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of conceptions worthy of God. We seek by all means the signs of goodness in God. And what could be a clearer testimony of the good than that he should reclaim him who had deserted to the opposite, and not be affected in common by the changeableness of human choice, his nature being fixed in goodness and immutable? For he would not have come to save us, as David says, unless goodness had produced such a purpose. But the goodness of the purpose would have been of no avail, unless wisdom made that love for humanity effective. For in the case of those who are sick, there are perhaps many who wish that the one lying there not be in a bad state, but only those bring to completion the good intention for the sick in whom some skillful power is at work for the healing of the sufferer. Therefore wisdom must by all means be yoked with goodness. How, then, in the things that have happened, is the wise seen together with the good? Because it is not possible to see the good in purpose naked. For how could the purpose appear, if not manifested through the things that happen? And the things that have been done, proceeding with a certain connection and order in sequence, show the wisdom and skill of the economy of God. But since, as was said in what came before, wisdom yoked with justice certainly becomes virtue, but if it were separated, it could not be good by itself alone, it would be well also in the account of the economy concerning man to consider the two together, I mean the wise and the just.

21 What then is justice? We surely remember what was set out in sequence in the first parts of the discourse: that man was created an imitation of the divine nature, preserving the likeness to the divine in the rest of the good things and in the self-determination of his choice, but being of a mutable nature by necessity. For it was not possible for that which had its beginning of being from alteration not to be in every way mutable. For the passage from non-being to being is a certain alteration, non-existence being changed into substance by divine power, and otherwise, change is necessarily observed in man, since man was an imitation of the divine nature. But that which imitates, if it were not in some otherness, would be altogether identical with that which it is made like. In this, then, lies the otherness of that which came to be according to the image from the archetype: in that the one is immutable by nature, while the other is not so, but subsisted through alteration according to the argument given, and being altered does not altogether remain in being. And alteration is a certain movement toward another from that in which it is, always proceeding. And there are two kinds of such movement: the one which is always toward the good, in which progress has no stopping point, because no limit of that which is being traversed is reached; and the one toward the opposite, whose substance consists in not subsisting. For the opposition of the good, as was said before, has such a meaning by way of contrast, just as we say that being is contrasted with non-being, and existence with non-existence. Since, therefore, according to its mutable and alterable impulse and motion, it is not possible for nature to remain unmoved in itself, but choice by all means strives for something, being naturally drawn into motion by the desire for the beautiful; and one kind of beautiful is truly so by nature, while another is not so, but is adorned with a certain fantasy of beauty; and the criterion of these is the mind, established within us, in which there is the risk either of attaining the truly beautiful, or of being turned aside from it by some deception according to appearance and flowing away to the opposite, just as the pagan fable says the dog suffered when it looked in the water at the shadow of what it was carrying in its mouth, letting go of the real food, and gaping at the image of the food, it became famished. Since, therefore, the mind, cheated of its desire for the truly good, was carried away to non-being, being persuaded by the deception of the counsellor and inventor of evil that the opposite of the beautiful was beautiful; for the deception would not have been effective, unless like a bait on the hook of evil of the of the

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τῶν θεοπρεπῶν ὑπολήψεων. ζητοῦμεν πάντως ἐπὶ τοῦ θεοῦ τῆς ἀγαθότητος τὰ σημεῖα. καὶ τίς ἂν γένοιτο φανερωτέρα τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ μαρτυρία ἢ τὸ μεταποιηθῆναι αὐτὸν τοῦ πρὸς τὸ ἐναντίον αὐτομολήσαντος, μηδὲ συνδιατεθῆναι τῷ εὐμεταβλήτῳ τῆς ἀνθρωπίνης προ αιρέσεως τὴν παγίαν ἐν τῷ ἀγαθῷ καὶ ἀμετάβλητον φύσιν; οὐ γὰρ ἂν ἦλθεν εἰς τὸ σῶσαι ἡμᾶς, καθώς φησιν ὁ ∆αβίδ, μὴ ἀγαθότητος τὴν τοιαύτην πρόθεσιν ἐμποιούσης. ἀλλ' οὐδὲν ἂν ὤνησε τὸ ἀγαθὸν τῆς προθέσεως, μὴ σοφίας ἐνεργὸν τὴν φιλανθρωπίαν ποιούσης. καὶ γὰρ ἐπὶ τῶν ἀρρώστως διακειμένων πολλοὶ μὲν ἴσως οἱ βουλόμενοι μὴ ἐν κακοῖς εἶναι τὸν κείμενον, μόνοι δὲ τὴν ἀγαθὴν ὑπὲρ τῶν καμνόντων προαίρεσιν εἰς πέρας ἄγουσιν, οἷς τεχνική τις δύναμις ἐνεργεῖ πρὸς τὴν τοῦ κάμνοντος ἴασιν. οὐκοῦν τὴν σοφίαν δεῖ συνεζεῦχθαι πάντως τῇ ἀγαθότητι. πῶς τοίνυν ἐν τοῖς γεγενημένοις τὸ σοφὸν τῷ ἀγαθῷ συνθεω ρεῖται; ὅτι οὐ γυμνὸν τὸ κατὰ πρόθεσιν ἀγαθὸν ἔστιν ἰδεῖν. πῶς γὰρ ἂν φανείη ἡ πρόθεσις, μὴ διὰ τῶν γιγνομένων φανερουμένη; τὰ δὲ πεπραγμένα εἱρμῷ τινὶ καὶ τάξει δι' ἀκολούθου προιόντα τὸ σοφόν τε καὶ τεχνικὸν τῆς οἰκο νομίας τοῦ θεοῦ διαδείκνυσιν. ἐπεὶ δέ, καθὼς ἐν τοῖς φθάσασιν εἴρηται, πάντως τῷ δικαίῳ τὸ σοφὸν συνεζευγ μένον ἀρετὴ γίγνεται, εἰ δὲ χωρισθείη, μὴ ἂν ἐφ' ἑαυτοῦ κατὰ μόνας ἀγαθὸν εἶναι, καλῶς ἂν ἔχοι καὶ ἐπὶ τοῦ λόγου τῆς κατὰ ἄνθρωπον οἰκονομίας τὰ δύο μετ' ἀλλήλων κατα νοῆσαι, τὸ σοφόν φημι καὶ τὸ δίκαιον.

21 Τίς οὖν ἡ δικαιοσύνη; μεμνήμεθα πάντως τῶν κατὰ τὸ ἀκόλουθον ἐν τοῖς πρώτοις τοῦ λόγου διῃρημένων ὅτι μίμημα τῆς θείας φύσεως κατεσκευάσθη ὁ ἄνθρωπος, τοῖς τε λοιποῖς τῶν ἀγαθῶν καὶ τῷ αὐτεξουσίῳ τῆς προαιρέσεως τὴν πρὸς τὸ θεῖον διασώζων ὁμοίωσιν, τρεπ τῆς δὲ φύσεως ὢν κατ' ἀνάγκην· οὐ γὰρ ἐνεδέχετο τὸν ἐξ ἀλλοιώσεως τὴν ἀρχὴν τοῦ εἶναι σχόντα μὴ τρεπτὸν εἶναι πάντως· ἡ γὰρ ἐκ τοῦ μὴ ὄντος εἰς τὸ εἶναι πάροδος ἀλλοίωσίς τίς ἐστι, τῆς ἀνυπαρξίας κατὰ θείαν δύναμιν εἰς οὐσίαν μεθισταμένης, καὶ ἄλλως δὲ τῆς τροπῆς ἀναγκαίως ἐν τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ θεωρουμένης, ἐπειδὴ μίμημα τῆς θείας φύσεως ὁ ἄνθρωπος ἦν· τὸ δὲ μιμούμενον, εἰ μὴ ἐν ἑτερότητι τύχοι τινί, ταὐτὸν ἂν εἴη πάντως ἐκείνῳ, ᾧ ἀφωμοίωται. ἐν τούτῳ τοίνυν τῆς ἑτερότητος τοῦ κατ' εἰκόνα γενομένου πρὸς τὸ ἀρχέτυπον οὔσης, ἐν τῷ τὸ μὲν ἄτρεπτον εἶναι τῇ φύσει, τὸ δὲ μὴ οὕτως ἔχειν, ἀλλὰ δι' ἀλλοιώσεως μὲν ὑποστῆναι κατὰ τὸν ἀποδο θέντα λόγον, ἀλλοιούμενον δὲ μὴ πάντως ἐν τῷ εἶναι μένειν· ἡ δὲ ἀλλοίωσις κίνησίς τίς ἐστιν εἰς ἕτερον ἀπὸ τοῦ ἐν ᾧ ἐστὶν εἰς ἀεὶ προιοῦσα· δύο δὲ τῆς τοιαύτης εἴδη κινήσεως· τὸ μὲν πρὸς τὸ ἀγαθὸν ἀεὶ γιγνόμενον, ἐν ᾧ ἡ πρόοδος στάσιν οὐκ ἔχει, διότι πέρας οὐδὲν τοῦ διεξο δευομένου καταλαμβάνεται· τὸ δὲ πρὸς τὸ ἐναντίον, οὗ ἡ ὑπόστασις ἐν τῷ μὴ ὑφεστάναι ἐστίν· ἡ γὰρ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ ἐναντίωσις, καθὼς ἐν τοῖς ἔμπροσθεν εἴρηται, τοιοῦτόν τινα νοῦν κατὰ τὴν ἀντιδιαστολὴν ἔχει, καθάπερ φαμὲν τῷ μὴ ὄντι τὸ ὂν ἀντιδιαιρεῖσθαι καὶ τῇ ἀνυπαρξίᾳ τὴν ὕπαρξιν· ἐπειδὴ τοίνυν κατὰ τὴν τρεπτήν τε καὶ ἀλλοι ώτην ὁρμήν τε καὶ κίνησιν οὐκ ἐνδέχεται τὴν φύσιν ἐφ' ἑαυτῆς μένειν ἀκίνητον, ἀλλ' ἐπί τι πάντως ἡ προαίρεσις ἵεται, τῆς πρὸς τὸ καλὸν ἐπιθυμίας αὐτὴν φυσικῶς ἐφελ κομένης εἰς κίνησιν· καλὸν δὲ τὸ μέν τι ἀληθῶς κατὰ τὴν φύσιν ἐστί, τὸ δὲ οὐ τοιοῦτον, ἀλλ' ἐπηνθισμένον τινὶ καλοῦ φαντασίᾳ· κριτήριον δὲ τούτων ἐστὶν ὁ νοῦς, ἔνδοθεν ἡμῖν ἐνιδρυμένος, ἐν ᾧ κινδυνεύεται ἢ τὸ ἐπιτυχεῖν τοῦ ὄντως καλοῦ, ἢ τὸ παρατραπέντας αὐτοῦ διά τινος τῆς κατὰ τὸ φαινόμενον ἀπάτης ἐπὶ τὸ ἐναντίον ἡμᾶς ἀπορρυῆναι, οἷόν τι παθεῖν ὁ ἔξωθεν μῦθός φησιν ἀπιδοῦσαν ἐν τῷ ὕδατι τὴν κύνα πρὸς τὴν σκιὰν οὗ διὰ στόματος ἔφερε, μεθεῖναι μὲν τὴν ἀληθῆ τροφήν, περι χανοῦσαν δὲ τὸ τῆς τροφῆς εἴδωλον ἐν λιμῷ γενέσθαι· ἐπεὶ οὖν τῆς πρὸς τὸ ὄντως ἀγαθὸν ἐπιθυμίας δια ψευσθεὶς ὁ νοῦς πρὸς τὸ μὴ ὂν παρηνέχθη, δι' ἀπάτης τοῦ τῆς κακίας συμβούλου τε καὶ εὑρετοῦ καλὸν ἀναπει σθεὶς εἶναι τὸ τῷ καλῷ ἐναντίον· οὐ γὰρ ἂν ἐνήργησεν ἡ ἀπάτη, μὴ δελέατος δίκην τῷ τῆς κακίας ἀγκίστρῳ τῆς τοῦ