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, most wonderfully showing the foolishness of what is being said from their response; for not rebuking, as some have thought, did he add this, since it is very foreign to the blessed Paul to state the opponents' proposition and add a rebuke before the resolution of the question. But it was necessary for those who thought this to also see that it is the Apostle's custom to use "nay but" for a resolution, saying "nay but" instead of "and yet." And one will find this shortly after; for having proposed to himself: "But I say, have they not heard?" he adds: "Nay but, their sound went out into all the earth," clearly having made the addition for the resolution of what was proposed. So also here, resolving that it is not in their power to do what they wish, he added: "Nay but, O man, who are you who replies against God?" You say, he says, that you are not worthy of blame; for it is not in you to do what you wish. And yet I do not see the foolishness of what is being said from another source, but from your own response; for tell me, O man, whoever you may be who uses these words towards God; what do you wish yourself to be, being able, as you say, to have no discernment of good and evil, nor knowing how to choose the good from the worse, but by necessity doing what seems good to God, and inclining toward it and taking pleasure in it, whether it happens to be good or evil? And how do you not show this by your own words? On the contrary, then, from what you say in reply to God, you seem to know precisely the distinction between good and evil, seeing that you even make arguments about each of these, and you have been eager to refer the cause of what happens to God, releasing yourself from the accusation for what has been done. Or are not these the actions of one who knows the nature of both the good and the worse, and of one who is able to choose each of them from the other clearly? Most opportunely, however, he also refuted the sayings for a greater emphasis on the absurdity of what is said; for having said from the person of the opponents: "For who has resisted His will?" 146 he added: "Who are you who replies against God?" being clearly contrary to what was said; for if he replies, it is clear that he has resisted, so that "not to have resisted" is false. There is then, as it were in brief, some such kind of resolution of the question; You do nothing by your own will, but all things according to what seems good to God, since you say it is possible for no one to resist what seems good to Him. How then do you reply? It is clear that you have also resisted. Therefore you do not do all things persisting in what seems good to Him, but by your own will, choosing as it may seem good to you. Then also from the general principle: "Will what is formed say to him who formed it: 'Why have you made me thus?'" For it is not possible for what has been made by the <creator> to blame the creator for the constitution of its own nature; for each thing rejoices in what is according to its nature, however it may be. How then will it find fault with that which indeed most of all happens to be pleasing to it? And confirming what has been said with an example: "Or has the potter no authority over the clay, from the same lump to make one vessel for honor and another for dishonor?" For let us look, if you please, at the work of potters, how from the same clay with great authority they make each of the vessels for whatever purpose they wish, and nothing stands in their way, wishing to make some for a useful purpose, and others for dishonorable use. Who has ever heard of the vessels made for more dishonorable purposes blaming the potter for the work, and that he did not rather fashion them for the better purpose? For the matter does not have this nature. If then you yourself had been made by God in the same way, so that by some natural constitution, through irrationality and ignorance of what is fitting, you were given over to the worse according to the likeness of the vessels and the potter, neither would any inherent discernment of both the good and the worse be seen in you, nor would you have been eager to bring upon God the cause of what happens, releasing yourself from blame, but you would always continue rejoicing in what is according to nature. But now

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, θαυμασιώτατα ἀπὸ τῆς ἐκείνων ἀποκρίσεως τοῦ λεγουμένου δεικνὺς τὸ εὔηθες· οὐ γὰρ ἐπιτιμῶν, ὥς τινες ᾠήθησαν, τοῦτο ἐπήγαγεν, ἐπείπερ σφόδρα ἀλλότριον τοῦ μακαρίου Παύλου τὸ πρότασιν τῶν ἐναντίων τιθέντα ἐπιτίμησιν ἐπάγειν πρὸ τῆς τοῦ ζητουμένου λύσεως. ἐχρῆν δὲ τοὺς τοῦτο οἰηθέντας καὶ πρὸς ἐκεῖνο ἰδεῖν, ὅτι ἐπὶ λύσεως τὸ μενοῦνγε ἔθος κεχρῆσθαι τῷ ἀποστόλῳ ἀντὶ τοῦ καὶ μὴν τὸ μενοῦνγε λέγοντι. καὶ τοῦτο μετ' οὐ πολύ τις εὑρήσει· προτείνας γὰρ ἑαυτῷ· ἀλλά γε λέγω, μὴ οὐκ ἤκουσαν; ἐπάγει· με νοῦνγε εἰς πᾶσαν τὴν γῆν ἐξῆλθεν ὁ φθόγγος αὐτῶν, σαφῶς ἐπὶ λύσει τοῦ προτεθέντος τὴν ἐπαγωγὴν ποιησάμενος. οὕτω κἀνταῦθα λύων τὸ μὴ ἐν αὐτοῖς εἶναι ποιεῖν ἅπερ ἂν βούλωνται, ἐπήγαγεν· μενοῦνγε, ὦ ἄνθρωπε, σὺ τίς εἶ ὁ ἀνταπο κρινάμενος τῷ θεῷ; λέγεις, φησίν, ὡς οὐκ ἄξιος εἶ μέμψεως· οὐδὲ γὰρ ἐν σοὶ τὸ ποιεῖν ἃ βούλει. καὶ μὴν οὐχ ἑτέρωθεν τοῦ λεγομένου συνορῶ τὴν εὐήθειαν, ἀλλ' ἀπὸ τῆς σῆς ἀποκρίσεως· εἰπὲ γάρ μοι, ὦ ἄνθρωπε, ὅστις ποτ' ἂν εἴης ὁ τούτοις πρὸς θεὸν κεχρημένος τοῖς ῥήμασιν· τίνα εἶναι βούλει σαυτὸν καλοῦ τε καὶ κακοῦ διάγνωσιν, ὡς φῄς, οὐδεμίαν ἔχειν δυνάμενον, οὐδὲ ἐκλέγειν τὸ καλὸν ἀπὸ τοῦ χείρονος εἰδότα, ἀνάγκῃ δὲ ποιοῦντα τὸ δοκοῦν τῷ θεῷ καὶ πρὸς τοῦτο ῥέποντα καὶ τούτῳ ἡδόμενον, εἴτε καλὸν εἶναι εἴτε κακὸν αὐτὸ συμβαίνοι; καὶ πῶς οὐ τοῦτο ἐπὶ τῶν σαυτοῦ δεικνύεις ῥημάτων; τοὐναντίον μὲν οὖν ἔοικας ἀφ' ὧν ἀντιφθέγγῃ τῷ θεῷ ἀκριβῶς εἰδέναι τοῦ καλοῦ καὶ τοῦ χείρονος τὴν διάκρισιν, ὅπουγε καὶ λόγους περὶ ἑκατέρου τούτων ποιῇ, καὶ τὴν αἰτίαν τῶν γιγνομένων ἐπὶ θεὸν ἀνα φέρειν ἐσπούδακας, σαυτὸν ἀπολύων τῆς ἐπὶ τοῖς πεπραγμένοις αἰτιάσεως. ἢ οὐχὶ ταῦτα καὶ εἰδότος ἐστὶ τοῦ τε καλοῦ καὶ τοῦ χείρονος τὴν φύσιν, καὶ ἐκλέγειν ἑκάτερον αὐτῶν ἀπὸ τοῦ ἑτέρου δυνα μένου σαφῶς; καιριώτατα μέντοι καὶ τὰς ῥήσεις ἀντέκρουσεν εἰς μείζονα ἔμφασιν τοῦ λεγομένου τῆς ἀτοπίας· εἰρηκὼς γὰρ ἐκ τοῦ τῶν ἐναντίων προσώπου· τῷ γὰρ βουλήματι αὐτοῦ τίς ἀνθέστηκεν; 146 ἐπήγαγεν· σὺ τίς εἶ ὁ ἀνταποκρινάμενος τῷ θεῷ; σαφῶς ἐναντίον ὂν τῷ εἰρημένῳ· εἰ γὰρ ἀνταποκρίνεται, δῆλον ὅτι ἀνθέστηκεν, ὥστε τὸ μὴ ἀνθεστάναι ψεῦδος. ἔστι τοίνυν τοιουτότροπός τις ὡς ἐν συντόμῳ τοῦ ζητουμένου ἡ λύσις· οὐδὲν πράττεις οἰκείᾳ τῇ γνώμῃ, ἅπαντα δὲ κατὰ τὸ δοκοῦν τῷ θεῷ, ἐπειδὴ ἀνθεστάναι τοῖς αὐτῷ δοκοῦσιν οὐδενὶ φῂς εἶναι δυνατόν. πῶς οὖν ἀνταποκρίνῃ; δῆλον ὅτι καὶ ἀνθέστηκας. οὐκ ἄρα τοῖς αὐτῷ δοκοῦσιν ἐπιμένων ἅπαντα πράττεις, ἀλλ' οἰκείᾳ τῇ γνώμῃ, ὡς ἂν αὐτό σοι φαίνηται καλῶς ἔχειν αἱρούμενος. εἶτα καὶ ἀπὸ τοῦ καθόλου· μὴ ἐρεῖ τὸ πλάσμα τῷ πλάσαντι· τί με ἐποιήσας οὕτως; οὐδὲ γὰρ οἷόν τε τὸ γεγονὸς ὑπὸ τοῦ <δημιουργοῦ> τὸν δημιουργὸν αἰτιᾶσθαι ἐπὶ τῇ κατασκευῇ τῆς οἰκείας φύσεως· χαίρει γὰρ τῷ κατὰ φύσιν ἕκαστον, ὅπως ἂν ἔχῃ. πῶς οὖν αἰτιάσεται ἐπὶ τούτῳ ὃ δὴ μάλιστα πάντων αὐτῷ καθ' ἡδονὴν εἶναι συμβέβηκεν; καὶ παραδείγματι τὸ εἰρημένον πιστούμενος· ἢ οὐκ ἔχει ἐξουσίαν ὁ κεραμεὺς τοῦ πηλοῦ ἐκ τοῦ αὐτοῦ φυράματος ποιῆσαι ὃ μὲν εἰς τιμὴν σκεῦος ὃ δὲ εἰς ἀτιμίαν; ἀπίδωμεν γάρ, εἰ δοκεῖ, πρὸς τὴν τῶν κεραμέων ἐργασίαν, ὅπως ἐκ τοῦ αὐτοῦ πηλοῦ μετὰ πολλῆς τῆς ἐξουσίας ἕκαστον τῶν σκευῶν πρὸς ὅτι ἂν βούλωνται ποιοῦσιν, καὶ οὐδὲν αὐτοῖς ἵσταται ἐμποδών, τὰ μὲν ἐπί τι χρήσιμον βουλομένοις ποιεῖν, τὰ δὲ ἐπὶ τὴν τῶν ἀτίμων χρῆσιν. τίς ἀκήκοέν ποτε τῶν ἐπὶ τὰ ἀτιμότερα γεγονότων σκευῶν αἰτιασαμένων τῆς ἐργασίας τὸν κεραμέα, καὶ ὅτι μὴ μᾶλλον ἐπὶ τὸ κρεῖττον αὐτὰ κατεσκεύασεν; οὐ γὰρ ἔχει φύσιν τὸ πρᾶγμα. εἰ δὴ κατὰ τὸν αὐτὸν ἦσθα τρόπον, καὶ αὐτὸς ὑπὸ τοῦ θεοῦ γεγονώς, ὥστε ἀλογίᾳ τε καὶ ἀγνωσίᾳ τοῦ προσήκοντος φυσικῇ τινι τῇ κατασκευῇ πρὸς τὸ χεῖρον ἐκδεδόσθαι κατὰ τὴν τῶν σκευῶν καὶ τοῦ κεραμέως ὁμοιότητα, οὔτ' ἂν διάκρισις ἐνοῦσά τις ὀφθῇ σοι τοῦ τε καλοῦ καὶ τοῦ χείρονος, οὔτ' ἂν ἐσπούδασας ἐνεγκεῖν ἐπὶ τὸν θεὸν τοῦ γιγνομένου τὴν αἰτίαν σαυτὸν ἀπολύων τῆς μέμψεως, χαίρων δὲ διατέλεις τῷ κατὰ φύσιν πάντως. νυνὶ δὲ