TO THE FELLOW PRESBYTER TIMOTHY, DIONYSIUS

 being illuminated super-cosmically by them for the hymns of the Godhead and being conformed to the sacred hymnologies, so as to see the divine lights

 For all knowledges are of things that are and have their limit in things that are, but It is beyond all essence and is removed from all knowledge. <5>

 <7> Thus, therefore, to the Cause of all and which is above all, both the nameless will apply and all the names of the things that are, so that it may

 the Father raises the dead and gives them life, so also the Son gives life to whom he will, and that It is the Spirit that gives life? That the ent

 to the one-principled Trinity also is common the super-essential existence, the super-divine divinity, the super-good goodness, the identity beyond al

 has partaken of the Word, unless someone might say according to the good-pleasing and man-loving common will and according to all the transcendent and

 Jesus, he says in his compiled Theological Outlines: <10> The all-causing and fulfilling Godhead of the Son, which preserves the parts in harmony with

 <III.> <1> And first, if you please, let us investigate the name Good, which reveals the whole procession of God's emanations, invoking the Good-Pri

 to the hierarchs, when we too, as you know, both yourself and many of our sacred brethren, had gathered for the sight of the life-originating and God-

 communions, the unconfused distinctions, the powers of the subordinate that lead up to the superior, the providences of the senior for the secondary,

 moves and nourishes and increases and perfects and purifies and renews. And light is the measure and number of hours, of days, and of all our time. Fo

 impartations and as calling all things to itself, whence it is also called Beauty, and as gathering all in all into one, and Beautiful as being All-Be

 the beautiful and the good is that which is beyond all rest and motion. Wherefore every rest and motion and that from which and in which and to which

 <12> And yet it has seemed to some of our sacred writers that the name 'eros' is even more divine than that of 'agape'. And the divine Ignatius also w

 an eternal circle through the Good, from the Good and in the Good and to the Good, moving about in an unerring convolution and in the same and accordi

 Whence then is evil? one might say. For if evil does not exist, virtue and vice are the same thing, and the whole is the same as the whole, and the pa

 irrational desire, in this it neither exists nor desires existing things, but it nevertheless partakes of the good by virtue of the faint echo itself

 simply nor in respect to time. <22> But neither is evil in angels. For if the good-like angel proclaims the divine goodness, being secondarily by part

 <24> But would someone say that souls are evil? If, because they associate with evil things providentially and for salvation, this is not evil, but go

 <30> To speak concisely The good is from one and the whole cause, but the evil from many and partial deficiencies. God knows evil, insofar as it is g

 goodnesses. <34> Therefore evil is not a being, nor is evil in beings. For evil, as evil, is nowhere. And the coming-to-be of evil is not according to

 manifestation of the all-perfect providence of the one God, and those of the more universal and the more particular things of the same. <3> And yet on

 <6> Therefore, the Essential Super-Goodness, putting forth the first gift, that of being itself, is praised by the first and most ancient of participa

 For if our sun, although the substances and qualities of sensible things are many and various, yet it, being one and shining a uniform light, renews a

 godlike and unchangeable immortality and the unwavering and unswerving perpetual motion, extending through an abundance of goodness even to the life o

 and is the cause of being of Wisdom itself, both of the whole and of each particular. <2> From it the intelligible and intellectual powers of the ange

 the cause of all things. Therefore God is known both in all things and apart from all things. And God is known through knowledge and through unknowing

 to be power-in-itself, both by being beyond-power and by bringing forth other powers, infinitely many times the infinite number of existing powers, an

 of the age, as having fallen away from none of the things that are, but rather both surpassing and pre-eminent over all beings according to a supra-es

 is defined and all inequality, which is a privation of the equality in each of them, is banished. For if anyone were to take inequality to mean the di

 We said the neck was opinion, as between the rational and irrational the breast, spirit the belly, desire the legs and feet, nature, using the name

 the return to him of those who have proceeded from him. <10> But if one should take the divine name 'Same' from the Oracles, or 'Justice,' in the sens

 beings, inasmuch as He is both before eternity and above eternity and His kingdom is a kingdom of all the ages. Amen. <ΧI.> <1> Come now, let us c

 and would never willingly wish to be at rest. And if he who says these things says that otherness and distinction are the particularity of each of the

 self-deification, of which beings, partaking according to their own nature, both are and live and are divine, and are and are called, and the others l

 It is therefore Perfect not only as being self-complete and defined in itself by itself in a single form and most perfect whole through whole, but als

 And not even the name of Goodness do we offer to It as being applicable, but from a yearning to conceive and speak something about that ineffable Natu

Whence then is evil? one might say. For if evil does not exist, virtue and vice are the same thing, and the whole is the same as the whole, and the part as that which is analogous, or not even that which wars against virtue will be evil. And yet moderation and intemperance are opposites, and justice and injustice. And I do not speak, of course, with respect to the just man and the unjust man, nor the moderate and the intemperate, but even before the externally apparent opposition of the virtuous man to his opposite, the vices are altogether separated from the virtues much earlier in the soul itself, and the passions are in rebellion against reason, and from these things it is necessary to grant that something evil is contrary to the good. For the good is not contrary to itself, but, as the offspring of one beginning and one cause, it rejoices in communion and unity and friendship. And the lesser good is not contrary to the greater, for neither is the less hot or cold contrary to the more. Therefore, evil is among existing things, and it is a being, and it is set against and is contrary to the good. And if there is corruption of existing things, this does not cast evil out from being, but it too will be a being and a generator of beings. Or is not the corruption of this thing often the generation of that thing? And evil will contribute to the completion of the universe, providing through itself for the whole not to be incomplete. <> But to these things the true account will say that evil, insofar as it is evil, produces neither substance nor generation, but only vitiates and corrupts, as far as it can, the subsistence of beings. But if someone should say that it is generative and that by its corruption it gives generation to another, it must be truly answered: Not insofar as it corrupts does it give generation, but insofar as it is corruption and evil, it only corrupts and vitiates; but generation and substance come about through the good, and evil will be corruption through itself, but generative through the good, and insofar as it is evil, it is neither a being nor a producer of beings, but through the good it is both a being and a good being and a producer of good things. Rather, neither will the same thing be, in respect to the same thing, both good and evil, nor is the corruption and generation of the same thing the same power in respect to the same thing, nor self-power or self-corruption. Therefore, evil-in-itself is neither a being nor good nor generative nor a producer of beings and good things; but the good, in those things in which it may be perfectly present, makes them perfect and unmixed and wholly good, but those things that partake of it less are both imperfect goods and mixed on account of the lack of the good. And evil is universally neither good nor a producer of good, but that which is more or less near to the good will be good analogously, since the all-perfect goodness that pervades all things does not proceed only as far as the all-good substances around it, but extends to the very last things, being present to some wholly, to others in a lesser degree, and to others in the last degree, as each of the beings is able to partake of it. And some partake of the good in every way, others are more and less deprived, others have a fainter participation in the good, and to others the good is present as a last echo. For if the good were not present to each thing analogously, the most divine and eldest things would have the rank of the last. And how was it possible for all things to partake of the good in a single form, when not all things are equally suited for whole participation in it? But now this is "the exceeding greatness" of the power of the good, that it empowers even the things deprived and its own privation, by virtue of partaking of it at all. And if I must speak the truth boldly: Even the things that fight against it exist and are able to fight by its power. Rather, to speak concisely, all beings, insofar as they exist, are also good and from the good; but insofar as they are deprived of the good, they are neither good nor beings. For in the case of other states, such as heat or cold, things that have been heated or cooled exist even when the heat and cold have left them, and many beings are without a share of life and mind. And God is removed from substance and exists super-substantially. And simply, in the case of all other things, even when the state has departed or never been present at all, beings exist and are able to subsist; but that which is in every way deprived of the good in no place and in no way was, or is, or will be, or can be. For instance the intemperate man, if even he is deprived of the good with respect to the

Πόθεν οὖν ἐστι τὸ κακόν; Eἴποι τις. Eἰ γὰρ μὴ ἔστι τὸ κακόν, ἀρετὴ καὶ κακία ταὐτὸν καὶ ἡ πᾶσα τῇ ὅλῃ καὶ ἡ ἐν μέρει τῇ ἀνὰ λόγον ἢ οὐδὲ τὸ τῇ ἀρετῇ μαχόμενον ἔσται κακόν. Καίτοι ἐναντία σωφροσύνη καὶ ἀκολασία καὶ δικαιοσύνη καὶ ἀδικία. Καὶ οὐ δήπου κατὰ τὸν δίκαιον καὶ τὸν ἄδικόν φημι καὶ τὸν σώφρονα καὶ τὸν ἀκόλαστον, ἀλλὰ καὶ πρὸ τῆς ἔξω φαινομένης τοῦ ἐναρέτου πρὸς τὸν ἀντικείμενον διαστάσεως ἐν αὐτῇ πολλῷ πρότερον τῇ ψυχῇ καθόλου διεστήκασι τῶν ἀρετῶν αἱ κακίαι καὶ πρὸς τὸν λόγον τὰ πάθη στασιάζει καὶ ἐκ τούτων ἀνάγκη δοῦναί τι τῷ ἀγαθῷ κακὸν ἐναντίον. Oὐ γὰρ ἑαυτῷ τἀγαθὸν ἐναντίον, ἀλλ' ὡς ἀπὸ μιᾶς ἀρχῆς καὶ ἑνὸς ἔκγονον αἰτίου κοινωνίᾳ καὶ ἑνότητι καὶ φιλίᾳ χαίρει. Καὶ οὐδὲ τὸ ἔλαττον ἀγαθὸν τῷ μείζονι ἐναντίον, οὔτε γὰρ τὸ ἧττον θερμὸν ἢ ψυχρὸν τῷ πλείονι ἐναντίον. Ἔστιν οὖν ἐν τοῖς οὖσι καὶ ὄν ἐστι καὶ ἀντιτέθειται καὶ ἠναντίωται τἀγαθῷ τὸ κακόν. Καὶ εἰ φθορὰ ἔστι τῶν ὄντων, οὐκ ἐκβάλλει τοῦτο τοῦ εἶναι τὸ κακόν, ἀλλ' ἔσται καὶ αὐτὸ ὂν καὶ ὄντων γενεσιουργόν. Ἢ οὐχὶ πολλάκις ἡ τοῦδε φθορὰ τοῦδε γίγνεται γένεσις; Καὶ ἔσται τὸ κακὸν εἰς τὴν τοῦ παντὸς συμπλήρωσιν συντελοῦν καὶ τῷ ὅλῳ τὸ μὴ ἀτελὲς εἶναι δι' ἑαυτὸ παρεχόμενον. <> Ἐρεῖ δὲ πρὸς ταῦτα ὁ ἀληθὴς λόγος, ὅτι τὸ κακόν, ᾗ κακόν, οὐδεμίαν οὐσίαν ἢ γένεσιν ποιεῖ, μόνον δὲ κακύνει καὶ φθείρει τὸ ἐφ' αὑτῷ τὴν τῶν ὄντων ὑπόστασιν. Eἰ δὲ γενεσιουργόν τις αὐτὸ εἶναι λέγοι καὶ τῇ τούτου φθορᾷ τῷ ἑτέρῳ διδόναι γένεσιν, ἀποκριτέον ἀληθῶς· Oὐχ ᾗ φθείρει, δίδωσι γένεσιν, ἀλλ' ᾗ μὲν φθορὰ καὶ κακόν, φθείρει καὶ κακύνει μόνον, γένεσις δὲ καὶ οὐσία διὰ τὸ ἀγαθὸν γίγνεται, καὶ ἔσται τὸ κακὸν φθορὰ μὲν δι' ἑαυτό, γενεσιουργὸν δὲ διὰ τὸ ἀγαθὸν καί, ᾗ μὲν κακόν, οὔτε ὂν οὔτε ὄντων ποιητικόν, διὰ δὲ τὸ ἀγαθὸν καὶ ὂν καὶ ἀγαθὸν ὂν καὶ ἀγαθῶν ποιητικόν. Μᾶλλον δὲ οὐδὲ γὰρ ἔσται τὸ αὐτὸ κατὰ τὸ αὐτὸ καὶ ἀγαθὸν καὶ κακόν, οὐδὲ τοῦ αὐτοῦ φθορὰ καὶ γένεσις ἡ αὐτὴ κατὰ τὸ αὐτὸ δύναμις οὔτε αὐτοδύναμις ἢ αὐτοφθορά. Τὸ μὲν οὖν αὐτοκακὸν οὔτε ὂν οὔτε ἀγαθὸν οὔτε γενεσιουργὸν οὔτε ὄντων καὶ ἀγαθῶν ποιητικόν, τὸ δὲ ἀγαθόν, ἐν οἷς μὲν ἂν τελέως ἐγγένηται, τέλεια ποιεῖ καὶ ἀμιγῆ καὶ ὁλόκληρα ἀγαθά, τὰ δὲ ἧττον αὐτοῦ μετέχοντα καὶ ἀτελῆ ἐστιν ἀγαθὰ καὶ μεμιγμένα διὰ τὴν ἔλλειψιν τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ. Καὶ οὐκ ἔστι καθόλου τὸ κακὸν οὔτε ἀγαθὸν οὔτε ἀγαθοποιόν, ἀλλὰ τὸ μᾶλλον ἢ ἧττον τῷ ἀγαθῷ πλησιάζον ἀναλόγως ἔσται ἀγαθόν, ἐπείπερ ἡ διὰ πάντων φοιτῶσα παντελὴς ἀγαθότης οὐ μέχρι μόνον χωρεῖ τῶν περὶ αὐτὴν παναγάθων οὐσιῶν, ἐκτείνεται δὲ ἄχρι τῶν ἐσχάτων, ταῖς μὲν ὁλικῶς παροῦσα, ταῖς δὲ ὑφειμένως, ἄλλαις δὲ ἐσχάτως, ὡς ἕκαστον αὐτῆς μετέχειν δύναται τῶν ὄντων. Καὶ τὰ μὲν πάντη τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ μετέχει, τὰ δὲ μᾶλλον καὶ ἧττον ἐστέρηται, τὰ δὲ ἀμυδροτέραν ἔχει τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ μετουσίαν καὶ ἄλλοις κατὰ ἔσχατον ἀπήχημα πάρεστι τἀγαθόν. Eἰ γὰρ μὴ ἀναλόγως ἑκάστῳ τἀγαθὸν παρῆν, ἦν ἂν τὰ θειότατα καὶ πρεσβύτατα τὴν τῶν ἐσχάτων ἔχοντα τάξιν. Πῶς δὲ καὶ ἦν δυνατὸν μονοειδῶς πάντα μετέχειν τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ μὴ πάντα ὄντα ταὐτῶς εἰς τὴν ὁλικὴν αὐτοῦ μέθεξιν ἐπιτήδεια; Νῦν δὲ τοῦτο ἔστι τῆς τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ δυνάμεως «τὸ ὑπερβάλλον μέγεθος», ὅτι καὶ τὰ ἐστερημένα καὶ τὴν ἑαυτοῦ στέρησιν δυναμοῖ κατὰ τὸ ὅλως αὐτοῦ μετέχειν. Καὶ εἰ χρὴ παῤῥησιασάμενον εἰπεῖν τἀληθῆ· Καὶ τὰ μαχόμενα αὐτῷ τῇ αὐτοῦ δυνάμει καὶ ἔστι καὶ μάχεσθαι δύναται. Μᾶλλον δέ, ἵνα συλλαβὼν εἴπω, τὰ ὄντα πάντα, καθ' ὅσον ἔστι, καὶ ἀγαθά ἐστι καὶ ἐκ τἀγαθοῦ, καθ' ὅσον δὲ ἐστέρηται τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ, οὔτε ἀγαθὰ οὔτε ὄντα ἐστίν. Ἐπὶ μὲν γὰρ τῶν ἄλλων ἕξεων οἷον θερμότητος ἢ ψυχρότητος ἔστι τὰ θερμανθέντα ἢ τὰ ψυχθέντα καὶ ἀπολιπούσης αὐτὰ τῆς θερμότητος καὶ τῆς ψυχρότητος, καὶ ζωῆς καὶ νοῦ πολλὰ τῶν ὄντων ἄμοιρα. Καὶ οὐσίας ὁ θεὸς ἐξῄρηται καὶ ἔστιν ὑπερουσίως. Καὶ ἁπλῶς ἐπὶ μὲν τῶν ἄλλων πάντων καὶ ἀπελθούσης ἢ μηδὲ ἐγγενομένης πάντη τῆς ἕξεως ἔστι τὰ ὄντα καὶ ὑφίστασθαι δύναται, τὸ δὲ κατὰ πάντα τρόπον τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ ἐστερημένον οὐδαμῆ οὐδαμῶς· οὔτε ἦν οὔτε ἐστὶν οὔτε ἔσται οὔτε εἶναι δύναται. Oἷον ὁ ἀκόλαστος, εἰ καὶ ἐστέρηται τἀγαθοῦ κατὰ τὴν