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But if it is not natural, it is either circumstantial like slave and master, or technical like student and teacher, or preferential like friend and friend, enemy and enemy. But if it is not among things self-wrought but among accidents, it is either natural like the double and the half, or not natural. But relatives must first be brought under another category as being considered in themselves, and then as having a relation to another under the category of relatives; for something must first exist without relation and then a relation be considered in it. 35 Concerning the qualified and quality. Quality is that according to which certain things are called qualified. And again, quality is that according to which the things that partake of it are paronymously named; from wisdom, the one having wisdom is called wise, and hot, the one partaking of heat. But one must know that the qualified is more universal than the quality; for the qualified signifies the quality and that which partakes of it, that is, heat and the hot thing, that which has heat; for those having the quality are qualified, for example, those having heat are called hot. The hot things are qualified, but heat is a quality. And often quality itself is also called qualified, similarly also in the case of the quantified and quantity. And of qualities, some inhere in animate {and rational} bodies, such as knowledge and virtues, diseases and health, and are called states and dispositions, while others inhere in both animate and inanimate things, such as heat, cold, form, shape, capacity and incapacity. And of these, some are in potentiality, and others in actuality; and if in potentiality, they produce capacity and incapacity; but if in actuality, they have either penetrated deeply, like the heat through the whole of fire and the whiteness through the whole of milk and of snow, and it produces an affection and an affective quality, or they are on the surface and they produce shape and form. There are, therefore, four species of quality: state and disposition, capacity and incapacity, affection and affective quality, shape and form. But a state differs from a disposition, because a state is difficult to change and more lasting, such as wisdom; for one does not quickly change from wisdom to foolishness. Similarly also knowledge, when someone knows precisely, the knowledge in him is difficult to change, it is a state; and courage and temperance and justice likewise. But dispositions are things easily moved and quickly changing, such as heat, cold, disease, health and such things; for a man is disposed according to these things, but he quickly changes, from being hot becoming cold, and from sickness healthy. And these very things, such as disease and health and such things, if they are permanent and difficult to change, are states. But disposition is more universal; for both are called dispositions, for a man is somehow disposed according to them, but the disposition that is difficult to change is called a state, while the one that is easy to change is called only a disposition. The second species of quality is capacity and incapacity, which are not in actuality, but they have an aptitude and natural capacity or inaptitude, as we say the child is potentially musical, for even if he does not have music in actuality, yet he has an aptitude for receiving music, but the irrational creature is unmusical as having music neither in actuality nor being able to receive it; and the hard thing has the capacity of not being quickly divided. The third species is affective quality and affection, such as heat, whiteness, cold, blackness and such things. Now, affection is easily cast off, like a disposition, as when someone might grow pale or blush through shame or fear, but the affective quality is hard to move and hard to change. And of the affective qualities, some have not come from an affection, that is, not from elsewhere, but exist according to substance, as heat in fire and sweetness in honey; for neither to fire

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Εἰ δὲ οὐ φυσική, ἢ τυχικὴ ὡς δοῦλος καὶ δεσπότης ἢ τεχνικὴ ὡς μαθητὴς καὶ διδάσκαλος ἢ προαιρετικὴ ὡς φίλος καὶ φίλος, ἐχθρὸς καὶ ἐχθρός. Εἰ δὲ οὐκ ἐν τοῖς αὐθεδράστοις ἀλλ' ἐν τοῖς συμβεβηκόσιν, ἢ φυσικὴ ὡς τὸ διπλάσιον καὶ τὸ ἥμισυ, ἢ οὐ φυσική. Χρὴ δὲ τὰ πρός τι πρότερον ὑπ' ἄλλην κατηγορίαν ἀνάγεσθαι ὡς καθ' ἑαυτὸ θεωρούμενον καὶ τότε ὡς σχέσιν ἔχον πρὸς ἕτερον ὑπὸ τὰ πρός τι· δεῖ γὰρ πρότερον εἶναί τι ἀσχέτως καὶ τότε θεωρεῖσθαι ἐν αὐτῷ σχέσιν. 35 Περὶ ποιοῦ καὶ ποιότητος. Ποιότης ἐστί, καθ' ἣν ποιοί τινες ὀνομάζονται. Καὶ πάλιν ποιότης ἐστί, καθ' ἣν παρωνύμως τὰ μετέχοντα αὐτῆς λέγεται· ἐκ τῆς φρονήσεως φρόνιμος λέγεται ὁ ἔχων τὴν φρόνησιν καὶ θερμὸς ὁ μετέχων θερμότητος. Χρὴ δὲ εἰδέναι, ὅτι τὸ ποιὸν καθολικώτερόν ἐστι τῆς ποιότητος· τὸ γὰρ ποιὸν σημαίνει τὴν ποιότητα καὶ τὸ μετέχον αὐτῆς ἤγουν τὴν θερμότητα καὶ τὸ θερμόν, τὸ ἔχον τὴν θερμότητα· ποιοὶ μὲν γάρ εἰσιν οἱ ἔχοντες τὴν ποιότητα, οἷον οἱ ἔχοντες θερμότητα θερμοὶ λέγονται. Οἱ μὲν θερμοὶ ποιοί εἰσιν, ἡ δὲ θερμότης ποιότης. Λέγεται δὲ πολλάκις καὶ αὐτὴ ἡ ποιότης ποιόν, ὁμοίως καὶ ἐπὶ τοῦ ποσοῦ καὶ τῆς ποσότητος. Τῶν δὲ ποιοτήτων αἱ μὲν τοῖς ἐμψύχοις {καὶ λογικοῖς} ἐνυπάρχουσι σώμασιν ὡς ἐπιστῆμαι καὶ ἀρεταί, νόσοι καὶ ὑγίεια, καὶ λέγονται ἕξεις καὶ διαθέσεις, αἱ δὲ καὶ τοῖς ἐμψύχοις καὶ τοῖς ἀψύχοις ὡς θερμότης, ψύξις, μορφή, σχῆμα, δύναμις καὶ ἀδυναμία. Τούτων δὲ αἱ μέν εἰσι δυνάμει, αἱ δὲ ἐνεργείᾳ· καὶ εἰ μὲν δυνάμει, ποιοῦσι δύναμιν καὶ ἀδυναμίαν· εἰ δὲ ἐνεργείᾳ, ἢ διὰ βάθους κεχωρήκασιν, ὡς ἡ θερμότης δι' ὅλου τοῦ πυρὸς καὶ ἡ λευκότης δι' ὅλου τοῦ γάλακτος καὶ τῆς χιόνος καὶ ποιεῖ πάθος καὶ παθητικὴν ποιότητα, ἢ ἐπιπολῆς καὶ ποιοῦσι σχῆμα καὶ μορφήν. Εἰσὶν οὖν τῆς ποιότητος εἴδη τέσσαρα· ἕξις καὶ διάθεσις, δύναμις καὶ ἀδυναμία, πάθος καὶ παθητικὴ ποιότης, σχῆμα καὶ μορφή. ∆ιαφέρει δὲ ἕξις διαθέσεως, ὅτι ἡ μὲν ἕξις δυσμετάβλητός ἐστι καὶ χρονιωτέρα οἷον ἡ φρόνησις· οὐ γὰρ ταχὺ μεταβάλλεταί τις τῆς φρονήσεως εἰς ἀφροσύνην. Ὁμοίως καὶ ἡ ἐπιστήμη, ὅτε ἀκριβῶς τις ἐπίσταται, δυσμετάβλητός ἐστιν ἐν αὐτῷ ἡ γνῶσις, ἕξις ἐστί, καὶ ἡ ἀνδρεία καὶ ἡ σωφροσύνη καὶ ἡ δικαιοσύνη ὁμοίως. ∆ιαθέσεις δέ εἰσι τὰ εὐκίνητα καὶ ταχέως μεταβάλλοντα οἷον θερμότης, ψύξις, νόσος, ὑγίεια καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα· διάκειται μὲν γὰρ κατὰ ταῦτα ὁ ἄνθρωπος, ταχέως δὲ μεταβάλλεται ἐκ θερμοῦ ψυχρὸς γινόμενος καὶ ἐκ νόσου ὑγιής. Καὶ αὐτὰ δὲ ταῦτα οἷον ἡ νόσος καὶ ἡ ὑγίεια καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα, ἐὰν ὦσι μόνιμα καὶ δυσμετάβλητα, ἕξεις εἰσί. Καθολικωτέρα δέ ἐστιν ἡ διάθεσις· ἀμφότεραι μὲν γὰρ διαθέσεις λέγονται, διάκειται γάρ πως κατὰ ταύτας ὁ ἄνθρωπος, ἀλλ' ἡ μὲν δυσμετάβλητος διάθεσις ἕξις λέγεται, ἡ δὲ εὐμετάβλητος διάθεσις μόνον. ∆εύτερον εἶδος ποιότητος δύναμις καὶ ἀδυναμία, ἅτινα οὔκ εἰσιν ἐνεργείᾳ, ἔχουσι δὲ ἐπιτηδειότητα καὶ δύναμιν φυσικὴν ἢ ἀνεπιτηδειότητα, ὥς φαμεν τὸν μὲν παῖδα δυνάμει μουσικόν, εἰ γὰρ καὶ μὴ ἔχει ἐνεργείᾳ τὴν μουσικήν, ἀλλ' ἔχει ἐπιτηδειότητα πρὸς τὸ δέξασθαι τὴν μουσικήν, τὸ δὲ ἄλογον ἄμουσον ὡς μήτε ἐνεργείᾳ ἔχον τὴν μουσικὴν μήτε δυνάμενον αὐτὴν δέξασθαι· καὶ τὸ σκληρὸν δὲ δύναμιν ἔχει τοῦ μὴ ταχέως διαιρεῖσθαι. Τρίτον εἶδος παθητικὴ ποιότης καὶ πάθος οἷον θερμότης, λευκότης, ψύξις, μελανία καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα. Τὸ μὲν οὖν πάθος εὐαπόβλητόν ἐστιν ὡς ἡ διάθεσις, ὡς ἄν τις ἢ διὰ αἰδὼ ἢ διὰ φόβον ὠχριάσῃ ἢ ἐρυθριάσῃ, ἡ δὲ παθητικὴ ποιότης δυσκίνητος καὶ δυσμετάβλητός ἐστι. Τῶν δὲ παθητικῶν ποιοτήτων τινὲς μὲν ἀπὸ πάθους οὐ γεγένηνται ἤγουν οὐκ ἀλλαχόθεν, ἀλλὰ κατ' οὐσίαν ὑπάρχουσιν ὡς τῷ πυρὶ ἡ θερμότης καὶ τῷ μέλιτι ἡ γλυκύτης· οὔτε γὰρ τῷ πυρὶ