insofar as there is one principle in the changing thing, it is contrary to nature; for as a whole, it is contrary to nature- <for each thing is a whole according to the principle in it> -, but as part of the whole, it is according to nature; for by this it has both come to be from another that has perished and perishes again for the generation of another. 61 Therefore, evil in bodies does not exist as unmixedly evil, but is in one way evil, insofar as it is not from there, and in another way good, insofar as it is from natural providence. And in general, for those things whose generation is for the sake of the good, how could one say that these are entirely deprived of the good and remain without a share in the nature of the good? For it is not even possible for evil to exist unless its contrary is imagined as good, because all things are for the sake of the good, even evil itself. But all things are for the sake of the good, and the divine is not the cause of evils; for nowhere is evil as evil from there, but from other causes and from those for which begetting is said to exist not according to power, but through weakness. Wherefore it seems to me that Plato also, placing all things around the king of all and all things for his sake [ep. II 312e 1-2], and whatever is not good—for being imagined as good, these things too are among the beings. <likewise> called that the cause of all beautiful things [Pl. ib. 312e 2-3] and not simply of all things; for not of evils either; but it is both not the cause of these and the cause of every being; for it is the cause of these too as beings and insofar as each is good. And if we say these things correctly, then all things would be from providence, and evil has a place among beings. So that the gods also do evil, but as good, and they know it as having a single knowledge of all things: undividedly of the divisible, in a good-like manner of evils, and unitively of the multitude. For the knowledge of the soul is one thing, and that of the intelligible <nature> another, and that of the gods <themselves> another; ---knowing and producing all things by the one itself.

φύσιν ὄντα μὴ ἐστὶ νόσοι· καὶ γὰρ τὰ τέρατα φύσεως ἐστὶν αἴσχη· <καὶ τούτων τὸ μὲν αἰσχρὸν> κατὰ φύσιν τὴν ὅλην ..., παρὰ φύσιν δὲ τὴν μερικήν· ἐν μὲν γὰρ τῇ μερικῇ φύσει εἷς ἐστι λόγος καὶ τὸ παρὰ τοῦτον αὐτῇ παρὰ φύσιν· ἐν δὲ τῇ ὅλῃ πάντες οἱ λόγοι καὶ πάντα τὰ εἴδη φυσικῶς· καὶ ποτὲ μὲν ἐξ ἑνὸς εἴδους ἓν τὸ γινόμενον, κυριώτερον εἰπεῖν· ἄνθρωπος γὰρ ἄνθρωπον γεννᾷ· ποτὲ δὲ ἐξ ἑνὸς πολλά· καὶ γὰρ ὁ τοῦ σχήματος λόγος εἷς, ἀλλὰ τὰ κατ' αὐτὸν πολλά· ποτὲ δὲ ἐκ πολλῶν ἕν, ὡς αἱ περὶ τὴν ὕλην τῶν εἰδῶν μίξεις, αἳ καὶ τέρατα δοκοῦσιν εἶναι πρὸς τὴν ἄτομον φύσιν ἑνὶ φιλοῦσαν κρατεῖσθαι εἴδει καὶ καθ' ἓν ὑφιστα-μένην· ποτὲ δὲ ἐκ πολλῶν πολλά-καὶ γὰρ ἰσότης καὶ ἀνισότης ἐν πολλοῖς. πάντα γοῦν τὰ εἴδη τά τε ἄμικτα καὶ ὅσα μεμειγμένα κατὰ φύσιν τὲ καὶ ἐκ τῶν ἐν φύσει λόγων, ὄντων πάντων ἐκεῖ. ἡ δὲ νόσος ἄλλῳ τρόπῳ κατὰ φύσιν, ὅτι τούτων ἕκαστον γέγονε ... καὶ ἐν τῇ μερικῇ φύσει καὶ ἐν τῇ ὅλῃ· φθαρτικὴ δὲ κατὰ φύσιν μὲν τὴν ὅλην, παρὰ φύσιν δὲ τὴν μερικήν· τὸ γὰρ εἰς ὃ μεταβάλλει τὸ φθειρόμενον εἶδος ἔχει καὶ λόγον ἐκ τῆς ὅλης φύσεως, ἐναντίον τῇ τούτου φύσει καὶ οὐ παρ' ἐκείνης ἔχοντα τὸ εἶδος .... ᾗ μὲν οὖν ἐκεῖθεν ἡ μεταβολή, κατὰ φύσιν ..., τὰ μὲν φθείρει, τοῖς δὲ παρέχεται γένεσιν· ᾗ δὲ εἷς λόγος ἐν τῷ μεταβάλλοντι, παρὰ φύσιν· ὡς μὲν γὰρ ὅλῳ, παρὰ φύσιν- <ὅλον γὰρ ἕκαστον κατὰ τὸν ἐν αὐτῷ λόγον> -, ὡς δὲ τοῦ ὅλου μέρει, κατὰ φύσιν· τούτῳ γὰρ καὶ γέ- γονεν ἐξ ἄλλου φθαρέντος καὶ φθείρεται πάλιν εἰς ἄλλου γένεσιν. 61 Οὐκ ἄρα τὸ ἐν σώμασι κακὸν ἀμιγῶς ὑπάρχει κακόν, ἀλλ' ὡδὶ μὲν κακὸν καὶ καθ' ὅσον οὐκ ἐκεῖθεν, ὡδὶ δὲ ἀγαθὸν καὶ καθ' ὅσον ἐκ προ- νοίας φυσικῆς. ὅλως δέ, οἷς καὶ ἡ γένεσις διὰ τὸ ἀγαθόν, πῶς ἄν τις φαίη ταῦτα πάντῃ ἀγαθοῦ παρῃρῆσθαι καὶ τῆς τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ φύσεως ἄμοιρα μένειν; οὐδὲ γὰρ εἶναι τὸ κακὸν ἐστὶ δυνατὸν μὴ τοὐναντίον φανταζόμενον ὡς ἀγαθόν, ὅτι τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ ἕνεκα πάντα, καὶ αὐτὸ τὸ κακόν. ἀλλὰ πάντα τε ἕνεκα τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ, καὶ τὸ θεῖον ἀναίτιον τῶν κακῶν· οὐδαμοῦ γὰρ τὸ κακὸν ᾗ κακὸν ἐκεῖθεν, ἀλλ' ἐξ ἄλλων αἰτίων καὶ οἷς τὸ γεννᾶν οὐ κατὰ δύναμιν, ἀλλὰ δι' ἀσθένειαν ὑπάρχειν εἴρηται. διό μοι δοκεῖ καὶ ὁ Πλάτων περὶ τὸν πάντων βασιλέα τὰ πάντα θέμενος καὶ ἐκείνου ἕνεκα πάντα [ep. II 312e 1-2], καὶ ὅσα μὴ ἀγαθά, φανταζόμενα γὰρ ὡς ἀγαθὰ καὶ ταῦτα τῶν ὄντων ἐστίν. <ὁμοίως> καλῶν ἁπάντων αἴτιον ἐκεῖνο [Pl. ib. 312e 2-3] προσειπεῖν καὶ οὐχ ἅπαξ πάντων· οὐδὲ γὰρ τῶν κακῶν· ἀλλὰ καὶ τούτων ἀναίτιον καὶ παντὸς τοῦ ὄντος αἴτιον· καὶ γὰρ καὶ τούτων ὡς ὄντων καὶ ᾗ ἀγαθόν ἐστιν ἕκαστον. εἰ δὲ ταῦτα ὀρθῶς φαμέν, καὶ πάντα ἂν ἐκ προνοίας εἴη, καὶ τὸ κακὸν ἔχει χώραν ἐν τοῖς οὖσιν. ὥστε καὶ ποιοῦσιν οἱ θεοὶ τὸ κακόν, ἀλλ' ὡς ἀγαθόν, καὶ γινώσκουσιν ὡς πάντων ἑνιαίαν ἔχοντες τὴν γνῶσιν, ἀμερίστως μὲν τῶν μεριστῶν, ἀγαθοειδῶς δὲ τῶν κακῶν, ἑνιαίως δὲ τοῦ πλήθους. ἄλλη γὰρ τῆς ψυχῆς γνῶσις καὶ ἄλλη τῆς νοερᾶς <φύσεωσ>, ἄλλη <αὐτῶν> τῶν θεῶν· ---αὐτῷ τῷ ἑνὶ τὰ πάντα καὶ γινώσκουσα καὶ παράγουσα.