Elements of Theology

 as one subsisting, but according to participation not one, the one will be multiplied, just as the multiplicity is unified through the one. Therefore

 activity is better than that which is not self-sufficient but has the cause of its perfection dependent on another substance. For if all beings by nat

 it desires that also, how most of all the good? or if it does not desire, how does it not desire the cause of all things, having proceeded from it? Bu

 is itself, and the mover and the moved are one and the same. For either it moves in one part and is moved in another part, or as a whole it moves and

 beginning from a monad, it proceeds into a multitude coordinate with the monad, and the multitude of every order is led back to one monad. For the mon

 the one being divided. But if it is in one of all things, it will no longer be of all things, but of one. If, therefore, it is both common to those ab

 the thing produced is other than it. Therefore, that which begets is established as unchangeable and undiminished, multiplying itself through a genera

 from something and reverting has a cyclical activity. For if it reverts to that from which it proceeds, it joins the end to the beginning, and the mot

 procession. For since each occurs through likeness, that which has proceeded immediately from something has also reverted immediately to it (for the l

 has reverted to itself according to nature and is perfect in its reversion to itself, and would have its being from itself for that to which the reve

 the self-subsistent is set apart from things measured by time in respect to its substance. For if the self-subsistent is ungenerated, it would not be

 having received the power to produce from the cause which is superior to it, it has from that cause its being the cause of those things of which it is

 Thus the producer in relation to the produced, taken in relation to each other, but that which is able to do more has a greater and more universal pow

 a cause has pre-contained in itself the effect, being primarily what that is secondarily or in the thing produced the producer (for this too, partici

 suffers from the former) and when the second in turn acts, that also co-acts, because whatever the second does, the more causal also co-begets with i

 being, or needing it somehow in order to be, would be in this respect more imperfect than the effect. But that which is in the result is a co-cause ra

 passible, being in every way divisible, and in every way to infinity. But the incorporeal, being simple, is impassible for the indivisible can neithe

 undiminished it contains in itself. But surely infinity in respect to magnitude and in respect to multitude is a complete privation and a falling away

 set apart and if all things enter into it, yet it has something hidden and incomprehensible to secondary things and if it unfolds the powers within

 but nowhere for thus it would be divided and separate from itself, if indeed one part of it is everywhere and in all things, but the other part nowhe

 all things. For since each thing exists either according to cause or according to existence or according to participation, in the first the rest exist

 a turning back as if through similars, dissimilar <being>. For the one is similar as a particular to a particular, the other is kindred as being of th

 a hypostasis but no longer a henad, it would be assigned to another order on account of the alteration of its property. 115 Every god is supra-essenti

 supra-essential, being nothing other than the one for each is not one thing, and then good, but only good, just as it is not one thing, and then one,

 is and in beings has the power of apprehending truth (for it both grasps thoughts and has its subsistence in acts of intellection) but the gods are b

 having set the same before itself, is most self-sufficient and such is all that is divine. Therefore it needs neither other things, being goodness-it

 is more unified than beings. All divine genera, therefore, are bound together by their proper intermediaries, and the first do not proceed immediately

 of a henad working, with which it is connate. This, then, is that which in itself defines the being that partakes of it and shows essentially the supr

 to the gods so that, while they are present to all things in the same way, all things are not present to them in the same way, but as each is able, i

 For the one, having a most unitive power, sends itself through the entire union and unifies all from above, while remaining in itself. But the mean, s

 proceeds from the infinity of the divine power, multiplying itself and passing through all things, and pre-eminently demonstrating the unfailing in th

 presides over composites and of their order and of their division according to number, and is of the same series as the paternal in more partial produ

 they have intelligible [qualities]. In the same way, therefore, that those, by illuminating Being, are intelligible, so also these, by illuminating th

 and sees itself. But seeing that it is thinking and seeing, it knows that it is Intellect in actuality and knowing this, it knows that it thinks, and

 Therefore it has the causes of all things intellectually. So that every intellect is all things intellectually, both the things before it and the thin

 more akin, contracted in quantity, in power surpasses the things after it and conversely the things further from the one. Therefore, those that are h

 on the one hand, but being only intellectual, is participated by souls that are neither divine nor come to be in a state of change from intellect to u

 by its very being, if the participant is suitable, it immediately becomes ensouled and living, not by the soul reasoning and choosing, nor giving life

 and to the soul that substantiates the essential principles of all things in it for everything that produces by its being, which it is primarily, thi

 of the motions it will also have restorations for every period of the eternal things is restorative. 200 Every period of a soul is measured by time

 the relation to the secondary ones, which the divine has to the intellectual, and this to the psychical and the quantities of the lower ones are grea

 it admits of every kind of change, being moved together with their own ruling causes. But indeed that it is also indivisible, is clear. For everything

being, or needing it somehow in order to be, would be in this respect more imperfect than the effect. But that which is in the result is a co-cause rather than a cause, either being a part of what comes to be or an instrument of the maker; for the part is in that which is coming to be, being more imperfect than the whole, and the instrument serves the maker for the coming-to-be, not being able to define for itself the measures of the production. Therefore every proper cause, if indeed it is more perfect than that which comes from it and itself provides the measure for the coming-to-be, is removed from instruments and from elements and simply from all things called co-causes. 76 Everything that comes to be from an unmoved cause has an unchangeable existence; but everything from a moved cause, a changeable existence. For if the maker is in every way unmoved, not through motion, but by its very being it brings forth the second from itself; and if this is so, it has that which is from it co-existent with its own being; and if this is so, as long as it is, it produces. But it always is; therefore it always brings into subsistence that which is after it; so that this too always comes to be from that and always is, having joined its own eternal procession to the eternal actuality of that one. But if the cause is moved, that which comes to be from it will be changeable in substance; for that whose being is through motion, changes its being as the moved thing changes. For if, being produced from motion, it were to remain unchangeable, it would be superior to the cause that gave it subsistence. But this is impossible. Therefore it will not be unchangeable. Therefore it will change and be moved in substance, imitating the motion that gave it subsistence. 77 Everything that is in potentiality proceeds to actuality from that which is in actuality what the former is potentially; that which is in some respect in potentiality from that which is in some respect in actuality, in the respect that it is potential; while that which is in every respect in potentiality from that which is in every respect in actuality. For the potential is not by nature able to bring itself forth into actuality, being imperfect; for if, being imperfect, it became the cause for itself of the perfect and actual, the cause would be more imperfect than that which has come from it. therefore the potential, insofar as it is potential, is not the cause for itself of the actual; for it would be, insofar as it is imperfect, the cause of the perfect, if indeed everything potential, insofar as it is potential, is imperfect, and everything actual, insofar as it is actual, is perfect. If, therefore, the potential is to be in actuality, it will have its perfection from something else; and this will be either itself potential (but thus again the imperfect would be generative of the perfect) or actual, and either something else or that which the thing becoming actual was potentially. But if some other actual thing produces it, acting according to its own property it will not make actual the potentiality that is in the other; therefore this thing will not be actual either, if it does not become so in the very respect in which it is potential. It remains, therefore, that a thing changes into actuality from that which is actually what it is potentially. 78 Every power is either perfect or imperfect. For that which brings forth actuality is a perfect power; for it also makes other things perfect through its own actualities, and that which perfects others is itself more greatly perfect. but that which needs something else pre-existing in actuality, in virtue of which something exists potentially, is imperfect; for it needs the perfection that is in another, so that by partaking of that it may become perfect; therefore such a power is in itself imperfect. so that the power of the actual is perfect, being productive of actuality; while the power of the potential is imperfect, acquiring its perfection from that. 79 Everything that comes to be comes to be from a twofold power. For it itself must be suitable and have an imperfect power, and the maker, being actually what this is potentially, must have previously possessed a perfect power. For every actuality proceeds from an indwelling power; for if the maker did not have power, how will it actualize and produce into another? and if that which comes to be did not have the power according to suitability, how could it come to be? For every maker acts upon that which is able to be affected, but not upon a chance thing and that which is not by nature able to be affected by it. 80 Every body is by nature able to be affected in itself, and every incorporeal thing to act, the one being inert in itself, the other impassible; but the incorporeal is also affected through its association with body, just as bodies are also able to act through their participation in incorporeals. For body, insofar as it is body, is only divisible, and in this respect

ὑπάρχον ἢ δεόμενόν πως αὐτοῦ πρὸς τὸ εἶναι, ἀτελέστερον ἂν εἴη ταύτῃ τοῦ αἰτιατοῦ. τὸ δὲ ἐν τῷ ἀποτελέσματι ὂν συναίτιόν ἐστι μᾶλλον ἢ αἴτιον, ἢ μέρος ὂν τοῦ γινομένου ἢ ὄργανον τοῦ ποιοῦντος· τό τε γὰρ μέρος ἐν τῷ γινομένῳ ἐστίν, ἀτελέστερον ὑπάρχον τοῦ ὅλου, καὶ τὸ ὄργανον τῷ ποιοῦντι πρὸς τὴν γένεσιν δουλεύει, τὰ μέτρα τῆς ποιήσεως ἀφορίζειν ἑαυτῷ μὴ δυνάμενον. ἅπαν ἄρα τὸ κυρίως αἴτιον, εἴ γε καὶ τελειότερόν ἐστι τοῦ ἀπ' αὐτοῦ καὶ τὸ μέτρον αὐτὸ τῇ γενέσει παρέχεται, καὶ τῶν ὀργάνων ἐξῄρηται καὶ τῶν στοιχείων καὶ πάντων ἁπλῶς τῶν καλουμένων συναιτίων. 76 Πᾶν μὲν τὸ ἀπὸ ἀκινήτου γινόμενον αἰτίας ἀμετάβλητον ἔχει τὴν ὕπαρξιν· πᾶν δὲ τὸ ἀπὸ κινουμένης, μεταβλητήν. εἰ γὰρ ἀκίνητόν ἐστι πάντῃ τὸ ποιοῦν, οὐ διὰ κινήσεως, ἀλλ' αὐτῷ τῷ εἶναι παράγει τὸ δεύτερον ἀφ' ἑαυτοῦ· εἰ δὲ τοῦτο, σύνδρομον ἔχει τῷ ἑαυτοῦ εἶναι τὸ ἀπ' αὐτοῦ· εἰ δὲ τοῦτο, ἕως ἂν ᾖ, παράγει. ἀεὶ δὲ ἔστιν· ἀεὶ ἄρα ὑφίστησι τὸ μετ' αὐτό· ὥστε καὶ τοῦτο ἀεὶ γίνεται ἐκεῖθεν καὶ ἀεὶ ἔστι, τῷ ἐκείνου ἀεὶ κατὰ τὴν ἐνέργειαν συνάψαν τὸ ἑαυτοῦ κατὰ τὴν πρόοδον ἀεί. εἰ δὲ δὴ κινεῖται τὸ αἴτιον, καὶ τὸ ἀπ' αὐτοῦ γινόμενον ἔσται μεταβλητὸν κατ' οὐσίαν· ᾧ γὰρ τὸ εἶναι διὰ κινήσεως, τοῦτο τοῦ κινουμένου μεταβάλλοντος μεταβάλλει τὸ εἶναι. εἰ γὰρ ἐκ κινήσεως παραγόμενον ἀμετάβλητον αὐτὸ μένοι, κρεῖττον ἔσται τῆς ὑποστησάσης αἰτίας. ἀλλ' ἀδύνατον. οὐκ ἄρα ἀμετάβλη τον ἔσται. μεταβαλεῖ ἄρα καὶ κινήσεται κατ' οὐσίαν, τὴν ὑποστήσασαν αὐτὸ κίνησιν μιμούμενον. 77 Πᾶν τὸ δυνάμει ὂν ἐκ τοῦ κατ' ἐνέργειαν ὄντος ὃ τοῦτο δυνάμει ἐστὶν εἰς τὸ ἐνεργείᾳ πρόεισι· τὸ μέν πῃ δυνάμει ἐκ τοῦ πῃ κατ' ἐνέργειαν, ᾗ αὐτὸ δυνάμει· τὸ δὲ πάντῃ δυνάμει ὂν ἐκ τοῦ πάντῃ κατ' ἐνέργειαν ὄντος. αὐτὸ μὲν γὰρ ἑαυτὸ τὸ δυνάμει προάγειν εἰς ἐνέργειαν οὐ πέφυκεν, ἀτελὲς ὄν· εἰ γὰρ ἀτελὲς ὂν αἴτιον ἑαυτῷ γίνοιτο τοῦ τελείου καὶ κατ' ἐνέργειαν, τὸ αἴτιον ἔσται τοῦ ἀπ' αὐτοῦ γεγονότος ἀτελέστερον. οὐκ ἄρα τὸ δυνάμει, ᾗ δυνάμει, ἑαυτῷ τοῦ κατ' ἐνέργειαν αἴτιον· ἔσται γάρ, ᾗ ἀτελές, τοῦ τελείου αἴτιον, εἴπερ τὸ δυνάμει πᾶν, ᾗ δυνάμει, ἀτελές, τὸ δ' ἐνεργείᾳ πᾶν, ᾗ ἐνεργείᾳ, τέλειον. εἰ ἄρα ἔσται τὸ δυνάμει κατ' ἐνέργειαν, ἀπ' ἄλλου τινὸς ἕξει τὸ τέλειον· καὶ ἤτοι καὶ αὐτὸ δυνάμει (ἀλλ' ἔσται οὕτω πάλιν τὸ ἀτελὲς τοῦ τελείου γεννητικόν) ἢ ἐνεργείᾳ, καὶ ἤτοι ἄλλο τι ἢ τοῦτο ὃ δυνάμει τὸ κατ' ἐνέργειαν γινόμενον ἦν. ἀλλ' εἰ μὲν ἄλλο τι ἐνεργείᾳ ὂν ποιεῖ, κατὰ τὴν ἑαυτοῦ ἰδιότητα ποιοῦν οὐ τὸ δυνάμει τὸ ἐν θατέρῳ ποιήσει ἐνεργείᾳ· οὐδὲ τοῦτο τοίνυν ἔσται κατ' ἐνέργειαν, εἴπερ μή, ᾗ δυνάμει ἔστι, ταύτῃ γίνοιτο. λείπεται ἄρα ἐκ τοῦ κατ' ἐνέργειαν ὄντος ὃ δυνάμει τί ἐστιν εἰς τὸ ἐνεργείᾳ μεταβάλλειν. 78 Πᾶσα δύναμις ἢ τελεία ἐστὶν ἢ ἀτελής. ἡ μὲν γὰρ τῆς ἐνεργείας οἰστικὴ τελεία δύναμις· καὶ γὰρ ἄλλα ποιεῖ τέλεια διὰ τῶν ἑαυτῆς ἐνεργειῶν, τὸ δὲ τελειωτικὸν ἄλλων μειζόνως αὐτὸ τελειότερον. ἡ δὲ ἄλλου του δεομένη τοῦ κατ' ἐνέργειαν προϋπάρχοντος, καθ' ἣν δυνάμει τι ἔστιν, ἀτελής· δεῖται γὰρ τοῦ τελείου ἐν ἄλλῳ ὄντος, ἵνα μετασχοῦσα ἐκείνου τελεία γένηται· καθ' αὑτὴν ἄρα ἀτελής ἐστιν ἡ τοιαύτη δύναμις. ὥστε τελεία μὲν ἡ τοῦ κατ' ἐνέργειαν δύναμις, ἐνεργείας οὖσα γόνιμος· ἀτελὴς δὲ ἡ τοῦ δυνάμει, παρ' ἐκείνου κτωμένη τὸ τέλειον. 79 Πᾶν τὸ γινόμενον ἐκ τῆς διττῆς γίνεται δυνάμεως. καὶ γὰρ αὐτὸ δεῖ ἐπιτήδειον εἶναι καὶ δύναμιν ἀτελῆ ἔχειν, καὶ τὸ ποιοῦν, κατ' ἐνέργειαν ὃ τοῦτο δυνάμει ἐστὶν ὑπάρχον, δύναμιν προειληφέναι τελείαν. πᾶσα γὰρ ἐνέργεια ἐκ δυνά μεως τῆς ἐνούσης πρόεισιν· εἴτε γὰρ τὸ ποιοῦν μὴ ἔχοι δύναμιν, πῶς ἐνεργήσει καὶ ποιήσει εἰς ἄλλο; εἴτε τὸ γινόμενον μὴ ἔχοι τὴν κατ' ἐπιτηδειότητα δύναμιν, πῶς ἂν γένοιτο; τὸ γὰρ ποιοῦν εἰς τὸ παθεῖν δυνάμενον ποιεῖ πᾶν, ἀλλ' οὐκ εἰς τὸ τυχὸν καὶ ὃ μὴ πέφυκεν ὑπ' αὐτοῦ πάσχειν. 80 Πᾶν σῶμα πάσχειν καθ' αὑτὸ πέφυκε, πᾶν δὲ ἀσώματον ποιεῖν, τὸ μὲν ἀδρανὲς ὂν καθ' αὑτό, τὸ δὲ ἀπαθές· πάσχει δὲ καὶ τὸ ἀσώματον διὰ τὴν πρὸς τὸ σῶμα κοινωνίαν, ὡς δύναται ποιεῖν καὶ τὰ σώματα διὰ τὴν τῶν ἀσωμάτων μετουσίαν. τὸ μὲν γὰρ σῶμα, ᾗ σῶμα, διαιρετόν ἐστι μόνον, καὶ ταύτῃ