Elements of Theology

 as one subsisting, but according to participation not one, the one will be multiplied, just as the multiplicity is unified through the one. Therefore

 activity is better than that which is not self-sufficient but has the cause of its perfection dependent on another substance. For if all beings by nat

 it desires that also, how most of all the good? or if it does not desire, how does it not desire the cause of all things, having proceeded from it? Bu

 is itself, and the mover and the moved are one and the same. For either it moves in one part and is moved in another part, or as a whole it moves and

 beginning from a monad, it proceeds into a multitude coordinate with the monad, and the multitude of every order is led back to one monad. For the mon

 the one being divided. But if it is in one of all things, it will no longer be of all things, but of one. If, therefore, it is both common to those ab

 the thing produced is other than it. Therefore, that which begets is established as unchangeable and undiminished, multiplying itself through a genera

 from something and reverting has a cyclical activity. For if it reverts to that from which it proceeds, it joins the end to the beginning, and the mot

 procession. For since each occurs through likeness, that which has proceeded immediately from something has also reverted immediately to it (for the l

 has reverted to itself according to nature and is perfect in its reversion to itself, and would have its being from itself for that to which the reve

 the self-subsistent is set apart from things measured by time in respect to its substance. For if the self-subsistent is ungenerated, it would not be

 having received the power to produce from the cause which is superior to it, it has from that cause its being the cause of those things of which it is

 Thus the producer in relation to the produced, taken in relation to each other, but that which is able to do more has a greater and more universal pow

 a cause has pre-contained in itself the effect, being primarily what that is secondarily or in the thing produced the producer (for this too, partici

 suffers from the former) and when the second in turn acts, that also co-acts, because whatever the second does, the more causal also co-begets with i

 being, or needing it somehow in order to be, would be in this respect more imperfect than the effect. But that which is in the result is a co-cause ra

 passible, being in every way divisible, and in every way to infinity. But the incorporeal, being simple, is impassible for the indivisible can neithe

 undiminished it contains in itself. But surely infinity in respect to magnitude and in respect to multitude is a complete privation and a falling away

 set apart and if all things enter into it, yet it has something hidden and incomprehensible to secondary things and if it unfolds the powers within

 but nowhere for thus it would be divided and separate from itself, if indeed one part of it is everywhere and in all things, but the other part nowhe

 all things. For since each thing exists either according to cause or according to existence or according to participation, in the first the rest exist

 a turning back as if through similars, dissimilar <being>. For the one is similar as a particular to a particular, the other is kindred as being of th

 a hypostasis but no longer a henad, it would be assigned to another order on account of the alteration of its property. 115 Every god is supra-essenti

 supra-essential, being nothing other than the one for each is not one thing, and then good, but only good, just as it is not one thing, and then one,

 is and in beings has the power of apprehending truth (for it both grasps thoughts and has its subsistence in acts of intellection) but the gods are b

 having set the same before itself, is most self-sufficient and such is all that is divine. Therefore it needs neither other things, being goodness-it

 is more unified than beings. All divine genera, therefore, are bound together by their proper intermediaries, and the first do not proceed immediately

 of a henad working, with which it is connate. This, then, is that which in itself defines the being that partakes of it and shows essentially the supr

 to the gods so that, while they are present to all things in the same way, all things are not present to them in the same way, but as each is able, i

 For the one, having a most unitive power, sends itself through the entire union and unifies all from above, while remaining in itself. But the mean, s

 proceeds from the infinity of the divine power, multiplying itself and passing through all things, and pre-eminently demonstrating the unfailing in th

 presides over composites and of their order and of their division according to number, and is of the same series as the paternal in more partial produ

 they have intelligible [qualities]. In the same way, therefore, that those, by illuminating Being, are intelligible, so also these, by illuminating th

 and sees itself. But seeing that it is thinking and seeing, it knows that it is Intellect in actuality and knowing this, it knows that it thinks, and

 Therefore it has the causes of all things intellectually. So that every intellect is all things intellectually, both the things before it and the thin

 more akin, contracted in quantity, in power surpasses the things after it and conversely the things further from the one. Therefore, those that are h

 on the one hand, but being only intellectual, is participated by souls that are neither divine nor come to be in a state of change from intellect to u

 by its very being, if the participant is suitable, it immediately becomes ensouled and living, not by the soul reasoning and choosing, nor giving life

 and to the soul that substantiates the essential principles of all things in it for everything that produces by its being, which it is primarily, thi

 of the motions it will also have restorations for every period of the eternal things is restorative. 200 Every period of a soul is measured by time

 the relation to the secondary ones, which the divine has to the intellectual, and this to the psychical and the quantities of the lower ones are grea

 it admits of every kind of change, being moved together with their own ruling causes. But indeed that it is also indivisible, is clear. For everything

a cause has pre-contained in itself the effect, being primarily what that is secondarily; or in the thing produced the producer (for this too, participating in the producer, shows in itself secondarily what the producer is primarily); or each thing is contemplated according to its own order, and neither in the cause nor in the effect; for the one exists in a superior way than it is, the other in an inferior way than it is, but it must somewhere be also what it is; and each thing exists substantially in its own order. 66 All beings in relation to one another are either wholes or parts or the same or different. For either some contain the others, and the rest are contained; or they neither contain nor are contained, and they have either experienced something identical, as participating in one thing, or are distinguished from one another. But if they contain, they would be wholes; if they were contained, parts; if the many should participate in one thing, they are the same according to the one; but if they should be merely many, they are different from one another in this respect, inasmuch as they are many. 67 Every whole is either before the parts or from the parts or in the part. For either we contemplate the form of each thing in the cause, and we call that which has pre-existed in the cause a whole before the parts; or in the parts which participate in it. And this in two ways: for either in all the parts together, and this is a whole from the parts, of which any part whatsoever being absent diminishes the whole; or in each of the parts, as the part also through participation in the whole has become <a whole>, which also makes the part to be a whole partially. Therefore, the whole from the parts is a whole by existence; the whole before the parts by cause; and the whole in the part by participation. For this too is a whole in the last degree of subsistence, in that it imitates the whole from the parts, when it is not just any part, but one able to be assimilated to the whole of which the parts are also wholes. 68 Every whole in a part is a part of the whole from the parts. For if it is a part, it is a part of some whole; and either of the whole in itself, according to which it is called a whole in a part (but thus it would be a part of itself, and the part will be equal to the whole, and each the same); or of some other whole. And if of another, it is either a part of that alone, and thus it would again in no way differ from the whole, being one part of one thing; or with another (for the parts of every whole are more than one), and that will be, being from more than one, a whole from the parts from which it is; and thus the whole in the part is a part of the whole from the parts. 69 Every whole from parts participates in the wholeness before the parts. For if it is from parts, the whole is an affected thing (for the parts having become one, the whole has been affected through the union), and it is a whole in parts that are not wholes. But of everything participated, the unparticipated pre-exists. Therefore the unparticipated wholeness pre-exists the participated. There is therefore some form of wholeness before the whole from parts, which is not an affected whole, but wholeness-itself, from which comes the wholeness from parts. Since also the whole from parts is in many places and in many things, in different things and in other things which are from parts, some being parts of some wholes, others of others; but there must be the monad of all wholenesses in itself. For neither is each of these wholes pure, being in need of the parts from which it is, which are not wholes; nor, having come to be in something, can it be the cause for all others of being wholes. Therefore the cause for all wholes of being wholes is before the parts. For if this too is from parts, it will be a certain whole and not simply a whole, and this again from another, and either this goes on to infinity or there will be the primary whole, not a whole from parts, but being what wholeness is. 70 Everything more universal in the principles and prior to the particulars illuminates the participants and leaves the participant after they do. For it begins its activity towards the secondary things before that which is after it, and is present with the presence of that one, and when that one is no longer active, the more causal is still present and active; and not only in different subjects, but also in each of the things that at any time participate. For it is necessary (for instance) to become first a being, then a living creature, then a man. And it is no longer a man when the rational power has departed, but it is a living creature, breathing and perceiving; and again when life departs, being remains (for even when it does not live, being is present). And it is likewise in all cases. And the reason is that, being more effective, the more causal acts earlier upon the participant (for the same thing by the more powerful

αἴτιον ἐν ἑαυτῷ τὸ αἰτιατὸν προ είληφε, πρώτως ὂν ὅπερ ἐκεῖνο δευτέρως· ἢ ἐν τῷ παραγομένῳ τὸ παράγον (καὶ γὰρ τοῦτο, μετέχον τοῦ παράγοντος, ἐν ἑαυτῷ δείκνυσι δευτέρως ὃ τὸ παράγον ὑπάρχει πρώτως)· ἢ κατὰ τὴν ἑαυτοῦ τάξιν ἕκαστον θεωρεῖται, καὶ οὔτε ἐν τῷ αἰτίῳ οὔτε ἐν τῷ ἀποτελέσματι· τὸ μὲν γὰρ ἔστι κρειττόνως ἢ ἔστι, τὸ δὲ χειρόνως ἢ ἔστι, δεῖ δέ που εἶναι καὶ ὅ ἐστιν· ἔστι δὲ καθ' ὕπαρξιν ἐν τῇ ἑαυτοῦ τάξει ἕκαστον. 66 Πάντα τὰ ὄντα πρὸς ἄλληλα ἢ ὅλα ἐστὶν ἢ μέρη ἢ ταὐτὰ ἢ ἕτερα. ἢ γὰρ περιέχει θάτερα, περιέχεται δὲ τὰ λοιπά· ἢ οὔτε περιέχει οὔτε περιέχεται, καὶ ἢ ταὐτόν τι πέπονθεν, ὡς ἑνὸς μετέχοντα, ἢ διακέκριται ἀλλήλων. ἀλλ' εἰ μὲν περιέχει, ὅλα ἂν εἴη· εἰ δὲ περιέχοιτο, μέρη· εἰ δ' ἑνὸς τὰ πολλὰ μετέχοι, ταὐτά ἐστι κατὰ τὸ ἕν· εἰ δὲ πλείω μόνον εἴη, ἕτερα ἀλλήλων ταύτῃ, καθὸ πολλά ἐστιν. 67 Πᾶσα ὁλότης ἢ πρὸ τῶν μερῶν ἐστιν ἢ ἐκ τῶν μερῶν ἢ ἐν τῷ μέρει. ἢ γὰρ ἐν τῇ αἰτίᾳ τὸ ἑκάστου θεωροῦμεν εἶδος, καὶ ὅλον ἐκεῖνο πρὸ τῶν μερῶν λέγομεν τὸ ἐν τῷ αἰτίῳ προϋποστάν· ἢ ἐν τοῖς μετέχουσιν αὐτῆς μέρεσι. καὶ τοῦτο διχῶς· ἢ γὰρ ἐν ἅπασιν ὁμοῦ τοῖς μέρεσι, καὶ ἔστι τοῦτο ἐκ τῶν μερῶν ὅλον, οὗ καὶ ὁτιοῦν μέρος ἀπὸν ἐλαττοῖ τὸ ὅλον· ἢ ἐν ἑκάστῳ τῶν μερῶν, ὡς καὶ τοῦ μέρους κατὰ μέθεξιν τοῦ ὅλου <ὅλου> γεγονότος, ὃ καὶ ποιεῖ τὸ μέρος εἶναι ὅλον μερικῶς. καθ' ὕπαρξιν μὲν οὖν ὅλον τὸ ἐκ τῶν μερῶν· κατ' αἰτίαν δὲ τὸ πρὸ τῶν μερῶν· κατὰ μέθεξιν δὲ τὸ ἐν τῷ μέρει. καὶ γὰρ τοῦτο κατ' ἐσχάτην ὕφεσιν ὅλον, ᾗ μιμεῖται τὸ ἐκ τῶν μερῶν ὅλον, ὅταν μὴ τὸ τυχὸν ᾖ μέρος, ἀλλὰ τῷ ὅλῳ δυνάμενον ἀφομοιοῦσθαι οὗ καὶ τὰ μέρη ὅλα ἐστίν. 68 Πᾶν τὸ ἐν τῷ μέρει ὅλον μέρος ἐστὶ τοῦ ἐκ τῶν μερῶν ὅλου. εἰ γὰρ μέρος ἐστίν, ὅλου τινός ἐστι μέρος· καὶ ἤτοι τοῦ ἐν αὐτῷ ὅλου, καθ' ὃ λέγεται ἐν τῷ μέρει ὅλον (ἀλλ' οὕτως αὐτὸ ἑαυτοῦ μέρος, καὶ ἴσον τῷ ὅλῳ τὸ μέρος ἔσται, καὶ ταὐτὸν ἑκά τερον)· ἢ ἄλλου τινὸς ὅλου. καὶ εἰ ἄλλου, ἢ μόνον ἐστὶν ἐκείνου μέρος, καὶ οὕτως οὐδὲν ἂν πάλιν τοῦ ὅλου διαφέροι, ἑνὸς ὄντος ἓν ὂν μέρος· ἢ μεθ' ἑτέρου (παντὸς γὰρ ὅλου τὰ μέρη πλείω ἑνός), κἀκεῖνο ἔσται, ἐκ πλειόνων ὄν, ὅλον ἐκ τῶν μερῶν ἐξ ὧν ἐστι· καὶ οὕτω τὸ ἐν τῷ μέρει ὅλον τοῦ ἐκ τῶν μερῶν ἐστι μέρος. 69 Πᾶν τὸ ἐκ τῶν μερῶν ὅλον μετέχει τῆς πρὸ τῶν μερῶν ὁλότητος. εἰ γὰρ ἐκ μερῶν ἐστι, πεπονθός ἐστι τὸ ὅλον (τὰ γὰρ μέρη ἓν γενόμενα τὸ ὅλον διὰ τὴν ἕνωσιν πέπονθε), καὶ ἔστιν ὅλον ἐν μὴ ὅλοις τοῖς μέρεσι. παντὸς δὲ τοῦ μετεχομένου προϋφέστηκε τὸ ἀμέθεκτον. ἡ ἄρα ἀμέθεκτος ὁλότης προϋπάρχει τῆς μετ εχομένης. ἔστιν ἄρα τι εἶδος ὁλότητος πρὸ τοῦ ἐκ τῶν μερῶν ὅλου, ὃ οὐ πεπονθός ἐστι τὸ ὅλον, ἀλλ' αὐτοο̈λότης, ἀφ' ἧς ἡ ἐκ τῶν μερῶν ὁλότης. ἐπεὶ καὶ τὸ μὲν ἐκ τῶν μερῶν ὅλον πολλαχοῦ καὶ ἐν πολλοῖς ἐστιν, ἐν ἄλλοις καὶ ἐν ἄλλοις ἐκ μερῶν οὖσι, τοῖς μὲν ἄλλων, τοῖς δὲ ἄλλων· δεῖ δὲ εἶναι τὴν μονάδα πασῶν τῶν ὁλοτήτων καθ' αὑτήν. οὔτε γὰρ εἰλικρινὲς ἕκαστον τῶν ὅλων τούτων, ἐπιδεὲς ὂν τῶν μερῶν ἐξ ὧν ἐστιν οὐχ ὅλων ὄντων· οὔτε ἐν τινὶ γεγονὸς τοῖς ἄλλοις ἅπασιν αἴτιον εἶναι δύναται τοῦ εἶναι ὅλοις. τὸ ἄρα τοῦ ὅλοις εἶναι τοῖς ὅλοις ἅπασιν αἴτιον πρὸ τῶν μερῶν ἐστιν. εἰ γὰρ καὶ τοῦτο ἐκ τῶν μερῶν, τὶ ὅλον ἔσται καὶ οὐχ ἁπλῶς ὅλον, καὶ πάλιν τοῦτο ἐξ ἄλλου, καὶ ἢ εἰς ἄπειρον ἢ ἔσται τὸ πρώτως ὅλον, οὐκ ἐκ μερῶν ὅλον, ἀλλ' ὅ ἐστιν ὁλότης ὄν. 70 Πᾶν τὸ ὁλικώτερον ἐν τοῖς ἀρχηγικοῖς καὶ πρὸ τῶν μερι κῶν εἰς τὰ μετέχοντα ἐλλάμπει καὶ δεύτερον ἐκείνων ἀπολείπει τὸ μετασχόν. καὶ γὰρ ἄρχεται πρὸ τοῦ μετ' αὐτὸ τῆς ἐνεργείας τῆς εἰς τὰ δεύτερα, καὶ σὺν τῇ ἐκείνου παρουσίᾳ πάρεστι, καὶ ἐκείνου μηκέτι ἐνεργοῦντος ἔτι πάρεστι καὶ ἐνεργεῖ τὸ αἰτιώτερον· καὶ οὐκ ἐν διαφόροις μόνον ὑποκειμένοις, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐν ἑκάστῳ τῶν ποτὲ μετεχόντων. δεῖ γὰρ (εἰ τύχοι) γενέσθαι πρῶτον ὄν, εἶτα ζῶον, εἶτα ἄνθρωπον. καὶ ἄνθρωπος οὐκέτι ἔστιν ἀπολιπούσης τῆς λογικῆς δυνάμεως, ζῶον δὲ ἔστιν ἐμπνέον καὶ αἰσθανόμενον· καὶ τοῦ ζῆν πάλιν ἀπολιπόντος μένει τὸ ὄν (καὶ γὰρ ὅταν μὴ ζῇ τὸ εἶναι πάρεστι). καὶ ἐπὶ πάντων ὡσαύτως. αἴτιον δέ, ὅτι δραστικώτερον ὑπάρχον τὸ αἰτιώτερον πρότερον εἰς τὸ μετέχον ἐνεργεῖ (τὸ γὰρ αὐτὸ ὑπὸ τοῦ δυνατωτέρου