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is enhypostatic but heterohypostatic, but sometimes it also signifies the hypostasis in itself, that is, the individual, which is properly not enhypostatic but is and is called a hypostasis. But properly enhypostatic is that which does not subsist by itself but is contemplated in the hypostases, just as the form, that is, the nature of men, is not contemplated in its own hypostasis but in Peter and Paul and the other hypostases of men, or that which is composed with another different in substance for the generation of some whole, and completes one composite hypostasis, for example, man is composed of soul and body; neither the soul alone is called a hypostasis nor the body, but enhypostatic things, but that which is completed from both is the hypostasis of both. For a hypostasis is properly and is called that which subsists by itself with its own proper constitution. Again, that is called enhypostatic which is a nature assumed by another hypostasis and has its existence in it. Whence also the flesh of the Lord, not having subsisted by itself, not even for a moment of time, is not a hypostasis but rather is enhypostatic; for in the hypostasis of God the Word it subsisted, having been assumed by it, and it had and has this as its hypostasis. 29 Concerning the anhypostatic. And the anhypostatic is spoken of in two ways; for sometimes it signifies that which in no way is, that is, the non-existent, and sometimes that which does not have being in itself but has existence in another, that is, the accidental. 30 Division of being and of substance. Being is divided into substance and accident, not as a genus into species, but as a homonymous term or as things from one and to one. Substance is a most general genus; this is divided into body and incorporeal, the body into animate and inanimate, the animate into sensitive and insensitive (animal, zoophyte and plant), the animal into rational and irrational, the rational into mortal and immortal, the mortal into man, ox and such things, man into Peter, Paul and the other particular men, who are individuals and hypostases and persons. 31 Concerning what is proper to substance. What, then, substance and nature and form are, has been stated, and what hypostasis and individual and person, enhypostatic and anhypostatic, and what is the difference between substance and accidents, and how substance is more proper than accidents, as the accidents have their existence in it. It has also been stated concerning its division, and how substance differs from substantial differences, because through them substance, being formed into a species, completes such a species and becomes such things. It has also been stated what nature is and what form and hypostasis and person and individual, and how those outside thought concerning these things, and how the holy fathers, the disciples and teachers of the truth and of true philosophy, rightly divided. Come now, let us speak of the properties of substance. It is proper to substance not to be in a subject; for it is rather the subject for the accident to be in, and does not itself have its existence in another. This is also a property of the substantial differences; for that which is in a subject neither preserves when present nor destroys when absent; wherefore it is not included in the definition, for it is entirely an accident. But substantial differences are not accidents and when present they preserve and when absent they destroy; wherefore they are also included in the definition. It is also proper to be predicated synonymously, that is, to impart both the name and the definition; and to have no contrary, for to a stone, that is, to the very substance of the stone, there is nothing contrary; and not to admit of more and less; this is also a property of the substantial differences, for neither is man more a substance or an animal than a horse, nor is a horse more than a man; and to

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ἐνυπόστατόν ἐστιν ἀλλ' ἑτεροϋπόστατον, ποτὲ δὲ καὶ τὴν καθ' αὑτὸ ὑπόστασιν ἤγουν τὸ ἄτομον δηλοῖ, ὅπερ κυρίως οὐκ ἐνυπόστατον ἀλλ' ὑπόστασίς ἐστί τε καὶ λέγεται. Κυρίως δὲ ἐνυπόστατόν ἐστιν ἢ τὸ καθ' ἑαυτὸ μὲν μὴ ὑφιστάμενον ἀλλ' ἐν ταῖς ὑποστάσεσι θεωρούμενον, ὥσπερ τὸ εἶδος ἤγουν ἡ φύσις τῶν ἀνθρώπων ἐν ἰδίᾳ ὑποστάσει οὐ θεωρεῖται ἀλλ' ἐν Πέτρῳ καὶ Παύλῳ καὶ ταῖς λοιπαῖς τῶν ἀνθρώπων ὑποστάσεσιν, ἢ τὸ σὺν ἄλλῳ διαφόρῳ κατὰ τὴν οὐσίαν εἰς ὅλου τινὸς γένεσιν συντιθέμενον καὶ μίαν ἀποτελοῦν ὑπόστασιν σύνθετον, οἷον ὁ ἄνθρωπος ἐκ ψυχῆς ἐστι καὶ σώματος συντεθειμένος· οὔτε ἡ ψυχὴ μόνη λέγεται ὑπόστασις οὔτε τὸ σῶμα ἀλλ' ἐνυπόστατα, τὸ δὲ ἐξ ἀμφοτέρων ἀποτελούμενον ὑπόστασις ἀμφοτέρων. Ὑπόστασις γὰρ κυρίως τὸ καθ' ἑαυτὸ ἰδιοσυστάτως ὑφιστάμενόν ἐστί τε καὶ λέγεται. Λέγεται πάλιν ἐνυπόστατον ἡ ὑφ' ἑτέρας ὑποστάσεως προσληφθεῖσα φύσις καὶ ἐν αὐτῇ ἐσχηκυῖα τὴν ὕπαρξιν. Ὅθεν καὶ ἡ σὰρξ τοῦ κυρίου μὴ ὑποστᾶσα καθ' ἑαυτὴν μηδὲ πρὸς καιροῦ ῥοπὴν οὐχ ὑπόστασις ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον ἐνυπόστατόν ἐστιν· ἐν γὰρ τῇ ὑποστάσει τοῦ θεοῦ λόγου ὑπέστη προσληφθεῖσα ὑπ' αὐτῆς καὶ ταύτην καὶ ἔσχε καὶ ἔχει ὑπόστασιν. 29 Περὶ ἀνυποστάτου. Καὶ τὸ ἀνυπόστατον δὲ δισσῶς λέγεται· ποτὲ μὲν γὰρ τὸ μηδαμῇ μηδαμῶς ὂν σημαίνει ἤγουν τὸ ἀνύπαρκτον, ποτὲ δὲ τὸ μὴ ἐν ἑαυτῷ ἔχον τὸ εἶναι ἀλλ' ἐν ἑτέρῳ ἔχον τὴν ὕπαρξιν ἤγουν τὸ συμβεβηκός. 30 ∆ιαίρεσις τοῦ ὄντος καὶ τῆς οὐσίας. Τὸ ὂν διαιρεῖται εἰς οὐσίαν καὶ συμβεβηκός, οὐχ ὡς γένος εἰς εἴδη ἀλλ' ὡς ὁμώνυμος φωνὴ ἢ ὡς τὰ ἀφ' ἑνὸς καὶ πρὸς ἕν. Ἡ οὐσία γενικώτατον γένος ἐστίν· αὕτη διαιρεῖται εἰς σῶμα καὶ ἀσώματον, τὸ σῶμα εἰς ἔμψυχον καὶ ἄψυχον, τὸ ἔμψυχον εἰς αἰσθητικὸν καὶ ἀναίσθητον (ζῷον, ζωόφυτον καὶ φυτόν), τὸ ζῷον εἰς λογικὸν καὶ ἄλογον, τὸ λογικὸν εἰς θνητὸν καὶ ἀθάνατον, τὸ θνητὸν εἰς ἄνθρωπον, βοῦν καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα, ὁ ἄνθρωπος εἰς Πέτρον, Παῦλον καὶ τοὺς λοιποὺς κατὰ μέρος ἀνθρώπους, οἵτινές εἰσιν ἄτομα καὶ ὑποστάσεις καὶ πρόσωπα. 31 Περὶ τοῦ τί ὑπάρχει ἴδιον τῆς οὐσίας. Τί μὲν οὖν ἐστιν οὐσία καὶ φύσις καὶ μορφή, εἴρηται καὶ τί ὑπόστασις καὶ ἄτομον καὶ πρόσωπον ἐνυπόστατόν τε καὶ ἀνυπόστατον καὶ τίς ἡ διαφορὰ οὐσίας καὶ συμβεβηκότων, καὶ ὡς κυριωτέρα ἐστὶν ἡ οὐσία τῶν συμβεβηκότων ὡς ἐν αὐτῇ ἐχόντων τῶν συμβεβηκότων τὴν ὕπαρξιν. Εἴρηται δὲ καὶ περὶ τῆς διαιρέσεως αὐτῆς καὶ τί διαφέρει οὐσία τῶν οὐσιωδῶν διαφορῶν, ὅτι δι' αὐτῶν ἡ οὐσία εἰδοποιουμένη τοῖον εἶδος ἀποτελεῖ καὶ τοιάδε γίνεται. Εἴρηται δὲ καὶ τί φύσις καὶ τί μορφὴ καὶ ὑπόστασις καὶ πρόσωπον καὶ ἄτομον, πῶς τε οἱ ἔξω περὶ τούτων ἐδόξασαν, καὶ πῶς οἱ ἅγιοι πατέρες, οἱ τῆς ἀληθείας καὶ τῆς ὄντως φιλοσοφίας μαθηταὶ καὶ διδάσκαλοι, ὠρθοτόμησαν. Φέρε δὲ νῦν τὰ ἴδια τῆς οὐσίας εἴπωμεν. Ἴδιον τῆς οὐσίας τὸ μὴ ἐν ὑποκειμένῳ εἶναι· αὕτη γὰρ μᾶλλον ὑπόκειται τῷ συμβεβηκότι εἰς τὸ εἶναι καὶ οὐχὶ αὐτὴ ἐν ἑτέρῳ ἔχει τὴν ὕπαρξιν. Τοῦτο δὲ τὸ ἴδιον καὶ τῶν οὐσιωδῶν διαφορῶν ἐστι· τὸ γὰρ ἐν ὑποκειμένῳ οὔτε παρὸν σῴζει οὔτε ἀπὸν φθείρει· διὸ οὐδὲ ἐν τῷ ὁρισμῷ λαμβάνεται, καὶ συμβεβηκὸς γὰρ πάντως ἐστίν. Αἱ δὲ οὐσιώδεις διαφοραὶ οὔκ εἰσι συμβεβηκότα καὶ παρόντα σῴζουσι καὶ ἀπόντα φθείρουσι· διὸ καὶ ἐν τῷ ὁρισμῷ λαμβάνονται. Ἴδιον δὲ καὶ τὸ συνωνύμως κατηγορεῖσθαι ἤγουν μεταδιδόναι καὶ τοῦ ὀνόματος καὶ τοῦ ὁρισμοῦ· καὶ τὸ μὴ ἔχειν τι ἐναντίον, τῷ γὰρ λίθῳ ἤγουν αὐτῇ τῇ οὐσίᾳ τοῦ λίθου οὐδέν ἐστιν ἐναντίον· καὶ τὸ μὴ ἐπιδέχεσθαι τὸ μᾶλλον καὶ ἧττον· τοῦτο δὲ καὶ τῶν οὐσιωδῶν διαφορῶν ἐστιν ἴδιον, οὐδὲ γάρ ἐστιν ὁ ἄνθρωπος μᾶλλον τοῦ ἵππου οὐσία ἢ ζῷον οὐδὲ ὁ ἵππος μᾶλλον τοῦ ἀνθρώπου· καὶ τὸ