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likeness. But to demonstrate the impiety and foolishness of such a supposition I will postpone for a little while, and now I will try to direct my discourse in order according to what is written word for word, as many points as may be at hand that are liable to censure. For he says that it is not possible for a perfect God to be with a perfect man. Meanwhile, here, which of the two mentioned he called imperfect, he has left ambiguous, and because of the obscurity of the meaning the mind looks equally toward each, and it is not possible from what we have heard to be taught concerning which one he thinks the imperfection is, concerning God or man, or whether he thinks it is equal for both. He says that he is God in spirit, having the glory of God, but man in body, wearing the inglorious form of men. He said God, and he said man; but it is clear to all that the meaning of these names is not the same, but the account which explains divinity is one thing, and that which explains humanity is another. For God is that which is always the same, the cause of all good things, neither at any time not existing nor not going to exist; but man in other respects is related to the nature of irrational creatures, being managed similarly to them through flesh and sense, but being separated from irrational creatures by the addition of the mind, in this he has the particularity of his nature. For no one defining man would define him from flesh and bones and senses, nor would anyone by mentioning the power of eating and changing indicate the particularity of human nature, but the intellectual and rational showed the man. It is therefore the same thing either to interpret the nature through the name or through that 3,1.164 which particularly accompanies the nature. For he who said "man" indicated the rational, and he who named "the rational" demonstrated man by this word.

Therefore Apollinarius also, having named God and man, if he included in this word the meanings inherent in divinity, would not have mutilated the meaning of man through his interpretation. But if he is called man, the title is certainly true and not a false name; and the truth of the name is shown in the one so named being a rational animal, and reason comes certainly from the intellect; so that if he is a man, he is also of necessity intellectual; but if he is not intellectual, he is not a man. But he was a man in body, he says, wearing the inglorious form of men. These things he puts forward from his own resources and not from the teaching of scripture; however, so that the matter of his concern might be turned against him from the very things he says, let us consider the argument thus. The inglorious form of men, he says, he wore. What is the glory of man, we will first consider, and thus from what follows we will understand the ingloriousness. Therefore the glory of man, the true glory, is certainly a life according to virtue. For to define the glory or ingloriousness of men by some fairness of complexion or beauty of flesh, or conversely by deformity of body, would be characteristic of the effeminate. If therefore virtue is acknowledged as glorious among men, vice is certainly the inglorious. But indeed Apollinarius says that God assumed the inglorious form of men. If therefore the inglorious is in vice, and vice is a disgrace of the will, and the intellect wills, and the intellect is a movement of the mind, then seeing human ingloriousness in relation to God he does not separate the man, through whom God conversed with human life, from the intellect. And this is consistent 3,1.165 with the divine scriptures, that for our sake he became sin, that is, to unite to himself the sinful soul of man. The Lord, he says, having appeared in the form of a servant; was this servant, whose form the Lord put on, complete or mutilated? For what is deficient and maimed in the constitution of the animal one might reasonably call a mutilation.

Not a man, he says, but as a man, because he is not consubstantial with man in the most essential respect; if not consubstantial, then certainly of a different substance; and of those things of which the account of the substance is

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ὁμοιότητα. ἀλλὰ τὴν μὲν ἀσέβειάν τε καὶ τὴν ἄνοιαν τῆς τοιαύτης ὑπολήψεως ἐπιδεῖξαι μικρὸν ὑπερθήσομαι, νυνὶ δὲ καθεξῆς τοῖς γεγραμμένοις κατὰ λέξιν διευθῦναι τὸν λόγον πειράσομαι, ὅσαπερ ἂν ὑπαίτια κατὰ τὸ πρόχειρον ᾖ. φησὶ γὰρ μὴ εἶναι θεὸν τέλειον μετὰ ἀνθρώπου τελείου. τέως ἐνταῦθα πότερον ἀτελῆ τῶν εἰρημένων ὠνόμασεν, ἀφῆκεν ἀμφίβολον καὶ τῷ ἀδήλῳ τοῦ σημαινομένου πρὸς ἑκάτερον ἐπίσης ἡ διάνοια βλέπει καὶ οὐκ ἔστιν ἐξ ὧν ἠκούσαμεν περὶ τίνα νομίζει τὸ ἀτελὲς διδαχθῆναι, περὶ τὸν θεὸν ἢ τὸν ἄνθρωπον ἢ καὶ περὶ ἀμφοτέρων τὸ ἴσον οἴεται. αὐτὸν εἶναι φησὶ θεὸν μὲν πνεύματι τὴν τοῦ θεοῦ δόξαν ἔχοντα, ἄνθρωπον δὲ σώματι τὴν τῶν ἀνθρώπων ἄδοξον φορέσαντα μορφήν. εἶπε θεόν, εἶπε καὶ ἄνθρωπον· φανερὸν δὲ πᾶσιν, ὅτι οὐ ταὐτὸν τῶν ὀνομάτων τούτων τὸ σημαινόμενον, ἀλλ' ἴδιος μὲν ὁ τῆς θεότητος, ἕτερος δὲ ὁ τῆς ἀνθρωπότητος ἑρμηνευτικός ἐστι λόγος. θεὸς μὲν γάρ ἐστι τὸ ἀεὶ ὡσαύτως ἔχον πάντων ἀγαθῶν αἴτιον, οὔτε ποτὲ μὴ ὂν οὔτε μὴ ἐσόμενον· ἄνθρωπος δὲ τὰ μὲν ἄλλα συγγενῶς πρὸς τὴν τῶν ἀλόγων φύσιν διάκειται καὶ διὰ σαρκὸς καὶ αἰσθήσεως παραπλησίως αὐτοῖς διοικού μενος, τῇ δὲ τοῦ νοῦ προσθήκῃ τῶν ἀλόγων κεχωρισμένος ἐν τούτῳ τὸ ἰδιάζον ἔχει τῆς φύσεως. οὐ γὰρ ἄν τις ἄνθρωπον ὁριζόμενος ἀπὸ σαρκῶν τε καὶ ὀστέων καὶ αἰσθητηρίων ὁρίσαιτο οὐδὲ τὴν βρωτικήν τε καὶ ἀλλοιωτικὴν δύναμιν εἰπών τις τὸ ἴδιον τῆς ἀνθρωπίνης ἐνεδείξατο φύσεως, ἀλλὰ τὸ διανοητικὸν καὶ λογικὸν τὸν ἄνθρωπον ἔδειξεν. ἴσον οὖν ἐστιν ἢ διὰ τοῦ ὀνόματος ἐρμηνεῦσαι τὴν φύσιν ἢ διὰ τοῦ 3,1.164 ἰδίως παρεπομένου τῇ φύσει. ὅ τε γὰρ ἄνθρωπον εἰπὼν τὸ λογικὸν ἐνεδείξατο ὅ τε λογικὸν ὀνομάσας τὸν ἄνθρωπον διὰ τῆς φωνῆς ταύτης ἀπέδειξεν.

Οὐκοῦν καὶ ὁ Ἀπολινάριος θεὸν καὶ ἄνθρωπον ὀνομάσας, εἴπερ τὰς ἐμφαινομένας τῇ θεότητι σημασίας τῇ φωνῇ ταύτῃ συμπεριέλαβεν, οὐδ' ἂν τοῦ ἀνθρώπου τὸ σημαινόμενον διὰ τῆς ἑρμηνείας λωβήσαιτο. ἀλλ' εἴπερ ἄνθρωπος λέγεται, ἔστι πάντως ἡ κλῆσις ἀληθὴς καὶ οὐ ψευδώνυμος· τὸ δὲ ἀληθὲς τοῦ ὀνόματος ἐν τῷ λογικὸν εἶναι ζῷον τὸν οὕτω κατονομαζόμενον ἐπι δείκνυται, ὁ δὲ λόγος ἐκ διανοίας πάντως· ὥστε εἰ ἄν θρωπος, καὶ διανοητικὸς ἐξ ἀνάγκης· εἰ δὲ οὐ διανοητικός, οὐδὲ ἄνθρωπος. Ἀλλ' ἄνθρωπος ἦν τῷ σώματι, φησί, τὴν τῶν ἀνθρώπων ἄδοξον φορέσας μορφήν. ταῦτα μὲν οἴκοθεν καὶ οὐκ ἐκ τῆς γραφικῆς ἡμῖν διδασκαλίας προβάλ λεται· πλὴν ὡς ἂν καὶ ἀπ' αὐτῶν ὧν λέγει πρὸς τοὐναντίον αὐτῷ περιτραπείη τὸ σπουδαζόμενον, οὑτωσὶ τὸν λόγον κατανοήσωμεν. τὴν ἄδοξον, φησίν, ἐφόρεσε τῶν ἀνθρώπων μορ φήν. τίς δόξα ἀνθρώπου, πρῶτον ἐπισκεψόμεθα καὶ οὕτως ἐκ τοῦ ἀκολούθου τὴν ἀδοξίαν νοήσομεν. οὐκοῦν δόξα ἀνθρώπου ἥ γε ἀληθὴς δόξα ἡ κατὰ ἀρετήν ἐστι πάντως ζωή. τὸ γὰρ εὐχροίᾳ τινὶ ἢ ὥρᾳ σαρκὸς ἢ τὸ ἔμπαλιν ἀμορφίᾳ σώματος τὴν δόξαν τῶν ἀνθρώπων ἢ τὴν ἀδοξίαν ὁρίζεσθαι τῶν διατεθρυμμένων ἂν εἴη. εἰ οὖν ἡ ἀρετὴ τὸ ἔνδοξον ἐπ' ἀνθρώπων ὁμολογεῖται, ἡ κακία πάντως τὸ ἄδοξον. ἀλλὰ μὴν φησὶ τὸν θεὸν ὁ Ἀπολι νάριος τὴν ἄδοξον τῶν ἀνθρώπων ὑπεληλυθέναι μορφήν. εἰ οὖν ἐν κακίᾳ τὸ ἄδοξον, κακία δὲ προαιρέσεως αἶσχός ἐστι, προαιρεῖται δὲ ἡ διάνοια, διάνοια δὲ νοῦ τι κίνημα, ἄρα τὴν ἀνθρωπίνην ἀδοξίαν περὶ τὸν θεὸν βλέπων οὐκ ἀποσχίζει τῆς διανοίας τὸν ἄνθρωπον, δι' οὗ ὁ θεὸς τῇ ἀν θρωπίνῃ ζωῇ καθωμίλησεν. καὶ συμβαίνει γε τοῦτο ταῖς 3,1.165 θείαις γραφαῖς, τὸ δι' ἡμᾶς αὐτὸν ἁμαρτίαν γενέσθαι, τουτέστι τὴν ἁμαρτικὴν τοῦ ἀνθρώπου ψυχὴν πρὸς ἑαυτὸν ἑνῶσαι. Κύριον, φησίν, ἐν δουλικῷ φανέντα σχή ματι· ἆρα ὁ δοῦλος οὗτος, οὗ τὸ σχῆμα ὑπέδυ ὁ κύριος, ἄρτιος ἦν ἢ λελώβητο; τὸ γὰρ ἐλλιπές τε καὶ ἠκρωτηριασ μένον κατὰ τὴν τοῦ ζῴου συμπλήρωσιν λώβην ἄν τις εἰκότως προσαγορεύσειεν.

Οὐκ ἄνθρωπος, φησίν, ἀλλ' ὡς ἄνθρωπος, διότι οὐχ ὁμοούσιος τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ κατὰ τὸ κυριώτατον· εἰ μὴ ὁμοούσιος, ἑτεροούσιος πάντως· ὧν δὲ ὁ λόγος τῆς οὐσίας