Chapter XII.—Impossibility of Acknowledging God Without This External Evidence141 Of His Existence. Marcion’s Rejection of Such Evidence for His God Savours of Impudence and Malignity.

But even if we were able to allow that he exists, we should yet be bound to argue that he is without a cause.142 For he who had nothing (to show for himself as proof of his existence), would be without a cause, since (such) proof143 is the whole cause that there exists some person to whom the proof belongs. Now, in as far as nothing ought to be without a cause, that is, without a proof (because if it be without a cause, it is all one as if it be not, not having the very proof which is the cause of a thing), in so far shall I more worthily believe that God does not exist, than that He exists without a cause. For he is without a cause who has not a cause by reason of not having a proof. God, however, ought not to be without a cause, that is to say, without a proof. Thus, as often as I show that He exists without a cause, although (I allow144 that) He exists, I do really determine this, that He does not exist; because, if He had existed, He could not have existed altogether without a cause.145 So, too, even in regard to faith itself, I say that he146 seeks to obtain it147 without cause from man, who is otherwise accustomed to believe in God from the idea he gets of Him from the testimony of His works:148 (without cause, I repeat,) because he has provided no such proof as that whereby man has acquired the knowledge of God. For although most persons believe in Him, they do not believe at once by unaided reason,149 without having some token of Deity in works worthy of God. And so upon this ground of inactivity and lack of works he150 is guilty both of impudence and malignity:  of impudence, in aspiring after a belief which is not due to him, and for which he has provided no foundation;151 of malignity, in having brought many persons under the charge of unbelief by furnishing to them no groundwork for their faith.

CAPUT XII.

Caeterum, etsi esse eum possemus confiteri, sine caussa esse eum deberemus argumentari. Sine caussa enim esset, qui rem non haberet; quia res omnis caussa est, ut sit aliquis cujus res sit. Porro, in quantum nihil oportet esse sine caussa, id est sine re: quia 0259C si sine caussa sit, perinde est atque si non sit, non habens rei caussam, rem ipsam ; in tantum Deum dignius credam non esse, quam esse sine caussa. Sine caussa enim est, qui rem non habendo, non habet caussam. Deus autem sine caussa, id est sine re, esse non debet. Ita, quoties ostendo eum sine caussa esse, tamquam sit, hoc constituo non esse illum, quia, si fuisset, omnino sine caussa non fuisset. Sic et ipsam fidem dico illum sine caussa ab homine captare, aliter solito Deum credere ex operum auctoritate formatum , quia nihil tale prospexit, per quod homo Deum didicit. Nam, etsi credunt plerique in illum, 0260A non statim ratione credunt, non habentes Dei pignus, opera ejus, Deo digna. Itaque, hoc nomine cessationis et defectionis operum, et impudentiae et malignitatis adfinis est: impudentiae , qua fidem non debitam sibi captat, cui praestruendae nihil prospexit; malignitatis, qua plures incredulitatis reos fecit, nihil fidei procurando.