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but neither body nor accident, it is clear that it is an incorporeal substance and none of those things that have their being in another. For these things both come into being and pass away without the destruction of the underlying subject; but when the soul is separated, the body is completely destroyed. Using the same arguments, it is possible to demonstrate that the soul is immortal. For if it is neither a body, which by nature has been shown to be dissoluble and corruptible, nor a quality nor a quantity nor anything else of the things that perish, it is clear that it is immortal. There are, then, many proofs of its immortality in Plato and the others; but those are rigid and difficult to understand and scarcely known to those who have been brought up in those sciences; but for us, for the proof of its immortality, the teaching of the divine oracles is sufficient, having its certainty from itself because it is divinely inspired; but for those who do not accept the writings of the Christians, it is sufficient to prove that the soul is none of the things that perish. For if it is none of the things that perish, it is imperishable, and it is also immortal, so that this, being sufficiently established, must be passed over. 3 concerning the union of soul and body But it must be investigated how the union of a soul and a soulless body comes to be; for the matter is difficult. But if man is composed not only of these, but also of mind, as some have said, it is even more difficult. For all things that come together into the substance of one being are completely united; but all things that are united are altered and do not remain what they were before, as will be shown in the case of the elements; for having been united, they have become something else. How then does the body, being united to the soul, still remain a body, or again, how does the soul, being incorporeal and a substance in its own right, unite with a body and become part of the living being, while preserving its own substance unconfused and incorruptible? For it is necessary either that the soul and the body are united and both are altered and corrupted together, like the elements; or that they are not united because of the aforementioned absurdities, but are placed side by side like dancers in a chorus or a pebble next to a pebble, or are mixed, like wine and water. But that the soul cannot be placed side by side with the body has been proved in the work On the Soul. For then only that part of the body close to the soul would be ensouled, while the part not joined to it would be soulless; in addition to not being able to say that things placed side by side are one, such as, say, pieces of wood or iron or something of that sort. And the mixture of wine and water corrupts both together, for the mixture is neither pure water nor wine, although such a mixture occurs by juxtaposition, escaping the perception of the senses because of the fine particles of the things mixed; and this is clear from the fact that they can be separated from each other again; for instance, an oiled sponge draws up the pure water, as does papyrus; but it is altogether impossible to separate perceptibly things that are precisely united. But if it is neither united nor placed side by side nor mixed, what is the reason for the living being to be called one? Plato, then, because of this difficulty, does not want the living being to be composed of soul and body; but a soul using a body, and as it were clothed in the body. But this account also has a difficulty. For how can the soul be one with its garment? For the tunic is not one with the person wearing it. But Ammonius, the teacher of Plotinus, used to solve the problem in this way. He said that intelligible things have such a nature as to be united with things able to receive them just like things that are corrupted together, and being united to remain unconfused and incorruptible, like things placed side by side. For in the case of bodies, union completely produces an alteration of the things that come together, since they are changed into other bodies, as the elements into compounds, and food into blood, and the blood into flesh and the other parts of the body; but in the case of intelligible things, a union occurs, but alteration does not follow. For it is not by nature altered in its substance, but either it departs or is destroyed into non-being, but it does not admit of change; but it is neither destroyed into non-being, for then it would not be immortal; and the soul, being life, if it were changed in the mixture, would have been altered and would no longer have been life. And what would it contribute to the body if it did not provide it with life? Therefore not
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δὲ μήτε σῶμα μήτε συμβεβηκὸς δῆλον ὅτι ἀσώματός ἐστιν οὐσία καὶ οὐδὲν τῶν ἐχόντων ἐν ἄλλῳ τὸ εἶναι. ταῦτα γὰρ καὶ γίνεται καὶ ἀπογίνεται χωρὶς τῆς τοῦ ὑποκειμένου φθορᾶς· τῆς δὲ ψυχῆς χωριζομένης, τὸ σῶμα πάντως φθείρεται. τοῖς αὐτοῖς δὲ χρησάμενόν ἐστιν ἀποδεῖξαι τὴν ψυχὴν ἀθάνατον οὖσαν. εἰ γὰρ μήτε σῶμά ἐστιν, ὅπερ φύσει διαλυτὸν ἀπεδείχθη καὶ φθαρτόν, μήτε ποιότης μήτε ποσότης μήτε ἄλλο τι τῶν φθειρομένων, δῆλον ὅτι ἀθάνατός ἐστιν. πολλαὶ μὲν οὖν εἰσι τῆς ἀθανασίας αὐτῆς ἀποδείξεις παρά τε Πλάτωνι καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις· ἀλλ' ἐκεῖναι μὲν περισκελεῖς καὶ δυσκατανόητοι καὶ μόλις τοῖς ἐντεθραμμένοις ἐκείναις ταῖς ἐπιστήμαις γνώριμοι· ἡμῖν δὲ ἀρκεῖ πρὸς ἀπόδειξιν τῆς ἀθανασίας αὐτῆς ἡ τῶν θείων λογίων διδασκαλία τὸ πιστὸν ἀφ' ἑαυτῆς ἔχουσα διὰ τὸ θεόπνευστος εἶναι· πρὸς δὲ τοὺς μὴ καταδεχομένους τὰ τῶν Χριστιανῶν γράμματα ἀρκεῖ τὸ μηδὲν εἶναι τὴν ψυχὴν τῶν φθειρομένων ἀποδεῖξαι. εἰ γὰρ μηδέν ἐστι τῶν φθειρομένων, ἔστι δὲ ἄφθαρτος, ἔστι καὶ ἀθάνατος ὥστε τοῦτο μὲν ἀρκούντως ἔχον παραλειπτέον. 3 περὶ ἑνώσεως ψυχῆς καὶ σώματοσ Ζητητέον δὲ πῶς ψυχῆς καὶ σώματος ἀψύχου γίνεται ἕνωσις· ἄπορον γὰρ τὸ πρᾶγμα. εἰ δὲ μὴ μόνον ἐκ τού των, ἀλλὰ καὶ τοῦ νοῦ συνέστηκεν ὁ ἄνθρωπος, ὡς εἶπόν τινες, ἔτι πλέον ἀπορώτερον. πάντα γὰρ τὰ συνιόντα εἰς μιᾶς οὐσίας ὑπόστασιν πάντως ἑνοῦται· πάντα δὲ τὰ ἑνούμενα ἀλλοιοῦται καὶ οὐ μένει ἃ πρότερον ἦν, ὡς ἐπὶ τῶν στοιχείων δειχθήσεται· ἑνωθέντα γὰρ ἄλλο τι γέγονεν. πῶς οὖν ἢ τὸ σῶμα ἡνωμένον τῇ ψυχῇ ἔτι μένει σῶμα ἢ πάλιν ἡ ψυχὴ ἀσώ ματος οὖσα καὶ οὐσιώδης καθ' ἑαυτήν, πῶς ἑνοῦται σώματι καὶ μέρος γίνεται τοῦ ζῴου, σῴζουσα τὴν ἰδίαν οὐσίαν ἀσύγχυτον καὶ ἀδιάφθορον; ἀνάγκη γὰρ ἢ ἡνῶσθαι τὴν ψυχὴν καὶ τὸ σῶμα καὶ συνηλλοιῶσθαι καὶ συνεφθάρθαι ἀμφότερα, ὡς τὰ στοιχεῖα· ἢ μὴ ἡνῶσθαι μὲν διὰ τὰς προειρημένας ἀτοπίας, παρακεῖσθαι δὲ ὡς χορευτὰς ἐν χορῷ ἢ ψῆφον ψήφῳ, ἢ κεκρᾶσθαι, ὡς οἶνον καὶ ὕδωρ. ἀλλ' ὅτι μὲν οὐ δύναται παρακεῖσθαι τῷ σώματι ἡ ψυχὴ ἐν τῷ περὶ ψυχῆς ἀποδέδεικται. ἦν γὰρ ἂν μόνον αὐτὸ τὸ μέρος τοῦ σώματος ἔμψυχον τὸ πλησιάζον τῇ ψυχῇ, τὸ δὲ μὴ συνημμένον ἄψυχον· πρὸς τῷ μὴ δύνασθαι ἓν λέγειν εἶναι τὰ κατὰ παράθεσιν, ὡς ξύλα φέρε ἢ σίδηρον ἤ τι τοιοῦτον. καὶ ἡ κρᾶσις δὲ τοῦ οἴνου καὶ τοῦ ὕδατος ἀμφότερα συνδιαφθείρει, οὔτε γὰρ ὕδωρ ἐστὶ καθαρὸν τὸ κρᾶμα οὔτε οἶνος, καίτοι τῆς τοιαύτης κράσεως κατὰ παράθεσιν γινομένης λανθάνουσαν τὴν αἴσθησιν διὰ τὸ λεπτομερὲς τῶν κεκραμένων· δῆλον δὲ ἐκ τοῦ πάλιν ἀπ' ἀλλήλων δύνασθαι χωρίζεσθαι· σπόγγος γοῦν ἐλαιωθεὶς ἀνιμᾶται καθαρὸν τὸ ὕδωρ καὶ πάπυρος· αἰσθητῶς δὲ χωρίσαι τὰ ἀκριβῶς ἡνωμένα παντάπασιν ἀδύνατον. εἰ δὲ μήτε ἥνωται μήτε παράκειται μήτε κέκραται, τίς ὁ λόγος τοῦ τὸ ζῷον ἓν λέγεσθαι; Πλάτων μὲν οὖν καὶ διὰ ταύτην τὴν ἀπορίαν οὐ βούλεται τὸ ζῷον ἐκ ψυχῆς εἶναι καὶ σώματος· ἀλλὰ ψυχὴν σώματι κεχρημένην, καὶ ὥσπερ ἐνδεδυμένην τὸ σῶμα. ἔχει δὲ καὶ οὗτος ὁ λόγος ἄπορόν τι. πῶς γὰρ ἓν εἶναι δύναται μετὰ τοῦ ἐνδύματος ἡ ψυχή; οὐ γὰρ ἓν ὁ χιτὼν μετὰ τοῦ ἐνδεδυμένου. Ἁμμώνιος δὲ ὁ διδάσκαλος Πλωτίνου τὸ ζητούμενον τοῦτον τὸν τρόπον ἐπελύετο. ἔλεγεν τὰ νοητὰ τοιαύτην ἔχειν φύσιν ὡς καὶ ἑνοῦσθαι τοῖς δυναμένοις αὐτὰ δέξασθαι καθάπερ τὰ συνεφθαρμένα, καὶ ἑνούμενα μένειν ἀσύγχυτα καὶ ἀδιάφθορα, ὡς τὰ παρακείμενα. ἐπὶ μὲν γὰρ σωμάτων ἡ ἕνωσις ἀλλοίωσιν τῶν συνιόντων πάντως ἐργάζεται, ἐπειδήπερ εἰς ἄλλα σώματα μεταβάλλεται, ὡς τὰ στοιχεῖα εἰς τὰ συγκρίματα, καὶ αἱ τροφαὶ εἰς αἷμα, τὸ δὲ αἷμα εἰς σάρκα καὶ τὰ λοιπὰ μόρια τοῦ σώματος· ἐπὶ δὲ τῶν νοητῶν ἕνωσις μὲν γίνεται, ἀλλοίωσις δὲ οὐ παρακολουθεῖ. οὐ γὰρ πέφυκε [νοητὸν] κατ' οὐσίαν ἀλλοιοῦσθαι, ἀλλ' ἢ ἐξίσταται ἢ εἰς τὸ μὴ ὂν φθείρεται, μεταβολὴν δὲ οὐκ ἐπιδέχεται· ἀλλ' οὔτε εἰς τὸ μὴ ὂν φθείρεται, οὐ γὰρ ἂν ἦν ἀθάνατα· καὶ ἡ ψυχὴ ζωὴ οὖσα εἰ ἐν τῇ κράσει μετεβάλλετο ἠλλοιώθη ἂν καὶ οὐκ ἦν ἂν ἔτι ζωή. τί δὲ συνεβάλλετο τῷ σώματι εἰ μὴ παρεῖχεν αὐτῷ τὴν ζωήν; οὐκ ἄρα