Elements of Theology

 as one subsisting, but according to participation not one, the one will be multiplied, just as the multiplicity is unified through the one. Therefore

 activity is better than that which is not self-sufficient but has the cause of its perfection dependent on another substance. For if all beings by nat

 it desires that also, how most of all the good? or if it does not desire, how does it not desire the cause of all things, having proceeded from it? Bu

 is itself, and the mover and the moved are one and the same. For either it moves in one part and is moved in another part, or as a whole it moves and

 beginning from a monad, it proceeds into a multitude coordinate with the monad, and the multitude of every order is led back to one monad. For the mon

 the one being divided. But if it is in one of all things, it will no longer be of all things, but of one. If, therefore, it is both common to those ab

 the thing produced is other than it. Therefore, that which begets is established as unchangeable and undiminished, multiplying itself through a genera

 from something and reverting has a cyclical activity. For if it reverts to that from which it proceeds, it joins the end to the beginning, and the mot

 procession. For since each occurs through likeness, that which has proceeded immediately from something has also reverted immediately to it (for the l

 has reverted to itself according to nature and is perfect in its reversion to itself, and would have its being from itself for that to which the reve

 the self-subsistent is set apart from things measured by time in respect to its substance. For if the self-subsistent is ungenerated, it would not be

 having received the power to produce from the cause which is superior to it, it has from that cause its being the cause of those things of which it is

 Thus the producer in relation to the produced, taken in relation to each other, but that which is able to do more has a greater and more universal pow

 a cause has pre-contained in itself the effect, being primarily what that is secondarily or in the thing produced the producer (for this too, partici

 suffers from the former) and when the second in turn acts, that also co-acts, because whatever the second does, the more causal also co-begets with i

 being, or needing it somehow in order to be, would be in this respect more imperfect than the effect. But that which is in the result is a co-cause ra

 passible, being in every way divisible, and in every way to infinity. But the incorporeal, being simple, is impassible for the indivisible can neithe

 undiminished it contains in itself. But surely infinity in respect to magnitude and in respect to multitude is a complete privation and a falling away

 set apart and if all things enter into it, yet it has something hidden and incomprehensible to secondary things and if it unfolds the powers within

 but nowhere for thus it would be divided and separate from itself, if indeed one part of it is everywhere and in all things, but the other part nowhe

 all things. For since each thing exists either according to cause or according to existence or according to participation, in the first the rest exist

 a turning back as if through similars, dissimilar <being>. For the one is similar as a particular to a particular, the other is kindred as being of th

 a hypostasis but no longer a henad, it would be assigned to another order on account of the alteration of its property. 115 Every god is supra-essenti

 supra-essential, being nothing other than the one for each is not one thing, and then good, but only good, just as it is not one thing, and then one,

 is and in beings has the power of apprehending truth (for it both grasps thoughts and has its subsistence in acts of intellection) but the gods are b

 having set the same before itself, is most self-sufficient and such is all that is divine. Therefore it needs neither other things, being goodness-it

 is more unified than beings. All divine genera, therefore, are bound together by their proper intermediaries, and the first do not proceed immediately

 of a henad working, with which it is connate. This, then, is that which in itself defines the being that partakes of it and shows essentially the supr

 to the gods so that, while they are present to all things in the same way, all things are not present to them in the same way, but as each is able, i

 For the one, having a most unitive power, sends itself through the entire union and unifies all from above, while remaining in itself. But the mean, s

 proceeds from the infinity of the divine power, multiplying itself and passing through all things, and pre-eminently demonstrating the unfailing in th

 presides over composites and of their order and of their division according to number, and is of the same series as the paternal in more partial produ

 they have intelligible [qualities]. In the same way, therefore, that those, by illuminating Being, are intelligible, so also these, by illuminating th

 and sees itself. But seeing that it is thinking and seeing, it knows that it is Intellect in actuality and knowing this, it knows that it thinks, and

 Therefore it has the causes of all things intellectually. So that every intellect is all things intellectually, both the things before it and the thin

 more akin, contracted in quantity, in power surpasses the things after it and conversely the things further from the one. Therefore, those that are h

 on the one hand, but being only intellectual, is participated by souls that are neither divine nor come to be in a state of change from intellect to u

 by its very being, if the participant is suitable, it immediately becomes ensouled and living, not by the soul reasoning and choosing, nor giving life

 and to the soul that substantiates the essential principles of all things in it for everything that produces by its being, which it is primarily, thi

 of the motions it will also have restorations for every period of the eternal things is restorative. 200 Every period of a soul is measured by time

 the relation to the secondary ones, which the divine has to the intellectual, and this to the psychical and the quantities of the lower ones are grea

 it admits of every kind of change, being moved together with their own ruling causes. But indeed that it is also indivisible, is clear. For everything

suffers from the former); and when the second in turn acts, that also co-acts, because whatever the second does, the more causal also co-begets with it; and when that one ceases, this is still present (for the participation from the more powerful, acting more greatly, later leaves behind the participant; for indeed through the participation from the second, it has strengthened its own illumination). 71 All things that have a more universal and higher order in the archetypal causes, in the effects, according to the illuminations from them, become in a way subject to the participations of the more particular; and the illuminations from the higher receive the processions from the second, and those are established upon these; and thus some participations precede others, and different manifestations from above come upon others into the same subject, with the more universal acting first, and the more particular, upon their activities, bestowing their own participations to the participants. For if the more causal act before the second, being present and illuminating even those which have a less perfect aptitude, because of an abundance of power, while the subordinate in order, the second things, bestow what is from them, it is clear that the illuminations of the higher, pre-occupying the participant of both, support the participations of the subordinate; and these use the manifestations from those as foundations, and act upon the participant, which has been prepared by those. 72 All things that have the status of subjects in the participants proceed from more perfect and more universal causes. For the causes of more things are more powerful and more universal and nearer to the one than the causes of fewer things. And the causes that give subsistence to things that pre-exist as subjects for others are causes of more things, giving subsistence also to the aptitudes for the presence of the forms. Therefore these are more universal and more perfect among the causes. From these things, then, it is clear that matter, having subsisted from the one, is in itself without form; and body in itself, even if it has participated in being, is without participation in soul. For matter, being the subject of all things, has proceeded from the cause of all things; and body, being the subject of ensoulment, has subsisted from the more universal of soul, having participated somehow in being. 73 Every whole is at the same time a being, and participates in being; but not every being happens to be a whole. For either being and whole are the same, or the one is prior and the other posterior. But if the part, as part, is a being (for the whole is from parts that are beings), yet it is not a whole in itself, therefore being and whole are not the same. For then the part would not be a being; and if the part is not a being, neither is the whole. For every whole is a whole of parts, either as being before them or as in them; so if the part is not a being, it is not possible for the whole to be either. But if the whole is before being, every being will immediately be a whole; therefore the part will again not be a part. But this is impossible; for if the whole is a whole, being a whole of a part, the part will also be a part, being a part of a whole. It remains, therefore, that every whole is a being, but not every being is a whole. From these things, then, it is clear that the primary being is beyond wholeness, since the one, being, is present to more things (for being belongs also to the parts, as parts), while the other is present to fewer. For the cause of more things is superior, and the cause of fewer things is inferior, as has been shown. 74 Every form is a certain whole (for it subsists from a plurality of things, each of which completes the form); but not every whole is a form. For both the 'what' and the individual is a whole, as individual, but it is not a form. For every whole is that which subsists from parts, but form is that which is already divided into a plurality of particulars. Therefore the whole is one thing and the form another; and the one belongs to more things, the other to fewer. Therefore the whole is above the forms of beings. From these things, then, it is clear that the whole holds a middle rank between being and the forms. From which it follows that being subsists before the forms, and that the forms are beings, but not every being is a form. Hence also in the effects the privations are in a way beings, but they are not forms, since through the unitive power of being they themselves have received some faint manifestation of being. 75 Every cause spoken of in the proper sense is separate from the effect. For being in it, or completing it

πάσχει προτέρου)· καὶ τοῦ δευτέρου πάλιν ἐνεργοῦντος κἀκεῖνο συνεργεῖ, διότι πᾶν, ὅπερ ἂν ποιῇ τὸ δεύτερον, συναπογεννᾷ τούτῳ καὶ τὸ αἰτιώτερον· καὶ ἀπολιπόντος ἐκείνου τοῦτο ἔτι πάρεστιν (ἡ γὰρ τοῦ δυνατωτέρου μετάδοσις, δρῶσα μειζόνως, ὑστέρα τὸ μετα σχὸν ἀπολείπει· καὶ γὰρ διὰ τῆς τοῦ δευτέρου μεταδόσεως τὴν ἑαυτῆς ἔλλαμψιν ἐδυνάμωσεν). 71 Πάντα τὰ ἐν τοῖς ἀρχηγικοῖς αἰτίοις ὁλικωτέραν καὶ ὑπερτέραν τάξιν ἔχοντα ἐν τοῖς ἀποτελέσμασι κατὰ τὰς ἀπ' αὐτῶν ἐλλάμψεις ὑποκείμενά πως γίνεται ταῖς τῶν μερικωτέρων μεταδόσεσι· καὶ αἱ μὲν ἀπὸ τῶν ἀνωτέρων ἐλλάμψεις ὑπο δέχονται τὰς ἐκ τῶν δευτέρων προόδους, ἐκεῖναι δὲ ἐπὶ τούτων ἑδράζονται· καὶ οὕτω προηγοῦνται μεθέξεις ἄλλαι ἄλλων, καὶ ἐμφάσεις ἄλλαι ἐπ' ἄλλαις ἄνωθεν εἰς τὸ αὐτὸ φοιτῶσιν ὑπο κείμενον, τῶν ὁλικωτέρων προενεργούντων, τῶν δὲ μερικωτέρων ἐπὶ ταῖς ἐκείνων ἐνεργείαις τὰς ἑαυτῶν μεταδόσεις χορηγούντων τοῖς μετέχουσιν. εἰ γὰρ τὰ αἰτιώτερα πρὸ τῶν δευτέρων ἐνεργεῖ, διὰ περιου σίαν δυνάμεως καὶ τοῖς ἀτελεστέραν ἔχουσι τὴν ἐπιτηδειότητα παρόντα καὶ ἐλλάμποντα κἀκείνοις, τὰ δὲ ὑφειμένα κατὰ τὴν τάξιν δεύτερα χορηγεῖ τὰ ἀπ' αὐτῶν, δῆλον ὡς αἱ τῶν ὑπερ τέρων ἐλλάμψεις, προκαταλαμβάνουσαι τὸ μετέχον ἀμφοτέρων, ἐπερείδουσι τὰς τῶν ὑφειμένων μεταδόσεις· αἱ δὲ ταῖς ἀπ' ἐκείνων ἐμφάσεσιν ὑποβάθραις χρῶνται, καὶ δρῶσιν εἰς τὸ μετέχον, προειργασμένον ὑπ' ἐκείνων. 72 Πάντα τὰ ἐν τοῖς μετέχουσιν ὑποκειμένων ἔχοντα λόγον ἐκ τελειοτέρων πρόεισι καὶ ὁλικωτέρων αἰτίων. τὰ γὰρ πλειόνων αἴτια δυνατώτερά ἐστι καὶ ὁλικώτερα καὶ ἐγγυτέρω τοῦ ἑνὸς ἢ τὰ τῶν ἐλαττόνων. τὰ δὲ τῶν προϋπο κειμένων ἄλλοις ὑποστατικὰ πλειόνων αἴτιά ἐστιν, ὑφιστάντα καὶ τὰς ἐπιτηδειότητας πρὸς τῆς τῶν εἰδῶν παρουσίας. ὁλικώτερα ἄρα ταῦτα καὶ τελειότερά ἐστιν ἐν τοῖς αἰτίοις. ἐκ δὴ τούτων φανερὸν διότι ἡ μὲν ὕλη, ἐκ τοῦ ἑνὸς ὑποστᾶσα, καθ' αὑτὴν εἴδους ἐστὶν ἄμοιρος· τὸ δὲ σῶμα καθ' αὑτό, εἰ καὶ τοῦ ὄντος μετέσχε, ψυχῆς ἀμέτοχόν ἐστιν. ἡ μὲν γὰρ ὕλη, ὑποκείμενον οὖσα πάντων, ἐκ τοῦ πάντων αἰτίου προῆλθε· τὸ δὲ σῶμα, ὑποκείμενον ὂν τῆς ψυχώσεως, ἐκ τοῦ ὁλικωτέρου τῆς ψυχῆς ὑφέστηκε, τοῦ ὄντος ὁπωσοῦν μετασχόν. 73 Πᾶν μὲν ὅλον ἅμα ὄν τί ἐστι, καὶ μετέχει τοῦ ὄντος· οὐ πᾶν δὲ ὂν ὅλον τυγχάνει ὄν. ἢ γὰρ ταὐτόν ἐστιν ὂν καὶ ὅλον, ἢ τὸ μὲν πρότερον, τὸ δὲ ὕστερον. ἀλλ' εἰ καὶ τὸ μέρος, ᾗ μέρος, ὂν μέν ἐστιν (ἐκ γὰρ μερῶν ὄντων ἐστὶ τὸ ὅλον), οὐ μέντοι καὶ ὅλον καθ' αὑτό, οὐκ ἄρα ταὐτόν ἐστιν ὂν καὶ ὅλον. εἴη γὰρ ἂν τὸ μέρος οὐκ ὄν· εἰ δὲ τὸ μέρος οὐκ ὄν, οὐδὲ τὸ ὅλον ἔστι. πᾶν γὰρ ὅλον μερῶν ἐστιν ὅλον, ἢ ὡς πρὸ αὐτῶν ὂν ἢ ὡς ἐν αὐτοῖς· μὴ ὄντος οὖν τοῦ μέρους, οὐδὲ τὸ ὅλον εἶναι δυνατόν. εἰ δὲ τὸ ὅλον πρὸ τοῦ ὄντος, ἔσται πᾶν ὂν ὅλον εὐθύς· οὐκ ἄρα ἔσται πάλιν τὸ μέρος μέρος. ἀλλὰ ἀδύνατον· εἰ γὰρ τὸ ὅλον ἐστὶν ὅλον, μέρους ὂν ὅλον, καὶ τὸ μέρος ἔσται μέρος, ὅλου μέρος ὄν. λείπεται ἄρα πᾶν μὲν εἶναι τὸ ὅλον ὄν, οὐ πᾶν δὲ τὸ ὂν ὅλον. ἐκ δὴ τούτων φανερὸν ὅτι τὸ πρώτως ὂν ἐπέκεινα τῆς ὁλό τητός ἐστιν, εἴπερ τὸ μὲν πλείοσι πάρεστι, τὸ ὄν (καὶ γὰρ τοῖς μέρεσιν, ᾗ μέρη, τὸ εἶναι ὑπάρχει), τὸ δὲ ἐλάττοσι. τὸ γὰρ πλειόνων αἴτιον κρεῖττον, τὸ δὲ ἐλαττόνων καταδεέστερον, ὡς δέδεικται. 74 Πᾶν μὲν εἶδος ὅλον τί ἐστιν (ἐκ γὰρ πλειόνων ὑφέστηκεν, ὧν ἕκαστον συμπληροῖ τὸ εἶδος)· οὐ πᾶν δὲ ὅλον εἶδος. καὶ γὰρ τὸ τὶ καὶ ἄτομον ὅλον μέν ἐστιν, ᾗ ἄτομον, εἶδος δὲ οὐκ ἔστι. πᾶν γὰρ ὅλον ἐστὶ τὸ ἐκ μερῶν ὑφεστός, εἶδος δὲ τὸ εἰς πλείω τὰ καθέκαστα ἤδη τεμνόμενον. ἄλλο ἄρα τὸ ὅλον καὶ ἄλλο τὸ εἶδος· καὶ τὸ μὲν ὑπάρχει πλείοσι, τὸ δὲ ἐλάττοσιν. ὑπὲρ τὰ εἴδη ἄρα τῶν ὄντων ἐστὶ τὸ ὅλον. ἐκ δὴ τούτων φανερὸν ὅτι τὸ ὅλον μέσην ἔχει τάξιν τοῦ τε ὄντος καὶ τῶν εἰδῶν. ᾧ ἕπεται τὸ καὶ πρὸ τῶν εἰδῶν ὑφεστάναι τὸ ὄν, καὶ τὰ εἴδη ὄντα εἶναι, μὴ μέντοι πᾶν ὂν εἶδος. ὅθεν καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἀποτελέσμασιν αἱ στερήσεις ὄντα μέν πώς εἰσιν, εἴδη δὲ οὔκ εἰσι, διὰ τὴν ἑνιαίαν τοῦ ὄντος δύναμιν καὶ αὐταὶ τοῦ εἶναι καταδεξάμεναί τινα ἀμυδρὰν ἔμφασιν. 75 Πᾶν τὸ κυρίως αἴτιον λεγόμενον ἐξῄρηται τοῦ ἀποτελέσ ματος. ἐν αὐτῷ γὰρ ὄν, ἢ συμπληρωτικὸν αὐτοῦ