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incorruption, and if there is any lofty concept and name, to say that it has changed to its opposite. If, then, God is true virtue, and some nature is not opposed to virtue, but vice is, and God is not in vice, but comes to be in human nature, and only the passion associated with vice is unseemly and shameful, in which God has neither been, nor is it in his nature to be, why are they ashamed of the confession that God took on human nature, since no opposition to the principle of virtue is seen in the constitution of man? For neither the rational, nor the intellectual, nor that which is receptive of knowledge, nor anything else of that kind which is proper to human substance, is opposed to the principle of virtue.

16 But, he says, this very change of our body is a passion. and he who has come to be in this comes to be in passion; but the divine is impassible. Therefore, the conception of God is foreign, if indeed they determine that he who is impassible by nature has come into communion with passion. But against these things we will again use the same argument, that "passion" is spoken of in one sense properly, and in another by an extension of meaning. Now, that which pertains to choice and turns from virtue toward vice is truly a passion, but whatever is observed in nature proceeding exhaustively according to its own course, this would more properly be called a work rather than a passion, such as birth, growth, the persistence of the subject through the inflow and outflow of nourishment, the concourse of elements around the body, and the dissolution again of what was composed and its return to its kindred elements. Of what, then, does our mystery say the divine has partaken? Of the passion properly so called, which is vice, or of the movement according to nature? For if the account maintained that the divine came to be among forbidden things, one ought to flee the absurdity of the doctrine, as it explains nothing sound about the divine nature; but if it says that he took on our nature, whose first generation and subsistence had its origin from him, where does the proclamation err from the conception befitting God, since no passible disposition enters into the conceptions about God through faith? For we do not say that a physician is in a state of passion when he is treating one who is in a state of passion; but even if he touches the disease, the healer remains outside the passion. If generation itself, in itself, is not a passion, nor would one call life a passion, but the passion for pleasure precedes human generation, and the impulse of living beings toward vice, this is the sickness of our nature; but indeed the mystery says that he is pure of both; if, then, his generation was alien to pleasure, and his life to vice, what passion remains in which the mystery of piety says that God has partaken? But if one should call the separation of the body and the soul a passion, much more rightly would he thus name the union of both. For if the separation of things joined is a passion, the joining of things separated would also be a passion; for there is a certain motion both in the combination of things separated and in the separation of things intertwined or united. Therefore, whatever the last motion is called, it is fitting that the preceding one be called this too. But if the first motion, which we call generation, is not a passion, neither then would the second motion, which we call death, consistently be called a passion, by which the union of the body and the soul is separated. And we say that God has been in each motion of our nature, by which the soul runs together with the body, and the body is separated from the soul; and having been mingled with each of these, I mean, with both the sensible and the intelligible of the human composite, he ordained this through that ineffable and inexpressible co-mingling, that the union of those things once united, I mean soul and body, should remain forever. For when our nature, following its own sequence, was moved even in him toward the separation of the body and the soul, he again joined together the separated parts, as if with a kind of glue, by the

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ἀφθαρσίαν, καὶ εἴ τι ὑψηλόν ἐστι νόημά τε καὶ ὄνομα, πρὸς τὸ ἐναντίον μεταπεπτωκέναι λέγειν. εἰ οὖν θεὸς μὲν ἡ ἀληθὴς ἀρετή, φύσις δέ τις οὐκ ἀντιδιαιρεῖται τῇ ἀρετῇ, ἀλλὰ κακία, θεὸς δὲ οὐκ ἐν κακίᾳ, ἀλλ' ἐν ἀνθρώπου γίνεται φύσει, μόνον δὲ ἀπρεπὲς καὶ αἰσχρὸν τὸ κατὰ κακίαν πάθος, ἐν ᾧ οὔτε γέγονεν θεός, οὔτε γενέσθαι φύσιν ἔχει, τί ἐπαισχύνονται τῇ ὁμολογίᾳ τοῦ θεὸν ἀνθρωπίνης ἅψασθαι φύσεως, οὐδεμιᾶς ἐναντιότητος ὡς πρὸς τὸν τῆς ἀρετῆς λόγον ἐν τῇ κατασκευῇ τοῦ ἀνθρώπου θεωρουμένης; οὔτε γὰρ τὸ λογικόν, οὔτε τὸ διανοητικόν, οὔτε τὸ ἐπιστήμης δεκτικόν, οὔτε ἄλλο τι τοιοῦτον, ὃ τῆς ἀνθρωπίνης ἴδιον οὐσίας ἐστί, τῷ λόγῳ τῆς ἀρετῆς ἠναντίωται.

16 Ἀλλ' αὐτή, φησίν, ἡ τροπὴ τοῦ ἡμετέρου σώματος πάθος ἐστίν. ὁ δὲ ἐν τούτῳ γεγονὼς ἐν πάθει γίνεται· ἀπαθὲς δὲ τὸ θεῖον. οὐκοῦν ἀλλοτρία περὶ θεοῦ ἡ ὑπό ληψις, εἴπερ τὸν ἀπαθῆ κατὰ τὴν φύσιν πρὸς κοινωνίαν πάθους ἐλθεῖν διορίζονται. ἀλλὰ καὶ πρὸς ταῦτα πάλιν τῷ αὐτῷ λόγῳ χρησόμεθα, ὅτι τὸ πάθος τὸ μὲν κυρίως, τὸ δὲ ἐκ καταχρήσεως λέγεται. τὸ μὲν οὖν προαιρέσεως ἁπτόμενον καὶ πρὸς κακίαν ἀπὸ τῆς ἀρετῆς μεταστρέφον ἀληθῶς πάθος ἐστί, τὸ δ' ὅσον ἐν τῇ φύσει κατὰ τὸν ἴδιον εἱρμὸν πορευομένῃ διεξοδικῶς θεωρεῖται, τοῦτο κυριώτερον ἔργον ἂν μᾶλλον ἢ πάθος προσαγορεύοιτο, οἷον ἡ γέννησις, ἡ αὔξησις, ἡ διὰ τοῦ ἐπιρρύτου τε καὶ ἀπορρύτου τῆς τροφῆς τοῦ ὑποκειμένου διαμονή, ἡ τῶν στοιχείων περὶ τὸ σῶμα συνδρομή, ἡ τοῦ συντεθέντος πάλιν διάλυσίς τε καὶ πρὸς τὰ συγγενῆ μεταχώρησις. τίνος οὖν λέγει τὸ μυσ τήριον ἡμῶν ἧφθαι τὸ θεῖον; τοῦ κυρίως λεγομένου πάθους, ὅπερ κακία ἐστίν, ἢ τοῦ κατὰ τὴν φύσιν κινήματος; εἰ μὲν γὰρ ἐν τοῖς ἀπηγορευμένοις γεγενῆσθαι τὸ θεῖον ὁ λόγος διισχυρίζετο, φεύγειν ἔδει τὴν ἀτοπίαν τοῦ δόγματος, ὡς οὐδὲν ὑγιὲς περὶ τῆς θείας φύσεως διεξιόντος· εἰ δὲ τῆς φύσεως ἡμῶν αὐτὸν ἐφῆφθαι λέγει, ἧς καὶ ἡ πρώτη γένεσίς τε καὶ ὑπόστασις παρ' αὐτοῦ τὴν ἀρχὴν ἔσχε, ποῦ τῆς θεῷ πρεπούσης ἐννοίας διαμαρτάνει τὸ κήρυγμα, μηδεμιᾶς πα θητικῆς διαθέσεως ἐν ταῖς περὶ θεοῦ ὑπολήψεσι τῇ πίστει συνεισιούσης; οὐδὲ γὰρ τὸν ἰατρὸν ἐν πάθει γίνεσθαι λέγομεν, ὅταν θεραπεύῃ τὸν ἐν πάθει γινόμενον· ἀλλὰ κἂν προσάψηται τοῦ ἀρρωστήματος, ἔξω πάθους ὁ θεραπευτὴς διαμένει. εἰ ἡ γένεσις αὐτὴ καθ' ἑαυτὴν πάθος οὐκ ἔστιν, οὐδ' ἂν τὴν ζωήν τις πάθος προσαγορεύσειεν, ἀλλὰ τὸ καθ' ἡδονὴν πάθος τῆς ἀνθρωπίνης καθηγεῖται γενέσεως, καὶ ἡ πρὸς κακίαν τῶν ζώντων ὁρμή, τοῦτο τῆς φύσεως ἡμῶν ἐστὶν ἀρρώστημα· ἀλλὰ μὴν ἀμφοτέρων αὐτὸν καθαρεύειν φησὶ τὸ μυστήριον· εἰ οὖν ἡδονῆς μὲν ἡ γένεσις ἠλλοτρίωται, κακίας δὲ ἡ ζωή, ποῖον ὑπολεί πεται πάθος, οὗ τὸν θεὸν κεκοινωνηκέναι φησὶ τὸ τῆς εὐσεβείας μυστήριον; εἰ δὲ τὴν τοῦ σώματος καὶ τῆς ψυχῆς διάζευξιν πάθος προσαγορεύοι, πολὺ πρότερον δι καῖος ἂν εἴη τὴν συνδρομὴν ἀμφοτέρων οὕτω κατονομάσαι. εἰ γὰρ ὁ χωρισμὸς τῶν συνημμένων πάθος ἐστί, καὶ ἡ συνάφεια τῶν διεστώτων πάθος ἂν εἴη· κίνησις γάρ τίς ἐστιν ἔν τε τῇ συγκρίσει τῶν διεστώτων καὶ ἐν τῇ δια κρίσει τῶν συμπεπλεγμένων ἢ ἡνωμένων. ὅπερ τοίνυν ἡ τελευταία κίνησις ὀνομάζεται, τοῦτο προσήκει καλεῖσθαι καὶ τὴν προάγουσαν. εἰ δὲ ἡ πρώτη κίνησις, ἣν γένεσιν ὀνομάζομεν, πάθος οὐκ ἔστιν, οὐδ' ἂν ἡ δευτέρα κίνησις, ἣν θάνατον ὀνομάζομεν, πάθος ἂν κατὰ τὸ ἀκόλουθον λέγοιτο, καθ' ἣν ἡ συνδρομὴ τοῦ σώματος καὶ τῆς ψυχῆς δια κρίνεται. τὸν δὲ θεόν φαμεν ἐν ἑκατέρᾳ γεγενῆσθαι τῇ τῆς φύσεως ἡμῶν κινήσει, δι' ἧς ἥ τε ψυχὴ πρὸς τὸ σῶμα συντρέχει, τό τε σῶμα τῆς ψυχῆς διακρίνεται· κατα μιχθέντα δὲ πρὸς ἑκάτερον τούτων, πρός τε τὸ αἰσθητόν φημι καὶ τὸ νοερὸν τοῦ ἀνθρωπίνου συγκρίματος, διὰ τῆς ἀρρήτου ἐκείνης καὶ ἀνεκφράστου συνανακράσεως τοῦτο οἰκονομήσασθαι, τὸ τῶν ἅπαξ ἑνωθέντων, ψυχῆς λέγω καὶ σώματος, καὶ εἰς ἀεὶ διαμεῖναι τὴν ἕνωσιν. τῆς γὰρ φύσεως ἡμῶν διὰ τῆς ἰδίας ἀκολουθίας καὶ ἐν ἐκείνῳ πρὸς διά κρισιν τοῦ σώματος καὶ τῆς ψυχῆς κινηθείσης, πάλιν συνῆψε τὰ διακριθέντα, καθάπερ τινὶ κόλλῃ, τῇ